Wednesday, January 24, 2007

Freedom House, an independent non-governmental organization that supports the expansion of freedom in the world, has rated Tibet "worst" in terms of political rights and civil liberties in its survey for 2006, released on January 17, 2007.

Freedom in the World 2007, a survey of worldwide political rights and civil liberties, said that Tibet was among "the two worst rated territories" (the other being Chechnya under The Russian Federation) in 2006. Freedom House has been designating Tibet under the Disputed Territories category in its annual surveys.

In the survey's ratings of comparative measures of freedom, Tibet received 7 (the least free rating) in both political rights and civil liberties while China itself received 7 in political rights and 6 in civil liberties. These ratings were the same for Tibet and China in its survey released last year.

The survey found that on a global scale, the state of freedom in 2006 showed a modest decline from that of 2005. The number of countries that experienced negative changes in freedom without meriting a status change outweighed those that received positive changes: the scores for 33 countries declined, while only 18 improved.

"Freedom House also noted that the trends reflected the growing pushback against democracy driven by authoritarian regimes, including Russia, Venezuela, China, Iran, and Zimbabwe, threatening to further erode the gains made in the last thirty years," a Freedom House press statement said. "The pushback is targeted at organizations, movements, and media that advocate for the expansion of democratic freedoms," the statement added.

According to the survey, the number of countries judged by Freedom in the World as Free in 2006 stood at 90, representing 47 percent of the global population. Fifty-eight countries qualified as Partly Free, with 30 percent of the world's population. The survey finds that 45 countries are Not Free, representing 23 percent of the world's inhabitants. "About one-half of those living in Not Free conditions inhabit one country: China," Freedom House said.

In an accompanying essay, Arch Puddington, director of research at Freedom House, had this to say about China. "Although China continued to reflect dynamic change in the economic sphere, there was little evidence of openings toward political freedom or enhanced individual liberties. Heightened activism among the country's middle class have led some to hope that the ripple effects produced by those changes that have enabled China to emerge as a major force in the global economy may transform the country's political culture. Unfortunately, the past year was dominated by further repression of the press and internet, the prosecution of civic activists and the lawyers who represent them, and increased efforts to keep religion under the control of the state.

"According to Freedom House, its survey provides three broad category designation for each of the countries and territories included in the index: Free, Partly Free, and Not Free.

A Free country is one where there is broad scope for open political competition, a climate of respect for civil liberties, significant independent civic life, and independent media.

A Partly Free country is one in which there is limited respect for political rights and civil liberties. Partly Free states frequently suffer from an environment of corruption, weak rule of law, ethnic and religious strife, and often a setting in which a single political party enjoys dominance despite the façade of limited pluralism.

A Not Free country is one where basic political rights are absent, and basic civil liberties are widely and systematically denied. Both Tibet and China have received "Not Free" ratings for 2006.

Freedom House began publishing its annual index of global freedom in 1972. [Source: Phayul]

Major Areas of Conflict at Local Level in Nepal

Dr. Rabindra Khanal, Political Science Department, t. U, Nepal

The mass movement of 1990 took place with a goal to end the socioeconomic and political conflicts that had long existed in the society. People joined the call of political parties to fight against the old regime because they hoped that democracy would bring comfort and convenience and help them to live with dignity. But it did not work that way. The system could not handle the changed situation. The political leaders had no experience of handling the state machinery and, more importantly, they could not keep up themselves with the spirit of the mass movement. They put themselves before the people, individual leaders before the party, and the party before the people. As a consequence, the political system suffered legitimacy crisis. This was not derived from the people's mistrust of democracy, rather it was a result of the new system's inability to live up to the high expectations set in the aftermath of the 1990 mass movement. New conflicts emerged and continue to emerge everywhere. This is the situation both at the center and at grassroot levels. There is thus the need for a drastic change in the attitude of everybody, whether an ordinary citizen or a politician or an intellectual and a professional, if such conflicts must be resolved.

