A very welcome event

At the inauguration of Exercise  Shantiprayas, a South Asian Peacekeeping Operations Multi-Platoon Training Event (MTPE) involving one platoon each from Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and the USA, the Chief of Army Staff sought endorsement for the proposal that the UN Peacekeeping Training Centre for Royal Nepal Army peacekeepers be declared a United Nations South Asian Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre. This was certainly a most befitting way of affirming Nepal’s commitment to peace throughout the world and the region in particular. The Assistant Secretary General of UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Pacific Command not only praised the calibre of Nepali peacekeepers but also supported the proposal. The subsequent UN commitment that it will back the proposal for establishing a peace centre in Nepal is no doubt a recognition of Nepal’s contribution to UN peacekeeping efforts as also the priority the UN attaches to peace in South Asia.   

The MTPE is the first event of its kind to be held in South Asia. Apparently, the concept of regional peace centres is quite new and there are only a few such centres in the world. Nepal, with four decades of involvement in UN missions to its credit, has contributed thirty-five thousand peacekeepers in various UN peacekeeping missions. While this contribution cannot by any means be called insignificant, the level of    experience gained through involvement in peacekeeping missions will certainly be of great value in training peacekeepers from the region and elsewhere as well.

The relevance of a UN regional peacekeeping centre for South Asia cannot be overemphasized. South Asia is no doubt a most neglected region of the world. It is also the most backward with a high percentage of  population living below the absolute poverty line. Economically insecure and politically unstable, the region is prone to conflict. Moreover, the longstanding rivalry of over fifty years—that has resulted in three wars over Kashmir including the most recent Kargil conflict—between the region’s largest countries, India and Pakistan, does not make South Asia a very safe region.

The end of the Cold War has not really made the world a safer place. The frequency of regional conflicts has increased. And in the context of South Asia, the nuclear capability of both India and Pakistan has made things worse.

In this backdrop, a ready UN South Asian regional peacekeeping body that can ensure peace when the situation so demands has become imperative. The MTPE must therefore be seen as a pioneering initiative in peacekeeping in South Asia.

Mahakali treaty : Progress and problems

-By Rajendra K Kshatri

The Mahakali treaty, taken as a whole,  stands out as one of the most positive spheres of bilateral accomplishment compared to certain antiquated and unequal treaties concluded between Nepal and India in the past. It is evidenced by several facts that this treaty has changed the attitude of the past legacy due to the realization of the unfortunate episode of the Tanakpur agreement. The treaty has not only established Nepal’s entitlement on water but also a secured right on the use of water for possible increase in demands in the future.

In essence, the treaty institutionalizes the process of addressing the issues of water resources in bilateral relations and thereby enhances practical projects of mutual benefit. The principle notes in the treaty  entitled both countries to have equal and similar rights in the use of waters of the Mahakali River. More broadly the treaty also establishes the principles of equality and its process of approving works on boundary waters. Apart from the principles the most lasting and vibrant provision of the Mahakali  Treaty is the constitution of the Mahakali River Commission.

In spite of these positive changes in water resource management, significant shortcomings remain  that temper a sanguine appraisal of the recent trends. Nepal and India both are still considerably shy to implement comprehensive activities in the execution of the treaty. At the outset it is worth stating that recent progress in implementing the provision of the treaty has taken many observers by  some degree of surprise.

 The structure of bilateral relations, sharp differences on water allocation, technical and other details seemed to define the area as a relatively non-promising province for binational cooperation. Progress is evident nonetheless, with the opening of the Joint Project Office of Pancheshwar in Kathmandu, preparation of topo maps and agreements on the bilateral agenda. However, a considerable agenda on the dynamic arena of bilateral policies remain outstanding.

Substantial differences in interpretation of treaty provisions, particularly on the existing consumptive use of waters of the Mahakali River illustrate potential question that arises by the Lower Sharada canal across Indo-Nepal border constructed by India for its irrigation purpose. In fact, it creates a question of downstream benefits to Nepal.

Continually controversial way of working on the part of both the countries has led to a painfully slow development of water resources projects.

The timely utilization of water resources has never been taken into account. Nepal and India have been so adamant in their perceived national sentiment that nowhere one can find critical cooperation between these riparian neighbours.

As is evident in the history, the enforcement and interpretation of treaty provisions have been a periodic source of controversy between Nepal and India mainly due to Indian attitude that tends to look at Nepal as its own backyard. This is why commitments and obligations are often paid less attention by India to enforce them even if they are established by treaty provisions. Assurances are usually made but nothing really moves effectively and quickly.

Moreover, there is no such narrative and descriptive detail in the treaty which may make it easy to understand. This, however, is not a result of the imprecision in the language of the treaty. After all, the document was only a piece of paper whose enforcement depended entirely on the goodwill of both nations. This goodwill is not always immediately forthcoming and so it needs a diplomatic manoeuvring with precise commitments. Due to the lack of such exercise, the treaty concluded in February 1996 could not do anything more than render an empty promise. Especially after Nepal and India developed differences over the interpretation of the treaty with the sharing of waters, different quarters of Nepalese society have changed their interpretations of the treaty according to shifts in political and economic leadership.

