Wednesday, February 22, 2006

- Dr. Suresh Chalise, Senior Sociologist, Nepal

The concept of political elite has most frequently been invoked in explaining the problems and prospects of social change. In the Third World social system such a tendency is more apparent because the social order is usually a function of the political leadership or the elite dynamics. The political elites by virtue of their outstanding position in society inspire developmental programmes. However, the degree of effectiveness of the political elites in launching the programmes and policies of development may vary from one polity to another. The recruitment process of the elites depends on the nature and structure of the political system. Under a democratic set­up, elites are being recruited through the electoral processes on the basis of the adult franchise while under an autocratic polity, such a popular process is being discouraged, if not out rightly prohibited. Whatever the nature of the political structure of a society, the crux of sociopolitical and economic development lays at the hands of the political actors at the top.

The Kingdom of Nepal has undergone many political changes since its unification as a modern nation in 1769 AD. The Shah (Kshatriya) kings of Nepal ruled the country through a centralized system of governance from 1769 to 1846. Then the Ranas took over the reigns of power reducing the King's status to a figurehead and established their oligarchy that continued till 1950. Rana oligarchy was opposed by the new educated elites of those days who were inspired by the political movements taking place all over the world, especially in India , against the British rule. In 1951 the Rana rule came to an end giving way to a new democratic order. The clouds of political confusion, however, did not end until 1959 when the then king proclaimed a democratic constitution and elections were held in accordance with the spirit of the new constitution. An elected government was formed by the Nepali Congress, which bagged two­-thirds of majority in the Lower House of the Parliament-Pratinidhi Sabha. Unfortunately, a headlong confrontation developed between the elected government of the Nepali Congress and the monarch that ultimately led to the Royal Takeover in December 1960 and the consequent dissolution of the elected parliament, and its government. With draconian measures the Prime Minister and his cabinet colleagues were imprisoned, and a state of emergency was set in. The King ruled the country through peremptory command in the name of party less Panchayat system for thirty long years. In the year 1990, following a people's pro-democracy movement launched by the outlawed political parties in 1960, the Panchayat System was ultimately dismantled.

On November 9, 1990 for the first time in the over 221 years political history of modern Nepal , a people's constitution was ultimately promulgated. Political parties were legalized thus marking a dramatic shift in the Nepalese politics from an autocracy to a modern democracy. Now the Kingdom of Nepal , according to the constitution of 1990, has two-tiered legislature: the House of Representatives-Pratinidhi Sabha and the National Council-Rastriya Sabha. The members of the former chamber are elected through direct elections based on adult franchise while the latter are elected indirectly. After the second general elections in 1991 (the first was in 1959), the Nepali Congress Party again formed the government and the Communist Party of Nepal (UML) catapulted itself into the role of the main opposition in the bicameral legislature. These two parties sacrificed hundreds of lives of their activists in their relentless struggle for the establishment of multiparty democracy in the Kingdom.

In the evolving democratic power structure, the representatives elected to the legislature play a crucial role in the process of goal attainment in society. These elected elites' values, judgment, skill, alignment with interest groups, etc impinge directly and indirectly upon the entire social life of the nation, because they are the key actors and standard setters. In this context, Nepal where democracy is recently ushered in and has begun to function, an academic interest in researching the sociopolitical processes about the recruitment patterns of the legislative elites is, sui generis. Because, the elites who are in the legislature not only represent their social characteristics at the national level but also reflect the socioeconomic and political characteristics of their respective interest groups and political parties. Therefore, in this study attempts are made in identifying the key characteristics of the social background and political socialization patterns of the legislative elites of Nepal .

Elite as a Functional Group

The term 'elite' is of French origin derived from the Latin word 'eligere' that etymologically implies "to elect" or "to choose". The word has been subject to diverse use, from the earliest days in the military terminology in the sense of a choice of persons ("homes d' elite" and " compagnie d' elite"), to Froissart's 15th century term "Meilleurs des Meilleurs" (the best of the best), and its application in the 17th century to recite the characteristics of the commodities of excellent quality that later came to refer to the prestigious and superior social groups, such as crack military units of the higher ranks and nobility.

