Wednesday, April 12, 2006

Dev Raj Dahal, Nepal

Many Nepalese believe that the Treaty is not practiced in the mutual interests of both the countries. Nepal wanted to occupy equal status with other states and sought to promote the nation's freedom of maneuver. In 1955 it opened diplomatic relations with China, participated in the Bandung conference of Afro-Asian countries and became a member of the UN. In 1956, it established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. A year later, it established diplomatic relations with Switzerland, Japan and Germany and began to receive cooperation from them. Prime Minister B. P. Koirala tried to enhance the freedom of maneuver of the nation by recognizing the right to self-determination of Israel, a posture quite different from the neighbors and rejected to share the Indian perception of "China is a threat to Nepal." In 1961 Nepal joined Bretton Woods Institutions.

Asserting its sovereignty Nepal in 1968 called for the withdrawal of Indian Military Liaison Mission in Kathmandu and its intelligence posts in Nepal-China border. Similarly, on September 6, 1973 King Birendra rejected the buffer status of Nepal saying, "Nepal is not a part of the subcontinent; it is really that part of Asia which touches both China and India." He also proclaimed that Nepal be declared a "zone of peace" to refuse to render the nation as a part of the Indian security system on the Himalayan front-line and secure independent identity of the nation. India's influence is so pervasive in all spheres of Nepali life that the "Nepali people, by way of reaction, feel impelled to appear different from Indian at every possible opportunity". It is also because Indian leaders continue to demand ideological conformity with the Nepalese leaders and common position on security issues. In contrast, the Chinese are satisfied with the state-­to-state relations and often downplay ideological rhetoric.

Self-image of Nepal as a small state has imposed it the need for a coalition with friendly countries in order to balance the influence of neighbors who continue to view each other as strategic counterweights and even follow competitive policies. Nepal joined non-aligned movement since its first conference in Belgrade in 1961 and is actively participating in its movement. As a member of G-72 it campaigned for a new international economic order demanding the concessional benefits for the least developed and developing countries. In 1985, the UN decided to establish Regional Center for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific with its headquarters in Kathmandu. The Nepalese army participated in several UN peace making, peace keeping and peace building activities since 1950s, such as India-Pakistan Observation Mission, Kashmir, Syria, Lebanon, Cyprus, East Timor and Sierra Leone, Cambodia, Liberia, Congo, Afghanistan, Croatia. etc. and projected its independent self-image and identity.

Nepal was twice elected as non-permanent member of the Security Council of the UN. It is a founding member of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and its secretariat is located in Kathmandu. As a small country, Nepal expects to gain from sub-regional, regional and international cooperation. Despite its outward-­oriented trade policy, Nepal's total trade ratio is only fifty percent of GDP and foreign private investment and technology transfer have improved only marginally. It joined the Bay of Bengal initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation, World Trade Organization Sub-Regional Economic Cooperation (SASEC) designed to foster economic cooperation, regional integration and peace. Acculturation of Nepalese citizens into democracy, human rights and social justice is exposing them into a world culture and inspiring a sense of cosmopolitan outlook. Geopolitically, after King Gyanendra's takeover on the vortex of strategic competition of great powers for influence evoking China's increased security concern in Nepal.

DIFFUSED NATIONALISM, STATE FRAGILITY AND THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRACY

After the restoration of multiparty polity in Nepal in 1990 the Nepalese did not feel marginal in terms of the universalistic spirit of nationalism, modernity, democracy and human rights. The restoration of democracy helped them to regain their right to legislate and self-rule as well as achieve historical personality. The Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal 1990 for the first time recognized popular sovereignty. Democratic institutions and laws were created and three national and two local elections were held to institutionalize democratic processes. The equality of citizenship heralded the era of participatory democracy. But, the Constitution failed to become consensual national document among political parties of various hues. Left parties lent it either "critical" support or dubbed it a "bourgeoisie document." As a result, rival visions and dissimilar socialization produced a political culture that was not sufficiently a democratic one to control the behavior of special interest groups of society and give the citizens fair chance to equality of opportunity and the highest possible value both to themselves and to the nation. As distribution of power in the polity remained imbalanced due to executive dominance over legislature, judiciary and watchdog agencies, there remained a contested relationship between political representation and popular sovereignty. Although the constitution has de-legitimized caste in equality, the operation of market economy continues to reinforce and institutionalize the caste and class hierarchy and patriarchy. The Nepalese citizens are thus enjoying uneven sovereignty caste and class hierarchy and patriarchy. The Nepalese citizens are thus enjoying uneven sovereignty of the nation by age, sex, caste, class, religion and region putting the weaker sections of society under rock bottom. Family structure, childhood, socialization and cultural patterns provide reasons for the growth of authoritarian political culture at the societal, political party and government levels and constrained the operation of the rule of law.

