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| Kathmandu, Wednesday March 05, 2003 Falgun 21, 2059. |
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‘Cease-fire’ and
after
By RAM SHARAN MAHAT
The most positive side of the national
scenario after the so-called ceasefire between the government and the Maoists is obviously
the relief from violence, notwithstanding cases of kidnapping, intimidation and extortion
which still continue in parts of the country side. Even more important is the eagerness of
the Maoists to join the national mainstream, which is apparent from the manner in which
they are sending their emissaries to political leaders as part of the confidence building
exercise.
Meanwhile, political forces - particularly
the Maoists and the government - are at work to maneuver the present fluid situation in
their favour. The government appears to be trying to prolong the present transition period
as much as possible to prolong its own life. The Prime Minister has expressed his wish to
handover the reign-of-power to the elected government as soon as possible, making it clear
in no uncertain term that he does not favour another interim government. If Minister Pun
is to be believed, the peace process which involves numerous steps including finalisation
of the code of conduct, ‘goodwill’ talks, preparation for the round-table
meeting, the round-table meeting and peace talks could take a year and more.
The Maoists have deftly manipulated the
situation substantially to their advantage already. The government readily accepted their
three demands even before the beginning of formal talks. By promptly announcing a fairly
representative and inclusive negotiating team and starting a strong public relations
exercise, they have succeeded in sending a positive message. By making the government
accept their three demands even before the start of peace talks, they are coming
over-ground to expand their organisation and mobilise people to their strategies
objectives without any fear of arrests or any action for their past acts. Encouraged by
their initial success in the bargain vis-a-vis a weak government, they have come up with
more demands such as release of their comrades behind bars under various charges, repeal
of the anti-subversion and terrorism act and confining the army to their barracks. It is
their intention to treat the areas wherefrom the security forces withdrew presence in the
wake of organised Maoists attacks in the isolated countryside as their ‘areas of
influence’ and expect the government to recognise that. Obviously, they want to
delimit the national character of the present government and its security forces carving
out therefrom a space for themselves. It is as if the whole country is divided into two
parts—one controlled by the government and the other controlled by the rebels. For
them it is a negotiation between two ‘governments’ backed by military strength.
This probably explains the delay in the finalisation of the code of conduct.
The problem is inherent in the specific
nature of the present situation itself. The political forces and parties who are familiar
with the intricacies of the power game and receive direct feedback from their grass-root
workers are not directly or indirectly involved in the present process. When negotiation
takes place between a weak government without popular support (and whose constitutional
states itself is questionable) and a highly organised and clever entity as the Maoists,
the outcome is predicable. Events subsequent to the ‘cease-fire’ have already
shown that.
The most intriguing side of the present drama
is the complete neglect of the interest of those who have been the principal victims of
the politics of violence of the last seven years. I mean those people in the countryside
who were not part of any side of the conflict -the Maoists or the security forces- but
suffered the most. The widows who lost their husbands and children, and those whose
fathers and sons were slaughtered in front of their eyes, people with broken legs and
amputated arms— victims of the so-called Janakarbahi, people whose houses were looted
and burnt and forced to leave their villages, and so on. Those who did not leave their
villages were forced to pay protection money. This remains the reality even now.
The government, however, seems unconcerned
about their plights. The voice of political parties has not been strong, although they
themselves have been part of the victims. Even the civil society and human rights
organisations have remained silent spectators. One question: Are the people now free to
lead peaceful life and enjoy freedom guaranteed by law. Can the people—the social
workers, teachers and local leaders who were forced to leave the country side because of
their social status and leadership position—go back to their village to lead a normal
life from now onward without fear for their life and property? Is the country life free
from extortion and intimidation? Unfortunately, the elitist view prevailing in the country
does not reflect the real situation of the rural areas where one hardly sees improvement
in the situation except the absence of selected annihilation and brutal physical attacks
on individuals. Is the state not responsible for guaranteeing the freedom of its citizens,
at least, after the declaration of the cease-fire? Why did it not form part of the initial
package when the government met the Maoists demands but did not insist on anything in
return?
The fundamental reality is there will be no
peace atmosphere as long as the Maoists continue to hold arms, which remain the source of
terror and intimation. It is for this reason, the displaced group of political workers,
social activists, teachers and other local leaders have not returned homes, despite the
declaration of the cease-fire. Activities of political parties have not extended beyond
the district headquarters. A fair and healthy political competition between armed and
unnamed groups is impossible anytime, anywhere. After the cease-fire, the Maoists have
been free to build their organisation openly and mobilise people without giving up arms.
This remains the irony of the whole situation. The proposed code of conduct may not allow
the rebels to show arms in public places, but maintaining and enforcing the same is
impossible given Nepal’s geographical condition, and highly dispersed settlements.
Another interesting casualty of the present
political development has been the neglect of the Constitution which remains the
fundamental law of the land even at present. As the constitutional status of the present
government itself is questionable, few people would except it to be serious about
constitutional provisions. As for the Maoists, the whole purpose of their movement is to
destroy the present Constitution. For them, the legitimacy of their violent methods will
be established only after the formal demise of the present Constitution. It is for this
reason that they are insisting on a constituent assembly to formulate a new constitution,
although the end product could be created even with suitable amendments to the present
constitution. The formal abrogation of the Constitution will formalise their victory and
legitimacy of the method used which eventually will reinforce their case to lead an
interim government which goes naturally to the victorious party. They have also no use for
the restoration of the House of Representatives demanded by Nepali Congress and some other
parties, as the proposed round-table conference will work as the future legislative body.
Under such circumstances., the political parties who have faith in the present
Constitution should have been committed to making it work through scrupulous
implementation of its fundamental provisions for which the existence of the House of
Representatives is a pre-requisite. Any deviation from this will only open the door for
further breaches which ultimately will render the Constitution irrelevant.
(The author is former Finance Minister)
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