Wednesday, November 1, 2006

Pradip P. Upadhayay, Nepal

Background

The ten-year conflict in the country has been adversely affecting overall governance of the country. It has greatly affected development processes and the future course of action. Violation of human rights; rapidly growing security expenditure and its developmental consequence to service sector; under spending of the allocated budget in the basic service sectors; failure of the government to provide security to on-going development programs and projects; insecurity perceived by the development workers in villages from security forces and obstruction created in many instances; and the failure of the government to respect the human rights commitment are some of the prime issues and unresolved tasks.

The failures of the efforts relate to the unclear stand of the government on “conflict sensitive approach of governance.” It is highly unlikely that the targets (even the lower level targets) set in the Tenth Plan will be fulfilled. The obstructed governance has affected its four pillars: broad-based economic growth, social and infrastructure development, implementation of targeted programs (inclusion of excluded groups of people), and good governance.

The experience of many conflict affected countries show that the functions of government machineries can be continued even in the situation of on-going conflict. But, it depends on conflict sensitive governance modalities, which require different approach, mechanism, and procedure. Some development programs show that if development activities are transparent, need-based, and directly benefiting to the poorest and most marginalized section of people, they are implemented smoothly and thus get people’s support.  Some of the programs such as Rural Access Program (RAP), RCIW, SPDI, etc. were facing less obstruction because community support was strong, local people were recruited or mobilized, activities were apolitical and transparency was ensured. However, the governments in the past were not able to build and implement programs to minimize the adverse effect on the lives of the people.

Scope of Governance

“Governance” describes the application of rules and processes through which authority and control are exercised in a society, political decisions are made, the rules for the scope of action of state and society are structured, and resources for economic and social development are administered. The term governance, as defined by GTZ, covers three dimensions such as security governance, political-administrative governance and socio-economic governance.

Security governance:

It can be regarded as a prerequisite for the other dimensions of governance. Without providing a minimum level of security to its citizens, the state is unable to perform its regulatory function. This is usually not a question of a lack of security forces, but rather of the ability to place these under effective democratic control. In addition, the power that security forces usually acquire in times of conflict also makes it difficult to cut military spending to pre-conflict levels. Other important factors contributing to the erosion of the state’s authority are the ready availability of arms beyond the control of the state.

Law and order situations are also beyond control, where judiciary roles are seized by ‘rebellion forces.’ This is not only the absence of formal judiciary activities, but its continued activities encourage criminal activity, it also fosters vigilante justice and lynch law, which in turn exacerbate the general lack of security in the conflict prone society. Combatants are usually found disintegrated and in many incidents disobey order of their high-command and thus create more chaos in the society. The people at large face collective and individual trauma (Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, PTSD).

Political-administrative governance

In conflict societies the legitimacy of the government is frequently in doubt and some population groups often resent the government’s right to regulate their lives. The weakened government’s legitimacy causes the population groups in exclusion and non-represented. Lack of horizontal separation of powers and the lack of vertical division between the central state and decentralized local administrations have caused poor or failed governance.

The relationship between all relevant social groups is found weak and destroyed depending on the nature of the history of a given conflict. General torture to the people, gender-based violence, and ethnic cleansing are found common.

Insecurity in the society regenerates varying situations of new violence, individuals wish to secure personal short-term advantages or to cash in quickly on the spoils of war. This shows frequent abuse of power, undermining the legitimacy of the government. The real danger here is that the absence of government authority and legitimacy could lead to the resumption of hostilities.

Due to the damage to its administrative structure, the conflict state is often unable to provide its citizens with a minimum level of basic services. In addition to the sequential costs of the war, over-centralization also tends to limit the capacity of the state apparatus. Where services can be provided, there are opportunities and incentives for bribery and corruption. Particularly in economically precarious conflict situations, corruption is a widespread survival strategy for administrative employees with low and undependable salaries.

Socio-economic governance

Macroeconomic stability and a distribution of goods and opportunities that are perceived as equitable reduce the potential for continuing of conflict. In conflict society there is always a chance of malfunctioning of the existing structures of its economy, and often claims to ownership which needs to be resolved.