The term 'elite' itself had not been in vogue in socio-political writings until the Italian sociologist Vilfredo Pareto wrote a book Trattato di Sociologia Generate in which he discussed the term with academic excellence. The same book was translated into English as The Mind and Society, which helped bring about a shift of the term "elite" from "choice" and "election" to "eminence" Pareto, for whom 'elite' and 'class' are synonymous, writes: Let us assume that in every branch of human activity, each individual is given an index that stands as a sign of his capacity, very much the way grades are given in various subjects in examinations in school.., And so on for all the branches of human activity ... So let us make a class of the people who have highest indices in their branch of activity and to that class give the name of elite.

Pareto, in fact, was of the firm view that individuals living in society are not equal: intellectually and morally. Therefore, he preferred to call 'elite' to those who are the most competent and effective social groups under a socio-economic and political system. In his writing "elite" as a notion is devoid of any intent implying respect (honorific) connotations. That is why he argued that people who possess superiority in intelligence, character, skill, power, etc are regarded as the elites. According to him all successful professors, businessmen, politicians, artists and so on, are elites.

There is an almost consensus among social scientists that the term 'elite' is not categorically applied to only one or two people but always to a plurality: a collectivity of some kind inside a society. Cole has defined elite as groups that emerge to positions of leadership and influence at every social level: that is to say, as leaders of classes of other important elements in the social structure. The idea of high status and superiority is always linked with the term. Elite members do often feel having a high status and in some way superior as a group. However, as Lasswell thinks, the it elites" are the very individuals who contribute as a model and standard setters to the social values. He further says, "the elite group possesses power, respect, wealth and skill in combination or singly". Gaetano Mosca defined the elite in terms of a social class believing that behind the facades of state government, the power is always limited to the governing few. According to him: In all societies... two classes of people appear - a class that rules and a class that is ruled. The first class, always the least numerous, performs all political functions, monopolises power and enjoys the advantages that the power brings, whereas the second, the more numerous class is directed and controlled by the first in a manner that is how more of less legal , how more of less arbitrary and violent, and supplies the first in appearance at least with material means of subsistence and with the instrumentalities that are essential to the vitality of the political organism.

A cohesive and irresponsible small group is more readily organised for its vested interests against, than a large one, says Mosca. He says further, "the power of any minority is irresistible as against each single individual - the majority-who stands alone before the totality of the organised minority. He believed that elite has advantages simply because it is unified and less numerous. Besides, Mosca's interesting observation, in respect to class character is that the "Political Class" tends to become hereditary, if not in law .This is a landmark contribution in the study of sociological theory.

According to Mosca, because of the lust to establish itself in power, this class of people tries to remain dominant for an indefinite period, hence, encouraging oligarchy. However, with some exceptions, such a phenomenon has been in vogue all over the world. Even in democratic societies, successful candidates make efforts to express hereditary characteristics. Mosca observes that in the French and Italian parliaments there were seen the sons, grandsons, nephews, and sons-in- law, etc of ex-members.

For C. Wright Mills, the elite comprises those whose decisions and policies carry major consequences in society. They are in command of the influential institutions and hierarchies. He gives importance to the institutional approach. According to him, power in modern society is institutionalised and elite is a natural product of the "institutional landscape" of the societal setting. His monumental work The Power Elite is largely based on the analysis of the personal characteristics, morals, and backgrounds of the individuals (mainly political leaders, head of the corporation, and military chiefs) at the apex of the American society. Mills used the term "power elite" in relation to the governing class as he believed that the 'ruling class ' is a badly loaded phrase. As per Bottomore, Mills opined that 'class' is an economic term and 'rule' is a political one. The phrase 'ruling class,' therefore, suggests that an economic class rules politically.