To make a larger audience aware of the existence of the treaty, it is necessary for our political leaders to invoke provisions of the treaty so that it might be executed, without compromising national interests. They should also strive to adopt a “collegial” approach in the pursuit of the common development objective in harnessing the strategic resources. Further understanding of the complexities involved is, therefore, of paramount importance.   It is through cooperation rather than by competition that shared water resources could be used best.

The process of fact finding and fact evaluation is to be done for the  detailed design before finalizing the Detailed Project Report (DPR) of the proposed Pancheshwar Project. For this purpose, Joint Group of Experts (JGE) at the technical level of both Nepal and India have been negotiating for quite a long time. However, they have not been able to come out with a concrete solution.

Nepalese parliamentary committee has directed  His Majesty’s Government to make a political move to create a formal network of contact among government officials and experts to facilitate understanding of each government’s positions. Wrong strategies consume time that otherwise could well be used to deploy more appropriate programmes. In contentious boundary references where neither side has full confidence in other’s facts, the commission would, only through its board investigations, be able to determine and win acceptance of the facts of the issues.

All this calls for a greater cooperation to examine such issues in depth and to resolve problems in the long-term. Crisis on both sides of the border provides unique opportunity to view such issues in a broader context and to examine issues that the Joint Group of Experts from both parties have not yet been able to pursue in depth. Given the tremendous urban expansion on both sides of the border, the fact finding on such issues would help both parties to protect the water rights and subsequent utilization of waters as of their entitlements.

These issues on the basis of principles embodied in the treaty can be resolved by the Mahakali River Commission as provisioned in the treaty itself. The commission is to be guided by the principles of equality, mutual benefit and no harm to either party. It  is also supposed to be comprised of an equal number of representatives from both the parties.

 It has been made responsible for making recommendations to the parties for the utilization and conservation of the Mahakali River as well as examining any differences arising between the parties concerning the interpretation and application of this treaty. Despite its presence, the parties also reserve their rights to deal directly with each other on matters that even fall under the competence of the commission. The commission has not yet been constituted. Had it been constituted it might be of help to evaluate, coordinate and monitor plans of actions for the implementation of the treaty.

It would require a great deal of moral and technical influence in any subsequent debates over equity and fairness of allocation of waters. The commission may sometimes fail to reach a decision because of splits along national lines. Nevertheless, the commissioners will bring national point of view to bear with varying degrees of force.

The practices of such river commissions usually provide a sort of a collegial approach in the sense that they come to collective decisions, not under instruction or as representatives of their governments.

Apparently, institutionalized cooperation through the commission has been urgent to provide an appropriate forum for dealing with all aspects of problems presently facing both Nepal and India. Overall nature and the character of the commissioners would reflect the capabilities of the commission. His Majesty’s Government, therefore, should take care in selecting qualified, professional and capable appointees without any political bias in order to implement the provisions of the treaty in the national interests.

Opposite thoughts on art

-By Ajit Baral

Ihave grown up seeing the subtle flow  of colour over a canvas and each brush stroke revealing forms and images, which at times strains and at other times doesn’t, to convey the thematic connotations with mesmerizing felicity. This has invariably rubbed off in me. So, whenever I am around in Kathmandu, I make it a point to visit different galleries and painting exhibitions. Last time when I was here, I was pleasantly surprised to see so many exhibitions. Kathmandu at once had become a centre of Art- a la Paris.

Seeing more than half a dozen exhibitions in different galleries at one time, on Christmas and Millennium eve, I deduce that Nepalese artists had also learned the marketing gimmick (Hussainesque gimmick would be even better),. Good for Nepalese art, though. One foggy morning, I went to an exhibition. Before entering, I read an art review concerning the same exhibition pasted on the door. Well, with forced interest. 'All blandishment', I thought. Went inside and saw- the paintings. But, didn’t find what was written in the review, I condemned myself for being a  novice.  At other times, I have gone and seen the paintings. Childlike scribbles over rough material stuck on the canvas. And, the so-called art critic proclaimed it was a foremost post modernist artist. I have read that medium is subservient to the theme. Not an end in itself. But contented myself that probably, I had misread it and I have no understandings of art. Also, I have seen foreigners' exhibitions. Their work is repetitious, to the extent of being a craft, rather than an art. And, the press goes gaga over them.

The number of exhibitions being organized in Kathmandu augurs well for Nepalese art. Nepalese art has yet to establish its identity in the international art scene. New and young artists are emerging in the national art scene. And, they have dared to discard the passe medium and used different innovative mediums consistent with the intended theme. This experimentation with the medium (to emphasize again, consistent with theme) and forms gives way to creativity. And, frees the art form artistic menopause.

We have the legacy of Araniko and Bal Krishna Sama - both artists par excellence. Only we have to go to NAFA to marvel at the artistic ability of Sama. His landscape of green forest and river below is more real than reality itself. The sheen of light passing through the forest and falling on the surface of a river are portrayed so vividly and in lively manner that even the novice cannot remain uninfluenced by it. And, the rich artistic tradition handed down from one ear to another ear can only exult us with emotive optimism.