The existing number of disintegrated combatants, refugees, and internal exiles into the economy puts further financial strain on states that suffer from sharply reduced revenue bases. Further borrowing, which often seems unavoidable, fuels inflation; declining confidence in the domestic currency leads to a flight of capital, further reducing the government’s scope for action. Elementary basic needs are mainly met – if at all – “outside the state,” either through support from international aid organizations or through recourse to traditional networks.

Socio-economic Dimension, Poor Governance and Conflict

Nepal ’s economic situation remains poor. The first decade since the restoration of democracy in 1990 saw reasonable progress in national output that raised per capita income at a rate of about four percent apparently followed helped reducing the incidence of poverty to 32 percent of population below the poverty line. Since 2001, however, with the escalation of the conflict, the country apparently has succumbed to rapid deterioration in economic incentives. Long-term investment in manufacturing was drying up even before the conflict heightened.

This was the case of crisis of governance caused by escalated conflict and war. A sense of pessimism and skepticism existed about the government's ability to change situation for good governance. A clear absence of trust between the people and those in any positions of power and authority emerged and a change was felt necessary for ensuring peace and prosperity in the country. Donor community demanded a change of leaders, in the government at all levels and in the civil society be it village leaders or business leaders, who align strongly with the champion. Need for change was also realized among common citizens, who empower themselves and participate as stakeholders in the renewal process.

Socio-economic gap among the households, among the ecological regions caused by poor governance impacted upon the escalation of conflict, which in turn further caused increased gaps among the citizen creating a vicious circle of worsening of governance.

Central Government and Governance

Nepal (GON) is facing a great challenge of emerging expectations of people in all political, social, and economic fronts. Freedom of choice and right to public goods are voiced by majority of people. How the people in exclusion get “right space” in society is the major concern where government machineries should function promptly and effectively. These all demand formulation of new policies and their implementation. These all require question whether the present government machinery in general and public administration in specific is efficient or not.

Since 2001, GON has initiated Governance Reform Program (GRP), which emphasizes on ownership, participation, capacity building, improved social outcome, and service delivery through increased client participation. It aims at establishing a result and people oriented civil service addressing gender empowerment, economic growth, and poverty reduction. Briefly it includes civil service reform, capacity building of selected institutions, service delivery, liberalization, social inclusion, decentralization, improvement in accountability, and transparency of government processes. The program envisages to: develop an internal capacity within the government to lead and undertake the governance reform agenda; improve the efficiency of the civil service; improve governance and ensure that corruption in government is effectively prosecuted under the law; enhance the competence and motivation of civil servants; and establish the processes for improving performance in key ministries.

Besides various efforts made, certain segments of people are under-represented in bureaucracy and politics usually considered positions of influence. Some efforts were made to include women, janjati and dalits in the Civil Service. Similarly, efforts were also made curb corruption and control leakages. It is viewed that the corruption has reduced the effectiveness of development efforts and undermined public confidence in Government, helping to fuel the conflict. In 2002, four anti-corruption bills were passed by Parliament; the Impeachment Act, the CIAA Second Amendment Act, the Corruption Control Act and the Special Court Act. Following these legislative changes, the CIAA has raised its profile and increased significantly the scale of its activities. National Vigilance Centre has also been established to control corruption. However, these two organizations CIAA and NVC have not been successful to achieve their mission.

In the last five years various efforts have been made. First, a component of ‘reform management and capacity building in change units in five ministries (Education, Health, Agriculture, Land Reform and Local Development) component aimed at improving management structure and processes at the centre of government for leading, coordinating, and implementing the reforms. Second, emphasis was given to the ‘overall efficiency improvement’ through specific tools like right sizing, improved personnel record management systems, revised pay policy and decentralization. Third, focus has been given to ‘governance improvement’ mainly through curbing corruption. Fourth, ‘competence and motivation enhancement’ component has emphasized on professionalizing civil service, increasing the level of motivation and enhancing overall skills of the civil servants. Fifth, emphasis has been given to ‘performance improvement’ to deliver better services to the citizens.