However, the Marxian doctrine of "governing" or 'ruling class' has a different theoretical approach regarding 'power elite'. According to it, all societies bear people of two different socio-economic and cultural classes: bourgeoisie or capitalist and proletariat or workers. The former, who holds monopoly over the means of production and distribution, also controls the political machinery that becomes a means by which it perpetuates its dominance and exploitation of the common working class ranks. The people of ruling classes, comprising a small number of individuals, use the state's political machinery to assert their common interest. He believed political power is the power of one class used in oppressing another, l2 which ultimately leads the society to a radical polarisation of classes breaking directly into antagonistic camps: bourgeoisie and proletariat. 13

The central theme of the elitist theory is that a minority population that is superior in thought and action takes decision affecting the socio-economic and cultural life of the majority of the population in society. The general views of the elitists that power, pelf, and social status concentrate in a closely integrated socio-economic group, however, is criticised by the pluralists. According to them, in a pluralistic social system, there is not only one integrated elite class but various elite groups with different characteristics. As per Dahl, there are the political notables, the economic notables, and social notables with hardly any overlap between different groups. The modern democratic polity in which power is largely distributed in the different organs of the government also refutes the elitist theory. Aaronovitch's observation that the pressure group allegedly compels the governing elites to share their power with the former also invalidates the elitist approach.

Whatever arguments and counter-arguments are there in defence of, or against the elitist and pluralistic school of thoughts, the truth may lie closer to the latter. As per P. Scott also, an elite is the most influential and prestigious stratum in a society. It is composed of persons who are recognised as outstanding, are considered leaders in a given field, and exercise tremendous influence in shaping the values and attitudes held by their segment of society. Here the contention that elites exercise an important influence is associated with the power and authority in connection with the four functional problems to be resolved by the four types of strategic elites: : Goal attainment, Adaptation, Integration, and Pattern-maintenance. All these elites are equally wealthy, prestigious, and powerful. However, in a transitional society as Nepal is, the elites of goal attainment have, relatively, much more power than others because of the hierarchical socio-political structure of the society and the greater political significance of their activities. Politics is a key area of activity that has a considerable impact on other areas such as: economics, military, diplomacy, and science, religious institutions, philosophy, education, art, sports, and other recreational institutions of a society.

Legend Behind STUPA

- Amber Tamang , Nepal

Whoever visiting Buddhist sites invariably witnesses a pyramid like structure erected on the base of a giant life-size dome;some with decoration and some in a simple form. The Buddhists use the term Stupa to describe such structure. The Sanskrit term for it is `Chaitya' and the Tibetans call them `Chorten'.

Though Stupa varies in size with some as high as four-storied building, their shapes are more or less same. Nepal , being the birthplace of lord Buddha and bearing a series of unbroken Buddhist Traditions in its pristine form than any other country, possesses a number of significant Buddhist heritages. Among them, the stupa serves as the most recognizable emblem of the Buddhist faith.

Every nook and corner of the historic sections of Katmandu valley, which also includes Patan, Bhaktapur, Kirtipur and many other smaller ancient towns, is filled with interestingly decorated miniature stupas alongside Hindu shrines and temples.

The Legendary Stupa of Swoyambhunath and the equally historic Bouddha Stupa in the Katmandu valley are regarded as being some of the holiest pilgrimage sites for Buddhists all over the world and especially for the devotees of the Mahayana and Vajrayana Buddhist Sect .

The tradition of constructing stupas prevailed in Vedic times too, though it is now a strict Buddhist preserve. Shortly before Buddha's Mahaparinirvana (great departure) Ananda, his personal attendant had asked him in grief what he thought would be the best way to honor his physical remains. Buddha replied that as traditionally done by the saintly persons and Kings, they should build a stupa to preserve the remains of his body.

Therefore it was felt that a stupa had to be built to preserve his holy relics. But no sooner had

they cremated his body in Kushinagar (presently near Gorakhpur in UP of India ), a row ensued. The representatives of different countries at the funeral procession of Buddha also staked a claim on receiving some portions of his relics so that their people in their respective countries could pay homage to him.

Then the relics were divided into 8 equal portions and were subsequently taken to these countries to be preserved under stupas.

Among 8 different original stupas located at various parts of Asia , seven were unearthed by Buddhist Emperor Ashoka's (circia 250bc) missionaries, sent to collect the relics which later were further divided into 84,000 portions in order to build stupas in areas covered by his empire. The site of one remaining stupa missed by the missionaries still exists in Southern Nepal at a place called Ramagrama, near Lumbini, the birthplace of Lord Buddha.