Altogether there are 3,914 VDCs and 58 municipalities in the country. Almost all the VDCs that had the necessary infrastructure for a town were made municipalities. All those who are relatively rich have migrated to the towns. The difference between urban and rural life has increased the gap between the affluent classes and the poor. The rural people are suffering from maldevelopment in every field and the difference between urban and rural life has been one of the major instruments in creating more conflicts in the society.

The local leadership has belonged to the members of feudal classes in every village and community even after the restoration of democracy. The advent of democracy has not changed the social and political situation. The feudal class people continue to control the local politics. They still are the promoters of conflict in the villages because their interests are preserved by maintaining the status quo and creating more gaps between the rich and the poor. They are the least affected by the spirit of democracy. They pretend to advocate for liberalism and democracy—only to protect their own interests and consolidate their leadership. This has given rise to ethnic conflicts and exploitation of the weaker sections of the society such as women, children, unemployed youths, and migrant workers. Thus, conflicts increase at local levels and the situation can become volatile if it is not managed in time.

Political conflicts: People in villages were rarely divided politically as they are today. During the panchayat period, the divisions prevailed only at national level. Villagers did not bother much about the political parties and political ideologies. Today, the villages are divided along the political beliefs. People take the political differences naturally and consider them as an inevitable part of democracy. Political parties have failed to socialize the people in a healthy democratic way. They have been misinformed about democracy and the democratic ways of governance. The culture of harmonization, which was the character of Nepali society, is losing ground. Politics has created differences between brothers and sisters, fathers and sons, among neighbors, and even between husbands and wives. Democracy has not been able to consolidate human values and beliefs. As a result, more conflicts at the political level are emerging, especially at grassroots.

Social Conflicts: Villages tend to have social conflicts as the people are engrossed in the traditional social taboos that often breed conflicts. Living in small communities, the people cannot transcend the limits of social norms. There are problems related to caste, gender, ethnicity, poverty, religion, and language, which divide the society. These problems need to be identified and analyzed as they dominate the society and have a critical role in engendering social conflicts.

Caste: The perception of caste is a major source of conflicts in villages. Castes were initially created and continued to be developed to maintain social order and proper distribution of work for all so that everybody had a status and a work according to his/her ability. But in the long run, the caste system got perverted with the theory and practice of untouchability. Despite the guarantees provided by the constitution and Muluki Ain regarding the equality of all castes and creeds, social discrimination against untouchables continues to this day. Political openness and pluralism have encouraged the affected people to raise their voice against social injustices and political discrimination born of casteism which cannot be eradicated overnight.

Gender: Women constitute more than 51 percent of the total population of the country. The state as well as the international organizations have recognized their contribution to gross domestic production of the country. They are perhaps superior to men in every way except in physical strength. But they do not yet have equal status in many things. Now, the women's forums and NGOs dealing with the women's interests have been able to push the government in passing women's property rights and constituting a Women's Commission. But mere laws and commissions will hardly be of any value unless they are put into practice. Women cannot empower and develop themselves so long as men do not want to share power with them on an equal footing.

Ethnicity: Nepal is a multiethnic country. There are over 60 ethnic and caste groups, which constitute about 20 percent of the population. They were either grouped with the Hindu caste structure or with the Buddhist social stratification. The issues and problems of ethnicity had taken a back seat in the past. But after the restoration of the multiparty system in 1990, they started to assert themselves openly and even refused to identify themselves with any of the majority groups. They want to project their independent identities as the indigenous people of Nepal. They feel concerned about the rights and privileges of the ethnic minority. This has challenged the existing power structures of Nepali politics and governance. The conflicts between the minority ethnic groups and the majority caste groups will continue to occur frequently as long as they cannot share power on an equal footing. However, ignoring the ethnic issues may provoke a protracted ethnic insurgency in the long run.

