Thursday, January 25, 2007

By Ruediger Frank, Professor at University of Vienna

The Changing Global Security Order

Despite the complicated and dangerous constellation of power and interests on and around the Korean Peninsula, it cannot be overlooked that after the armistice agreement that ended the hot phase of the Korean War in 1953, peace could by and large be maintained in Northeast Asia. A major source of this stability was the in­creasing significance of the region within the bipolar world or­der that emerged after 1945 and which had not been altered significantly until the very sudden collapse of the socialist bloc. The result was a situation that inspired Francis Fukuyama to make his much debated remark on the end of history and the victory of liberal democracy. From a neo-realist perspective, however, there was little reason to celebrate. In an anarchic world of zero-sum power games between players with conflicting interests, the collapse of one side of the power equation may have removed part of the threat emanating from stockpiles of means of deterrence, including nuclear weapons, but simultaneously created an imbalance that left a dangerous vacuum. A scenario in which a unipolar world order could be maintained for an infinite period seems to be unlikely from this perspective. Rather, we would expect the creation of new balanced regional and global power structures.

This is what seems to happen in Northeast Asia. For decades, the picture was rather simple: Japan under the Yoshida-Doctrine concentrated on economic development and relied on the close alliance with the United States for its national security. South Korea became part of this structure. The Soviet Union and China formed the other side, despite their many differences that sometimes were close to the outbreak of an open conflict. The threat emanating from the U.S.-Japan al­liance forced them to cooperate. North Korea had declared it­self independent from both Beijing and Moscow in the 1960s but had in fact no choice but to rely on protection by the Soviet Union's nuclear umbrella, in particular after the Nixon shock of the early 1970s reduced the likeliness of full Chinese support in case of a conflict involving the United States. North Korea needed external allies - either for its protection or for a new effort to reunify Korea by force. This made it, despite the continuous emphasis on Juche (self-reliance), part of the other side of the power equation. The Soviet Union, China and North Korea were pitted against the United States, Japan and South Korea.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the simultaneous shift of China towards a more liberal economic order, the suc­cessful economic and political development of South Korea, the emerging desire of Japan to become a more active player in terms of foreign and security policy, the equation as described above is no longer valid. The region right now is in the middle of a restructuring of its power balance. We witness a very dynamic period in international relations, with much room for positive development and creativity, but also a heightened risk of disputes. It is therefore important to find ways to mitigate the various interests in a way that prevents the outbreak of armed conflicts.

Korea in the Northeast Asian Region: The Korean Peninsula plays an important role in this process, both as a passive and as an active player. A theoretical analysis of the constellation of power and interests shows a significant conflict potential between Japan, which has de facto been the leader in terms of economic and soft power in the region for decades, and the rising giant China. Korea, divided into North and South with very different economic and political orders, finds itself both geographically as well as politically stuck right between these two whales and fights a difficult struggle to prevent turning into the proverbial shrimp. The United States, which still seizes the global hegemony, is heavily ex­posed on the peninsula.

Koreans have a long and frustrating experience with being the battlefield for great power interests, ranging from the lmjin War in the late 16th century over the Sino-Japanese War in 1894-95 up to the clash between the socialist East and the cap­italist West during the Korean War. The concerns in Seoul as well as in Pyongyang with Korea's security situation are great and understandable. The perspectives on this situation as well as the resulting solutions seem to differ, however. While the North follows a very neo-realistic path of deterrence, the South has decided in favor of the liberalist model. The latter emphasizes interdependency, transparency, and dialogue. These characteristics appear to be the mainstay of Seoul's ap­proach toward North Korea in the last years.

As the tremendous ideological and economic changes in North Korea show, this approach has been very successful. A certain causality between the North Korean transformation and the active role of the South Korean side cannot be overlooked. In particular, the economic support through humanitarian aid, the Mt. Geumgangsan tourism project, and the Gaeseong Industrial Zone have created a strong impact. The most impor­tant result of these changes is that an uncontrollable collapse of the DPRK (North Korea) could so far be prevented. Moreover, there is more and more evidence that a marketiza­tion and monetization of the economy takes place, with signif­icant and far-reaching effects on the North Korean society. The indirect nature of these effects represents a serious chal­lenge for South Korean policymakers who face enormous crit­icism from within and from the outside. The connection be­tween support for North Korea and actual changes is hard to prove. However, it is no coincidence that the changes in North Korea's ideology and economic policy coincide well with the 2000 summit meeting with the South and the subsequent mea­sures.