Fresh U.S Perspective:
Nepal ’s Political Crisis: A Look Back, A Look Forward

- U.S. Ambassador James F. Moriarty

I would like to dedicate these remarks today to four Nepali citizens – Bijaya Lal Das, Tribeni Majhi, Jitendra Shrestha, and Umesh Thapa. All recently perished. To my knowledge, I never ever met any of them. I’ll return to them at the end of these remarks.

I address you exactly one week after the February 8 municipal polls, and one year and two weeks since King Gyanendra took over the reins of government on February 1, 2005 . I want to talk to you today about this momentous period, and offer some thoughts on what the future might – or could – hold for Nepal .

At the outset, I wish to take note of the ruling by the Supreme Court this week to abolish the Royal Commission for Corruption Control, which also enabled the release of former prime minister Sher Bahadur Deuba. This decision was a positive step, and it was encouraging to see this issue settled through the rule of law.

As the polls just occurred, let me also note my country’s official view on their relevancy. Just as we had feared, the municipal elections unfortunately proved a hollow exercise. Elections are the fundamental building block of democracy, and we would have liked to have seen municipal elections that served this function. Yet the continuing polarization between the monarchy and the major political parties prevented this. The major parties boycotted the polls, relatively few candidates ran, and few citizens voted. In sum, the elections represented yet another missed opportunity to effectively begin tackling Nepal ’s political problems.

The Maoists, however, were not content to urge a boycott of the polls they deemed illegitimate. Instead, they unleashed violence to thwart the vote. The insurgents threatened candidates and their families and even assassinated two office seekers. Absolutely nothing justifies such measures, and all supporters of a just and peaceful Nepal should condemn them.

As for the year of authoritarian rule by the palace, it has clearly been unsuccessful. The results of the past year are the opposite of what the monarchy envisioned in seizing power in early 2005. As my government said to mark the first anniversary of the royal takeover, “Twelve months of palace rule have only made the situation more precarious, emboldened the Maoist insurgents, and widened the division between the country’s political parties and the King.” This is a harsh – but accurate – summation of palace rule. Yet the monarchy persists in its hard-line policy, its face set against the parties. In frustration, they have turned to the Maoists to seek political leverage against the palace.

The King and the parties, in fact, seem locked in a circle of mistrust, going round and round – but never advancing – as they launch continuous charges at each other of ill-will, animosity, and condemnation. Meanwhile, Nepal ’s desperate need for peace, security, and democracy only deepens. Moreover, both sides seem to view the insurgents as a kind of bargaining chip in their ongoing struggle of wills. “How can we usethe Maoists to advance our immediate political position?” they seem to independently ask themselves. These leaders should rather answer a far more difficult but essential question: “How can we work together to return democracy to Nepal , and defeat the Maoist threat to our country and its people?”

Without real progress between the two legitimate political forces, the Maoists will only continue to gain advantage – in the countryside, among people of goodwill tired of the King-parties standoff, and among others who desperately believe, or want to believe, that the insurgents will shed their ideological stripes and join the political mainstream. Alas, wishing that something were so does not make it that way, as we all learn in life. But the political parties, who entered the 12-point understanding with the insurgents in November, seem to want to do exactly that – to wish away or otherwise ignore the uncomfortable fact that their Maoist partners are committed to violence to achieve political ends. In this regard, here are some questions that I have asked myself in recent weeks, with the uncomfortable answers I have reached:

Not if you read the understanding itself. And certainly not if you read the recent statements of a senior Maoist, Baburam Bhattarai. The very first point in the understanding underscores that the signatories – parties and Maoists – will “establish absolute democracy … with all forces focusing their attack against the autocratic monarchy.” For the Maoists, this simply means they will continue employing murder, extortion, and intimidation as tactics of choice. The Maoist leader provided chilling insight in this regard in several articles in different Nepali publications in recent weeks. For instance, if autocracy is to be defeated, he argued in a Samaya article, “armed and unarmed struggle must go hand-in hand.”

Another question: Are the Maoists committed to joining the political mainstream?

Actually, a close reading of the understanding reveals that the insurgents seek to bring the parties further into their sphere, and to the Maoists’ advantage. Again, Bhattarai made Maoist thinking clear in several other articles. “Since our working policy [with the parties] is now the same, we have forged this partnership,” he said of the 12-point agreement. “But tomorrow if the nature of the political intercontradiction changes, the nature of our relations could change as well.” The translation here is icy: The Maoists pledge their partnership with the parties, until … they don’t need them any longer.

