On The Verge Of Collapse : Kulekhani Dam
By Dr. AB Thapa
Now talks are going on about the direct involvement of the private developer in the implementation of the mammoth West Seti storage dam project Everybody is at a great loss to understand who would actually be responsible on behalf of the government to ensure that this highly sensitive project would be planned and implemented fully complying the well established internationally accepted engineering practices. Let us refresh our memory for the Kulekhani dam which was on the verge of collapse.
In 1970s the construction of the Kulekhani High Dam Project was about to begin. I had horrible suspicion that the geology of the Kulekhani dam site area could be problematic. I published an article about that in the newspaper “ The Rising Nepal”. Some other local and foreign newspapers also carried partially the content of my article shortly thereafter. That news was very seriously taken up by the World Bank and the government. Much later on, I learnt that I was even going to be charged with criticizing the government decision The case was dropped, when few of my colleagues stepped in to plead on my behalf. It is said that extra concrete grouting works and other measures were taken up to protect the river bed and the terraces just adjacent to the dam to ensure safety. Despite such limited measures, few years after the completion of the Kulekhani dam news came out of the blue that very wide cracks have already developed over an wide area adjacent to the intake structures on the right bank. It was the result of poor geology of the dam site. Indeed, the Kulekhani dam was on the verge of collapse.
An Ironic Twist To The Story
The misgivings I had about the poor geological conditions turned into the most grave reality. At that time I was heading the monitoring section of the Water Resources Ministry. Dr. John Cooper and Mr. Deepak Gyawali from WECS had visited the Kulekhani dam site to spend the weekend. They were shocked to find that the Kulekhani dam was at the risk of being washed away. We got the full reporting from them It was feared that at any time in near future a very big portion of the right bank terrace along with the intake structure could plunge into the reservoir setting in motion a huge big mass of the reservoir water to overtop the dam. In a similar type of Vajont dam incident in Italy, the loss of life was significant even though the dam was left standing after the overtopping because it was a concrete dam. However, the whole project was rendered useless after that incident. In case of the Kulekhani dam made of earthen core the whole dam body would have been completely washed away after the overtopping.
I had to play the lead role on behalf of the ministry in expediting the civil works to save the Kulekhani dam Leading experts from the USA, Australia and Japan were called in for consultation shortly thereafter. On their recommendations works such as the clearing of large volume of weathered materials, anchor bolting of huge masses of rocks to prevent sliding into the reservoir, provision of underground drainage system were carried out. Nepal was guided all along by the advice of the donor agency. Their timely assistance helped to preclude the possibility of Nepal being hit by a big disaster.
Dam Failures
Insensitivity to advise from outsiders could have terrible consequences. A case in point could be the Malpasset dam near Frejus in Southern France . It is reported that the decision makers were cautioned in time. They were told that the dam site was not suitable so it was recommended that the dam be built elsewhere. However, for reasons of engineering convenience, the advice was disregarded. The dam failed on 2 nd December, 1959, causing death of a large number of people.
Construction of the high dam without full study of the environs led to the catastrophe of the Vajont Dam in Italy. The Vajont Dam is 261 meters high and the volume of the water contained in its reservoir is 150 million cubic meters ( the volume of the West Seti reservoir would be about 1500 million cubic meters). In September, 1963 the reservoir level reached a height of 180 meters, and an earth movement started along the slope of Mont Toc. That movement accelerated in October and caused a landslide which gave rise to a giant wave that flooded the valley beneath, wiping out several villages and killing more than 2,000 people.
Shoddy workmanship and poor quality of materials are often the prime cause of dam failures. The failure of St. Francis dam in California has been attributed to faulty foundations. Design errors were apparently largely responsible for the collapse of the Teton dam. In our own region ‘over-topping’ occurred with the Machau II dam in India in 1979 and caused the death of 1,500 people downstream. In this case, the malfunctioning of equipment contributed to the failure, as the spillway gates could not be opened in time. The failure of spillways to function properly also led to the near failure of the 140 m high Tarbela dam in Pakistan in 1975-6. It is reported that in this case design errors and possible poor construction materials were also involved.
Nepal ’s laissez-faire hydropower development policy could have adverse effect on dam safety. It is difficult to visualize how we can be assured that the private developers would be sincerely interested in maintaining the high standard of workmanship and superior quality of materials which are fundamental prerequisite for dam safety that would invariably lead to higher cost. What is the guarantee that the private developers would not be tempted to cut a lot of corners in order to make hefty profit that could be disastrous in long run.