Despite the uneasy past and serious security concerns, Seoul has intensified its efforts at expanding and enhancing the dialogue with the North on various levels, trying to mitigate the DPRK's relations with the international community and supporting its integration into international networks of commerce and finance. This has been and still is a very difficult process. However, both from a neorealist and a liberalist perspective, it is important to develop an understanding of the other side's interests and perceptions-either to better understand its actions, or to be able to influence them. South Korea is very well positioned for such a function because of the commonalities in language, history and culture.

In March 2005, President Roh Moo-hyun announced his desire to turn South Korea into a balancing power in Northeast Asia to prevent possible disputes in the region. Such a balancing role seems indeed to be necessary. There are several dis­agreements that hamper an efficient cooperation between the various regional powers, and which are skillfully utilized by North Korea to pursue its interests. These include the territori­al dispute between South Korea and Japan over Dokdo Island in the East Sea and the dispute between Japan and China over the exploration of an oil field in the East China Sea. Japan has explicitly regarded Chinese drilling in that area as a major threat to its sovereignty. Further, there are the history textbook issue and the Chinese and Korean criticism of Prime Minister Koizumi's visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. Japan and Russia have so far failed to end the dispute over the Kuril Islands. There is competition between China and Russia over the route for connecting Korea to the continental railway network, al­though this problem appears to having been resolved through expanded cooperation in the field of energy. The debate be­tween China and South Korea about the historical classifica­tion of Goguryeo is now less heated than some months ago, but it is still ongoing. A number of trade issues over products, such as garlic, mobile phones, fish and recently kimchi have emerged between the two countries. In December 2005, South Korean officials including the speaker of the National Assembly expressed their regret over remarks by the U.S. am­bassador to Seoul labeling the DPRK as a criminal regime, since such comments would not be helpful for the progress of the six-party talks on North Korea's nuclear weapons pro­gram.

The Risk: Conflict Potential

This very brief overview hints at opposing interests, different perspectives and the enormous conflict potential in the region. The debates are often not new, but had to be suppressed during the decades of relative stability under the bipolar Cold War regime and are now resurfacing. From the perspective as out­lined above, what would be needed to secure peace on the Korean Peninsula, and which consequences would such a sce­nario have for regional security? The option desired by most Koreans is unification after a gradual and peaceful process. However, this would instantly create the question of the align­ment of a unified Korea in the current regional power constel­lation. Neutrality - for example following the Austrian model would appear to be the most desirable position; however, it must be doubted whether such a status could be real and sus­tainable without strong external support. There are two possi­ble candidates for such an alliance that could guarantee a uni­fied Korea's independent position in dealings with its two big neighbors. The less controversial ally would be the European Union. However, due to a number of factors, including a pre­occupancy with important and controversial European issues such as the integration of new members states and the en­hancement of cohesion through a European Constitution, it ap­pears unlikely that the EU would have the will and the poten­tial to play such a role satisfactorily. This leads directly to the other alternative, which is supported by old Asian wisdom on strategic behavior: cooperation with a country that is big and strong, but is located conveniently far away. The United States fulfills these conditions. South Korea is therefore well advised to use the existing traditional close relationship with Washington and try to renegotiate in order to make it more open, equal, and fit for the future.

North Korea will win from either an improvement or a worsening of the bilateral relationship between South Korea and the United States. The former will make it easier for Seoul to play its advocacy role for the North and help to remove the many obstacles for economic exchange that so far exist based on U.S. sanctions. North Korea has for many years repeatedly stated that ideological differences should be overcome in the spirit of national unity and "sharing the same blood," which in fact is a not very well hidden pledge for assistance. A weak­ened trans-Pacific alliance, on the other hand, will negatively affect South Korea's power and therefore benefit Pyongyang strategically.

