Liberal Democracy, Insurgency and Terrorism in South Asia : Lessons from India 's Tripura state

By MADHUKAR S.J.B.RANA

The strategically-located Northeast Indian state of Tripura (population 3.2 million; with a territory that is 10, 453 sq. km. or 4,036 sq.miles) shares a 856 km border with Bangladesh . It is near completely (85%) surrounded by Bangladesh on all fronts; except the west being linked to Assam and Mirzoram. Myanmar is not very far from its borders.

Its history is ancient. It is said to be mentioned in the Mahabharata and Puranas. It rose to the pinnacle of its glory as a kingdom in the 16 th century. A symbol of its past glory is the Hindu temple at Radhakishorepur. By the 18 th century it became part of the Mughal empire; and by the19th that of the British empire . Under both empires, it maintained its own administration.

The Regent Maharani acceded to the Indian Union in 1949 --- two years after the departure of the British and the partitioning of Bengal into West Bengal an East Pakistan . Thus ended the Manikya dynasty founded in 1464. The Regent Maharani probably could not continue as an independent nation owing to the sad fact that, by the time of the partition of India , Tripura had been completely overwhelmed by Bengali immigrants. If in 1901, 51.8% of the population was local by 1951 it was down to 36.9, which is probably less than 28% presently.

Such was the demographic transformation that a proud Hindu kingdom was reduced to, thanks to electoral democracy and its fundamental principle of one- man-one-vote, a secular state losing its Tripuri national identity in the bargain with the indigenous inhabitants demeaned to the status of tribals. This is the root cause of the insurgency: deep resentment amongst the indigenous people for the loss of national identity---language, religion and customs. At one time in history the Tripura kingdom extended into Comilla and parts of Chitgaon, Dhaka and Nokhali with Bengalese as subjects. This profound experience of Tripura (as well as the others, to a lesser extent, in the Northeast of India; but more dramatically the events leading to the unconstitutional absorption in 1974 of Sikkim as the 28 th state) is probably the dominant factor explaining the nightmarish psyche of the Bhutanese king and people against its Nepalese ethnic majority. It is also a key factor for the retarded progress in sub-regionalism in the form of the South Asian Growth Quadrangle (SAGQ) approved by the SAARC council of ministers in 1997. Currently, 13 border security battalions are deployed. This number is considered to be inadequate by the state's political establishment.

It became a 'Union territory' in 1956 whereby direct administrative authority was maintained by the Indian central government. Thereafter, it became a full state in 1972 with its own administration. Insurgency took hold from 1947 itself and by today has taken pride of place, perhaps, as the most violent of the insurgencies amongst those festering in the seven Northeast Indian states. This is because insurgency deteriorated into terrorism from 1997. It is estimated that in between 1981-2001, 3000 lives have been lost, in between 1997-2001 around 1600 lost their lives; amongst whom were 1300 civilian casualties. Indeed, Indians classify Tripura as the most crime-ridden Indian state. It is near totally controlled by insurgents as can be seen from the fact that to travel one needs armed convoys and it takes 25 hours to travel 165 kms from Guwahati in Assam to the Tripura capital, Agartala. It has taken only about 1000-1500 armed militia belonging to the National Liberation Front (NLFT) and All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF) to create such havoc in the backwoods of federal India . Since 2001 communalism has entered insurgency politics with the NLFT driven by the mission to convert the indigenous people into becoming Christians together with its fight to end the 'neo-colonialism' by Bengalis.

Kidnapping, extortion and looting are a common place by the Tripura insurgents despite the CPI (M) and Congress being in power since 1972. It is publicly notified just how much levy each person or business is to pay the two insurgent groups. It is argued by Indian analysts that insurgency is 'good business' since after the loot they can re-join the mainstream by voluntary surrender of their arms and ammunition and live as the nouveau riche elite. Both the parties are said to be using the insurgents to garner electoral victory. While a deep nexus exists between ruling politicians and the two insurgent factions, all the blame for insurgency is laid on the doorstep of Bangladesh as being the promoter, protector and financier of insurgents domiciled in its territory.

The lesson from Tripura is precisely this: (1) Tolerance for holding of arms by non-state actors will embolden insurgency that prospers on extortion, smuggling and drug trafficking. (2) A powerful counter ideology must be enunciated by the democratic forces to combat those of the insurgents that give hope and vision to the youth with ample employment and educational opportunities opened for the minorities. (3) Insurgents could descend into becoming war lords when enticed by foreign powers' intelligence agencies; when they come into contact with the international mafia that deal with drugs, engage in smuggling of people, drugs and other goods protected from international competition, and engaged too in money laundering—they become a part of the international mafia economy, so to speak. (4) Last, but not least, that cross-border bilateral and regional intelligence and security cooperation are vital to contain insurgency and terrorism. Otherwise, the propensity to pursue hurt-thy-neighbor policies and counter-policies are a commonplace temptation in the kind of low intensity wars being fought between the state and non-state actors.

(Rana is a former Finance Minister)