COMMENT

Govt. must show restraint

Tension grips the nation as the bandh (closure) called by the Nepal Communist Party (Maoists) approaches nearer. People have always been apprehensive about this extreme form of protest, as during the initial days after the re-ushering in of democracy, such protests had always been violent. But as the years went by, except for stray incidents of vehicles being damaged, all bandhs have been relatively peaceful. But now, with the Maoists, who have been waging a violent “Peoples’ War” for the last five years, calling for a bandh, once more the same fear that used to be there many years back, is haunting the people and the security forces as well.

About the success of the bandhs that have been organised by different political parties and others in the past one decade or so, one can hardly remember any one such strike where the people voluntarily cooperated with the organisers of the strikes. Mostly, it has been out of sheer fear that people have pulled down the shutters of shops and private offices and not run their vehicles. But the people who are behind the protest programmes, proudly point to the mostly empty streets and claim what a big success their bandh has been. Also, apart  from such claims, they don’t care how the economy, trade, tourism and other sectors of the nation may have suffered, they are just happy that they have brought to a halt normal life in the nation. Such political coercion can hardly be called a good practice.

Just last week, the biggest opposition party in the Parliament, the Communist Party of Nepal (UML) organised a bandh. That day also, normal life was disrupted in the whole nation. Leaders of the party themselves could be seen leading their supporters and forcibly stopping any person who dared to open shop or drive around in vehicles. The government adopted a completely different tactics this time by not opting to clash with the protesters. This in some way defused the situation. Yet, it is also true that because of this indifferent attitude of the security people, incidents of arson and destruction of public property have taken place, even when they could have been avoided.

One question to those who organize bandhs is, what is their ultimate aim in conducting this crippling form of protest programme? Is it just to push the government to a corner? Is it to flex their political muscle and allow the supporters of the party to let off some steam? Is it to show the people that the party is doing something? Or is it genuinely to press home the demands of the people? Looking back at the effectiveness of the bandhs in solving the problems of the nation and the people, it seems they have been largely ineffective. All that has happened is, the nation has suffered economically and the people physically. But still, political parties don’t seem to tire from organising bandhs, ironically, in the name of the nation and the people.

However the coming bandh of the Maoists is a completely different matter. The party not functioning under the present Constitution of the Kingdom, can hardly be blamed for trying to show its might to the whole nation. However again this time also, the people will opt to comply by the call for the bandh not out of sympathy to the causes of the Maoists, but by fear. The government has been forced to deploy security personnel heavily in most places, including Kathmandu. But while this move may help ensure that untoward incidents do not take place on the day of the strike, the mere presence of gun toting policemen has sent another type of fear in the people. Virtually everyone has been talking of coming Thursday’s bandh for the past couple of days. They fear violence may take place that day, as the track record of the Maoists has been far from peaceful. The media has also given greatly hyped coverage of the programme, so the whole nation, including the government is tense. It can be hoped the Maoist will not indulge in unnecessary violence that day, as their bandh is surely to be a success without much effort. On the part of the government, it must show restraint and not resort to brutalities in the name of protecting the people.

Challenge to SAARC - Part I

Without eradicating the worst forms of poverty, does SAARC have credibility? Can South Asia move into the 21st Century with dignity. Asks PONNA WIGNARAJA

The Independent South Asian Commission on Poverty Alleviation, established by the Heads of the State of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) to enquire into the development options for South Asia, stated in its report of 1992 that “no matter what indices are used, the broad magnitude of poverty was of the order of 40 per cent in the region as a whole. This magnitude of poverty was likely to increase in the short to medium term as a result of ideologically oriented liberalisation and simplistic structural adjustment policies”. The commission also sent a political message to the SAARC Summit of 1993, that these numbers not only put democracy at risk in South Asia, but would make for an unmanageable polity. No SAARC country could solve this problem by itself and a coherent regional effort at poverty eradication in a given time-frame was required, as an indispensable first step.

These warning signals were accepted by the SAARC Heads of State when they endorsed and took over ownership of the recommendations of the Poverty Commission Report. The recommendations laid out an overall longer term development strategy, which included cautious liberalisation and a transitional shorter term pro-poor strategy, with social mobilisation. Objective was the eradication of the worst forms of poverty in South Asia in a given time frame, leaving only residual numbers to be carried by safety nets and welfare. Both the long and short term transitional strategies were pro-poor growth oriented, and not redistribution and welfare oriented. Thus, there was a two-fold challenge to SAARC — one to bring the problem of poverty to the centre stage of concern, and the other to embark on a pro-poor growth strategy.

Today, with the failure of South East Asia to sustain the “miracle” of simplistic liberalisation, the increased polarisation of South Asian societies and the inability to stabilise the polities, one is compelled to ask the question: why are SAARC Governments and their Finance and Trade Ministers, uncritically wedded to this ideologically oriented globalisation, liberalisation and inadequate structural adjustment strategy? Even the United Nations Development Programmes (UNDP), 1999 Human Development Report has said globalisation, in its present frame, is making the rich richer and the poor poorer, between and within countries. How is it that there appears to be sustained consensus on this irrational external oriented strategy and not on the more complex strategy, with greater self-reliance that was elaborated in the Poverty Commission report. The latter was culturally rooted, economically rational and also politically sound. This more rational strategy was not based on redistributive justice, safety nets and welfare. It was based on cautious liberalisation and a parallel pro-poor growth strategy starting at the base of the economy, which showed that the poor need not be the problem in South Asia. The poor could be a part of the solution and a resource.

