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Kathmandu Thursday December 20, 2001 Paush 05, 2058.
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Least
developed countries after Doha
By Ratnakar
Adhikari
Whilst the 1980s were
dubbed the "lost-decade" for developing countries in general, the 1990s have
become the decade of increasing marginalisation, inequality, poverty and social exclusion
for least-developed countries (LDCs) in particular. The decade of 2000s may well become a
decade of rhetoric and inaction, if the present trend is not reversed. Forty-nine LDCs of
the world, which are home to 10.7 percent of the global population have 0.5 percent share
in global GNP. Further, despite resounding rhetoric, their share in global trade is
rapidly falling and it stands at 0.4 percent at present. These figures are scandalous to
say the least. The efforts made so far to integrate them into the multilateral trading
system have largely failed.
One of the attempts in
this regard was the United Nations Third Conference on LDCs held in Brussels in May 2001.
This Conference too, like most other international events, could not provide much needed
relief to the LDCs in terms of better integrating themselves into the global economy. Most
of the commitments made during the Conference were at best ‘non-biding’ in
nature.
Despite meager
achievements made during the Brussels Conference, LDCs were of the view that whatever
precious little has been achieved during the Conference should be included in the Doha
Ministerial Conference (November 2001) in order to ensure that they are made binding. In
fact one of the objectives of Zanzibar Meeting of the LDC Trade Ministers (July 2001) was
to achieve this objective.
The Zanzibar Meeting
did come out with concrete proposals not only on Brussels issues but also on many other
fundamental issues, including but not limited to, the development agenda. The core issues
raised by the meeting included, inter alia, market access to LDC exports and full and
faithful implementation of existing provisions with special reference to the Uruguay Round
Agreements on agriculture, trade in services, subsidies, technical barriers to trade,
trade-related investment measures, textiles, and intellectual property rights.
However, the momentum
gained during the Zanzibar Meeting could not continue in Doha, due to several reasons.
Firstly, developed countries thought that there were other pressing needs during the Doha
Ministerial Conference than listening to the pleas of the LDCs. Secondly, the issues of
LDCs got diluted because of the fight between developed and developing countries on
implementation issues versus a new round (which also implied possibility of inclusion of
new issues). Thirdly, LDCs, as a group, despite being generally cohesive, could not create
required dent at the Conference. Finally, part of the blame also goes to the leader of the
LDC camp, who mixed up LDC concerns with a heterogeneous group of ACP (Asia, Pacific and
Caribbean) countries.
Despite these
shortcomings, the following sentence contained in para 42 of the Ministerial Declaration
could be considered the single major achievement for LDCs at Doha: "We commit
ourselves to the objective of duty-free, quota-free market access for products originating
from LDCs. In this regard, we welcome the significant market access improvements by the
WTO Members in advance of the Third UN Conference on LDCs (LDC-III), in Brussels, May
2001. We further commit ourselves to consider additional measures for progressive
improvements in market access for LDCs."
Contrasting this with
the formulation of Brussels Plan of Action, it becomes evident that Doha offers a much
better formulation, even though in reality developed countries might not do anything in
this regard. Further having realised the attitude of both developed Member Countries as
well as WTO to merely provide lip service, LDC ministers insisted on a time bound work
programme for the Sub-Committee for Least Developed Countries to design a work programme
concerning trade related elements of Brussels Declaration and Plan of Action and to report
on the agreed work programme to the General Council at its first meeting in 2002.
Similarly, the
following sentence contained in the para 43 of the declaration relates to Integrated
Framework: "We request the Director-General, following coordination with heads of the
other agencies, to provide an interim report to the General Council in December 2002 and a
full report to the Fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference on all issues affecting
LDCs." This statement could go a long way in providing a concrete shape to the
so-called Integrated Framework for Trade Related Technical Assistance – the programme
aimed at remedying the supply side constraints faced by LDCs.
There is a sporadic
mention of LDCs in several places in the Doha Ministerial Declaration and the two other
documents, namely, Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and
Public Health and Implementation Related Concerns attached to the same. They relate to,
inter alia, marginalisation, accession, services negotiations, industrial tariff
negotiations, investment, competition policy, trade facilitation, environment, debt and
finance, technical cooperation and capacity building, and special and differential
treatment.
In some respect the
Doha Ministerial Conference can be considered an attempt to overcome semantic barriers. On
the positive side, the implementation related concerns and TRIPS and Public health issues,
which were adopted as the trade-offs to make the developing countries agree to a new round
are likely to prove beneficial for the LDCs as well. However, a number of proposals made
by the LDCs during the Zanzibar Meeting were unheard of during the Doha Ministerial. For
example, they were resolutely opposed to the launching of a new round, but Doha did launch
a new round. Similarly, the market access text does not cover most of the decisions made
during the Zanzibar Meeting. The declaration did not even move an inch forward on the
accession issue, which is being considered a major stumbling bloc in the process of
LDCs’ integration into the global economy.
Nonetheless, on the
whole, the Doha Declaration should be considered the second best for the LDCs, given their
limited political capacity to influence the Conference outcome. Since the first best was
not possible during the Conference, they had to settle for the second best, which they
did. Something is still better than nothing.
Finally, what does Doha
mean to a country like Nepal, an LDC aspiring to become the member of the WTO? The answer
is, "virtually nothing" because the accession process still continues to be a
torturous and acrimonious power-based game where countries don’t get what they
deserve, but what they negotiate. Nepalese officials who were waiting the outcome at Doha
to move forward on the accession trail will have a bitter pill to swallow.
(The author is
currently based at Bern, Switzerland)
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