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Cover Story |
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VRS Experience Corporate
downsizing by retiring the employees earlier than the completion of
their tenure is widely used to address problems caused by changes in
technology or the market demand. But this method of Voluntary Retirement
Scheme (VRS), or the "golden handshake" as it is also called,
is frequently disturbing the proverbial hornet's nest in Nepal
triggering a spate of trade union opposition on the one hand and
expression of concern from the armchair intellectuals about the addition
of some hundred or thousand persons to the group of the unemployed. In
this context, it was no surprise that the recent effort by the two
ailing public sector commercial banks - Nepal Bank Ltd.(NBL) and the
Rastriya Banijya Bank (RBB) - to retire some four thousand people
through VRS was almost proving a failure had not the banks added more
facilities at the last minute. An
analysis of some of the experiences so far in VRS implementation in
Nepal reveals interesting lessons. The
primary problem associated with this scheme seems to lie in the lack of
a national policy on worker retrenchment. The Labour Act is completely
silent about it. The employment safeguards measures in Nepal are quite
strong in favour of employees (see box in Page 45). The
country's labour law has not incorporated any provision for VRS. Though
it has some provisions for 'pay-offs' and 'lay-offs', these are not
sufficient provisions for the private sector which is constantly
demanding for a clear system to regulate the exit of the firm from a
business by retrenching the employees. The situation now is likened to a
case in which though the person is dead the doctors have not declared so
because the family says it lacks the money needed for the last rites of
the deceased. This analogy better fits some public enterprises which are
already bankrupt, but the declaration is not made because in that case
there should be enough fund arranged to pay off the employees. Though
some private sector companies have successfully implemented VRS, the
success is attributed to the understanding shown by the employees.
Another
very interesting finding is that though there are many cases of VRS
implementation recorded, the learnings from the previous experiences
seem to be rarely used in the subsequent schemes. The method is used
more in public enterprises (PEs) in the course of their privatizations,
though it is also used by some private sector organisations. And neither
the PEs nor the private sector corporates seem to be following a broad
policy framework. Each company seems to have implemented its own scheme
structured uniquely. This difference was there also in the NBL and RBB
example and one of the reasons for that was the unique personnel rules
that these banks (and any other institution) has. For example, while NBL
has a pension system, RBB has life insurance system. The retirement
package was to be different also to address these differences in the
personnel rules. One
important point of criticism to VRS seems to be based on the fact that
these schemes are found to be focused only on the cash benefits that go
to the people who are retiring under the scheme. Being silent about the
benefit for those who will remain in the company after the VRS, the
scheme is looked upon with indifference by the staff members not
entitled for the golden handshake. At the same time, those employees who
are eligible for VRS find it a tricky decision. If they opt for VRS they
may lose the opportunity of hefty pay rise that the organisation may
introduce later. If they do not volunteer to go out now and such pay
rise is not introduced by the company later, they will lose the
additional benefits offered in the present scheme.
As
one explanation of the reason why the NBL and RBB schemes initially
received a cold response was the recent development in Nepal Rastra Bank
where there was a very substantial increase in the allowances to the
employees. Since traditionally the public sector banks follow the lead
of the central bank in salary and allowances, the employees in NBL and
RBB were expecting similar rise in their salary and allowances in the
near future. Similarly,
the latest schemes of NBL and RBB, as the earlier ones in different
organisations also lacked anything as to the future career of those who
retire. If evaluated on the basis of the bulk of the money offered, the
VRS package from Solid Waste Management Company is perhaps the heftiest
among all such packages so far in Nepal. But it is reported that some of
the ex-employees of this company simply spent off the money they
received as they did not know how to invest it. More importantly, the
employers who send their people away on VRS do not bother to keep track
of their ex-employees. There is no motivation for ex-employer do such
monitoring.
