View Point (Spotlight Weekly)

Limits and Scope of Dialogue

Notwithstanding the ceasefire between India and Pakistan or the talks between Indian government and Hurriyat there is little to suggest that the Indian government is willing to go beyond a devolution of power. This is far less than even internal autonomy that is a constitutional arrangement and means internal sovereignty

By GAUTAM NAVLAKHA

The first ever formal meeting between India’s deputy prime minister and a five-member delegation of the All Party Hurriyat Conference (Ansari) took place on January 22. And on February 16, a preparatory meeting for ‘composite’ talks (which includes the Kashmir dispute) began between officials of the Indian and Pakistani governments. All this has generated hope about a possible negotiated settlement of a 57-year old dispute.

It may seem inappropriate, now that the Indian government has shown a willingness to engage in talks, to give vent to skepticism. But, there is need to understand the limitations of such efforts. The exclusion of JKLF and Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) has any way robbed the talks of their representative character and the refusal by Indian government to make any substantive gesture has reduced their legitimacy. Now that the ‘composite dialogue’ is set to begin between India and Pakistan these talks threaten to become a sideshow.

The ceasefire along the 198km of international border and 928 km of LoC (which includes 150 km of Actual Ground Position Line claimed by India in Siachen) means that the civilian casualties along this tense area would now stop and so would the damage caused to farmlands (Neelam/Kishanganga Valley) and glaciers (in Saltoro Range) through cordite poisoning. However, while shelling across LoC may halt, counter-insurgency (CI) operation has continued. The expectation that the talks between Hurriyat (Ansari) and the Indian deputy prime minister would usher in internal ceasefire by Id-ul-Bakr has not been fulfilled. The Indian government did not even consider these developments important enough to be placed on the agenda for the meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Security. As for the release of political prisoners, the authorities have played their usual tricks: they released 32 petty criminals as a ‘goodwill gesture’ pretending to the world outside that they were releasing political activists languishing for years in jail without being chargesheeted. The recent Bandipora killing (February 7) of five villagers and the passing off of a Kashmiri militant (Mohammad Shafi Cheche) as a Pakistani (Sadiq) highlights how little things have changed on the ground. The disturbing thing about the massacre is that the security forces used villagers as ‘human shields’, as a result of which all the five villagers bled to their death with bullet wounds on their legs. This can only mean that the troops did not attend to the wounded ‘porters’ employed by them on daily wages. As far as Kashmiris are concerned the war continues.

It is true that there is a simmering discontent in Pakistan-held areas of Kashmir against various acts of omission and commission of successive Pakistani governments. CI has been confined to Indian-held territory. Starting in 1989 with an estimated 300 militants against whom were deployed 36,000 Indian troops, there has been a spurt in troop development which has crossed 5,00,000 (the army has three corps in J and K of which 15th and 16th corps are deployed for CI; there are 1,20,000 central para-military forces; 50,000 Rashtriya Rifles; 60,000 J and K police; 18,000 SPO’s; and about 8,000 village defence committees) even as the number of militants operating in Kashmir went down from a high of 10,000 in 1992-93 to less than 5,000 post-1996-97 and today it is said to be less than 3,000. Thus it is massive Indian military presence that confronts Kashmiris.

It is worth recalling that until 1995-96 the emphasis was on alienation of the people (erosion of internal autonomy, corruption, rigged elections, repression) and Pakistan’s moral and material support for the militancy was read within this context. It is true that the number of foreign militants since 1996 has increased. But this cannot be interpreted to mean that the foreigners have taken over militancy. According to ministry of home affairs (2002-03) of an estimated 3,000-3,500 militants in J and K 60-70 per cent “are from outside”. Yet the same report (page 13 para 3.11) reveals that three times as many Kashmiris were killed than foreigners. Even this data is contaminated by the fact that in a large number of cases bodies are not returned to the families making it difficult to know for certain the antecedents of the persons killed. In just over a month and a half a person alleged to be a foreign militant turned out to be a Kashmiri in five instances.

Moreover, the Indian Army has cleared only 58 per cent of the approximately three to four lakh landmines laid close to the IB and LoC in J and K until last year. In contrast all mines from IB in Punjab and Rajasthan have been cleared by year-end. Fencing of the LoC and its electrification will be completed by June 2004. Sensors and night vision devices are available for monitoring activities on the LoC. Residents of the border areas are obliged to keep their I-cards with them all the time. The combination of landmines and fencing of the LoC has disrupted the life of local communities. Even the current bonhomie between India and Pakistan has not dissuaded the authorities from stopping people from gathering along the LoC, after nearly 10,000 people gathered near Titwal on February 5 to speak and exchange letters with their kith and kin on the other side of Kishanganga river. Apart from these, forces are being deployed in areas which lead up to high mountain peaks as part of ‘Siachinisation’ of LoC. Besides, the security forces live in high-walled fortified camps spread over huge tracts of land in/around the mohalla/village/fields of the people. Before dawn and after dusk pathways get barricaded. The presence of such a huge force has meant that large tracts of productive land have passed into military hands.

