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Kathmandu Monday October 02, 2000 Aswin 16, 2057.
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The army's role
Media spotlight on the army's role during
the Maoist attack on Dunai and after has brought to the fore the unfortunate uneasy
relations between the government and the Royal Nepal Army (RNA). At the heart of the
controversy is the question: who is in charge? Just before his resignation Friday last,
Home Minister Gobinda Raj Joshi slammed the army for not cooperating. Apparently, the army
was supposed to block the entry/exit points to Dolpa so that the police strike force could
close in and prevent the Maoists from escaping. According to Joshi, the army had not done
its bit. On the other hand, the Defence Ministry, which is under Prime Minister Girija
Prasad Koirala, responded with a clarification that came as a slap on Joshi's face.
According to the Defence Ministry, the government preferred to use alternatives other than
mobilising the army to resolve the problem of insurgency. Joshi's resignation was
thus only an impulsive reaction. There was hardly any sense of moral responsibility for
the Dunai and the Lamjung attacks which claimed 22 police lives within three days. More
important than Joshi's resignation are the confusing signals the government has been
sending about its relationship with RNA. It is high time this relationship was clearly
defined. In this process, the government must be able to assert its authority over RNA
because the country cannot afford to have a renegade army. If constitutional amendments
are required for this then they should be effected forthwith.
If indeed, as the Defence Ministry claims,
RNA is really under the government's control, then the government is guilty of not using
the army to rescue the besieged police officers, and of failing to protect the bank and
district administrative office, the lives of people and property. The government cannot
use the pretext of preference for other alternatives and allow the army to stand by as
Maoists carry out attacks on the police and threaten life and property. This is not
advocating that the army should be mobilised. In fact, we have always held that a military
solution will not work and that a political solution is always preferable. This however
does not mean that the army should stand by refusing to respond to situations like the
Dunai attack. If the need arises the army may have to be mobilised but the orders must
come from the government.
As things stand at present, it appears that
the possibility of resolving the problem through political means has not yet been
exhausted. The problem is that instead of trying to negotiate a settlement the government
opted for creating a special force to combat the Maoists. This is the government's
alternative means of resolving the Maoist problem. Obviously, this means additional
expenditure of some billions of rupees. Equipping and training the said force is also
going to be time consuming. By that time the damage would be incalculable if the army were
to simply stand by. The government therefore has to come up with a decision regarding the
army's role very soon otherwise it could end up giving the impression that it is not
really in control of the situation.
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