Still one more question: If the parties and Maoists were ever able to topple the monarchy, what then?

The answer here is particularly worrisome: The Maoists would be armed; the parties would be unarmed. Presumably, to have reached this point, the Maoists would have co-opted or neutralized most parts or all of the Royal Nepalese Army, thereby removing the parties’ one logical source of defense. Maybe this is the moment Bhattarai has in mind when he speaks about the “political intercontradiction” changing. In any case, this stark scenario leaves the parties, and the people, defenseless against ideological “partners” long used to settling arguments with a gun.

These questions are provocative, which is their aim. After all, if ever the phrase “politics makes strange bedfellows” was appropriate, it is in Nepal in 2006. When the Maoists took up arms in 1996, they were attacking a struggling Parliamentary system; they killed hundreds of party activists and chased the parties out of the countryside. More recently, however, lack of leadership and unwillingness to compromise, primarily but not totally from the side of the monarchy, has resulted in a curious polarization. Two legitimate constitutional actors – who should be on the same side – are divided, with one of them aligned with a separate violent force that has long sought a totalitarian state.

At first glance, as mentioned previously, there seems much about the 12-point understanding that is hopeful. But the United States views the uneasy partnership between the parties and the Maoists as wrongheaded. Worse, as the questions posed earlier underscore, we believe cooperation along current lines between the Maoists and the parties is fraught with danger – for the political parties themselves, and for the future of the Nepalese people. Political terror by the Maoists, practiced with particular ferocity in the run-up to the municipal elections, sets a fearsome precedent and could impair the democratic credentials of their political party partners.

An interview with in the Kantipur newspapers caused some to swoon over the Maoist leaders’ apparent democratic leanings. Yet the Maoists themselves underscored the danger of cooperating on their terms, if anyone cares to pay attention. In the same interview, the Maoist known as Prachanda urged widening of the armed struggle that has bloodied Nepal for 10 years. He said, and I quote: “We say, let’s make a common army for constituent assembly and a democratic government of the parties and the Maoists. Let’s form a parallel government of the parties and Maoists.” A parallel government with a parallel army? This is a recommendation that the political parties join the Maoists in an underground, violent struggle against the state -- a formula to expand the bloodshed and misery in Nepal for the advantage of the Maoists, not to seek a peaceful, negotiated settlement of the conflict. I know what the response by Mahatma Gandhi, or indeed, K.P. Bhattarai would have been to such a suggestion.

Of course, to Maoist thinking, bloodshed is the byproduct of politics. Consider Prachanda’s speculation in a BBC interview this week that, in five years’ time, the King will “either be executed by the people’s court or maybe exiled.” Or, as Baburam Bhattarai noted in another interview last week, “every revolution in history demands its quota of sacrifice if it has to succeed.” Presumably, he is thinking of the final sacrifice other Nepalese men, women, and children have made or will be forced to make for his revolution.

Now it’s true that when the King took power last year, many were hopeful that the goals he cited for his action would be achieved. They were not. The international community recognizes this, as do many patriotic Nepalese citizens. Perhaps the government does as well, but balks at reconciliation with its legitimate partners because of fear that it may look weak or that it otherwise may no longer “control” Nepal ’s destiny. On the first concern, no honest supporter of reconciliation and progress would fault the King for reaching out to the parties and returning the country to democracy. On the contrary, such decisive leadership would be roundly welcomed. On controlling Nepal ’s destiny, I repeat, this is exactly the issue. Without engaging the legitimate civilian political forces, the palace is continuing to lose control of its ability to shape the country’s future. And the Maoists only gain confidence and influence as this polarization eases their divide-and-conquer strategy.

As I have done repeatedly, and as the commander of the U.S. Pacific Command did in Nepal here two weeks ago, the United States continues to call for reconciliation between the King and parties. We did so again last week after the failure of the municipal elections. Major international partners have urged a similar course. I make the same common sense plea here today.