Japan would not oppose Korean neutrality guaranteed by the United States. Tokyo's major concern appears to be the economic and political rise of China. A unified Korea that comes under the influence of Beijing is a nightmarish scenario for Japanese, since it would further isolate this island state and remove the buffer zone existing between the two contestants so far. China would be concerned over the other extreme-a unified Korea as an American outpost right at the border. An important and complicated task for diplomats in Seoul and Washington would therefore be to calm Beijing's worries by demonstrating that the American influence on the peninsula would be minimal.

For the United States, "losing" a unified Korea to China would constitute major image damage, both abroad and do­mestically. The American public is aware of the investments of capital, manpower and energy their country has made in Korea, and would only reluctantly accept their abandonment. However, assuming that Japan will remain the major U.S. ally in the region, a withdrawal from Korea would not appear to be too costly in real terms. If this is true, it would be a realistic option if a proper political solution can be found.

Opportunity: East Asian Cooperation: In case of a prolonged existence of a divided Korean Peninsula, conflict can best be prevented through encapsulat­ing the source of risk, i.e., integrating North Korea instead of isolating it. In this context, an alternative to the bilateral op­tions as explored above would be a multilateral setting. The developments in this field are highly dynamic, too. APEC, for many years the star among East Asia's efforts at regional co­operation, seems to have lost its predominant position. Instead, ASEAN, in the past often not taken seriously by many ob­servers, has shown an impressive development in particular since the more active role-played by China.

The looming threat of a consolidation of ASEAN+1 and of being left behind represents a strong motivation for South Korea and Japan to step up their efforts at actively contributing to a regional alliance, despite a number of reservations. The first East Asian Summit in December 2005, the outcome of a proposal made by former President Kim Dae-jung five years before, has been heavily debated and overshadowed by the criticism of Japan's position with regard to the Yasukuni Shrine. However, in a few decades this summit might indeed look like the beginning of an integration process toward an East Asian Community.

Korea, including North Korea, would constitute an integral and vital part of such a regional arrangement. A strong East Asian Community could be a third possible source of support for Korea's neutrality. Moreover, it could open new ways to engage and integrate North Korea into international networks of commerce and finance.

This is even more important since conventional access through the World Bank, the IMF and the Asia Development Bank is blocked due to resistance from Washington. A strong East Asian alliance could bypass these roadblocks. Herein is also the great danger of this approach: It is not clear whether a multilateral solution without participation of the United States will be sustainable, and whether all involved parties would be willing to risk a clash with Washington. A possible way out could be a three-way cooperation between the EAC, North Korea, and the United States.

To conclude, there is both a high risk of conflict as well as a good chance for progress on the Korean Peninsula. This issue is closely connected to the bigger picture of security relations in Northeast Asia, which are currently in a dynamic stage of restructuring. Events in Korea will influence the developments in the region, and vice versa. The Korean government there­fore has a chance to actively shape the Northeast Asian future by its efforts toward North Korea, and it can utilize regional dynamics to support its policy toward the DPRK. Maintaining a proper relationship with the United States appears to be of key importance for either task.

Text courtesy: JANUARY 2006/ KOREA POLICY REVIEW. Embassy of ROK in Nepal-ed

FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE

Prof. TED G. JELEN, Pol.Science, University of Greencastle, Indiana

This article discusses the value that freedom of religion provides to a healthy democracy. The author describes religious institutions as an alternative source of ideas and social criticism and a training ground for democratic citizenship, and he makes the case for why democratic governments should encourage respect for religious diversity. Ted G. Jelen is a professor of political science at DePauw University in Greencastle, Indiana, and at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas.

Respect for freedom of conscience, which most often involves freedom of religion, has many salutary effects on democratic government. The consequences of religious liberty are generally positive: 1) Religion provides alternative sources of ideas, social criticism, and innovation for democratic governments; 2) Religious institutions provide experiences and skills that can be applied to democratic citizenship; and 3) Respect for the prerogatives of religious minorities can enhance the legitimacy of democratic governments domestically and internationally.

RELIGION AND THE STATE

In a healthy democratic regime, the state and religious institutions should retain a respectful independence from one another. This is not to say that there should be no contact between the secular realm of politics and the sacred space defined by religion, because there is considerable overlap between the two. However, a certain functional autonomy between church and state seems to have important benefits for the state.

