Civil Conflict & Development Efforts
Mapping Out Conflict-Related Risks

By M. R. Josse

THE SPATE of clashes between Maoist insurgents and the state’s law and order personnel underlines, among other things, the fragile linkages between civil conflict and development efforts.

IMPACT OF CONFLICT: Follows below an insight on conflict-related risks to development and conflict reduction opportunities, based on a preliminary report by an international development agency which recently conducted an enquiry on that important theme.

Given space constraints, we look only at the report’s findings on (a) the impact of the ongoing conflict on development programmes; (b) the impact of development programmes the ongoing conflict; and (c) conflict reduction opportunities, under the following heads: security, political, economic and social.

As far as security aspects of (a) are concerned, the report identifies the following elements as conflict-related risks. Maoists, it says, target development "as a matter of policy." However, it adds that such "opportunistic attacks" on agencies are "by rogue elements of the Maoists."

Development agencies are in any case then caught "in the middle of increased police violence’; in such a climate of deteriorating security, access to rural poverty focused programmes is —quite naturally—no longer possible.

Specifically, "local partners are targeted". Consequently, agencies cannot retain staff. Another unfortunate impact is that whole communities are themselves displaced.

There are, then, a number of conflict-related risks of a political nature. Among them: that "political polarisation makes it increasingly difficult to work ‘cross lines’".

Thus, the "You are either with us or against us" syndrome takes over. In practical terms, it means that there is "increased pressure on field staff to show pro-government or pro-Maoist political allegiances."

In such a situation, "log term programming becomes increasingly difficult as government becomes more fractured and unstable." Besides, it is only inevitable that, in such an atmosphere, government partners are "no longer able to work outside the district centres."

Clearly, there are also several impacts of an economic nature. Among them is the "decline of banking facilities in rural areas." Another is that there is increased ‘wastage’ levels—an elliptical reference to "resources taken by the Maoists."

Not surprisingly, a "decline of government infrastructure, local investment, productive activities and markets mean programmes are no longer sustainable."

Furthermore, there is "declining space" on the social front, with social capital being "eroded" and there being "increased trauma and internal displacement, growing distrust of outsiders" with "target groups reluctant to get involved in aid programmes."

IMPACT OF PROGRAMMES: The report referred to here also briefly catalogues conflict-related risks from the point of view of the impact of programmes on conflict.

In the security category, the report indicates that "programmes that necessitate large gatherings of people may increase security risks for communities." Also, that "security risks associated with working with the police e.g. strengthening their capacity to wage war while having limited affect on their accountability."

The report also identifies several political conflict-related risks, as far as the impact of development programmes on conflict is concerned. Among them: that an "uncritical attitude to the government may encourage an escalation of counter insurgency."

It is apprehensive that "support for decentralisation may acentuate tensions between the centre and the districts."

Likewise, it fears that "civil service reform could accentuate competition and conflict within the bureaucracy" as also that "porgrammes that involve working with the government may either reinforce patronage systems or overtax and undermine the government’s already limited capabilities."

On the economic front, it believes that "high input programmes may feed directly into the war economy or criminalised networks. Interesting, too, is the possibility that "programmes may undermine
existing coping strategies, increase people’s level of risk and vulnerability and therefore increase the likelihood of them joining the Maoists."

At the social level, report writers anticipate that "mobilisation of communities e.g. literacy classes and forestry user groups may provide a point of entry for radicalisation by Maoist sadres."

CONFLICT REDUCTION: The report offers the following ideas on conflict reduction opportunities. In the section on security, it is of the view that "aid agency presence helps provide protection for communities as risk", as also that "security reform could reduce human rights abuses by the police force."

Politically, it recommends "support for local government to provide services in conflict affected area" as also "support for policies which promote greater decentralisation and participation."

Likewise, it believes that support should be there "to facilitate negotiations between the government and the Maoists" with the government being lobbied sensitively "to keep talks going." The building of governmental institutions "which help manage conflict more inclusively" is suggested and also "strengthening the implementation of human rights instruments."

In the economic arena it is suggested that "coping strategies and community resilience" be supported and that there be "sensitivity to the distributional effects of aid programmes’. Poverty alleviation efforts should be implemented in remote areas, as also provision of employment and income generation opportunities.

Socially, confidence-building with affected communities, "within the framework of a democratic state" is recommended as also identification and support of local capacities for peace.

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