The Mufti Mohammed Sayeed-led government exercises little control over the Indian security forces who operate under Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA). When AFSPA is invoked then the civilian authority ceases to exercise control over the security forces that operate under the act or hold them accountable for their action. In some cases police officers accused and suspended for crimes by the state government are rewarded by the central government. In addition they are also empowered with a regime of draconian laws like Public Safety Act (1978), Enemy Agent Ordinance (1948), The Egress and Internal Movement (Control) Ordinance (1948), Prevention of Unlawful Activities Act (1963), Prevention of Suppression and Sabotage Act (1965) among them. They can search, question, raid house, detain without charge, kill, all on mere suspicion, anytime and anywhere in J and K. Thus in the estimation of Kashmiris Indian forces are the aggressors. Neither the Farooq Abdullah-nor the Mufti Mohammed Sayeed-government has succeeded in getting central government approval to prosecute security force personnel/officers accused of atrocities. Even the apex court and the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) has failed to provide justice in sensational cases such as the Brijbehara massacre or assassination of Jalil Andrabi. Invariably they have helped the executive to suspend judicial proceedings in the ‘national interest’. It is hard to believe that training personnel to be humane, prompt investigation of excesses or providing human right lessons would halt bestial behavior by the troops. The fact of the matter is that CI means the use of force to suppress people. So long as this policy regime remains the occasional expressions of concern are exercises meant to deflect attention from the repressive policy-regime. It is worth recalling that Mufti government has neither been able to keep its election pledge to release all the political prisoners nor the promise to disband the Special Operations Group. In fact, preventive detention of opponents for up to two years without the bother of charge sheet continues unabated – some 52 cases of extra judicial killings have reportedly taken place since. According to the Association of Disappeared Persons over 116 persons have disappeared in this period. The day-long strike call on February 11, 2004 on the 20th death anniversary of Maqbool Butt (who was hanged in Delhi’s tihar jail and the body too lies buried there) received short shrift. In recent memory this was the most successful of the strike calls. The call was given by JKLF after many years, and received support from HM. Just the day before, on February 10, JKLF had organized a hunger strike which attracted five times more participants than the organizers expected; they had made preparations for upto 1,000 and more than 5,000 turned up. A week before that a couple of US academics on a semi-official venture went around meeting young Kashmiris suggesting that self-determination was a pipedream and advocating that Kashmiris should settle for less. Much to their consternation they found no takers for their line. Now comes the decision of Fazal Haq Qureishi of People’s Political Front, one of the five delegates who met LK Advani and part of the team headed by HM’s Abdul Majid Dar in July 1999, to stay away from dialogue because of worsening human rights situation. This was preceded by breach in People’s Conference where two brothers expelled each other over the issue of Mirwaiz’s presence at the funeral of Al Umar commander Rafiq Dar, alleged killer of their father Abdul Gani Lone.

The 15 years of CI have altered the social and economic lives of Kashmiri people. No section of Kashmiri society has escaped the debilitating consequence of violence and counter-violence. The human costs of the war and the extent of damage caused is staggering. According to the J and K police the death toll between January 1990 and December 2002 was 94,000 from 56,041 incidents of violence. Of these 60,000 were said to be militants, 30,000 civilians and balance 4,000 were security force personnel of which 1,037 were police personnel. It is interesting to recall that the then minister of state in Indian home ministry, Mohammad Maqbool Dar, said on July 16, 1996 in Jammu at a press conference that between 1989-90 and June 1996, 40,000 persons had died in the violence (The Indian Express, July 17, 1996). Besides, the Mufti Mohammed Sayeed government itself admitted in the state assembly (June 2003) that between 1990 and 2002 the number of ‘missing persons’ reached 3,931; incarceration of nearly 60,000 persons in last 14 years for varying lengths of time; tens of thousands injured and tortured; more than 50,000 widowed or half-widowed; and the presence and 35-40,000 orphans – all these are living reminders of a cataclysmic social impact of CI. The recurrent attack on women including rape and molestation are as debilitating as targeting of children. Although both the security forces as well as militants are guilty of committing heinous crimes it will not do to underplay the role of the Indian security forces who account for the largest number of atrocities in the past 15 years.

The Mufti government had pledged relief and rehabilitation (R and R) for all victims of violence’, ie, including those killed by Indian security forces. Significantly the Indian government has refused to provide any funds for R and R of those killed by the security forces. Of a total allocation for social welfare department for 2003-04 of Rs 153 crore a sum of Rs 18 crore was sanctioned for a corpus earmarked for social welfare council which is supposed to provide R and R from the interest earnings to the victims. The schemes for R and R are such that they cover only those who are victims of militancy and not those who are victims of excesses committed by the security forces. This involves bringing a copy of the FIR registered in the local police station signed by a gazetted officer to the tehsil office of the social welfare department in Srinagar which then provides a form to be filled by the victim. Based on this a verification officer visits the house of the victim and files his/her report at the tehsil office of the department. This report is then sent to the district office for clearance after which it is signed by the chief medical officer, the assistant divisional commissioner and finally the divisional commissioner. This can take months if not years. (This information is from a yet unpublished report by Sehba Husain on impact of violence on women and children in Kashmir.)