Religion often provides a "prophetic voice" to public discourse. Religious values can allow stable, transcendent values to enter the democratic dialogue and to empower the expression of minority viewpoints. This is an important function in regimes in which public opinion is the ultimate authority, since the presentation of alternative perspectives often enhances the process of political deliberation. The fact that religious principles are grounded in beliefs that are not based on the social and political exigencies of the moment allows for such beliefs to serve as independent sources of criticism of the prevailing political mood.

To illustrate, widespread adherence to Roman Catholicism provided a plausible, alternative world view to citizens of Poland during the period of communist domination. The efforts at political socialization made by the communist regime were not particularly effective, and they were actively resisted by a politically assertive Catholicism. Indeed, the presence of a popular Catholicism may have permitted Poles to make a distinction between the Polish state (secular and socialistic) and the Polish nation (Catholic and potentially democratic). Similarly, in the early years of Ronald Reagan's presidency (1981-1989) in the United States, policies such as nuclear disarmament and assistance to the poor fell out of favor in public discourse. The National Council of Catholic Bishops wrote pastoral letters concerning the immorality of nuclear war and asserting the moral imperatives underlying assistance to the poor. The spiritual and intellectual resources of the American church provided a necessary counterweight to economic and foreign policy conservatism.

There is, of course, nothing particularly novel about this insight. In his Democracy in America, Alexis de Tocqueville identified religion as one of the most important factors mitigating the tyranny of the majority in the United States. As sources of transcendent values, which contain numerous moral imperatives related to public policy, religious traditions that are not identified with ruling regimes provide an important check on the conformist tendencies of democratic cultures.

PROTECTING RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY

Democratic governments should protect and encourage religious diversity. The public presence of multiple religious traditions enhances their potential to serve as social and political critics for at least three reasons.

The most obvious value of religious diversity for democratic political discourse is that multiple voices may result in multiple perspectives being considered in public deliberation. For example, in contemporary Brazil, the Roman Catholic Church (especially at the level of the local parish) has been a source of social criticism of the structural sources of economic and political inequality (the tradition of "liberation theology"), while a growing movement of evangelical Protestantism has served to refocus attention on individual-level morality and family life.

Secondly, religious diversity has a positive effect on religious belief, participation, and membership. Sociologists of religion have suggested that denominational groups in competitive religious environments have strong incentives to make their respective traditions attractive to members and potential members. In such settings, overall religious participation is generally higher than in environments in which one tradition has a monopoly. For example, religious involvement is generally higher in the religiously pluralistic United States than in Scandinavian nations with established churches. Similarly, in the post-communist period in predominantly Catholic Poland, church attendance and other measures of religious participation have declined markedly.

Why should this matter? Research literature suggests that participation in religious organizations is an important source of social capital, or the cognitive and social skills necessary for engagement in democratic politics. People in churches learn to work together to achieve common goals, to mediate interpersonal conflict in constructive ways, and to choose among competing social goods. All of these skills are important for the development of democratic citizens. Indeed, some of this research has suggested that religious socialization is the only reliable source of social capital among otherwise disadvantaged citizens in the United States. Thus, religion, like other institutions in civil society, is an important source of citizenship training. More people are likely to avail themselves of the learning opportunities provided by religious institutions in religiously diverse environments.

Finally, religious diversity can reduce the potential for serious religious-based political conflict. In societies which have more than one dominant religious tradition, citizens can demonize their counterparts in other traditions, increasing the possibility of intense and violent conflict. By contrast, in a more pluralistic environment, no religious tradition may attract a majority, which forces religious citizens who engage in politics to compromise in order to achieve partial political goals.

In the United States, for example, some religiously affiliated groups have criticized government policies on a variety of moral or lifestyle issues. However, their effectiveness has been limited by, among other things, theological differences within their own religious traditions. Internal controversies, then, over such matters as modernism, evolution, religious experience, and doctrinal interpretation have largely prevented the formation of monolithic political coalitions. In brief, the doctrinal diversity within the religion practiced by a majority of Americans (Christianity) - as well as the tradition of respect for other religions, including Judaism and Islam - makes it unlikely that any single religious group will come to dominate political discourse in the United States.

