http://www.nepalnews.com

Please refresh your browser for the latest news update.

Search Nepalnews.com
 

DAILY

Forex
Gorkhapatra
Kantipur 
Kathmandu Post
Mahanagar
Nepali Times

Samacharpatra
The Rising Nepal
Weather
Zodiac

WEEKLY

Bimarsha 
Deshantar
Dristi
Telegraph
Independent
Kosheli
Saptahik
Satyagraha
Spotlight
Sunday Despatch
Sunday Post

IRREGULAR SERVICE

Sanibarya
WeeklyChronicle

FORTHNIGHTLY

Cyber Post
Hits FM 

MONTHLY

Apsara
Business Age
Casino Times
Kamana
  
Madhuparka
Muna
Nepal Traveller
Nepal Travel Trade Reporter

Sarbottam
Sadhana

Yuwamanch

SNAPSHOTS
OTHERS

BBC Nepali (audio)
Budget ' 2000 (Audio)
Budget ' 99
Chatroom
Election 99
Font Problems?
SAF 1999
Search Engine
Feedback
Advertise With Us
About Us
Hom
e

Pacification and Prachanda

By Kailali  

So Maoist supremo Puspa Kamal Dahal ( alias Comrade Prachanda ) now wants peace! It is more likely that he is again floating trial balloons, to test the current atmosphere of discord and split in the ruling Nepali Congress Party, and dissolution of parliament, and to see if these muddy waters will present good fishing for the Maoists. It is also reminiscent of philosopher and psychologist Sigmund Freud and his principle of pleasure and pain, and process of pacification. He had noted  how a baby derived pleasure when a toy was put in its hands; but it would soon throw away the toy and begin to cry at the deprivation that it had caused itself; only to derive pleasure again, and be pacified, when the toy was put back into its hands; which it would throw away again! On and on went this process of pleasure and pain, and pacification. It is possible that the pacification of Prachanda and his Maoists are following this rhythm. Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba  gave them negotiations in August 2001; which negotiations and associated status and prestige they threw away with contempt in November 2001, and followed with attacks on Royal Nepal Army and police forces. Then came the pain of being declared terrorists, and receiving calculated blows from invigorated security forces operating under emergency powers, and increasing regional and international isolation emanating from their pariah status of branded terrorists. So they hint again of negotiations. Times change! The rosy days of August 2001 may not return for the Maoists. 

 

The withdrawal from negotiations in November 2001, and first assault on the Royal Nepal Army in Dang almost immediately thereafter, were stunning acts of miscalculation by the Maoists. One can only assume that this was the product of discord and division in their own ranks. The cadres in the underground may also have felt that they were not fighting and dying in the jungles so that their leaders operating from safe havens in India may enjoy the comforts of power in Kathmandu. Given what for them were the heady days of the spring and summer of 2001, when things seemed to be going their way, the Maoists perhaps made the classic error of overestimating their strength, and underestimating their opposition. How else can one explain their cavalier attitude to the then still accommodation oriented Government of Prime Minister Deuba; the sudden and unprovoked assault on what was till then a largely quiescent Royal Nepal Army; and their egregious insults to the character and integrity of the newly crowned King Gyanendra? It is possible that Maoists did not receive the appropriate cool and calm and restraining advice from their band of sympathizers, apologists, and interlocutors, amongst the urban ‘intellectuals’. It was a missed opportunity!

In the Nepali context, the European Union ( EU ) countries, and others like Japan and Australia, were the proverbial powder puffs ( they still are? ) on whose ambivalence the Maoists thrived. In their ideological fixity with western liberalism, and neo-liberal arrogance of their economically superior donor status, these countries see Nepal as being poor and marginal enough for them to experiment here with the sort of milksop liberalism that voters are rejecting with disdain in their own countries, and that they would not dare impose upon countries that are more economically  and strategically important to them, like Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Arab States, Egypt or China. 

But September 11 has changed quite a few equations. The Bush doctrine on the indivisibility of terrorism, the primacy of the need to find and finish it, and the internationalization of efforts to control and contain it ( you are either with us or with them, was the uncompromising position of US President George Bush ), has silenced but not muted the EU and associated others. The US  position has become much more realistic and tougher, since after September 11, and the change to a more experienced and Nepal-tested leadership at the US Mission in Kathmandu. The security forces are beginning to receive the moral and material support they deserve. The need for better governance is not seen as any justification for Maoist insurgency and atrocities, and it does not take away from the imperative to “find them, fight them, and finish them”, as US President Bush reportedly advised Prime Minister Deuba during his visit to Washington. The Maoists are seen as terrorists, and Nepal has become a part of the international coalition against terror. The Maoists are seen as the Nepali version of Pol Potists, with similar tendencies of political primitivism and physical brutality, and the same potential for auto genocide and auto destruction. The Chinese are furious with the Maoists of Nepal; they see them as having sullied the  name of Mao Tse Tung, and having insulted by irrelevance a glorious chapter of modern Chinese history and experience.

