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Wednesday, December 27, 2006
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Sunshine’ in Germany vs. ‘Sunshine’ on the Korean Peninsula
Park Sung-jo
Professor, Free University of Berlin , Germany
Visiting Professor, University of Ulsan , Korea
In Germany , “sunshine” once meant to be a symbol of the abrogation of nuclear reactors and their replacement with natural energy. On the contrary, “sunshine” on the Korean peninsula has brought about a “nuclear bomb.” Over the ironic outcome, arguments are afoot lately in South Korea about who should be made the “scapegoat” for the North Korean nuclear crisis. Instead of blaming the United States for its hard-line policy that allegedly led North Korea to play a nuclear card, the arguers should learn from Immanuel Kant’s teaching on “enlightenment.” The great German philosopher defined those who are unable to use their own intellect and reason without the direction of another as falling into a state of immaturity.
In March 2000, then South Korean President Kim Dae-jung announced his “Berlin Proclamation” at the Free University of Berlin, where I was teaching. He spelled out an engagement policy toward North Korea , which was later dubbed the “sunshine policy.” For Koreans who were envious of Germany ’s reunification, the announcement seemed to signal that “sunshine” was on the rise over the horizon. However, we Koreans failed to thoroughly study the “Ostpolitik” (Eastern Politics) of former West German Chancellor Willy Brandt, a pioneer of the sunshine policy, who was active in the early 1970s to improve relations with East Germany , the Soviet Union and other East European countries.
Preceding Brandt’s Ostpolitik was West Germany ’s West-oriented policy, which had been initiated by the country’s first chancellor, Konrad Adenauer. Through the traditional “West engagement policy,” Bonn had managed to restore relations with France , joined NATO, played a leading role in the creation of the European Union, reconciled with Israel and thus won the trust of the United States and Western Europe .
Had there been no cooperation – in both hard and soft aspects – from Western countries, particularly the United States , Brandt’s Ostpolitik would have been an impossible project from its inception. In addition, the purpose of Brandt’s Ostpolitik was not to attain a “phased (federal) unification” but to gradually dissipate acute tension in Europe through dialogue and cooperation between East and West Germany , located at the center of Europe . West Germany ’s Eastern policy was most realistic; it was conceptualized and put into force with the support and within an institutional frame of Western countries that shared the absolute common values of liberal democracy and market economy.
On the other hand, South Korea ’s “sunshine policy” was initiated in an emotional frame based on nationalism or “ethnocentrism,” rather than trustful interrelations with friendly Western countries. South Koreans at large were more or less infatuated with sheer naivety in expectation that “blood” (ethnicity) would naturally overcome problems derived from ideological differences. They believed that should North and South Korea succeed in formulating a common economic community through stepped-up economic cooperation and taking further steps to create a federal government entity, national reunification could be eventually achieved. However, promoters of the sunshine policy failed to specify the form of a future unified government or economic system.
From its inception, the sunshine policy was based on ambiguous and fortuitous ethnic notions by which nationalism and patriotism were arbitrarily defined. According to a criterion set by “exclusive nationalistic (ethnic) concepts,” supporters of the sunshine policy were named as nationalists or patriots, who turned out to behave as selected “progressive leftists” serving the cause of “national (ethnic) morality.” A recent tendency in South Korea to place particular emphasis on “self-reliance” or independence is a phenomenon that stems from a gross misconception of the territorial sovereignty prevalent in the 19 th century, as well as the exclusive nationalistic concept, virtually following the pattern of North Korea ’s nationalist pursuit.
Paradoxically speaking, the sunshine policy defies engagement domestically and thus is exclusive within the realm of South Korea . Exclusionists formulated the policy and its implementation process was neither open to the public nor transparent, thus being liable to degrade to a political tool of a certain power elite. Pyongyang has been well aware of such a mechanism in the South and turned to manipulate it. The sunshine policy, meant to engage the North, forgot to embrace all South Koreans, a fallacy that practically led the Southerners to become the cat’s-paws of Pyongyang .
In this respect, one can find a big difference between the sunshine policy and Ostpolitik of Germany. The premise of Brandt’s Ostpolitik was to embrace West Germans in the first place. Had there been no policy of internal engagement at the time of German unification, how can Germans spend 4 percent of their entire national income as unification expenses until the year 2019? Former German chancellor Helmut Kohl wrote in his memoir published late last year that the most important factor in achieving German reunification was the support rendered by Western countries, especially the United States , and the next one was the endorsement given by West Germans.
South Korea ’s sunshine policy, focused only on engagement with North Korea , has proved to be a failure because it did not begin with engagement of South Koreans and friendly foreign countries.
Text courtesy: [The Chosun Ilbo, Oct. 16, 2006 ] Korea Focus-ed.
