July 28, 2006

By SHRISHTI RL RANA

Nuclearisation governs modern geopolitics. Essentially nuclearisation has two faces :one of war, one of peace. While, more often than not, going nuclear is a direct consequence of militaristic compulsion, it seems that the end result of countries becoming nuclear powers actually leads to active competition between them rather than the continuance of conflict. This, perhaps, appears to be almost a dialectical paradigm wherein antithetical conflict and cooperation synthesize into competition. The Sino- Indian nuclearism needs to be gauged against this backdrop especially as far as the immediate and long-term needs and interests of Nepal go.

The nuclearisation of China and later of India can be traced back to an aberrant period in Sino-Indian history when the two giants had become hostile towards each other to the extent of a serious war in 1962.Historically, for geographical and geopolitical reasons, these erstwhile Asian empires had never gone to war before. There were cordial intellectual and economic transactions between these nations for centuries. Interestingly, when China and India tested their nuclear weapons for the first time in 1964 and 1974 respectively, it did not have any drastic impact on international affairs. The acquisition of nuclear fire-power was perceived merely as an offshoot of their existing status, wealth, and development. Not surprisingly, such nuclear empowerment was brushed aside by the superpowers as a peripheral development rather than a part of new international order. Another reason why China and India's nuclear tests did not raise eyebrows was partly because of Waltz's theory of 'More May Be Better' which enshrines the view that the gradual spread of nuclear weapons is better than either no spread or rapid spread. Yet, the impact of their nuclearisation was bound to be felt sooner or later. The end of the Cold War in the nineties triggered the beginning of 'the Second Nuclear Age' in which the third world countries, mainly of the Asian region, were seen nuclearising themselves. Consequently, a new dynamics of change has emerged. This entails every nation, of this region, including Nepal, to evaluate afresh its policies in relation to these two Asian giants.

Despite the ominous scenario which 'the Second Nuclear Age' may seem to present, the ground reality, paradoxically, is different. Much of this change from conflict to competition, and even cooperation, can be explained by the basic contention that geopolitics at times is governed by the Hegelian model. Probably, such change has been made possible by the 'Nuclear deterrence’ inherent in the nuclearisation in the present international order. Thus, a beginning of an era of friendly competition between these nuclear-giants --- China and India--- is no anomaly. China and India have not only improved their bilateral relations but increased their economic and trade relations. In April, last year, they signed an agreement to boost their trade to $ 20 billion by 2008.This upswing in Sino-Indian relations has ushered in a new beginning in the region. So, such contemporary regional developments offer Nepal exciting prospects.

Moreover, a word about the internal situation of Nepal would not be out of place here. Nepal is heading towards rapid transformations internally through the process of a constituent assembly. Whatever the implications of such transformations, it would be incumbent upon the would be rulers to simultaneously reassess and re-execute an innovative foreign policy. The leaders need to build up a consensus about the re-structuring of policies relating to the massive advantages likely for Nepal.

The peace process and the constituent assembly , in particular, should capitalise on the recent changes within the region and design the policies that are for the long-term interests of Nepal.

These recent regional changes in South Asia are shifts in geopolitical reality. The first such shift lies in the near impossibility of foreign aggression against Nepal. The historically strategic importance of Nepalese territory has shrunk as China and India are not likely to go to war. Even if they do, it will not be a conventional land-based war wherein the Nepalese territory would assume much importance. Non-alignment would help Nepal remain a peaceful buffer state. In fact, Nepal could even disband its army ---demilitarising like Costa Rica, and eventually joining the Maldives, Mauritius or Palau which have no armies. The financial gain accruing thereby could be allocated to pressing economic development.

The second change lies in the economic opportunities and challenges which have presented themselves to Nepal. Newer avenues have been opened for Nepal to move beyond its obsolete hydro-electricity centered economy and attract huge foreign investments to produce goods for the Chinese and Indian markets. With the abundance of fresh river water supplies, Nepal can tempt India for both industrial and agricultural water supplies, and drinking water for its huge population. Nepal can also be a place for relocation of low-scale production processes from China and India. Since territorial expansion has become logically unnecessary for nuclearised countries, Nepal can now even gamble with the idea of linking its economy to India like the Mexican economy is to the US economy .Thereby the Nepalese economy can be saved from a serious crisis such as the one which happened in Argentina.

The third aspect promises Nepal more bargaining power both in regional and in international relations because these nuclearist neighbours poised to become superpowers wish to keep Nepal under their respective spheres of influence . Further, the change in the position of Nepal has been significant because of this Sino-Indian competitiveness. Nepal can now freely choose between China or India, or even use both of them for its advantage through a tactful foreign policy.

Summing up, from the global perspective, nuclearisation in South Asia has its ramification on the US also. With the end of the Cold War, there has been an increase of the US strategic interests in Asia. Further, the US wants to balance power between China and India to safeguard its own pre-eminence .For the US, Nepal may prove to be important strategically to contain both China and India as the other US bases in Asia are mainly located in Islamic nations with hostile fundamentalist groups. Hence, Nepal can now look beyond even China and India. Geopolitics is no longer a regional but global feature. The fear of political interference of these countries remains but the economic gains are much higher for economically backward Nepal. This, then, is the challenge of the future for Nepal.