“I Think Nepalese Are Desperate For Reconciliation”

-- James F. Moriarty

Below are the excerpts of the replies given by US ambassador JAMES MORIARTY to various queries that were made following the speech he gave at a talk program on “US-Nepal Relations” organized by the Nepal Council of World Affairs. Excerpts of his replies compiled by KESHAB POUDEL:

On Security Assistance

I would point out that there are in fact two separate issues and plans in Washington right now. One of the policy issues is the decision to hold back on security assistance until and unless we see steps towards reconciliation. Second is the legislation issue which is something we call Leahy Amendment, an appropriation act for 2005, which lays criteria for human rights that government must need to fulfill before we can release any sort of security assistance to Nepal . Those criteria are under review. In fact there is a national security waiver where if the Secretary of State feels that she is worried that the development in Nepal represented threat to the national security of the United States , she can waive the requirement and go ahead with the security assistance. We are concerned about the development in Nepal . We have been using the formulation all along that the security assistance is under review. We are absolutely afraid something might happen to this country that will allow the Maoists to take over. Obviously, we don’t want that to happen.

On Possible Maoist-Parties Cooperation

I would say that up to know parties are very careful in their formulation of such cause with specific demands that the Maoists have to renounce violence. One of the criteria to determine the formulation of common cause whether the Maoists are ready to come to the cause is whether they are ready to abandon violence to join mainstream Nepali politics. But the direction of the Maoist is not gearing towards forming the common cause. Maoists are still extorting, killing people and committing all crimes in the country. Under those conditions we don’t have a big concern. There is nothing to be said against trying to figure out whether the Maoists are ready to renounce violence. People have to be very careful and not pretend that the Maoists have changed.

On The Initiative To Resolve Crisis 

I have stressed in my speech that the government or the palace has to take first step, begin to try and reach out and reconcile with the parties. Then frankly the parties have to respond to explore whether these offers being made are in good faiths. Finally, I hope one of the primary topics of the discussion at that point between parties and palace would be how elections can be held as safely as possible but also as freely and fairly as possible; what kinds of guarantees can be adopted into the system to ensure the elections are free and fair and reflect true expression of the popular will? I would argue that the parties precisely need to be negotiating with the palace if the palace reaches out. I have been misquoted and I have been accused of saying that the parties have to come crawling on their bellies to the government. I am not saying that at all. What I have been saying is that the government has to reach out and the palace has to reach out to the parties. If palace does so, the parties need to respond.

On US-India Defense Pact

The US-India defense agreement is best viewed as stably improving relations between the United States and India . The world has changed a lot since the end of cold war and basically it allows two most populous democracies in the world to begin to explore how they can cooperate with each other. The division we have had in the past made little sense then and they make no sense at all right now. From Nepal ’s perspective, it is not actually any sort of NATO treaty nor any sort of binding defense commitments. But it is a commitment between our two countries to improve the relationship. I actually think it would have very little impact on US-Nepal relations. Again, we look upon our relations with Nepal through our own eyes or our own perspective and our own interest.

On US Policy On Nepal

We are cooperating with India frequently on Nepal because our views of the situation with respect to Nepal converge quiet a bit. I can assure you that when Indians see things differently from us, they let us know. When we see things differently from Indians, we let them know. Any of you who paid closer attention would be aware of the fact that there was discussion between President Bush and Indian prime minister Dr. Manmohan Singh (recently) in the Oval Office about the status and affairs of Nepal . I will tell you that this was a meeting of minds on the huge threat of Maoists and that the Maoists should not be allowed to take over Nepal and to prevent that from happening there has to begin reconciliation between palace and political parties. I am giving this message here with backing from the highest levels of my government. What you are seeing here in Nepal is that the Maoist insurgency has grown into the most serious threat even as outside powers have tried to figure out how to respond to the move of February 1. If you would listen to what spokesmen in Washington and New Delhi say, they give very similar response to the development here. Not because we said it sitting together. It is because our two countries see the problems in Nepal in similar way. Ever since the insurgency has flared up, Indian government is pretty clear that they want to see peaceful, prosperous and democratic Nepal . Those are the words, I, too, repeat because that is also US policy towards Nepal . So you have two actors here who have a convergence of interest.

On China Issue

You raised the China issue which is an interesting here in this context. I was telling people when I first got here that Nepal have actually come up with the issue that Beijing , New Delhi and Washington can agree on. Without any reservation, Beijing does not want to see any chaos in Nepal and Beijing does not want to see the so-called Maoist regime trying to export its revolution towards its neighbors. I see nothing but desires on the part of China to play helpful role here.  I don’t see any intention on the part of Beijing to try to use this uncertainty and confusion.

On Reconciliation

I was trying to say something different in my speech than a year ago but I could not. Why I am saying the same thing is because the problem is the same but has become worse with the time. A year ago I was saying that the legitimate political forces have to be united. At that time four of the major parties were in the coalition government and the fifth party was outside the coalition. You had an appearance of unity between that coalition government and palace on how to deal with the Maoists. Frankly speaking, I was very optimistic then. After February 1, times have changed but the solutions have not. Solution remains the legitimate political forces working together in Nepal to try and find a way back to a functioning democracy and try to address the Maoist insurgency. I personally stressed this because you can’t have one without the other. If you don’t have unity among the legitimate political forces, the Maoists have shown they will use the disunity for their advantages. I think majority of Nepalese are desperate for reconciliation that will allow the legitimate political forces to address the insurgency. Obviously, I am trying to make it clear that the worst enemies of freedom of Nepal as far as I can see are the Maoists. Their actions say so and their words say so. Their formula for the future is horrific as their actions now. Nobody can ignore that. Indians have also expressed that the Maoists are threat to their own security. They are also aware of the situation.

On Meeting Between King Gyanendra And President George Bush

I don’t think any such meeting between President George Bush and King Gyanendra will take place (on the sidelines of UN summit).