Poverty: Poverty is a major source of conflict everywhere. It divides the people into haves and have nots. Villages in Nepal are trapped in poverty because a few families control the entire production and the rest depend upon their mercy. The governments, since the restoration of multiparty democracy, have formulated policies and programs to alleviate poverty, but have failed to tackle at the roots of poverty. The poverty-stricken people are not involved in the poverty alleviation programs, as a result of which the gap between the rich and the poor is ever widening. The growth rate in agriculture sector is less than 2.5 percent whereas the population growth is 2.37 percent. In an agricultural country, such a disparity between population growth and the pace of agricultural production bodes ill for the growth process. However, improvement in governance itself and better distribution methods by the central government as well as the local governments may improve the situation to a considerable extent.

Religion: Religion is another constant source of conflict in Nepal in the villages. This problem has emerged especially after the restoration of multiparty democracy. The constitution declares the country as a Hindu state with a Hindu monarch, but it does not prohibit anyone from practicing one's religion. Legally, it is not allowed to convert a person from one religion to another. But due to inept mechanism of the state, conversions are taking place in large numbers. Hari and Shyam in the hills are becoming Harry and Shayaam and Badris in the Tarai are turning into Bilals. Sunday schools and madarasas are replacing the traditional form of worship and family custom. The monasteries in Buddhist villages, which were once looked after by everybody in the village, are suffering because the people are now into several sects. This is going to pose an acute problem in the Nepalese villages in future. It need not really matter who follows which religion but there must be harmony in human relations.

Language: Nepal is a multilingual country. The National Language Policy Advisory Commission has listed 60 living languages in Nepal. Some of these languages are well developed with their own script but others are spoken by a small number of people and have no script of their own. The advent of democracy also raised the aspirations of people for their languages. A false hope was raised that they would all be given primary education in their own tongue and their language would be recognized as a national language in the constitution. No one at the policy level had thought that one day it would bring so much confusion and chaos that the politicians would be unable to exploit the issue in their own interest.

Nepal : The State/System Transformation

-Dr. Prem Sharma CDRD, TU

Nepal is a complex country which has complicated dimensions. The multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, multi-cultural and geo-diversified disparities are some crucial factors to be pondered. Besides them, the underlying dimensions are many more and need to be given due recognition (Gurung:1994). All major underlying dimensions should be identified, operationally defined and measured well in their perspectives implications to CA. Few of them should be treated with an immediate measure and the rest be kept under a perpetual quarantine strategy. However, the following constituents need well-paid and well-fed status for peaceful transformation of state authority. Even once Tony Hagan had rightly observed that Nepal is the ethnic turn table of Asia because of its great racial, ethnic, religious, linguistic, and cultural diversity (1961). The saying of king Prithivi Narayan Shah this county is ‘charjat chhattis barnako phoolbari‘ (colorful common garden of all Nepali) takes logical meaning. These are inmate things which will hurt less but the living things are livelihood and well-being of the people under their choices that matters the most. The new accord is impregnated with a number of elements for qualitative transformation of Nepali state which, till today, remains exploitative and discriminatory in nature and practice. Therefore, it is imperative that the inclusive democracy should have a mechanism where the full representation of all such diverse groups is reflected in the structure of governance and its government policies (Sharma 2006:43).

