 |
Kathmandu Friday December 21, 2001 Paush 06, 2058.
|
Is long-lasting peace possible
?
By Dr Alok K Bohara
In an old movie, two macho guys play
"chicken" by driving their cars towards a cliff, and the one to swerve away last
is to be declared winner. There is no optimal way to play this game, because in order to
win you have to be willing to keep driving until you fall off the cliff. All options are
bad and even a simple draw would require both to swerve simultaneously. This is the game
scheme that has been used to describe the Cuban missile crisis between the US and the
Soviet Union.
The purpose of this article is to explain a
game theory bargaining model of the current situation between the government and the
Maoists, and show that the latest decision of the Maoists to revert back to violence was a
miscalculated irrational move, which, among other things, has plunged the nation into deep
chaos and unrest.
In any conflict, a simple game consists of
two players each with two options — to negotiate to solve a dispute and perhaps
settle for some form of compromise (A) or to act on the threat points (insurgency or army
reprisal) to escalate the conflict (D).
The escalation options under the state of (D)
result in three possible outcomes: a complete victory and a hope to win the entire reward,
a possibility of losing everything to the opponent (as in Afghanistan), or a drawn-out
costly conflict (as in Sri Lanka). Since the escalating route is risky and expensive, the
warring parties tend to stay away from this option unless there is a (perceived) benefit
of starting a conflict (B or C) to gain some bargaining advantages (eg, Arafat’s
refusal to accept Barak’s offer at Camp David and his decision to restart the
Palestinian Intifada). Because of the mutual fear of each other’s credible threat
points, the parties generally would not prefer to stay on B or C for a long period of
time; they tend to move to a Nashe quilibrium solution A, which should be a second best,
but a preferred scenario for both (ending of the cold war instead of continuing a nuclear
stand-off). If one party does not have an ability (or reluctance) to act on its threat
point, its opponent’s best strategy is then not to come to the negotiating table, but
to act on its own threat point and stay there, weaken the opponent’s position as long
as possible, and improve its bargaining position (ie, staying on the off-diagonal
positions B or C ). For the last six years, the Maoists stayed in position B, and showed
no interest in moving to the negotiating table (outcome A).
The reason was that the beleaguered
governments could not demonstrate that its threat point to wage any reprisal was credible.
As a result, the Maoists’ strategy to stay in position B payed-off: (1) they became
financially strong through various bank raids and fund raising, (2) generated positive
public support, (3) enjoyed party squabbles, (4) increased rebel recruitments, (5) raised
doubts about the army and the palace’s ability and resolution, (6) enjoyed watching
the Congress leaderships oust each other. Further, as predicted by this model, without
moving from B to A, the Maoists made the governments give up on numerous issues such as,
untouchability, property rights for daughters, land reforms, anti-corruption acts, and the
biggest prize of all, the resignation of Koirala. In return, the Maoists gave nothing.
According to this game, they did not have to,
and, notwithstanding the reasons, it was the "fault" of the previous governments
for not being able to generate any popular support in creating a credible threat point to
push the rebels towards the negotiation table. Thus, aside from the motives and problems
surrounding him, Koirala’s game was theoretically right all along in his firm stance
in demanding permission to use the army to face the Maoists. If nothing else, it would
have shown the rebels that the government’s threat point was not without teeth, and,
if the government had been successful, it would have forced the rebels to come to the
table with some reasonable offers. Granted that there was a possibility that a military
move by an unpopular government, on the other hand, would have resulted in a totally
unpredictable outcome. Nevertheless, with Koirala gone, rebels came to the table
swaggering with a litany of non-negotiable demands such as, a place in the interim
government, abolition of monarchy, and establishment of a republic, demands that they knew
would be rejected by the government.
