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December, 2003

Political

Nepal's Peace Process: Most Likely Scenario

by Dr. David Scott Palmer

Nepal is in a particularly difficult moment at this time. The government lacks the legitimating effect that democratic status would provide and is further weakened, at least until recently, by a seemingly improvisational approach to the peace process. The Maoists, for their part, have pursued a superior strategy that exerts constant pressure with sets of demands designed to keep the government off balance and on the defensive. In addition, both sides' determination up to now to try to work out a peace process without outside intermediaries seems on balance to have favoured the rebels and to have worked against the government. Furthermore, with the decision by the major political parties to oppose the current regime, the government is further limited in its ability to participate in the peace discussions from a position of relative strength. Adding to the uncertainty is the way in which the rebels have used the peace talks, not to find a solution to the conflict, but as a strategic ploy to regroup before launching another military campaign, as they have done in the past. Finally, the widespread perception, advanced by both sides, that an agreement could be hammered out quickly once they sat down together and began to negotiate seriously is completely at odds with experiences elsewhere and created expectations among the general public that were bound to be dashed.

Nepal's situation is further complicated by its neighbour, India, whose government is in a position to play a significant role in the process and is doing so in multiple ways - from providing military assistance and advice to the king, on the one hand, and yet on the other continuing to give the Maoist leadership safe haven and strongly opposing a role by the United Nations (which has offered its assistance). From an outside perspective, it would seem that India's interests in Nepal would be best advanced by its wholehearted and unequivocal support for the government in the peace process. Some, however, see India's involvement as contributing to the perpetuation and exacerbation of Nepal's internal crisis and setting the stage for an eventual direct intervention. Whatever India's motivation and ultimate objective, however, there is no question but that its role will be a significant, perhaps even vital, factor in the Nepal conflict and its eventual denouement.

Given these multiple considerations as they bear on Nepal's peace process, the "best case" scenario represented by El Salvador's experience is unlikely to be achieved unless the government is able to bring back the political parties on its side by restoring democracy and develops a more effective negotiating strategy, and until the Maoists become convinced that a genuine negotiated solution is in their interest as well. The evidence available also suggests that the "worst case" scenario of Nicaragua is an equally remote possibility unless it turns out that the Royal Nepal Army and the Armed Police are much weaker than they appear and that the Maoists have more popular support and armed strength than seems to be the case at this time. With the break down in talks and rebel resumption of their people's war, the Peru scenario is a distinct possibility if the military and police gain a greater intelligence capacity and tactical mobility to go with their superior numbers and equipment, and the Maoists suffer a loss of local support and significant defections as the result of their terrorist tactics. The likelihood of a Guatemala scenario for Nepal is premature, because there has been to date no real advancement in the peace negotiations and thus no accord that fails to be implemented fully. However, the Guatemala scenario also conveys a warning for Nepal if and when a peace accord is reached concerning the pitfalls of incomplete implementation.

Five Peace Process Scenarios from Latin America

1. El Salvador scenario (the successful resolution of conflict through negotiation and implementation)

Government and rebels were able to work out a peace settlement that brought the insurgents back into the political system as a political party of the left. It also included the turning in of arms by the rebels and their retaining and reintegration into society as farmers, tradespeoples, and members of the national police or armed forces. In the ten years since the agreement, electoral politics have become routinized at both the national and local levels. The left has gained over time a majority of elected mayorships and municipal councils as well as an increase in its congressional representation to become the second largest political party in the country. The former rebels may even be in a position to win the presidency in the upcoming 2004 national elections.

2. Peru scenario (an example of successful resolution of conflict through defeat of the Maoist rebels of Shining Path)

Although the insurgents were never willing to engage in negotiations and at one point, after more than a decade of people's war, appeared to be poised to win a military victory, the government was able to regroup and decisively overcome the challenge. It did so through major changes in the military's approach to the insurgency that involved better intelligence, smaller and more precise field operations, numerous civic action initiatives in affected communities and neighbourhoods, and both training and modest arming of local civil defense committees that had emerged to try to prevent the guerrillas from successful attacks on their villages. The government also instituted special courts to try captured rebels quickly and instituted a "repentance law" to encourage defections and provide support to reintegrate the former Shining Path sympathizers and militants back into society. In addition, authorities began a new set of small microdevelopment programs in Peru's poorest localities that residents selected on the basis of their own individual priorities and took responsibility to organize the community to implement. The results of this multifaceted approach produced a rapid and impressive reduction in conflict, significant reduction of extreme poverty, the restoration of a continuing government presence in Peru's periphery, and an increase in citizen security. While Shining Path has recently shown new signs of life, it remains small and isolated and poses no threat to most citizens or to the state.