Intellectuals from minorities argue that in Nepal after the success of the movement for the restoration of democracy in Nepal in 1990 leaders of the United Left Front and Nepali Congress Party (NC) had imposed unitary Hindu state, Westminster style of parliamentary system and winner-takes-all political game. To them, the Hindu identity of Nepal enshrined in the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal 1990 does not capture the wholeness of "Nepaliness" because it carries religious meaning, not political. It also poses a problem as to how shared political unity across non-Hindu subsidiary identities be established when hegemony of one identity is maintained over the other. The state, polity, election system, public policies and foreign policy remained contested sites. Managing the fault-lines of Polity, subduing chaos and creating legitimate public order remain the first task of the state. It requires political unity rooted into the nation-state and make the state bulwark against injustice and inequality. Others, however, believe that Hindu identity is essential for its distinct position in the world and satisfy large constituencies of Hindus within the country and adjoining region-the Gangetic belt of India.

The power of civic nationalism presupposes a moral understanding embodied in civil institu­tions. Nepal still lacks the pluralistic forms of civil society to guarantee the rights of citizens and check the misuse of power by the state and market institutions. Hegemony of right-based civil society continues to foster the interests of organized group of society at the cost of those powerless, and disorganized. Transnational corporations, the global market and media power continue to challenge the Nepali nationalism. Can civil society help to protect it? Nepali public is still debating as to whether they are citizens or subjects (raiti). The growth of civil societies and social movements in Nepal has yet to transcend the power of kinship culture (affno manchhe) to evolve larger impersonal associations for political action essential for democratic citizenship. Traditional conflict between customary power and civic equality and opportunity rooted in constitutional culture continues to affect the sense of identity of people and the concept of civic nationhood.

The emerging identity of being an ethnic, woman, worker or Hindu is not confined to the boundaries of the nation and the concept of equal citizen. These primordial considerations of diverse sub-societies, their rival vision, policies and collective action have come to contest the political and social conservatism. The politicized discourse and social movements of women, Dalits, human rights, civil society, trade unions, etc transcend the domain of state-centric politics and establish a disjuncture between national political and social spaces. Coherence of various positional stands is, therefore, important for national constellation. Nepali culture is neither exclusively Hindu, nor Buddhist, nor animistic, Islamic and Lamaistic. Many native and foreign elements have been absorbed and synthesized into Nepali culture.

The implementation of Washington Consensus-articulated neo-liberal economy further limited the state's utility for society and its ability for national action. The neo-liberal economy was incompatible with the constitutional vision of social justice as it promoted economic freedom without justice and accountability. The state­-society disharmony produced by this economy additionally diffused the concept of nationalism as each political party and social group in Nepal defines nationalism in its own way. The State class, civil society and market institutions are operating independent of each other. Non-participation of people's representatives in macroeconomic policies has stymied the very base of representative system. Divided like interest groups, political parties too did not come for a national vision. There remained a dialectical relationship between the emergence of semi loyal opposition and incapacity of government to manage political competition within the framework of the constitution. People's right to self-governance against the special interest groups remained tantalizing despite constitutional provision of rooting power into the sovereignty of people.

Over-division of governmental power among the special interest groups of society twisted the will and ability of the public to influence crucial policy decisions. The call for decentralized laws, power and authority by the local federations of people's representatives and their social movements clearly indicate that incumbent leadership was paternalistic and authoritarian. Multiparty leadership thus failed completely to pursue political project of strengthening constitutionalism and redemption of citizenship, given the subversive implications of political revivalism and left radicalism. The leadership did not show any way to citizens of how to defend themselves as individuals, as a society and as a part of the world citizens. As democratic leaders lacked the moral consciousness of their political power, the will of the powerful surpassed the boundaries of constitutional politics. On a number of national issues, such as Tanakpur hydropower project, work-permit for non-Nepalese, citizenship act, labor act, right to information, de-bureaucratization, privatization, etc the Supreme Court had challenged the constitutionality of governments' action.