In order to keep the Maoists in state A, the
new government tried to show its good faith by undertaking many initiatives that the
rebels found totally unattractive (eg, bills related to issues of land
reform, property rights, and outlawing untouchability). Their negotiating agenda is so
diverse that they don’t even negotiate within the same domain. Both sides spend time
strengthening their respective positions. The Maoists buy time to gain strategic
advantages, and they show no interest in making any conciliatory moves to a "less
than powerful opponent." The government spends time building its PR with the palace,
the army, and the people, and hopes to engage the Maoists in state A (negotiation) for as
long as it can, but at the same time it cannot offer any new initiatives attractive enough
for the rebels. From the Maoists’ point of view, it is a foot dragging and a
stalemate, but from a game theoretic point of view, it is a stable state. Sensing a static
gap between their positions, and with no new revenues flowing in due to suspended
activities, the Maoists take a decision to break the talks. They also continue to believe
that the retaliatory threat point of the government was still not credible. This is where
they made a fatal error. By this time, the September 11th event had already tipped the
balance of power, and had altered the nature of the bargaining game completely in favour
of the government. Namely, now the government’s ability to act on its threat (army
reprisal through emergency) was real and highly credible. With this new state of affair,
any move from the rebels toward B would have been met in kind, landing both of them in
state D. Armed with international backing in the wake of the September 11 event, the
government called their bluff and decided to act on their own threat point. Further, a
direct attack on the army was just a part of a new strategy for the rebels to up the ante,
but it created a totally different backlash. Now this game has moved from A to a new Nash
equilibrium point D, which is not necessarily a desirable solution for the country and its
people, especially given the fact that the ultimate outcome - a long-run peaceful state -
is still uncertain. People are losing their lives and there is no guarantee that complete
peace will be achieved. Could they have played this strategic game differently to avoid D
and perhaps settle for a mutually agreeable second best outcome A? Yes. The rebels,
sensing a changed post September 11 world attitude towards terrorism, could have stayed in
the negotiating state A by offering some alternatives (eg, asking for federalism instead
of socialism; see Dec 6th TKP; What next for Deuba?), and avoid probably a complete
annihilation by a now highly motivated, strong Nepal Army.
Similarly, the government could have shown a
sense of generosity by starting to negotiate within the context of a common domain of
give-and-take (again, by offering to allow some form of regional self-reliance mechanism
–federalism or some other political concessions), knowing fully that the opponents
were more interested in the political power sharing opportunities rather than the
legislative laws and promises of good governance. Is there a hope to get the country out
of D? Can the country benefit from a peaceful measure to avoid any future conflicts?
The answer should be yes to both questions,
and a possible ten-point formula may look as follows: (1) The Maoists declare an
unilateral cease fire and cease all forms of offensive. (2) They agree to work within the
current framework of the constitution. (3) They immediately free all abducted civilians
and government officials. (4) The Maoists drop their demand for a republic state, accept
monarchy and the multiparty system of government. (5) The government in turn ceases its
counter offensive. (6) The government offers a constitutional change to implement some
form of federalism —a political decentralization mechanism to promote regional
self-reliance or some other political concessions. (7) The Maoists renounce violence and
publicly declare their respect for the constitution and agree to join the political
process. (9) The rebels begin to surrender arms. (9) The government lifts emergency and
provides amnesty for the rebels. (10) Within a year thereafter, a fresh election is held
to move the country forward. These are some preliminary thoughts without any intended
order. One may argue that the unilateral declaration of a cease fire may constitute a sign
of weakness and will not generate any incentive for the government to cease its own
counter offensive.
In April 1998, the British government signed the
Good Friday agreement on power-sharing –despite the fact that the IRA had already
declared a cease-fire. You may never know; Deuba government may feel morally obligated to
act in a similar manner to restore peace and harmony in the country, so that it can focus
on more important issues. After all, King Gyanendra himself has been quoted as expressing,
" ...I am extremely sorry that Nepalis are fighting each other." Nevertheless,
the Royal Nepal Army currently needs our utmost support, so that they can bring about
peace and tranquillity to this impoverished nation of twenty-four or so millions of
hardworking proud Nepalis.
Other Stories
|
