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| Kathmandu, Monday February 03, 2003 Magh 20, 2059. |
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Negotiating an end to internal
war
By ANUP K PAHARI
The latest cease-fire between the government and
the Maoists, and renewed prospects for a negotiated settlement, have signaled a temporary
halt in the slow death of the nation. For the second time in as many years, albeit in
different political circumstances, the Maoists and the Nepali state are poised to pursue
peace over war. That it has taken such devastation in human lives and institutions to
arrive at this point of initial truce should not take away from the enormous courage and
determination of the agents who initiated this venture.
This time around, those at the peace table will
deliberate in an environment of unimaginably high expectations and a margin of error so
slim it is almost non-existent. Theirs is not an enviable role by far. It is, however, a
role that people who trade in the currency of power and public expectations have
pre-approved and must face up to. To see this process to its desired end they will need to
draw on untold reserves of patience and perseverance, with matching support from us all.
But, that is not all they will need.
War perpetuates itself without conscious effort
because revenge and recrimination wage themselves. Waging peace, on the other hand,
demands deliberate, consensual and coordinated human effort. It is heartening that the
billigerents in Nepal appear to have surveyed and acknowledged the mounting indications of
the futility of imposing a unilateral "solution" to what are society and
polity-wide disorders. There are now signs of consensus where it counts that it is no
longer possible to "solve" the crisis by waiting it out, fighting it out, or by
political maneuver, co-optation and classical Nepali divide and rule strategies. The
Maoist insurgency is unlike any other social movement in Nepal’s history and is
liable to resist solutions that have worked in the past. Indeed, the present crisis has no
"solution" other than a negotiated resolution.
As negotiations proceed and hit the myriad
turbulences that they inevitably will, it may seem at times more straightforward and in
the interest of each side to seek the dubious remedy of continued war. It has happened
once before in the history of our own tragic conflict, and has plagued peace efforts
worldwide from Guatemala to Mozambique at various stages. While individual circumstances
differed, the return to war resulted in each case from a misreading of the nature of the
conflict and gross errors in judging renewed conflict as the better alternative to a
negotiated peace.
There are no guarantees that the peace process
in Nepal will be immune from such episodic crises. By attempting to provide a degree of
clarity on the core issues, this article seeks to reinforce on the general public and on
the parties entering into negotiations that even when viewed from the depths of the
darkest and most hopelessly fruitless periods in the dialogues, a negotiated settlement
will still remain more preferable, achievable and in the long-term interest of key parties
compared to any unilateral "alternative" or "solution." This article
is written with the purpose of making a reasoned and realistic case that dialogue and a
negotiated settlement are the only alternatives for ending Nepal’s current crisis.
The case as it is laid out argues from three interrelated yet distinct angles that a
negotiated resolution stands out as the only way to bring peace and to democratically
re-institutionalize the needs and interests of the three parties in conflict –
monarchy, political parties and Maoists.
Negotiations and nature of the conflict: A
negotiated end to hostilities is dictated by the nature of the conflict itself.
Highlighted below are the major intrinsic dimensions of the political impasse in Nepal,
which together make the crisis highly resistant to non-negotiated
"solutions."
1) Three-way conflict: Most known internal
conflicts involve two parties – typically the state vs armed rebels. In Nepal’s
case it is no longer a two-way (state vs Maoists) but a three-way contest – political
parties vs. Maoists vs monarchy. If unilateral victories are hard to come by in protracted
two-way contests, they are near impossibilities in three-way conflicts. There is no
"solution" other than to seek a resolution.
2) Composition of Maoist movement: While we
speak of the Maoist movement in singular monolithic terms, it is in fact a movement
composed through the intertwining of class, race/ethnic, regional, and gender interests
and identities formed in opposition to real and perceived "oppressors." Thus,
the will and motivation of Maoist leaders and cadre draw on deep and multiple wells of
domestic discord over fundamental issues expressed and cemented through the ideological
doctrine of revolution. Only talks and negotiations can begin to untangle such deep-seated
social and ideological antagonisms and reach the human communities that harbor them.
Again, there is no "solution" other than to seek a resolution.
3) Constitutional crisis: The present
Constitution is moribund. In the current climate it is not only the Maoists but also
mainstream political parties and members of civil society that see a need to revisit
fundamental constitutional issues. Thus, the current dilemma goes well beyond the Maoist
insurgency and has converted into a full-blown constitutional crisis. Redesigning the
nature of the Nepali polity must not be conducted in the battlefield; rather, it is a task
best tackled through talks. Once again, there is no "solution" other than to
seek a resolution.
4) Advanced stage of insurgency: Guerilla
insurgencies are said to progress in four steps. The movement enters the third stage when
it is able to replicate state-like structures and functions in the areas under its sway.
The fourth and final stage of the guerilla insurgency is reached when entire regions come
under the active control of rebels. By all accounts, Nepal’s Maoist insurgency has
crossed the third stage and is entering the fourth stage, making it a politically
"dug in" insurgency. The "people’s war" has also found ways to
become economically "dug-in" through a countrywide network that systematically
"mines" public and private assets yielding tens of millions of rupees each month
in unaccounted and discretionary income to the managers of the "people’s war. As
politically and economically "dug-in" as the Maoist insurgency is, it is most
difficult to foresee any "solution" other than to seek a resolution.
5) External factor: Internal wars usually have
external linkages. Cuba, Mexico, Nicaragua, and the United States were active in Central
America and contributed in their own ways to the intractability of the domestic wars in
the region. It is clear by now that although "Maoists" by name, Nepal’s
rebels have deeper and more extensive ties with India than they have with the Beijing
regime. What is not clear is exactly what role official India plays or does not play in
either condoning or curtailing the Maoist insurgency in Nepal. Complicating this further
is the documented alliances that Nepali Maoists have forged with numerous communist
movements in India, making official India’s involvement or lack thereof somewhat
moot. In brief, the "India factor" throws in a number of imponderables into the
mix that together heighten the need to generate a domestic consensus for a peaceful end to
hostilities. Precisely because Nepalis do not and cannot fully know India’s position,
there is no "solution" other than to seek an internal resolution.
(To be concluded)
(The author is a sociologist based in the
US)
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