The ad hoc modes of transformation are the interim constitution, parliament and coalition government 2006. Then the mandate or the legitimacy of restructuring the Nepali state is going to be derived through the election of Constituent Assembly. It is because the Nepalese are capable to settle the decade long armed insurgency (conflict) and the issue of drafting the upcoming constitution through CA. In the venue of peace accord (comprehensive national peace treaty) speech two leaders- G.P. Koirala, PM of Nepal government and P.K. Dahal (Prachanda), the supremo of NCP-Maoist, had claimed this accord as unique in the world i.e. Nepalese traits and a model to be learnt by the out world who are suffering from such chronic conflict. “… we have set an example how peace can be restored through talks/dialogue ,” says Koirala. Prachanda responded “though Nepal is poor and backward, people of the land of Buddha had once again proved that they still had capacity to give message to the world about the ways of finding peace.” (The Himalayan Times 22 Nov. 2006). The accord has to review the 238 years old monarchial institution, electoral system based on majority seat rule of first past the post (FPTP) system; the unitary governance system, new practice of head of the state and bicameral legislative system composed of 205 lower house members, 60 state council members plus the king. The establishment of the new charter chapter will have to see or go through the existing governing institutions from central government to local bodies (DDCs, municipalities and VDCs). The voices of the local bodies are towards the autonomy and self governance system, in which the Maoist insurgency had a separate demand of the rights of self-determination. The aim of such demand is to have autonomous governance system within and under the cluster of ethnic domains e.g. Tharuhan, Magarhan, Newa Muktimorcha, Limbuhan, Tamuhan, Terai mukti morcha, etc. It means the country must free itself from the shackles of feudalism and other archaic tantrums of governance. It is viable in a federal system of governance as in Germany and elsewhere in others parts of the world.

The Structure Strategies

The Loktantrik outfit has pledged to achieve the inclusive Loktantrik governance holding the election of CA. So the major strategies undertaken in the upcoming charter of new constitution are as follows:

The new state system proposes to design federalism- reverse of centralism and unitary system. Most of the coalition partners are in position to have three tiers i.e.

• the existing lowest governance system- VDCs/municipals with reviews based on full autonomy and self-governance bodies, which can be attributed as true decentralization scheme (ADDCV 2006)
• multi-caste/ethnic autonomous regions, and
• multi-ethnic/caste central structure.

The power/rights and duties as well as functions of those governing strata will be demarcated by the new constitution. Vertically and horizontally the scope and the limitations between/among the three will also be outlined by the state law. Probably, the central government will look after only the foreign affairs, defense, finance, coordination between/among local governments (ADDCN 2006:8). They have also intended to have elected head of the state. The new setup or Loktantrik government will be formed by two cameras legislative system. And the election of the legislatures i.e. parliament will be performed by mixed electoral system. Half of the members of the parliament (MPs) will be elected as that of previous system- first past the post (FPTP) system and the rest half will be elected by proportional representative (PR) system i.e. size of the popular vote obtained or scored by the political parties. Especially focuses on the minorities- dalits, indigenous nationalities, backward regions, national figures and women would be represented in the National Assembly. But what would be the modality of election or selection of them has not been pronounced yet. The new state system will be based on secularism, recognition of multi-language freedom and right to self determination as defined by UN Convention Part VII, article 31 regarding indigenous nationalities. The country will have free and independent media. A scientific land reform policy and program will be followed. The new Nepal will be run as Loktantrikaran i.e. transformation of all state organs (legislative, executive and judiciary in each level), governing institutions, public and private and parastatal bodies. It means all constitutional bodies; security establishment and bureaucracy will go restructure Loktantrikaran (a bit vague and ambiguous). It is also aimed that the new state system will create an equal access and opportunity guarantee to all in the respective decision making level. However, such ambitious mission or objective can be attained in a proportional level as to what level the people are aware. Things do not turn up as smoothly as one expects. The outfit of the Loktantrik Nepal also contemplates that the future role of judiciary will be more transparent, effective and legitimate as responsible to public hearing. How far it will turn to and is possible will be observed in days to come. The Loktantrik pundits have further envisioned having mixed economy, progressive tax system, popular centric budget system and participatory development strategy. The new country is sincerely heading towards peaceful settlement of all political disputes/issues and adherence of equi-proxy and equidistance foreign policy (affairs). The state will comply and follow all international covenants, treaties, conventions, and undersigned as member state of the international community (UN).

The Corridor

The restructure of the state and the election of Constituent Assembly were not felt as utmost necessary prior to the takeover of the power monk King Gyanendra on 1 February 2005. The poor performance of multiparty democracy over the last decade was responsible to bring Maoist insurgency conflict; governments of mosaic traits (more than a dozen governments within a dozen of year) and eventually Royal indirect intervention in 2002 i.e. post house dissolution of Deoba government.