Until mid-April 2006, prior to restoration of democracy and reinstating of parliament, efforts were not carried out successfully mainly due to political instability. These actions were also suffered from institutional and resource constraints. Many provisions remained un-materialized. Frequent transfers of key personnel working in the ‘change management units’ of some ministries and departments have created the problem of continuity and commitment in the execution of reforms. Many challenges remain in achieving good governance.

Local Authorities and Governance

With the enactment of Local Self-Governance Act (LSGA) local authorities of district, municipality and village levels were given several authorities for managing local administration and development works. Such decentralized framework is taken as an important means of bringing development closer to the rural poor by involving local communities in developing appropriate programs. Authorities were given in implementing them, ensuring greater accountability for use of public resources, and mainstreaming the poor and deprived groups. It was considered that decentralization would address the problem of social exclusion by empowering people. These activities can also address political needs for greater self governance at the local level. The social conflict environment aggravated the need for decentralization. However, the impact of the conflict and the options for a development response vary from one district to another.

It is viewed that Nepal ’s initiative of decentralization is old, but the devolution has been only selective and slow. However, on the other hand, the framework for decentralization is strong. In this context it is viewed that local bodies are capable enough to managing their development activities. It is thought that districts with capable institutions having peoples’ ownership for effective service delivery should be provided full scale devolution.

However, the increased influence of conflict impeded the process of local self-esteemed efforts of planning processes. Process of formulating district periodic plans halted and even the implementation of local development activities could not be monitored. International NGOs had to quit the districts and local NGOs suffered from the lack of resources.

Conflict and Political Governance

The continued emphasis on good governance during the past ten years or so both by national stakeholders and international partners in development has failed to show results reflecting weakened ‘Nepali state’ itself usually termed as ‘fragile’ or ‘crisis’ state. So, there is a need for strategic programs, and projects on good governance arrest this progressive erosion of state institutions? The easy answer, especially from the establishment, would be the ongoing ‘conflict’. It appears that the state has begun interpreting conflict as something ‘given’. So much so that plan targets are defined in conflict terms so that, if they are not achieved, conflict could be presented as the escaping stick. This cannot be taken for granted, as conflict could be interpreted also in terms of the ‘effect’ of mis-governance.

In their seminal work on ‘the root causes of conflict’ covering many countries in Africa (including Cambodia in Asia), Prof. Frances Stewart of Oxford University and her colleagues have shown that violent conflicts are most likely to emerge where societies are marked by “horizontal inequalities”, (unequal distribution of income and political power between groups defined by region, ethnicity, class, and religion) rather than as a result of “vertical inequalities” (unequal distribution of income between all individuals in society). In other words, ‘structural violence’ is the precursor to violent conflicts. Their works also show how weak governments fare far worse in conflicts than others.

The state’s primary role in addressing conflict issues is, therefore, to mediate equalities between groups. It needs no mentioning that equality issues refer not only to incomes and other economic opportunities but also to social and political power relations. As more and more countries in the developing world seem to be ‘graduating’ from fragile to failed states due mostly to violent conflicts, mediation for equalities has become an international agenda on governance. These attempts raise equity issues as Karl Polanyi in 1944 had predicted in The Great Transformation that the failure to accommodate citizens’ impulse for social protection would result in “unexpected outcomes.” This is becoming true.

The categorization of weak states into different groups to basically understand the degree of weakness does not depend upon the intensity of conflict only. There are other socio-economic indicators to measure. Infant mortality, trade openness, and off-track MDGs (millennium development goals) are examples. Based on these indicators, some studies have labeled Zambia as a ‘crisis state’ although it has not seen any violent conflict in the recent past. Uganda and, lately Mozambique , have offered examples at the other end of the scale. They are still conflict-ridden but have come out of the fragile/failed group.

Nepal ’s inability to deliver on the ‘good governance’ promise needs to be examined against this emerging understanding of state fragility and failure. The good governance agenda of the past decade misplaced - and perhaps misunderstood – reform priorities. The focus has been on technical solutions to managerial problems, and not on broader political issues that needed attention. Good governance requires legitimate and accountable systems of political management and consists basically of (i) opportunities to make political choices (e.g., through free and fair elections), (ii) leadership of political institutions in policy formulation, and (iii) public confidence in state institutions. These core elements of good governance have not been attended to. The World Bank defines governance as ‘the manner in which the state exercises and acquires authority’. Maintaining ‘goodness’ in both acquiring and exercising state powers is a daunting challenge requiring, again, reforms in executive, legislative, and judicial agencies.