 

India is changing too. In the perspective of its policy of divide and rule ( inherited from the rulers of the British Raj in India ) towards the Himalayan Kingdoms, and other neighbors, Maoism was the destabilizing tool that would keep Nepal weak, and therefore amenable to Indian intervention. But the Indians are also beginning to at least partially shake off their colonial perspective, and the politics of convenience, on this issue. They are beginning to see the indivisibility of terrorism in the nexus between the Naxalites of Bengal/Bihar, and Peoples War Group of Andhra Pradesh; and they appear even to be suspecting a growing linkage with Islamic militants in Kashmir, and Bin Ladenite terrorists globally. India is also beginning to be embarrassed by the ambivalence of insisting that the West be more forthright and forthcoming about fighting Islamic militancy cum terrorism in India, while remaining ambivalent about fighting Maoist insurgency and terrorism in Nepal. The Indians are beginning to find that they cannot have their ‘laddoo’ ( sweetballs ) and eat it too; just as earlier, in regard to their sympathy with Tamil insurgency in Sri Lanka, they found at they could not have their ‘dosha’ ( vegetable pancake ) and eat it too! It is beginning to slowly, very slowly, turn the screws on the India based infrastructure and cadres of the Nepali Maoists, while also giving limited military assistance to Nepal ( this also helps to keep its fingers in the military pie in Nepal, while delaying and obstructing decisive military assistance from the United States and possibly China). But will India dare to hand over Prachanda and Bhattarai?

The attitude of many ‘intellectuals’ in Nepal has been a weaker mirror image of  Indian politics of ambivalence towards the Maoists. Their initial reaction was to see the Maoists as latter day saints of the Marxist variety, who would free the nation from corruption and exploitation, and bad governance generally. Thus Maoist supremo Puspa Kamal Dahal was romanticized, almost deified, as “Comrade Prachanda”. Many ‘intellectuals’, feeling marginalized in the new set up of parliamentary democracy and constitutional monarchy, became apologists and  interlocutors for the Maoists, and sometimes fronts, in the strategic fields of human rights and law, politics and the press. Others set up front organizations among students and women. As the song goes: “when your hearts on fire, you will realize, smoke gets in your eyes”. The smoke is now clearing away!

There is no romanticism in the thousands of underage boys and girls dragged from their homes by the Maoists and forced to participate in armed conflict situations. There is no romanticism in the apparent allocation of girls at the rate one to every four male Maoists, and the apparent litter of condoms in the jungle hideouts. This is truly primitive communism. There is no romanticism in the sacred temples desecrated with the slaughter and consumption of cows, and villagers who are forbidden to cremate their dead or observe funeral rites. There is no romanticism in the case of the headmaster who was dragged from his classroom and tied to a tree, then speared alive by sharp metal rods, before being finished with bullets. There is no romanticism in the stories of security personnel captured in battle, then tied up and hacked to pieces with a thousand cuts. Or of political cadres dragged from their homes and slaughtered, or maimed with broken limbs. The above cases are not exceptions, but rather a reflection of widespread practice among the Maoists.

The Maoists have long ago, and comprehensively, crossed over from insurgency into terrorism, whether that definition comes more generally from the Oxford English Dictionary, or whether terrorism is defined from such international instruments and resolutions as the Conventions against the Taking of Hostages (1979), Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (1997), Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999), and General Assembly Resolution 55/158 on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism (2000). Under these and other instruments the following and widespread  activities of the Maoists constitute clear acts of terrorism: the financial extortion of individuals and institutions by the Maoists and their student and other fronts; the kidnaping, murder, maiming, beating and extrajudicial punishment, of civilians, teachers, local government officials, and cadres of political parties; the acts of arson and bombing by the Maoists and their student front, in Kathmandu and other areas, resulting in death and injury, as well as destruction of bridges, telephone towers, public buildings, schools and school buses and transport vehicles; the kidnaping, abduction and illegal detention, of civilians, teachers, local government officials, political party cadres and others; the kidnaping, murder, and assault, actual and attempted, by Maoists of officials of the government, political parties, and the judiciary ( the most notorious being the attempt on the life of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court during a tour in western Nepal ). It is therefore hardly surprising that after September 11, and with the imposition of the Emergency by parliament in November 2001, the Government finally declared the Maoists as a terrorist organization, and declared their leaders as wanted terrorists with a price on their heads.  