While CI is the main issue a communal divide is palpable. India’s lazy opinion makers put the blame on Kashmiris or present them as victims of Pakistani manipulations. Rarely do they bother to look at how successive Indian governments have fostered religious identities. Apart from the fact that Kashmiri Muslims have become the ‘natural victims’ of the security forces because the ‘enemy’ has been identified as Kashmiri Muslim the Indian authorities have clamped down on street protests and disallowed demonstrations by anyone questioning Kashmir’s accession to India. For the last 15 years night curfew operates and ban against gathering of more than five persons (Section 144) remains in place. Only large religious gatherings are permitted on Fridays. As a result politics has been pushed into mosques. Besides, slogans calling for ‘victory to mother India’ are found at every camp, bunker, post and picket. Lest the message does not get home the armoured vehicles of the CRPF carry names such as ‘Agni Varsha’ (rain of fire), BSF armoured vehicles call themselves ‘Bajrang’ while RR calls their carriers in the rural areas ‘MahaKaal’ (in common parlance ‘calamity’). The camps of security forces and especially of the CPMF spew out bhajans and kirtans through their loudspeakers. Besides, groups such as Panun Kashmir, the RSS, etc, have consistently favoured military suppression of the people and lamented that army has not been given a ‘free’ hand to crush insurgency. And yet, defeat of fundamentalist diktats in Kashmir was brought about by the Kashmiris who simply refused to obey them. It is equally worth remembering that while armed militancy has been presented as the main problem by the Indian government militancy cannot survive without the support of the people. Had fear of militants been a major concern of the people it would have been easier for Indian security forces to crush armed groups. Kashmiris have shown in more ways than one their desire for a democratic resolution by boycotting the 1996, 1998, 1999 and 2002 assembly elections. Even those who voted claimed that their main demand was for ‘azaadi’.

Does all this mean that ceasefire between India and Pakistan or the talks between Indian government and Hurriyat are of no consequence? There is little to suggest that the Indian government is willing to go beyond a devolution of power. This is far less than even internal autonomy which is a constitutional arrangement and means internal sovereignty. Knowing that even internal autonomy is an inadequate response what can talks between the Indian government and APHC (Ansari) hope to achieve? If talks are to inspire confidence then substantive steps ought to have been taken in the shape of release of all political prisoners, withdrawal of all draconian laws such as Armed Forces Special Powers Act and Public Safety Act, etc, prosecution of all those who committed atrocities, setting up of an independent commission to look into cases of enforced disappearances, provision of relief and rehabilitation of all those who were victims of security forces and so on. Is there any assurance that BJP-led NDA government if it returns to power will do anything differently after elections?

The recent d�tente between India and Pakistan threatens to pursue the same path of treating the dispute as ‘territorial’. The January 6 joint statement of Pervez Musharraf and Atal Behari Vajpayee speaks of ‘bilateral settlement of all bilateral disputes, including Jammu and Kashmir, to the satisfaction of both sides”. This is strange because the two countries have always favored relegating Kashmiris to the sidelines. For instance, president Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan recently said that LoC cannot be a solution when the two countries have fought three wars over it and wanted the two countries “to meet somewhere midway” implying that bilateral talks will focus on territorial ‘give and take’. There is reason to suggest that Pakistani military ruler is trying to sell the line to Kashmiris and to democratic opinion in Pakistan to let the regime handle the matter since Indian government can play fast and loose with Kashmir’s indigenous leadership. This suits the Indian government because it helps to turn the issue into a bilateral matter and sidelines a rebellious people whose plight earned India much opprobrium. Therefore, it is futile to expect a democratic solution to emerge from such exercises.

A just peace necessitates respecting the aspirations of the people by heeding the demand for exercising the right of self-determination. Undeniably there is a marked divide within Jammu and Ladakh region in contrast to Kashmir just as there is between Mirpur-Baltistan with Muzzarfarbad. The presence of these divisions actually lends even greater weight to the demand for the right of self-determination. Were referendum to be held prior to the starting of dialogue it would help set the agenda for purposeful negotiations. What is more it would force both India and Pakistan notorious for their reactionary politics to look inwards and address the issue of justice, people’s aspirations, protection of minorities, secularism, etc, as they contend to win people’s approval. It would also compel those advocating independence to spell out their vision of an independent Kashmir. Thus the choice before the international community and India’s democratic forces is to either lend support for those who are asserting their right to decide their own future or to acquiesce in their suppression of a people by hook or by crook. It is futile to search for a middle ground between oppression and resistance.

(This article on Kashmir by a noted Indian columnist Gautam Navlakha has been reproduced from the Economic and Political Weekly of 28, Feb. 2004. This objective analysis of the vexing issue not only helps the readers to have an insight into the Indian mindset but might also help the Nepali readers to understand better the Indian attitude towards the Maoist problem in Nepal – Ed.)