West Seti Dam Safety
The West Seti dam project appears to be ridden with very serious technical problems that concern the safety of its most important structure, the high dam itself. The WECS had few years back sent its opinion to the Water Resources Ministry stating that the type of the high dam proposed for the West Seti by the private developer could be risky. Some of the evidences put forward by the developers to justify their selection do not appear to tally with the information contained in the recently published scientific documents. So it was suggested to constitute a panel of few renowned international experts recognized to be the authority on their respective discipline to seek their opinion. Any further action in the direction of taking the decision to award the project to the private developer should be deferred until the panel gives its absolutely positive opinion. It is not known who had approved the technical design of the West Seti project on behalf of the government to vouch for the correctness. Unfortunately the developers were allowed to go ahead to find buyers for the electricity. Every sensible man will agree that the West Seti dam should be completely safe. The incident of the Kulekhani High Dam should not be allowed to be once more repeated. At that time the Kulekhani dam could be saved which was on the verge of collapse resulting into one of the biggest man made disasters in the world In case of the West Seti reservoir the magnitude of such disaster would be far greater because the volume of the West Seti reservoir might be about 15 times greater than the volume of the Kulekhani reservoir.
Why West Seti Dam Could Be Unsafe?
The West Seti Project will have a 195-m high concrete face rockfill dam ( CFRD ). This type of dams are found to be very competitive in cost but until recent time they were considered risky for heights above 150 meters. This type of dam could have also been considered as one of the alternatives in selection of the high dam for the Kankai Project. The French expert called in to advise on Kankai dam appears to have dissuaded the German study team from considering the CFRD as a viable option. It was considered that it could be unsafe to build the CFRDs. So finally at the end an embankment type dam with an asphaltic concrete face was selected.
The CFRD is very sensitive to settlement and deformation of the rock-fill supporting the upstream face. These deformations produce movements of the concrete slab joints by opening them and if the movements exceed certain limits then the resulting leakage is difficult to control. The deformations of CFRD for dynamic loading are even more difficult to evaluate. In the Michigan Convention of ASCE in 1985 on CFRDs papers were presented to establish Earthquake Severity Index (ESI) with relative vertical settlement. In the ICOLD meeting of 1988 it was suggested that future research should be focused to correlate ESI and the relative settlement as function of yield acceleration.
There is no Precedent
Needless to say that there is a need for great caution in adopting very high CFRD. According to J. Barry Cooks, Consultant USA ( Development in High CFRDs, Hydropower & Dams, Issue Four 1997), this type of dams are of empirical design and based on precedent design and experience. Unfortunately only very recently relatively high CFRDs have been introduced.
The proposed developer of the West Seti Project has cited as precedent in their report two CFRDs close to the West Seti dam in height. It is claimed that they are already in good service. They are the Tiensingquiao of China with a height of 180 meters and Aguamilpa of Mexico with a height of 185.5 meters. Unfortunately both these CFRDs can not be satisfactory example to justify the selection of CFRD for the West Seti Project. The Tiensigquiao dam of China might be still under construction. According to the original schedule the dam was expected to be completed towards the May of 1999. So nobody might be yet knowing how that dam would be going to perform. The Aguamilpa reservoir was first filled in August 1993. Since then two abnormal peak seepage values have been observed. These events were of great concern, and several hypothesis were made to explain this behaviour although none has been satisfactory. Now underwater inspections are in progress to try to identify any factor, which could explain the observed behavior.
There are not any other examples in the world of CFRDs in service with heights close to 195 meters. It is a fact that very high CFRDs are yet to be tested in practice. So a great deal of caution is required to adopt this type of dam. Let us not take the risk of unnecessarily endangering the life and property of innumerable people by recklessly deciding to implement the West Seti Project.
In Conclusion
Nepal ’s laissez-faire hydropower development policy could have adverse effect on dam safety. Until now our government’s performance in handling private developers of hydropower projects has been extremely shocking. Government endorsed whatever the private developers proposed. There is nobody from the government side to check the works of the private developers at the site. As a result, in case of the Bhotekosi Project the concerned Department and the Ministry came to know that the installed capacity of that hydropower project had been raised from 35 MW to 45 MW completely defying the power purchase agreement only after the completion of the construction works. Government learnt about it only after a claimed was lodged by the private developer with the government to compel the NEA to buy extra power to be generated entirely during the monsoon season which is going to be totally wasted.
It is difficult to visualize how we can be assured that the private developers would be sincerely interested in maintaining the high standard of workmanship and superior quality of materials which are fundamental prerequisite for dam safety that would invariably lead to higher cost. What is the guarantee that the private developers would not be tempted to cut a lot of corners in order to make hefty profit that could be disastrous in long run. Institutions like the Electricity Department, Ministry of Water Resources and National Planning Commission should take full responsibility to guarantee that the storage dam projects have been planned, constructed and operated in accordance with internationally accepted norms and practices.
(Dr. Thapa writes on water resources)