In a way, BBC became the victim of its own success. Its well cultivated image of an impartial, objective and universal truth medium places upon itself unrealistic expectations from the public. If BBC were to become more modest in acknowledging its own limitations of cultural, ideological and imperial positionality in the global contest of ideas and interests, the public outrage might not have been as great.

BBC’s mantle of fairness and objectivity is relative at best: the British media’s coverage of the current round of Palestinian-Jewish conflict is a case in point. Likewise, there is a continual deferment of judgment on the autocratic, despotic Middle Eastern rulers who supply cheap oil, but righteous zeal and passion in going after those nations that are not as compliant towards British interests, whether economic or strategic. We fear and respect BBC and the likes not only because they are the voices of truth and fairness but because they carry consequences - the ability to manufacture reality in one’s service through strategy of selections, silences and exclusions.

So when BBC posted the topic "Can Nepal survive a resurgent India?" for a website discussion on South Asia, the poser could be simultaneously read as a neutral question and a value judgment on the non-sustainability of the Nepali nation-state.

The impassioned debate ensued on the Web and overflowed into Nepali media. Most of the reactions fell into two categories. The first was the usual condescending Indian exhortation that Nepal would be better off by entering into the Indian Union, or at the very least, coming under the Indian umbrella. This view is perhaps best exemplified by one Satya Ramiah from India/USA who posted on the website "there is no doubt that an Indian state of Nepal has a much brighter future than the nation of Nepal."

The other was the typically nationalist reaction which vehemently opposed the insinuation that Nepal should unify with India. The nationalistic position has two distinct undercurrents: the genuinely innocent, almost naive outrage of the romantic, and the perfunctory notes from cynical officialdom.

Ever since the Sugauli Treaty of 1816 with the British East India Company, the successive ruling elites in Nepal have engaged in a massive myth-making project to mask a certain contradiction, a certain lack in their own character. Instead of acknowledging the defeat and the limitations placed on Nepal’s options, they have chosen to deny this reality and to create a form of what historian Pratyoush Onta calls "Bir History". Acknowledging defeat at the hands of the English would lessen their legitimacy and credibility among those whom they ruled. More importantly, acknowledging national constraints would place the burden on the rulers to do something about this debilitating condition and undertake liberational engagement. Unfortunately, this is a task Nepali rulers of all hues continue to loathe and cringe from.

Instead, the ruling classes engaged in cultivating the myths of victory, bravery, sovereignty and independence which excused Nepalese rulers from the imperative of undoing the straitjackets imposed by the Sugauli Treaty and the successive agreements concluded with India.

A critical look at the events of the 1950s show the continuation of colonial control even after the departure of the British and their dependents, the Ranas. Wily Jawaharlal Nehru cornered the tottering last Rana Prime Minister Mohan Shumsher and extracted a new treaty that was more regressive than the one Chandra Shumsher had concluded with the British government in 1923- actually the Accord of 1950 is closer in spirit of the Treaty of Sugauli than anything else. Mohan Shumsher is an emblematic character of the Nepali ruling class whether autocratic or democratic - ready to cut any deals with foreign powers for getting into and remaining in power. But all that concession could not save Mohan Shumsher’s regime. Less than a year after he signed the Treaty of Friendship that was more insidious than the one surrendered by the Sugauli Treaty India had found more promising partners in Nepal and the Ranas were given the sack.

Forty years down the road, there was another watershed in Nepali politics when the Panchayat regime was pushed over to make room for multiparty system. Like the determining Indian role in the "revolution" of 1950, New Delhi made the crucial difference in the outcome of the Jana Andolan of 1990. From the ramparts of Kathmandu, Chandra Shekhar delivered a fiery clarion call for the launching of successful People’s Movement against Panchayat. The Indian leader’s call to arms was so mesmerizingly powerful that tapes of the speech were circulated throughout the countryside to mobilize revolutionary zeal against the old regime. It is, too bad Shekharji has not found the time to take a trip to liberate the long suffering Bhutanese masses from the despotic Drukpa ruler.

Like the inability of the ruling class to accept the limitations placed on Nepal’s sovereignty by the treaties of 1816 and 1950 (and of course 1965, 1990 and 1992), the new establishment now refuses to acknowledge the foreign intervention in 1990. In that sense, there is no difference between the post 1816, 1950, 1960 and 1990 rulers. In contrast, the Americans have no shame or guilt in publicly acknowledging the contribution of the Frenchman Lafayette in their war of independence against the British. That is because there were no strings attached for the revolutionary favours, or underhand concessions for external interference.

After strong reactions from the public and the Nepali government, BBC rephrased the debate into "Should Nepal develop closer ties with India?" and this seeming act of remorse from the BBC placated the nationalist slight. However, on closer examination, this seemingly redundant question is far more problematic than the earlier version.

A more appropriate question would be: How close should Nepal-India ties be? Better than anyone else, the British and the BBC know the status of the three Himalayan nations of Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan vis a vis British India during the colonial times. After the British vacated the subcontinent in 1947, the new Indian republic assumed the imperial burdens of the White Man towards the three kingdoms. A republic that had emerged from a glorious anti-colonial struggle chose to continue colonial and semi-colonial relations with its own smaller neighbours. In that process Sikkim was annexed by India in 1974, Bhutan’s foreign and defence matters have been usurped by India while New Delhi already has a de facto deterministic role in Nepal’s political and economic processes. So when BBC suggests closer ties with India, how close is "closer"? From its already dependent status, how close can Nepal get before approaching the Bhutani or the Sikkimi level of intimacy with India?