There is no other practical, workable solution to your constitutional crisis and to effectively face the most immediate, as well as the most serious long-term, threat to your peace and prosperity – the insurgency. To establish a foundation of trust, the United States believes it is up to the King to initiate this dialogue, assuring the major political parties and the Nepalese people that the monarchy is serious about returning democracy and peace to Nepal . And, once such an opening occurs – sooner rather than later, I hope – we urge the political parties to respond and enter talks in good faith.

Hard compromise, tough give and take, will be required if the monarchy and the parties are to hammer out a return to democracy and devise an effective response to the growing Maoist threat. This kind of negotiating, moreover, will not lend itself to daily headline seeking and one-upmanship by press release. At some point, for the sake of Nepal , senior party and palace leaders must gather together in a room and begin hashing out the hard details of the way forward. No one else can do it for them.

And there certainly is no way for the parties or the King to successfully ride the Maoist tiger for their own advantage. One could easily fall off … and tigers get hungry.

I'll be blunt: there is no easy way out of Nepal 's current crisis. History and common sense, as well as their leaders' own statements, suggest that the Maoists will feel no need to abandon their goal of absolute power as long as they believe they are winning. And as long as the King and the Parties remain divided, and as long as there is no coherent strategy in place to roll back the massive gains the Maoists have made over the past decade, the Maoists will rightfully conclude that they are winning. The simple, but unpalatable, truth is that, there will be no real reason for the Maoists to compromise until they begin to see in the areas they now terrorize:

Until that day, I fear, the understandable hopes that the Maoists will simply tire of their struggle or decide that a genuine multi-party system is preferable to their own unchallenged rule will prove mistaken.

And only a unified civilian and democratic government will be able to begin the process of convincing the Maoists that they will not be able to impose their will on the people of Nepal . The United States , for one, would look eagerly for ways to assist a new Nepal government that respects and supports democracy, human rights, and freedom. This also could include renewing assistance for the Royal Nepalese Army. I am confident that other nations, friends of Nepal , would do the same.

I hope the immediate future I have outlined sounds appealing, if difficult. Such a future calls for statesmanship and vision from all of Nepal 's legitimate political actors. First, to protect their reputation as supporters of peace and democracy in Nepal , the parties could consider issuing a strong public statement unequivocally warning their Maoist partners about the unacceptability of violence. Second, the palace needs to devise some effective gesture to make absolutely clear its willingness to enter formal and concrete talks with the major political parties to restore democratic government in Nepal and address the Maoist threat.

Finally, I return to the cynical Maoist mantra, “every revolution demands its quota of sacrifice.” And here I point to three of the people to whom I dedicated these remarks.

Maoists murdered all three in recent days. I mean no disrespect here. I cite these victims merely to remind us all of the unacceptable human cost of Nepal ’s ongoing tragedy. Three fellow humans were murdered because someone else with a gun thought their deaths would advance a particular political viewpoint.

There was also a fourth victim -- Umesh Thapa, a party activist shot by security forces after a rally protesting the municipal elections. His death served as a tragic reminder of the deep and growing divisions between the government and the legitimate political parties. My fervent hope is that, instead of using his death for short-term advantage, the government and the parties will view his sacrifice as a catalyst for reconciliation and compromise.

For Nepal is now facing a choice between three possible futures: If the King and the Parties reconcile, they can find a path back to genuine democracy and an effective means to counter the insurgency. If the King and his government opt for greater repression, their attempts will ultimately fail and Nepal will suffer greater misery and bloodshed. And if the armed Maoists and unarmed parties successfully implement Prachanda's and Baburam Bhattarai's vision of a violent revolution, the Maoists will ultimately seize power, and Nepal will suffer a disaster that will make its current problems pale in comparison.

Nepalis themselves will choose which future they want. The outside world is eager to help, but can do nothing if the wrong path is chosen. I love your country and I believe that the Nepali people are among the finest and hardest-working that I have met anyplace in the world. For that reason, I hope and pray that everyone in this room and everyone who hears my words in whatever form does everything possible to ensure that the leaders of your country choose the path of reconciliation, democracy, and genuine peace in the coming weeks and months.

Speech made by the author at a program jointly organized by Ganesh Man Singh Academy and American Center in Kathmandu on February 15, 2006-ed.