Another example is the anti-corruption reform. It is encouraging that some state institutions have been activated against corruption. On the whole, however, corruption is being seen more or less as a moral issue (i.e., something unbecoming of a good public post holder). While this understanding may be technically correct, it cannot fully mobilize socio-political coalitions against corruption. Recent studies on corruption undertaken by international organizations, including Transparency International and the World Bank, have focused on the implications of corruption for economic development. For example, they have established a co-relation between corruption and poor GDP within a wide range of countries and contributed thus to increased “sensitization” against corruption. While government agencies do not seem to be “bothered” about these findings, Nepali citizens look alive to the reality. For example, in the last year Himal survey on Nepal ’s burning problems, respondents named corruption as the second biggest problem after conflict. Based on this, the state could be expected to allocate comparable resources to fight corruption.

The slide from the high-pitch notion of good governance to the ground reality of ‘fragile state’ has been a painful experience. It must be avoided. There is one way out. It is increasingly recognized, including by the donor community, that fragile/failed states have difficulty in achieving good governance. What Nepal can do in this context is revise its position on good governance and focus on striving for ‘good enough governance.’

The conflict has severely damage some of the basic areas of political governance which need to be addressed:

Individual freedom and fundamental rights,

People’s sovereignty

Free and fair elections based on adult franchise and rights to form political parties,

Accountability of the government to the sovereign parliament,

Rule of law and elimination of unlawful vested interests,

Social inclusion measures to support the interests of backward, poor and marginalized classes,

Decentralization of powers,

Optimum use of national resources and capital for the increase in production,

Protection of the rights of peasants and vulnerable groups,

Abolition of the exploitation of laborers through the security of employment,

Guarantee of basic education, health, and social security, and

Protection of the autonomy and freedom of social institutions.

Conclusion

From the above analysis, it is virtually said that conflict has adversely affected the overall governance of the country. However, it can be brought in right track through engaging “strategic groups with conflict capability · .” Identifying the actors capable to formulate and pursue their interests by promoting or blocking certain parts of the social transformation process, governance can be strengthened.

The first-category group known as r eformers drives socio-economic and political-administrative transformation in the direction of a sustainable post conflict system maintaining rule of law, democracy, transparency and participation. Reformers seek to overcome weak economies through maintaining market economy. Moderate reformers mostly emphasize the need for consensus building and securing legitimacy, while radical reformers by contrast rely more on quick results. The second category group known as preservers is oriented towards maintaining the status quo relying on existing system and enjoying privilege, power and income. The third group falls under the category of spoilers who misuses their strength. Spoilers come from business, religious or military groups.

Ending of conflict and promoting good governance are quite inter-related and depends on various factors. Political dimension of governance is overwhelmingly dominant. The chances for consolidating peace and improving governance are greatest if the parties to the conflict negotiated an agreement without external pressure, but within a framework of external support and monitoring.

In the context of Nepal , movement for democracy of 1990 brought ‘one government’ rule in the country which resulted in a good governance and thus contributed to a very ‘dynamic growth period.’ However, mismanagement of the ruling parties allowed the ‘second force in hibernation’ to spread its arm on power which resulted in bad governance contributing instability and poor performance. This period also brought third force – the Maoist’s People’s War’ which basically influenced complete failure of governance.

Good governance is possible only when there is one rule in the country. The April movement of 2006 has ended the ‘royal power’. Now if the unified power structure between SPA and the Maoists is built would ultimately provide way out for achieving good governance in the country. It is therefore vital that no major obstacles to peace have been left out.

The above analysis basically put the situation more on negative aspects of the impact of conflict on governance. But one issue should be overwhelming taken in positive front is its in-built force of driving the country for inclusive democracy, economic system and governance. The conflict has enforced transformative role of the state beyond liberalization and property rights, beyond individual rational. It may show way out to survive where “the winner takes all.”

Text courtesy: Paper presented by the author at a NEFAS Seminar held recently in Kathmandu-ed.