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ROYAL NEPALESE ARMY |
Loyalty And Trust A major participant of the campaign of national unification and consolidation, the army has always been on the frontlines of Nepals political debate BY AKSHAY SHARMA The political discourse over the past year would suggest that the Royal Nepalese Army has emerged at the forefront of the national agenda because of questions surrounding the conduct and performance of the civilian leadership. The fact, however, is that the army has been inextricably linked with Nepalese nationhood ever since it established itself as a major instrument of the national unification and consolidation campaign that began under King Prithvi Narayan Shah the Great. "Is the democratic system in Nepal compatible with the preponderance of the Nepalese army?" BP Koirala asked in his posthumously published "Jail Journal". During his eight years in prison after his 18-month tenure as Nepals first elected prime minister came to an abrupt end in December 1960, BP spent a lot of time wondering what sequence of events led King Mahendra to take the drastic step of dismissing the Nepali Congress government.
Eleven years after the restoration of the multiparty democracy that was abolished with the removal of BP Koiralas government, the army still dominates political discussions. For the better part of a year, the country debated every legal nuance concerning who has the authority to deploy the army against the six-year-old Maoist insurgency. "An army coup is not very far off," wrote political scientist Dr. Pancha Narayan Maharjan in a recent article in Himal Khabarparika. "If the army is not modernized along with the political system and is not synchronized easily with the political system, this could result in a coup." Political analysts agree that the army is currently facing one of its biggest challenges. "But the reassuring factor is that the Nepalese army has always been a patriotic and nationalist force. They will never be stooges for alien powers," one analyst says. Since Nepal has always been an independent nation and the hallmark of the army has been obedience to the authority of the state, a built-in patriotic tradition has always existed in the force, says one security expert. Matters entered a new phase after the revolution of 1951 when King Tribhuvan, the Ranas and the Nepali Congress agreed on forming a coalition government paving the way for Nepals transition from isolation to democracy. However, the external variables that came into play left the army at the forefront of national affairs. In their book "Nepal: Profile of a Himalayan Kingdom", Leo E. Rose and John T. Scholz point to a major variable in the transformation of this pillar of state: "The wholesale adoption of the Indian version of non-alignment as a basic principle without even a serious discussions with its relevance to Nepal." They add: "Kathmandu accepted a client-state role in India regional security, economic and political systems. The establishment of an Indian military mission in Nepal in 1953 and of Indian posts on Nepals northerner border in 1954 associated Nepal even more directly in Indias security systems. And an informal system of periodic consultations between top officials of both governments assured a continual exchange of views, thus facilitating New Delhis guidance of Kathmandu on foreign policy." Some security analysts say the current "cold war" between India and China would cast a dark shadow on Nepalese politics. "The recent problems in the country cannot be attributed to the army. However, one can certainly point a finger to the political leadership," one analyst says. "We have a flexible constitution, but the unruly and anarchist attitude of the political leadership is the root cause of the problem because the de-facto leader cannot afford to be unruly or populist. Governance is the art of mastering and exercising their authority in a balanced manner." Military matters have inevitably crept into Indo-Nepal relations. Indias security concerns on its northern frontiers is a legacy from British colonial rule. "The massive range of the Himalayas in the north, in spite of a few passes, which remains snowbound for the major part of the year, is an effective way into the Kashmir Valley. This was proved by the Chinese unilateral declaration of the cease-fire in the winter of 1962 and the withdrawal of the Chinese forces behind the passage before snow fall," remember Lt. Colonel Sharma and K.S. Nagar, then head of the department of defense studies at the University of Gorakhpur, in their book "Indias Northern Security". "But the unity of Nepal and Bhutan as windows for India on China and Tibet and for China on the sensitive Indian regions in the Gangetic planes and the north-east can never be eliminated. This will continue to make the Himalayankingdoms a center of attention to the outside world," writes Lt Colonel Sharma. "Indias security is tied with Nepals, whereas Chinas is not," he adds. In the 1970s when Bangladesh gained independence from Pakistan, India emerged as the dominant power in the region, observes an expert. This resulted in pressures from India and China in Nepal. The Indian, US and Nepalese armies trained Khampas in hit-and-run tactics against Tibet. When the Chinese exerted pressure on Nepal, Indian army posts on the northern border were shifted to Army Headquarters in Kathmandu, says an expert. As Rose and Scholz recount, "A new treaty was signed in 1971, but with somewhat less dangerous terms than the 1960 treaty. Coincidentally, India was allowed to attach its military mission in Kathmandu. Although it operated out of Nepals headquarters, its rel ations with the headquarters staff were andstill are reported to be very close." King Mahendra had full control over the army and after the Sino-Indian border war in 1962, Rose and Scholz write: "In New Delhi, top priority was given to strengthening Indias security systems on its northern frontier. The Nepalese opposition forces were pressurized to cease their terrorist activities from bases in India and use peaceful political tactics." "The balance of military power on the Himalayan border shifted gradually to Indias favor, leading to a probable Indian superiority at key points on the frontier," wrote Rose and Scholz, accepting the fact that Nepal ended up vulnerable to Indian pressure in the 1970s as it had before the 1962 Sino-Indian war. Matters came to such a pass that when Nepal decided to buy anti-aircraft guns from China in the late 1980s, India responded by applying economic pressure against the kingdom. The sequence of events culminated in the dismantling of the partyless system and the restoration of multiparty democracy. "As all institutions of the state have weakened against alien forces, the army has managed to survive. Maybe the generals were aware of the pitfalls of supporting the party in power," says a security analyst, referring to the armys hesitation to move against the Maoist rebels in Nuwagaon recently. "Under the current political set-up, todays opposition parties could come into power tomorrow. Maybe the generals made the correct move by not appearing to side with one section of the majority party." The fact that the army in Nepal is still a force to be reckoned with was evident in the circumstances surrounding Girija Prasad Koiralas decision to step down as prime minister last month. A iron-willed politician who weathered sustained pressure from the combined opposition in parliament and on the streets, from the Maoist rebels in the rural hinterland and from a string of corruption allegations, Koirala found himself at a virtual dead end when he realised he couldnt deploy the army in the way he wanted to. |
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