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| Kathmandu, Thursday March 27, 2003 Chaitra 13, 2059. |
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Reasons
for cease-fire
By MANGAL SIDDHI
MANANDHAR
The present cease-fire
is a welcome respite for all Nepali countrymen. We all very much want the cease-fire to
continue and turn into durable peace. We also want all parties concerned to refrain from
doing anything that would break the cease-fire.
Irrespective of the
fact that the present cease-fire is a much sought after respite, it is quite natural for
all of us to want to know how it came about. I do not claim to know all the reasons for
the present cease-fire. I would, however, like to present here some of the reasons that I
think are important. The reasons presented here are not necessarily in order of
importance.
The very first reason
is the "strategic balance" which Maoist leader Dr Babu Ram Bhattarai claims to
exist at present between the warring parties. He further theorises that cease-fire and
talks become necessary with the existence of the strategic balance or equilibrium between
warring factions. Dr Bhattarai even refers to the British defense department report and
American military specialist Tom Marks work entitled Maoist Insurgency Since Vietnam
to support his contention. Successful insurgencies, according to many studies, generally
pass through three political and military stages. The first is the stage of
contention characterised by mobile warfare with a hit-and-run tactic. Further
development of insurgency brings about the stage of strategic balance or
equilibrium with full-time guerrilla army fighting guerrilla war with certain areas under
its control. Dr Bhattarai claims the Peoples War of the Maoists to have reached this
stage. The third stage is the stage of counter-offensive politically and
regular war military. This is the stage where guerrilla army defeats the
government army in a straight fight and takes over the whole country under its control. I
do not know whether the present Maoist insurgency has any prospect of progressing beyond
this strategic balance and challenging the government army in a regular
war. But definitely the insurgency can continue for a long time bringing death and
destruction to the country. The realisation on the part of the Maoists of no-win situation
or strategic balance and the necessity of cease-fire and talks as part of their struggle
is an important reason for the present cease-fire.
Second, equally
important is the realisation of His Majestys Government, though belatedly,
that gun alone cannot defeat the insurgents. Initially the HMG of Nepal thought of
finishing-off the Maoists by bringing in the military to the field. But even after almost
two years, the security forces are far from defeating the rebels. The government ignored
the nature of guerrilla warfare and did little to win the hearts and minds of the people.
It is Maoist terror tactics of extortion, abduction, murder, intolerance to differing
opinions and destruction of development infrastructure that prevented them from becoming
more popular. The government, too, woke up with a rude shock that even superiority in
number and arms without proper motivation to fight is not enough and took a sensible road
to cease-fire and talks.
The third reason for
the cease-fire is the change in the external condition. The external condition is not only
important it can prove decisive in an insurgency. The Maoists have been using the open
southern border to move easily in the Indian territory for safety, supplies and support of
many kinds. In fact, the Maoist ability to use the Indian territory as a safe haven has
lot to do in raising the level of success of insurgency in Nepal. However, in the last few
months, the news of the arrest of the Maoists in the Indian territory became more
frequent. There is a definite indication that Indian territory has turned increasingly
hostile. This, in my opinion, is another cause leading to cease-fire.
The forth reason is the
increasing American and European military involvement in Nepal. The entry of American and
Belgian guns in Nepal was not to the liking of India. India, this time was not able to
prevent the entry of third country arms to Nepal nor is in a position to retaliate like in
1989 with an embargo for bringing arms from China. India felt that Nepal was not paying
enough attention to Indias security concern. Even more objectionable to India was
the growing American military involvement. This probably was the reason for suddenly
turning Indian territory more hostile to the Maoists. This new condition, in my opinion,
forced for a quick cease-fire and talks to prevent increasing
military involvement of third countries in Nepal.
The fifth reason is the
qualitative improvement in the security force of Nepal. Already a thousand army men have
been given special counter-insurgency training by American advisers. Security forces are
being equipped with American and Belgian arms. The ability to respond quickly has been
greatly enchanced with the introduction of several night-vision equipped bullet proof
helicopters. The Maoists, on the other hand, are finding it difficult to recruit as many
young people have left their homes. The Indian territory has become very hostile to supplies.
Thus, no qualitative improvement corresponding to security forces have taken place in the
Maoist guerrilla army and the possibility of strengthening the Maoist guerrilla army is
becomingly increasingly difficult..
The sixth reason is the
absence of a clear cut objective of Maoist insurgency. No insurgency can succeed without a
clear-cut objective. In all successful insurgencies, a clear cut objective is a must, in
which most of the people could support and identify with . The Maoists certainly did not
have that kind of objective. Every passing day, the Maoists seem more confused about their
objective. The Maoists took up arms and entered the jungle with a list of forty-point
demands seven years ago. In the course of the insurgency, the Maoists made constituent
assembly and republic their main demands. They have already given up the republican
agenda, but the demand for a constituent assembly without republican demand is very weak.
Even the constituent assembly is now claimed to be only a process, not the goal. It is
becoming increasingly difficult for the Maoists to justify the violence of the last seven
years. At this critical time, cease-fire and talks were a better alternative than moving
towards a confused goal.
The last reason , of
course , is the will of the people for peace and security.
(The author is
former vice chairman of National Planning Commission)
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