Months of protests, rallies, sit-downs and so on and so forth hardly derailed the indirect autocratic monarchical rule for about three years and fourteen months direct rule. The King Gyanendra reshuffled and changed his three prime ministers and ultimately took the cabinet leadership himself appointing two deputy premiers. In February 2006 his cabinet held the mockery election of municipalities devoid of popular participation, just with 21 percent vote turnout. Except the quarter RPP led by the then home minister, Kamal Thapa, all major political parties had actively boycotted the elections (Sharma 2006: 8 and The Kathmandu Post 27 Magh 2063). National and international media, international donor agencies and some donor countries raised the questions of moral validity of the municipal elections. And even few of them suspended the aid and assistances. The election result demoralized the government itself whereas the SPA and Maoist were encouraged to exert the government to vacate the chair. Kathmandu valley blockade started and highway transportation suspended for few days. Maoist attacks in former two sub-capitals- Tansen (Palpa) and Dhankuta left no room for the occupation of state territory beyond Kathmandu valley. The valley was almost surrounded by the Maoists. They attacked Thankot police station, Dadikot Bhaktapur and Sankhu police posts. The Ring Road (capital) confined government became helpless. By and large the SPA and Maoist fought a decisive street war sans the weapons and surrounded the Narayanhiti royal palace marching and engulfing ahead from Ring Road. On the New Year day, 1 Baishak 2063 BS, the monarch seemed a bit soft towards the movement of SPA. On 8 Baishak he asked the SPA to recommend the name of their prime minister. It was hailed by special envoy of India Prime minister Dr. Manmohan Singh and major donor countries including the West- EU, UK, USA, China, Canada, India, BJP, Kofi Annan and even the house speaker Taranath Ranabhat (The Rising Nepal April 22 2006). By the pressure of the street demonstration, the political leaders rejected the offer of the King and dragged on the Loktantrik flood until the King Gyanendra was compelled to surrender his ambition and his centuries long monarchical throne (institution) to be justified “on the road map of SPA” (The Rising Nepal 25 April 2006).

The synergic forces behind the April movement were categorically and at the forefront- the peaceful agitation of SPA, role of civil society, private media especially Kantipur publications, diplomatic missionaries, particularly the India and USA, Indian political parties, and behind the curtain was the decade long People’s War of NCP- Maoist. And King Gyanendra himself is further responsible for felo de se to make Loktantra success.

The post 28 April 2006, political scenario of Nepal has been marching ahead with based on the 12 point agreement followed by 8 point, 6 point, 25 points code of conducts, 6 point agreement (8 Nov. 2006) and finally 10 points comprehensive peace accord (National Peace Treaty) of 21 November 2006 respectively (The Himalayan Times, 22 Nov. 2006). The peace accord ended the eleven years old People’s War, formed interim parliament, government based on interim constitution and committed to hold the election of CA for charting out the road map of Naya Nepal (restructuring the state) with a new constitution. The challenges for the implementation of the CPA are no less daunting. The political parties involved in the enterprise need to show a working unity until the onset of new order. If the parties start quarrelling for pretty interests as in the past- appointment of hangers-on, flatterers, favorites and relatives without any consideration of merit- the accord is likely to suffer a setback (Baral 2006: 6). The activists/fighters of the struggle for new democracy in Nepal are enthusiastically anticipating a peaceful Nepal where inclusive and participatory democracy flourishes. Let’s hope the dream of the martyrs will not go in vain and the new rulers will walk together with the people leaving their bad notions of traditional rule.

Thus, the challenges and hopes are more towards achieving and fulfilling the aspirations and tragedies of the people but at the same time opportunities to meet the demands of the impoverished people are abundant in the ideological convergence of all political forces hitherto engaged in fratricidal wars and bloodletting. The unbroken unity among all Nepali can make possible of unachievable.