3. Colombia Scenario (efforts by the government between 1998 and 2002 to engage the rebels in peace negotiations ultimately failed, and conflict resumed)

Although guerrilla activity remains high and well financed by access to drug trafficking resources, the government has become stronger both militarily, through significant US support of Plan Colombia, and politically, by retaining a democratic process with significant citizen support in spite of multiple obstacles and continuing high levels of political violence. The rebels have been forced onto the defensive and have lost most of their domestic and international support by their sabotage of the peace process and intemperate terrorist actions. While resolution of the conflict remains more a hope than a reality at this time, the government appears to be gradually regaining the initiative, and Colombia may soon be able to return to a more normal and more secure political reality. New peace talks could well be an element of this process.

4. Guatemala Scenario

This country went through a long and arduous peace process that produced, as in El Salvador, a successful negotiated settlement between the government and the insurgents with many of the same elements, but without effective implementation. Unfortunately, not all relevant actors were willing to accept the outcome, and some have engaged in selective assassination and disruption during the past eight years. In addition, some political leaders have acted irresponsibly as well, producing over time a gradual erosion of democratic form and practice. While the agreement remains in place, there is much concern that reality on the ground is slowly producing a situation in which larger scale political conflict and violence could return at any time.

5. Nicaragua Scenario

Here the insurgents defeated militarily a non-elected government that refused to make accommodations and engaged in massive repression against the population, provoking widespread citizen rejection of the regime and a complete loss of support by the international community. The victorious Sandinistas moved to consolidate their revolution, but in the course of doing so committed their own excesses, provoked the intervention of the United States through surrogate counter-revolutionaries, and gradually alienated many of their own citizens. When the Sandinistas held national elections in 1990, with full expectation of victory, they were surprised by their defeat at the polls. While the more open democratic process that resulted was far from complete or even effective, it has been able to maintain itself for more than a dozen years and appears likely to continue.

Which of these five scenario drawn from Latin America experiences best reflects the likely dynamic in Nepal's own efforts to find a solution to the country's political violence?

While nothing is certain at this point, the scenario that seems most probable is that of Colombia, in which neither the authorities nor the rebels can agree on terms for peace and violence resumes, but with the advantage slowly shifting towards the government as it gains greater military capacity through outside support and the insurgents find they are unable to retain their earlier strategic and tactical advantages. This scenario is now developing in Nepal with the breaking off of peace talks and, among other Maoist initiatives, an urban terrorist campaign directed at the capital - much as Shining Path initiated in Peru in the late 1980s. In Peru's case, it was this urban terrorism that finally galvanized the elites to change their approach to dealing with the insurgency, a change that eventually produced results. While Nepal's situation is different because it has involved peace talks by the parties to the conflict, it may take such an event to convince the government that it must change its approach to resolve the conflict. In this context, the possibilities for further negotiations will increase if both sides conclude that stalemate rather than victory is the most probable outcome.

At such a juncture, a peace agreement becomes a more likely possibility, though not without a lengthy period of working through the issues. The inevitable adjustments that will have to be made for any negotiated breakthrough, as drawn from other experiences, vary with the relative strength of each side, the quality and skills of the negotiators, the pressures brought to bear by civil society, and the influence of external actors.

What might be some of the balance points that could produce an agreement that both sides - and their constituencies - could live with? Drawing on the complex and multi-layered dynamics present in Nepal, one can discern a number of possible balance points that could be part of such an overall peace agreement. Such specific resolutions of issues need to be sequenced so that the points on which agreement might be more easily reached should be dealt with before the more difficult problems to help build mutual confidence and trust as well as momentum for further progress in the negotiations.

1. An interim government of transition within the context of a constitutional monarchy that includes invited representation by all major political parties - including the CPN (Maoist) - at the cabinet level.

2. Preparation for national and local elections by this transitional government at a date certain.

3. A change in the election law and/or amendment to the constitution that provides for representation in parliament by ethnic groups and women is some fixed proportion.

4. A change in the electoral law and/or amendment to the constitution that introduces proportional representation in place of first past the post for the election of members of parliament.

5. The continuation of the cease fire and the code of conduct, with specific steps toward demilitarization, beginning with the withdrawal of armed forces on both sides to specific designated locations.

6. The disarming of rebel combatants in the context of a general amnesty, the reduction in the size of the RNA and the Armed Police, and the retraining of selected ex-combatants for integration into the national army and police, with other ex-rebels offered retraining for reintegration into national society.

7. Effective political decentralization that includes the principles of ethnic and gender representation, hiring and firing authority, and funding levels to ensure effective operation.

8. A strengthened CIAA with sufficient funding, authority, and capacity to effectively implement its anti-corruption mandate, thereby strengthening democratic legitimacy.

Such a set of negotiated balance points would be more likely to be achieved by both sides if there is a prior commitment by international and outside funding agencies to provide substantial new financial support to implement infrastructure and microdevelopment programs when a comprehensive peace agreement is reached. It is also likely that some of the more difficult steps, particularly any demilitarization and rebel disarming agreement, would need to involve the presence of a respected international entity, such as a United Nations peacekeeping mission, to be able to be carried out. Finally, serious negotiations have the best chance of advancing if they remain closed and confidential, with a single individual chosen to present general information to the media and the public.

(Excerpted from a report presented to USAID by the author who is conflict mitigation and prevention specialist in Boston University)

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