These declared terrorists are now hinting of peace. How is Government to handle these feelers,      which could well turn out to be ‘shishnus’ or stinging nettles? With some very big doses of salt! Even diehard proponents of peace with the Maoists will wonder how genuine is this latest feeler from Puspa Kamal Dahal (alias Prachanda). It takes a great deal of coherence and courage to go for peace. But how coherent are the Maoists, and can Dahal alias Prachanda carry them along in the peace process? It is quite doubtful! It is possible that the Maoists are not as solid  in unity as some may believe; and that whereas they may retain a sort of vaguely dialectical or ideological unity in the jungles of insurgency, this solidarity will wither away in the cold air of civility and constitutionalism. Dahal alias Prachanda may find that he is riding on a tiger from whose back he dare not dismount for fear of being mauled, and that it will be much easier for him and his circle of ideologues to surrender personally to the Indian authorities, from the safety of their havens in India, than to disarm and disengage from insurgency and terrorism in Nepal. Maoism in Nepal is no longer the alternative ship of state that its proponents and apologists tried to make it out to be. It is now like a leaking boat from which leaders and cadres will want to jump off individually and in groups. To facilitate this process of abandonment, the Government and Royal Nepal Army and security forces, must be strong and getting stronger. People do not surrender to a power that they consider to be weaker than themselves. The harder they are hit, the more the logic of peace will dawn upon the Maoists. Thus those who help to strengthen the Royal Nepal Army and ancillary security services will be assisting the peace process by increasing the incentive of the Maoists to give up their terrorism. In the strength of Government and the Army lies the true hope of peace! 

Prime Minister Deuba will not want to be burned again, and has this time insisted that Maoist supremo Puspa Kamal Dahal alias Prachanda present himself personally for talks, as a clear sign of sincerity and good intent. Home Minister Khum Bahadur Khadga has said that the Maoists must first surrender their weapons as a sign of good intent, and they must be willing to take part in elections ( or at least to not hinder the elections or to intimidate voters ). The Maoists must be told that they are in no position to hold out pre-conditions for talks, and that such talks must be within the constitutional framework of parliamentary democracy,  constitutional monarchy, and the rule of law. The government must tell the Maoists bluntly that they are officially  declared terrorists, and there can be no question of entertaining their demand for an interim government. They cannot graduate overnight from being declared terrorists to being partners in government! This would be a mockery of the constitution and parliamentary democracy, and of the rule of law. It would also still further reduce the battered credibility of Nepal in the international arena. There can be no question of Maoist cadres being absorbed in the armed forces. It would be shortsighted. That would be the equivalent of planting  powerful time bombs for future discord and detonation.

The talks with the Maoists will then have to be about how they will be brought in from the cold of criminality and terrorism, and how they will be rehabilitated into the political mainstream. It will require the disarmament and demobilization of the Maoists, and their disengagement from the security forces, and from interference in local government. There is also the need to think of the numerous victims of the Maoists. They must not be overlooked simply because they are poor and primarily from the rural areas. There must be compensation for the victims and their families (recovery of the billions looted or extorted by the Maoists would help  to finance this; the failure to do so would reward the Maoist leaders who control this loot ). There will be the related need to identify and to punish the perpetrators amongst the Maoists of egregious acts of murder and maiming, kidnaping and rape, loot and arson, and to ensure that these offenders do not relapse into criminality in a post Maoist scenario of peace and order. The children whom the Maoists have forced into armed conflict situations, and perhaps into sexual service in the jungle, will also need appropriate counseling and rehabilitation. Recovery of the Maoist loot would help here too.

Only post-1990 Nepal could have produced such an exotic and excessive growth as the Maoists! But time and developments, national, regional, and international, are not on their side. It will be an ironic twist of the dialectical process if the Maoists find themselves in the state of withering away in Nepal. They may well turn out to be like a rampaging virus for which there is no cure, and whose eventual passing through the body politic requires firm and patient management. It is a further irony that it may now be simpler for Government to fight and to finish off the Maoists, than to bring them in from the cold of criminality and terrorism. There will me more considerable challenge in the pacification of Prachanda and his Maoists, than the management of the Freudian principle of pleasure and pain. There is always the possibility of that proverbial Freudian slip!

 


2002 © Mercantile Communications Pvt. Ltd. P.O. Box 876, Durbar Marg, Kathmandu, NEPAL. Tel : 977 1 220 773, 243 566. Fax: 977 1 225 407. Reproduction in any form is prohibited without prior permission. No part of the articles which appear in the internet version on nepalnews.com may be reproduced without the permission of Mercantile Communications Pvt. Ltd. For reprinting rights, please write to us. Send us your feedbacknpfeed@mos.com.np |Back to the top | Main