Whether the Newars are janajati or not?

By Malla K. Sunder

To answer this question, we need to understand the category of “Janajati” as it is used in Nepal today. To understand the contemporary use of Janajati, one could turn to the UNO’s encyclopedia entry or to the Vrihat Sabdakosh published by the Royal Nepal Academy. Yet, because these sources do not contextualize the concept in the history and culture of Nepal, they can only give partial answers. So if we are to understand Janajati as it relates to Newars, we need to examine the concept in both its historical perspective and contemporary usage.

In 888 NS., before King Prithvinarayan Shah invaded the ancient Nepal Valley, there were many independent Kingdoms in Nepal, such as Khasan, Kirants, and Måjha Kirånt. These kingdoms evolved into two opposing groups. On one side are the Íåsßaks, who work closely with the Íåhå kings. They include such peoples as the Båhuns, Chhetris, Thåpås, and Basnets. And on the other are the Íåßits, which include the Rai, Limbu, Råjbansi, Tåmång, Sherpå and Newars.

The asymmetrical power relations between these two groups are the main cause of social, cultural, racial, and religious dispute in Nepal. In modern Nepal, the Íåßaks’ domination of the Íåßits has been legitimized by Janga Bahadur’s Muluki Ain (Court of Law), and imposed by the Pachåyat system of government. The Muluki Ain categorized people as either Tågådhåri or Matwåli. Tågådhåris were said to wear the janåi (sacred string) and were considered to be part of the higher Bråhman varna, while on the other hand the Matawålis, who drink alcohol and eat buffalo, were placed in the lower Vaisya and Sudra varna. These asymmetrical positions were enforced by Prime Minister Chandra Shamsher and deeply rooted in the Pachåyat system .

The Janajati movement began in Shråwan 2036 (1979) during a multi-lingual public gathering. The Newars initiated the struggle, not just for themselves but for other dominated groups such as the Magar, Rai, Gurung, Tåmång, and Thakåli. Yet, Newars cannot win this struggle working solely by themselves. All ethnic groups must work together to achieve linguistic equality and the right to practice one’s own culture and ethnic traditions. The goals of the Janajati movement were expressed for the first time in Nepal by Bhasha Mankå khalah. Under the chairmanship of Ramananda Prashad Singh, the Nepal Måtribhåshå Parishad (The Council for Indigenous Languages in Nepal) was formed. And I, as the Secretary of the Council made sure that equal representation on the Council was given to Rai, Limbu, Tåmång, Magars, and all others. Yet the council did not remain active. Hence under the chairmanship of Mr. Sitaram Tåmång, a Sarva Jåtiya Adhikår Manch (A Forum for Ethnic Rights) was formed. Under the auspices of this Forum several press conferences and symposia were held on the problems of ethnic languages and ethnic rights. By the end of BS 2046 (1989AD), the forum came to be known as the Janajati Måhå Sangha (The National Committee for Ethnic Groups). As this short history shows, the concept of “Janajati” developed in Nepal as a way of demanding rights for all ethnic groups.

Equal rights does not apply only to the “Chuche Nåkh” (pointed nose people), nor does it apply only to “Chepte Nåkh” (flat nose peoples). It applies to all people. In short, the question of Janajati refers to any movement for equal rights. How is “Janajati” used today? In Nepal, the exact meaning may differ from other countries. Some people translate Janajati into English as “race,” “tribe,” “clan” or “ethnic group.” And in Nepal some people may use it to mean backward classes and what is known in India as “scheduled casts.” Yet in fact, Janajati translates into American English as “nationalities.” Similarly, the Janajati Måhå Sangh is often translated as the “Federation of Nationalities.” Therefore, the best meaning of the word Janajati is “nationalities.” Even His Majesty’s Government’s (HMG’s) special commission for Janajati is named “Råtriya Janajati Bikås Samiti”.” (The National Janajati Development Committee). The commission has recently published a book titled “Nepålkå Janajati Haru” which adopts none of the words “race,” “scheduled castes,” “backward class,” or “ethnic group,” but instead refers to the Janajati as “Nepalese nationalities.”