At
least in this regard there seems some consideration made in NBL and RBB
case. It is reported lately that the World Bank has promised a fund of
1.2 million US dollar to train the NBL and RBB people who take VRS so
that they would be able to continue with new economic activities.
However, the banks themselves have no motivation to conduct such
trainings or counselling. May be it would be a good idea to set up a
specialized agency to conduct such activities. But the sources say that
the government has not shown any interest. Contribution
or Sacrifice? Both
of the principles - contribution and sacrifice - can be found being
followed while implementing VRS in Nepal. Under contribution principle,
the people getting VRS are compensated on the basis of their
contribution to the organisation. Usually, the number of years of
service is taken as the level of contribution that the employee has
made. Hence, higher the number of service years completed, higher the
VRS compensation package and vice versa. In sacrifice principle, the
employees taking the VRS are compensated on the basis of the sacrifice
that they have made by opting for VRS. Under this principle, the lower
the service period of the retiring employee, higher the sacrifice he or
she is making in terms of the opportunity to work and earn income.
Therefore, the employee with lower number of years in the service is
paid higher compensation package while the employee with longer service
period is paid lower as it is considered that the older employee was
going to retire anyway in the next year or so. Though
both of the principles are backed by equally strong logic, it would be a
better idea to follow one principle for nationwide uniformity in the
scheme though by allowing enough flexibility as to the details so as to
suit the specific needs of the organisation where it is being
implemented. Other
Goods & Bads of VRS Some
macroeconomic analysts in favour of VRS point out at the economic growth
of the mid 1990s as contributed at least partly by the mass retirement
of people from the government and other public sector enterprises.
Particularly the finance companies of today are set up and managed by
such people. But on the flipside, they also point out the example of
Nepal Rastra Bank. The present day problems in the country's banking
sector are, according to such analysts, caused by the weak monitoring
capabilities of the central bank and such weakness is partly attributed
to the brain drain caused in the central bank during the previous VRS. One
bad aspect of VRS is associated with the slow speed. If the company lets
the rumour of imminent VRS to lenger, the employee productivity
naturally goes reducing. More
important adverse effect is the heavy expense that has to be borne to
pay off the employees who retire. The effect lingers long in future. For
example, the heavy salary and supplement expenses of HMG now are
attributed partly to the pension for those who retired in this way. In
corporate business firms, the VRS needs to be followed by speedy
improvement in productivity so as to cover the VRS expenses as early as
possible and to start generating profit. Trade
Unions and VRS The
trade unions are found to be in dilemma regarding VRS. If the scheme is
implemented, the membership base of the trade unions will erode.
Therefore, it is not in the interest of the TUs to have VRS. But the
members of the TU are reportedly pressing the TUs to negotiate with the
management for better terms of VRS. The example of this is said to be
provided by Agriculture Development Bank (ADB/N) where the employees are
reportedly pressing the TU to negotiate for better package. Another
aspect to it is also interesting. If senior people retire, the junior
members of TU will get better chances for promotion - both in the TU and
corporate hierarchy. Also
the managements are facing dilemma. They often find that those very
people whom they intended to retire by bringing the VRS do not apply for
retirement. As the participation in the scheme is by definition
"voluntary", the management may reject the application of
those employees whom it does not want to go away, but it cannot force
someone to go away under VRS just because it wants them not to remain. To
avoid this problem, the managements have limited options. One Nepali
experience in this is provided by Nepal Drinking Water Supply
Corporation which specified quota for each layer of the employees. In
another instance, which is from the private sector, the Nepal Lever Ltd.
received 136 applications out of a total workforce of 143 while it was
targeting to retire only 70. The Nepal Lever sources say those whom the
company wanted to retain were counselled not to take the retirement. But
in another such instance from a public enterprise (Nepal Electricity
Authority), the entire scheme was withdrawn because good people were
also likely to take retirement. Clearly,
the management needs to establish that it should be the prerogative of
the management to select people whom it wants to retire. |
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Cover Story
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