The nationalists’ claim that Nepal is a country that was never colonized is only a half truth, the fact of the matter is that it is a country that never got decolonized. Successive ruling families and classes have made sure that possibility of full liberation never registers as a necessity with the masses. So from a Nepali citizen’s point of view, the present problematique is to first firmly acknowledge Nepal’s de facto dependent status; and secondly, start the arduous task of liberation from the constraining relationship with India. Only after that point can closer ties with India be mutually dignified, beneficial and just. Shouting hoarse at BBC or others alone does not constitute nation-building or patriotism.

By Bishwambhar Neupane

When I was in the peak of my teens, I used to fall in love with beautiful girls walking down the street. If I happened to see them often, I used to have fantastic dreams about going out on dates with them and amusing them with small talk. In college or outside, if a girl looked at me more than once, I used to be dead sure that the girl had fallen for my charms. Then, I used to be mentally prepared for answers to their every query. But the woe was, she never came near me. One thing that I did not do in my life was learn from numerous past experiences. I always assured myself saying, "This girl looks different" and waited for that difference. I always hoped for it to happen but the years went by and so did numerous girls.

School days were over, I had not matured. But the college days were different. I was in sports, hardly attended classes (but I regularly attended theirs). I was tall, dark but handsome. Given all those qualities, I was surprised none of the girls even borrowed a pen or anything from me. Soon I Sc years were gone. But I prepared myself for B Sc, especially after those long hard experiments and experiences.

What has suddenly cropped up against Mankad? The argument that the preparation of the next budget required a different type of person does not gel because the last budget, which Finance Minister Yashwant Sinha described as one of the best, was essentially Mankad’s. In reality, a budget is the spelling out of Finance Minister’s suggestions.

Understandably, he cannot fire himself. The real reason is the Finance Minister himself. He has failed to make his promise of seven percent growth good. It is nowhere near that and he has been looking for alibis. He has been instructing Mankad to give an explanation or issue a press note on matters which were in the domain of Economic Affairs Secretary Dr E A Sarma. This was a topic of running discussion between Mankad and the Finance minister. Mankad was so unhappy that he even offered to resign.

The government’s annoyance was also on another count. Mankad is said to have written a note to point out that creation of the three new states might be good politics but bad economics. Where is the money? The question he supposedly posed is correct. At least, Chattisgarh and Uttrakhand are not financially viable. The Centre will have to give them subvention to enable the wheels of administration to turn. Mankad should have been appreciated for his candid opinion, not punished.

A senior civil servant has given me yet another explanation: Mankad was not pliable. A top industrial house often found him coming in the way of its scheme of things. Poor Mankad has been having a rough deal for many years. His functioning had begun to have an impact on the Information and Broadcasting Ministry but he was shunted out from there.

The matter attracted little attention at that time because he was appointed Finance Secretary. Again, he was due for promotion to the Cabinet Secretaryship but he failed to make it because he had no godfather. Andhra Pradesh Chief Minister N. Chandrababu Naidu had his man, Prabhat Kumar, hoisted to the position.

To lessen the shock over Mankad’s transfer in industry, finance and business circles, it has been given out that Mankad would succeed Ramachandran, India’s representative on the Board of the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Will Mankad ultimately get that position is anybody’s guess. The government works under pressure. He does not seem to have any to apply it. Had he been in that position, he would not have been unceremoniously removed from the Finance Ministry and relegated to the Department of Industrial Policy and Planning.

The basic question is why do such transfers take place? Are ministers becoming power hungry or have industrial houses acquired so much clout that they can use it to remove a recalcitrant officer? Had there been transparency in the working of the government, it would have been possible to understand the logic of impetuous transfers. Apart from rhetoric, the Vajpayee coalition is as opaque as any previous government. I wish the Prime Minister had implemented his statement that the transparency in his government would be complete.

Sarma is another upright officer, who has been punished for his frank views. Sarma has been a financial wizard all through his career, serving as economic adviser to various ministries. That a person of his calibre could not gulp down humiliation is understandable. But what a loss it is to the country which needs the best of advice at this juncture when the government has made a mess of economic activities.

There are also reports that some officers at the PMO wanted to fix both Mankad and Sarma. Whatever the reasons, there is no doubting the element of likes and dislikes have come to count with senior politicians. Some ministers and industrial houses have come to be the two sides of the same coin. This is what is influencing decisions. A few courageous officers, who oppose the nexus between politicians and money bags, will be hurt by transfers.

The deterioration in the law and order field -- it is well known by now -- is because of the frequent transfer of police superintendents and others in the state. Political masters in the states have made a mockery of the force by putting pressure on it to do or not to do a certain thing. The result is that obedient hands have the best of posts, whatever their calibre.

It looks as if the Central government is following the same methods in the field of administration. There have been too many and too frequent transfers of secretaries and officers of equivalent rank. The entire administration is beginning to reflect the same decay as the police cadres in the states do.

The Secretary is an institution which no government should be allowed to tamper with. Secretary-level officers should have a fixed tenure. Only then will they be able to express their honest and independent opinion. With the Vajpayee government, there is yet another trouble: it is posting only such officers, who enjoy its trust, at high positions. Mrs Indira Gandhi called it ‘commitment.’ The nation paid a heavy price for that.

During the emergency (1975-77), she was able to change the bureaucracy, called the steel frame into the ‘seal’ frame. Even top civil servants became instruments of tyranny because of the threat of
transfer. Desire for self-preservation, as subsequently admitted before the Shah Commission by a number of public servants at various levels, had become the sole motivation for their actions and behaviour.