Therefore, it is clear that Janajati means nationality (Råstriyatå, Janajatiyatå). Yet, are Newars national or alien? We lost our right to decide these questions when King Prithivi Narayan Shah invaded the Nepal Valley. He took away our right to use our own language, to practice our own religion, to preserve our own cultural heritage. He stripped us of our ethnic rights.

What are Newars? Do they have a place in Nepal or not? If we are demanding our ethnic rights, should we be a part of the Janajati? Excluding Newars from the Janajati movement not only takes away rights, but strips us of our own ethnic identity. In my opinion it is not a matter of pride whether or not the His Majesty’s Government (HMG) includes Newars in the list of Janajati. Nor is merely that if Newars are included they may nominate a person for the Janajati Academy and that they will be allotted a revenue of 10-20 million rupees. Newars do not have a choice; they are part of Janajati movement because they do not belong to the Íåßak group. They are not Bahuns or Chetris.

Since the movement claims the restoration of ethnic rights, why are many trying to exclude Newars from the movement? We must be aware of a conspiracy. It is a repetition of history. Whenever Newars try to claim for themselves their given rights, it is always Newars who stop it. When news programs in Nepal Bhasha were rejected by Radio Nepal, there was a Newar secretary at the Department of Communication. When participants were beaten during a program organized by the Nepal Bhasha Mankå khala· observing the birthday of the great poet Siddhi Das Amatya, there was a Newar Prime Minister.

A few years ago, on the basis of report submitted by Dr. Santa Bahadur Gurung and Dr. Krishna Bhattachan, the Nepalese government had included Newars on the list of sixty-one National Janajatis of Nepal. They had submitted the report after conducting extensive field work and consulting with several scholars from Eastern, Western and Far-western regions of Nepal. They have also contacted the National Forum for Newars, the Newåh De Dabuu”, which recommended that they include the Newars on the list of National janajati . The crucial point is this: When the report was brought up in the meeting of the cabinet ministers in the chairmanship of Prime Minister Girija Prashad Koirala, a dispute of confusion appeared. The prime minister asked for historical, cultural, and social data to consider whether are not Newars are Janajati. Prof. Manik Lal Shrestha, Hon. Padma Ratna Tuladhar, and Dr. Panta, Dr. Bhattachan supplied proof indicating that Newars were Janajati. All the cabinet members, including Minister Prakash Man Singh and and Minister Omkar Shrestha, were convinced that Newars were Janajati. Finally, the report was published in the ‘Nepal Rajpatra (The National Gazette).

The Nepal Bhasha Mankå Khalah is the organization which leads the Newar community. It is a member of the Janajati Måhå Sangh” (the Federation of National Janajati). Yet apparently, on the basis of an appeal submitted by so-called Newar society, Newars were deleted from the list of Janajati without consulting the existing organization. HMG has decided to delete the Newars from the list of Janajati merely on the basis of report registered by two appointed Newar MPs. The two appointed Newar MP’s are supposed to represent the interests of Newars. Yet none of the previously contacted Newar organizations or scholars where consulted.

When anti-Newar activities occur there often seem to be Newars involved in supporting the events. For instance, in the year 2029 (1972) a delegation from the Newar community, including Mr. Satya Mohan Joshi, asked for the king’s audience in the royal palace. They proposed that the language of Newars be called by Nepal Bhasha instead of Newari. At that time Tribhuvan University (TU) had issued a document arguing against the use of the term “Nepal Bhasha,” because of possible confusion with the Nepali language. Since then, TU started using the term “Newari” for the language of Newars. Among the members of the delegation a designated member of the Chwoså Påså (Nepal Bhasha Literary Society) was also there. After receiving audience with the King he started accepting “Newari” instead of Nepal Bhasha.