The challenge to SAARC was to revise its approach towards more self-reliant development and a stable polity. By eradicating the worst forms of poverty, such a strategy would also set the preconditions for trade liberalisation and trade cooperation. This advice by an independent South Asian Commission was not taken seriously enough. Instead, and ad hoc “shopping list” approach to SAARC has continued, with a great deal of rhetoric about poverty eradication.

SAARC in the first decade.

The SAARC started cautiously, in 1985, in moving towards a South Asian Economic Community, through a series of purely intergovernmental activities based on fragmented and sectoral issues already on the global intergovernmental agenda. This was called  Integrated Programme of Action (IPA) and dominated much of official attention in the first six years. There was little attempt to look at the emerging national, regional or global changes and realities, and not at the cultural commonalities within the region. Hence, in the first phase, there was no bold response to these changes and realities, through a vision of South Asian Regional cooperation and a coherent set of transitional steps to move from the South Asian reality towards such a vision.

At the Male SAARC Summit (the Maldives) in 1990, the Heads of State took two important decisions, realising that SAARC was totally unprepared for the changing global scenario and incapable of responding either to the internal contradictions within the region or to the news challenges posed by Europe 1992, Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and other regional groups, which were beginning to emerge. The first was that SAARC should move into core areas of cooperation. The second was that scholars, professionals, non-government organisations and the media should help reinforce the official SAARC process in moving into these core areas. The two decisions by the SAARC Heads of State, taken together, reflected their concern at the fragmented and painfully slow process of SAARC since its inception.

The second decision reflected unease that SAARC could not move forward purely as an intergovernmental process. A great deal of independent research support and innovative thinking and participation by independent non-governmental actors would be required to bring out the potential in South Asia for sustainable development, democracy and political stability. An Independent Group of concerned South Asian Scholars and Professionals (IGSAC), was one of the first to respond to this challenge posed by the Heads of State to the intellectual and non-governmental actors. Drawing  on a number of earlier research efforts, they submitted a synthesis study titled “SAARC: Moving into Core Areas of Cooperation” before the 1991 Colombo Summit. It contained three powerful messages and a coherent agenda for immediate action.”

The first message was that South Asia has a common history, a common eco-system and shared fundamental values, which could provide a vision on “Unity in Diversity”. The second message cautioned that South Asia was facing a multi-faceted crisis—poverty reproduction, slow economic growth, uneven development, population pressure, natural resource erosion, a high defence expenditure and an internal arms race, social polarisation, religious fundamentalism, youth alienation and ethnic conflicts; as well as, marginalisation, globally. These conflicts and problems are inter-related and becoming more unmanageable. External trends are also pushing South Asia further to the margins of the world economy and international politics. No South Asian country can solve these problems individually, and hence, collective regional cooperation is essential. As  pre-conditions, the third message called for a more complex sustainable development strategy, than mere simplistic liberalisation and structural adjustment.

The vision in the IGSAC report was translated into a recommendation containing five core areas for regional cooperation and immediate action. The areas were poverty eradication, food security, trade cooperation, payments union and external resources mobilisation. These areas were not only closely inter-related, but also necessary pre-requisites for  achieving the vision of a South Asian economic community with sustainable development, real democratic political formations and good governance. Without the eradication of the worst forms of poverty, SAARC could not establish the one billion strong South Asian mass market.

Food security is the other side of the poverty coin. In a region which has a food surplus, and further potential for food production, poverty eradication and the right to food go hand in hand. For trade cooperation, payment arrangements were also essential. In Europe, the Payments Union preceded economic cooperation. The mobilisation of external resources is necessary both for poverty eradication, as well as for decentralised industrialisation and building South Asia’s technological capabilities. Trade cooperation was not supposed to end with the signing of a framework agreement — the South Asian Preferential Trade Agreement (SAPTA). The IGSAC report urged that since the opening up of regional trade would help expand production and employment in all SAARC countries, to bring down costs of living and help reap the benefits of larger technology-led mass market, there should be reduction, across the board, of tariff and non-tariff barriers within five years. This was the South Asian Preferential Trade Agreement (SAPTA) which does not supersede the original SAPTA.

(To be concluded)

Is it possible?

The new Prime Minister said that his first priority will be to stop corruption. How can he stop corruption by choosing Khum Bahadur, Govind Raj Joshi, Mahesh Achaya, Ram Baran , Ram Krishna Tamrakar and Ram Chandra? Why did he give ministership to Amod Upadhaya? I think there are better people than him in the NC. May be he is a close relative of Nona Koirala.

Going by his first move, it seems next to impossible for Girija to stop corruption. It is sheer bad luck to Nepali people.

Sumukh Aryal
Canada
Via Internet

Putting facts straight

This refers to the article 'Secretary's Day in your Travel/Tourism section,. March 29.

Just to keep the record straight  - this celebration is not the "first of its kind to take place".  The New Era conceptualised and organised the first ever Secretary's Day in Nepal on Sep. 4, 1994 - to honour secretaries and acknowledge their invaluable contribution towards the smooth functioning of any organisation.  It was our way (as a secretarial management institute) of showing bosses/offices how to appreciate the work done by their secretaries.

Niti Rana
The New Era, Battisputali,
Kathmandu