The bottom line 

And now the Karmapa affair

-By M R Josse

The recent 1000-km flight from the  Tsurphu monastery in Tibet to Dharmasala in India of the 14-year old Urgen Thinley Dorje, recognised as the 17th Karmapa lama by both Beijing as well as the Dalai Lama, has created large-size waves -- and that not merely in the arcane world of Tibetan Buddhism.

Nepalese angle: Virtually re-enacting the escape of the Dalai Lama to India from Lhasa in 1959, the Karmapa’s dramatic arrival on January 5 in Dharmasala has deeply embarrassed China; wildly enthused the expatriate Tibetan community; delighted the traditional anti-China lobby, particularly in the West; and, ostensibly at least, placed India in a diplomatic spot.

Yet, ramifications of the Karmapa’s defection to India are likely to be experienced here in Nepal too. For one thing, although denied by Foreign Minister Dr Ram Sharan Mahat, it is becoming increasingly and embarrassingly evident that in travelling from Tibet to India, the young monk, the reincarnated leader of Tibet’s second most important Buddhist sect, did in fact transit through Kathmandu.

As much has been borne out not only from multiple reports in the Indian media; they have also been buttressed, for example, by a detailed Time magazine story (vide January 17, 2000 issue) datelined Dharamsala. Therein, inter alia, it is thus disclosed:

“The Karmapa and his party walked across the border with Nepal and travelled by horseback and via public transport to the capital Katmandu...From Katmandu the group crossed into India, passing through Lucknow and New Delhi. They travelled to Dharmasala by train and taxi, arriving on Jan. 5 to an emotional welcome.”

Coming as this dramatic development does so soon after the hijacking episode -- and New Delhi’s relentless pressure on the government to accept Indian control in the management of security affairs in this kingdom -- it has several important foreign/security policy implications for us.

For starters, if it is established that Nepal connived with interested parties in facilitating the Karmapa’s defection from Tibet and his onward journey to join the Dalai Lama, the dire results on the Nepal-China relations front can well be imagined. 

The possibility that at least one anticipated outcome of the Karmapa’s carefully engineered flight and clandestine journey through Nepalese territory was precisely that cannot be  discounted, specially given the efforts currently underway to ensure that our foreign relations are now guided by New Delhi.

On the other hand, even if no official agency was involved,  that does not preclude the possibility that private/foreign help and assistance was made available in Nepal in a move designed, among other things, to establish, as the Americans have recently pronounced, that “repression of religious activity” by China forced the teenaged reincarnate lama to flee to India.

What has been clearly established is that China’s security can be as adversely affected by the open Nepal-India border as India claims it impacts on hers, not to mention the serious effect on Nepal’s fragile security system and demography, assaulted by the constant flow of illegal immigrants and, even, criminal elements.

Indian perspective: At the time of writing, the Indian government has moved cautiously in pronouncing its official stance, specially in light of Beijing’s veiled following warning:

“The Indian side has said in explicit terms that Tibet is an inalienable part of China. It has also stated that the Dalai clique cannot carry out political activities...We hope the Indian side will strictly honour its commitments on the relevant question so that bilateral relations can improve and develop.”

Although it has been widely reported that the Dalai Lama has requested the Indian government to grant the Karmapa political asylum, South Block has thus far been maintaining the fiction that no “formal” request for such has been received.

On the other hand, influential newspapers often known to reflect India’s point of view have made numerous suggestions, all downplaying the palpable political significance of the issue and emphasising India’s reluctance in offering the monk sanctuary.

Of note in that context is that the Karmapa’s defection is a non-political act, as is presumably his reported request for asylum! Another imaginative idea is that since the “religious leader” is a “minor” -- a clear contradiction in terms -- “unless his parents or legal guardians insist that he return to Tibet, no Indian court can allow his forcible expulsion from this country.”

The official Indian stand on the question will probably be in the public realm by the time this write-up sees light of day. In the meantime, it is interesting to note that while some hint that there would be a hefty diplomatic bonus for India if she pleases the West -- principally the United States -- others believe that political asylum to the Karmapa would hurt India’s  national interest by only reinforcing the Beijing-Islamabad nexus.

Coincidentally or otherwise, no sooner had the Karmapa reached Dharmasala than Julia Taft, US assistant secretary for population, refugee and minority affairs, found it convenient to travel to that picturesque, isolated Himachal Pradesh township.

What is also enormously interesting, coming to think about it, is that the Karmapa defection has taken place not too long after the Clinton administration appointed a special envoy for Tibet and stationed her in India. 

Equally riveting is that at about the time as the Karmapa decided to hightail it from Tsurphu, the Clinton administration undertook a campaign to censure China in the UN Human Rights Commission. Which way will the Indian cat jump: pleasing the US or China? Or, will she attempt to placate both and end up pleasing neither?

That should be educative not least since the Vajpayee government includes “free Tibet” defence minister, George Fernandes, who famously made a trip to the Nepal-China border and chanted anti-Chinese slogans from Nepalese soil, as well as foreign minister Jaswant Singh who believes India “gave up every single right of ours in Tibet” (vide Singh’s book, Defending India, p. 35).