Often when Newars try to unite, Newars also help divide. For instance, although the National Convention of Newars held in 1995 was a glorious event, the same group has been discouraged from meeting again. Similarly, when the Nepali Supreme Court issued the writ forbidding the use of Nepal Bhasha in local bodies, some Newars published fliers against the outbreak of protest on the Supreme court issue. An unseen force becomes active when ever Newars try to unite. It has splintered many of Newar social bodies. Yet who benefits as long as Newars are divided?

To preserve our right of being Newars, we need to claim Janajati status. On the basis of ten major agendas established by the National Janajati Development Commission, the issue of political influence is the most important one for all. On the one hand the people who are in the Commission claim that the Newars play a significant role in political change in Nepal. It is true that the late Newar leader, Ganesh Man Singh, played a important role in the 1950 and 1990 democratic movements. Among four martyrs, three of them belonged to the Newar community. In 1990, when there was shooting in front of the Royal Palace, many young Newars were in the front lines. They gave their lives for the sake of the democratic movement.

Yet, Newars have gotten no real gain for their sacrifice. As Mr. Bal

Krishna Mabuhang, the Secretary of the ‘Janajati Måhå Sangha, said, Newars are treated like a kept women. Politicians enjoy their contribution but give nothing in return. And when Newars demand proper appreciation, the politicians ignore it. Politically, the ruling group has ignored the sacrifices of Mr. Ganesh Man Singh and all other Newar martyrs.

If Newars play a significant role in Nepalese politics, why don’t they

demand rights for Newars? For instance, when Mr. Tirtha Man Shakya was in the chief secretary why didn’t he extend the use of Nepal Bhasha to local development authorities? And why didn’t Mr. Pasupati Maharjan, who has been in the appropriate government office, engage in activities benefiting the welfare of Newars? Neither could demand rights for Newars, because both were mere puppets. They did not really have the power to make decisions. Similarly, Marich Man Singh, Ganesh Man Singh and Prakash Man Singh are powerless. This is why the Supreme Court banned Nepal Bhasha. This is why we hardly hear from the Ministry of Communication regarding the festivals of Janajati peoples, whereas we hear endlessly about Teej and Rishi Panchami.

In order to preserve the cultural heritage of Janajati, we must claim our political rights. Otherwise we will vanish as a people. The question of Janajati is neither a question of backward classes, nor of race. It is question of equality. If we need to preserve our right we must identify ourselves as Janajati. After the formation of the Janajati Mahå Sangh in 1990, it has become a tradition to include Janajati issues in elections. It also became a part of ninth Five-year Plan to provide rights to Janajati peoples. If we claim that we are not part of it, we will loose our status as Janjajåti. Moreover, we will be denying a section of the budget allotted by the five-year plan to develop Janajati issues.

Are Newars Janajati? Some of us say yes. We claim the right to speak our language. We demand radio programs in ethnic languages. We demand publication of Nepal Bhasha books. And we claim the right for political quotas and the administrative use of our mother tongue. On the other hand some Newars claim that we are not Janajati. The two sides of the questions are in contradiction. It reminds me of the proverb that describes two animals who fight at feeding time. We pick disputes when there is enough food in the bowl for everyone. If we want to maintain the status quo, I can only remain silent. Yet if we want to be part of the 21st century, we must struggle for both social and political multiculturalism. We live in a pluralistic age. In this multi-cultural age, if we claim we are not Janajati, we might be considered foolish. If we do not demand equality of language, ethnicity, and national identity, we will remain the servants of the ruling Båhuns and Chhetries. (This article is translated from the writer’s paper submitted in the symposium on ‘Whether the Newars are janajati or not’ organized by Newå· Råstriya Andolana. The original article ‘Newåta jana jåti kha makhu’ was published in Newå· journal 2000 in Nepal Bhasha.)