Following Chen Shui-bian’s Election Beijing-Taipei Ties

By M.R. Josse

WHILE major public attention in South Asia has focussed on US President Bill Clinton’s Bangladesh-India-Pakistan excursion significant development have been unfolding in East Asia too.

CHEN SHUI-BIAN: Those have taken place against the backdrop of Taiwan’s second presidential election which took place in March 18, 2000 and which resulted in the victory of former Taipei mayor Chen Shui-bian of the Democratic Progressive Party.

While Chen’s victory over his three main rivals was slender, it has effectively ended over 70 years of continuous KMT rule, 51 of them in Taiwan where KMT’s General Chaing Kai-shek took has followers in 1949 after losing a long and bloody civil war to Chinese communists led by Mao Zedong.

Indeed, one immediate outcome of Chen’s historic electoral triumph was the resignation from KMT party leadership of President Lee Teng-hui (who, however, retains his executive position until Chen’s installation on May 20) which took place amid a massive show of disenchantment by the party faithful.

Most Taiwanese voters desired to end what was seen as pervasive KMT corruption and arrogance. They were also reportedly attracted to the anti-graft, pro-democracy platform of Chen, the only one of the leading presidential candidates born in Taiwan.

For the world at large, however, the significance of Chen’s electoral victory has to do primarily with prospects — immediate and long-range — of war and peace between China and Taiwan.

That is, of course, due to Chen’s pro-independence stance in defiance of dire and repeated warnings of war from the Chinese leadership prior up Taiwan’s second presidential election.

To recall, prior to the March 18 election, there was a barrage of warnings from Beijing to Taiwanese voters against backing independence from China, including that from President Jiang Zemin, Premier Zhu Rongji and top military generals.

However, despite the angry rhetoric on that issue from China which also placed its military on full alert, Chen, in his victory speech, pointedly rejected Beijing’s “one country, two systems” formula for reunification.

Chen emphasised, instead: “We should insist on Taiwan’s independent sovereignty. This is not our job, this is our mission. We are determined to safeguard this land.”

Having said that, Chen however, went on, more soothingly, to add the following caveat: “We would like to engage in comprehensive communication and dialogue with China....We would like to negotiate with China on the so-called three links of investment, trade and military mutual trust.”

DIALOGUE: He also said he would welcome a visit by the Chinese premier Zhu Rongji and by Wang Daohan, Beijing’s top negotiator with Taiwan. Chen also indicated that he was prepared to go to China for peace talks “which would lead to a friendly resolution of the cross-strait issue and promote cooperation with China.”

Chen, however, is known to change positions quite frequently. Indeed, in the last months of his campaign, Chen toned down his position on independence, seeking to win the support of the large number of Taiwanese who favour the status quo and oppose both independence and reunification.

Then, on the very eve of his campaign, Chen neatly turned Chinese threats to use force if necessary to thwart Taiwanese self-declared independence into reverse gear by declaring that he would only move towards independence if China invaded Taiwan.

Equally significant are recent news reports from Taipei suggesting that the Democratic Progressive Party is likely to drop the pro-independence stance which has provoked threats of a military response from China.

While that remains to be seen, no less noteworthy is that despite fiery bluster from Beijing on the Taiwan independence issue, China did not this time — as in the 1956 election — lob missiles on the sea lanes of the Taiwan Strait, leading the United States to rush two aircraft carrier groups.

According to some experts, China and Taiwan will continue shadow boxing for sometime to come, particularly on the issue of how to define the “one China principle.”

In that context, analysts recall that Chen said a 1992 agreement between Taiwan’s Straits Exchange Foundation and China’s Association for the Relations Across the Strait on a “common understanding” of the one China principle, could lead to talks.

Others suggest that Chen’s remarks that he would set up a multi-party commission to decide how Taiwan deals with the mainland are significant as “this would allow Chen to say that despite the stance of his party, he is accepting a multi-party position in the interests of all Taiwan, while allowing himself a ladder to climb down from this previously stated position.”

That, too, remains to be seen. In the meantime, what also merits note is that world leaders have urged Taiwan to settle differences with Beijing by opening talks. It is particularly significant that American President Clinton, even after hailing Chen’s victory, gave not the slightest hint that he was moving away from adherence to Beijing’s “one China” policy.

MILITARY BALANCE: On another plane, Taiwan continues to hold a decade-long military advantage over China: although Beijing has more men than Taiwan, according to experts, its equipment is inadequate for the costly high-tech warfare of the 21st century.

On the other hand, China’s growing arsenal of missiles could neutralise Taiwan’s defense advantage. China recently announced a 12 per cent increase in its defense budget citing, among other things, concern over proposed US arms sales to Taiwan.

The US is committed under the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, to provide sufficient arms for Taiwan’s defense, although it is not clear if that would stretch to military involvement specially if a Republican is elected as the next American president.

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