CONCLUSION

Nationalism ties diverse groups, liquidates their parochial loyalties and inspires to their wills into sovereignty. Building national culture to conform the state boundaries requires pluralist accommodation. In Nepal, however, the total collapse of law into politics made every decisions of the government controversial and ignited disloyal anti-parliamentary, anti-constitutional and revolutionary agitations. Leaders were less amenable to frame the consent of citizens in clarifying and securing their common interests. Nepalese leaders thus clung to "imperfectly national" in perspective and identified themselves more with the political parties than with the national state, public institutions and the lives of ordinary citizens. Illiberal elites in power restricted the citizens from the benefits of the state as they fostered a culture of party-mindedness, clientalism, personalism and a culture of impunity. There was clear disjuncture between the popular sovereignty and the constitutional constraints of majority rule as well as the historical institutions associated with constitutional democracy. Too much preoccupation of the political leaders on governmental power deprived the people of the economic and political conditions of modernity executed by the modern state.

Majority of political leaders are struggling for power than democratic passion for nation-hood, peace and justice. The revolt of the youth, women, Dalits and indigenous people in each political parry symbolizes the endemic generational and distributional conflict. In post-democratic Nepal, the declining effectiveness of the major socializing agents, such as family, schools, community, media, civil society and political parties-thus posed difficulty in integrating youth and poor into a national culture. Utilization of communication can bridge the gap between political elites and the ordinary citizens. Education can add the moral and emotional attachment of young people to the state, prepare citizens for national responsibility and enthuse in them constitutional patriotism. Civic nationalism requires not cultural homogenization but "constitutional patriotism" because it constructs modern citizens with equal rights and responsibilities and strengthens civic bond with the state. It also deconstructs their primordial, pre-political, non-political and anti­-political instincts and loyalties by broadening cosmopolitan make up. A state captured by organized interest groups cannot stand above, remain autonomous of the privileged groups of society and become accountable to the citizens.

"Failed development" in the sense of just distribution of resources has put a question mark on the hegemonic discourse sponsored by party-minded democracy and the state-sponsored nationalism. New membership of citizens with a myriad of political parties, economic institutions and civil society organizations contested their loyalty to the state. One serious weakness of Nepalese civil society and market institutions is that they represent sectional interest of society, not the general interest that the state alone is capable of representing. Nepal has yet to accommodate the claims to ethnic, class, caste, religious and gender distinctiveness and make political power socially representative and legitimate. The historically existing discrimination and exploitation based on these lines have to be overcome through culturally sensitive and democratically formulated strategies. This is the way to overcome the fragility of the state and the unity among Nepali political community.

Due to failed development; Nepal's ability to aspire for universalism and cosmopolitanism has also been confined to only a few highly educated and mobile rich political classes despite the state's participation in several international regimes. Only the urban upper class can afford to travel to the global village and reap its benefits. For the poor, violent insurgency by the Maoists and counter­insurgency operations by the state and urban protest movements are driving them as never before from one country to another in the quest for security and better life. Elected bodies are dissolved and humanitarian crisis is emerging. Unless civic nationalism binds all the citizens together, tribal fears will drive them apart. The mix of nationalism with authoritarianism and conflict is increasingly tearing the possibility of Nepalese to live together and resolve the problem of collective action.

Multiparty dispensation could not incubate free societies for the ultimate triumph of human virtues. Due to authoritarian political culture of leadership and the very nature of society caught in class and caste hierarchy and patriarchy, no vibrant independent sector has emerged outside the "political" and "economic" society capable of mediating the power and resource for the benefit of majority of people. Modern civil societies of Nepal are addressing the concerns of organized parts of the society. They are right-based, anti­state, dependent on outside funding and philosophy and urban-centric in nature. Human rights, trade unions, NGOs, Lawyers Association, etc typically represent this trend. Modern civil society has opened itself to the global capital and trying to weaken the resiliency of the political culture of volunteerism and charity the traditional civil society of Nepal carefully fostered. As a result, new solidarity of citizens has yet to evolve for nationally legitimate collective action.

The Nepalese are caught now in a condition characterized by anxious awareness of the future as having political consequences of citizenship. Freedom of choice has declined in proportionate to the deterioration of governance, national security, stability and peace in the country. How can national society be created in which the state tries to link the metropolitan with the periphery and establishes justice across all the stratification and identities is a major policy challenge. So far, the state in Nepal was responsible to organize society and create public order. Concluded.

Text courtesy: Readings on Governance and development edited by Mukti Rizal. To be continued- ed.