RIGHTS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES

Religious traditions often make truth claims about ultimate realities, such as the nature of reality, the purposes of human existence, and explanations for the existence of evil in the world. Such assertions are not typically verifiable or refutable and, as such, are not subject to straightforward negotiation or compromise. From this, it follows that people or institutions in positions of political power (e.g., popular majorities in democracies) often are tempted to suppress alternative versions of religious truth or to restrict substantially the prerogatives of religious minorities. There are at least two reasons why political leaders in democratic governments should resist this temptation and should respect the rights of religious minorities to as great an extent as possible.

First, allowing religious freedom for members of minority religions, which may be socially or theologically marginalized, avoids the problem of equating full citizenship with membership in a particular religious tradition. To illustrate, if a person can be fully American without being a Christian, or fully Israeli without being a Jew, members of religious traditions that fall out of the culturally dominant pattern are not confronted with the problem of divided loyalties. If there is no necessary connection between national citizenship and discipleship in a particular religious tradition, members of minority traditions are more likely to obey the law and to participate fully in the political life of the nation. Put another way, allowing religious liberty for religious minorities seems likely to enhance the legitimacy of government for members of such groups.

The issue of legitimacy is especially important for democratic regimes, because democracy is a persuasive system, which requires the active assent and participation of the governed. That is, democratic governments achieve their legitimacy by persuading citizens of their right and ability to govern. Democratic governments also require active participation, rather than passive compliance, on the part of their citizens, and such participation is arguably more difficult to achieve when certain members of the community are denied the ability to exercise fundamental aspects of their identities.

A second reason to respect the rights of religious minorities is the international aspect. The flexibility of national governments to engage in complex relations with other states is often limited by perceptions of religious discrimination on the part of the governments of those states. Viewed another way, a government that discriminates against certain religious minorities is often disadvantaged in its dealings with other states in which the marginal religious tradition is more politically consequential.

For example, in the early 1970s, the ability of U.S. President Richard Nixon to engage in détente with the Soviet Union was occasionally limited by the perception on the part of many Americans (including many members of Congress) that the U.S.S.R. discriminated against Jews. The "Jackson Amendment" (introduced by Senator Henry Jackson) sought to limit trade between the United States and the Soviet Union and to make such trade contingent on improvement in the Soviet observance of human rights. Clearly, the path to détente would have been considerably smoother were the Soviet Union not widely perceived as anti-Semitic. More recently, allegations of restrictions on Christian missionaries have made it difficult for President George W. Bush to engage in cooperative relations with states such as Jordan, Egypt, China, and North Korea. Evangelical Christians are an important component of the president's Republican coalition in U.S. politics, and it is politically difficult for any president to pursue diplomatic policies at odds with the preferences of a key constituency.

Similarly, on a recent trip to Pakistan, I noted that my credibility as a representative of the United States was compromised by the widespread belief that the American government, and the American people, were somehow "anti-Muslim" in the post-9/11 period. I found several audiences of university students unwilling to listen to my defense of the principle of religious liberty until I had addressed to their satisfaction that Muslims living in the United States were not the victims of legal discrimination at the hands of the government. On the other side of the Atlantic, France's attempt to thwart religious divisiveness by banning Muslim girls from wearing headscarves along with Jewish boys from wearing skullcaps to public school may have caused a decline in the national prestige of France in the Middle East and elsewhere. Certain films perceived to be anti-Islam may have occasioned religiously motivated, political violence in the Netherlands.

In all these cases, the perception of discrimination is at least as important as the reality. To a considerable extent, successful diplomacy is contingent on goodwill between sovereign nations. The belief on the part of the citizens of some nations that their co-religionists are second-class citizens in other states can make the achievement of such goodwill problematic.

CONCLUSION

A vibrant, diverse, and pluralistic religious environment contributes to a healthy democratic society. While one should not exaggerate the importance of religion in democratic politics, religion can serve as a source of policy criticism, education for citizenship, and political legitimacy.

Text courtesy: e journal USA, Dec., 2005, American Center Kathmandu -ed