Democracy in SA is fast turning into an empty ritual

-Ms. Khadija Haq, Islamabad

The earlier Reports on Human Development in South Asia documented the magnitude of human deprivation in the region. This year's report explores the larger question that arises from such disturbing realities. The report analyses the issue of governance as it relates to the people. How has governance affected people's lives? Do people fully participate in governance? Are women equal partners with men in governance? Are the needs of the poor and disadvantaged met? Are people's human rights guaranteed? And what is the difference between good governance and humane governance? The report tries to answer these questions.

According to the Report's findings, South Asia which contains nearly one-fourth of humanity, is characterized by governments that represent the poor but aid the rich; taxation that is insufficient and regressive; and expenditures that are misdirected and ineffective. In addition, millions of dollars are transferred each year out of the region through corruption. South Asia today features societies that assert the rights of some but perpetuate the exclusion of others. The gravity of the governance challenges facing South Asia are further reflected in the following trends:

Only 1 per cent of the population pays income taxes; direct taxes form only 29 percent of total tax revenues.

Nearly 30 million cases are pending in the region's understaffed courts, and the number of cases per judge averages over two thousands.

All governments' exercise varying degrees of control over TV, radio and print media.

Though women are half the electorate, they hold only 7 percent of parliamentary seats and 4 percent of national cabinet posts; further, women are less than 3 percent of the total number of judges and 5 percent of total government employees.

Besides introducing the concept of humane governance that puts people at the center of all governance policies, economic and civic governance. The Report highlights the governance failures in South Asia on several fronts:

Firstly, the Report presents a grim picture of social deprivation. Formal institutions of governance have often bypassed the voiceless majority. These are the unfortunate many that suffer from multiple deprivations on account of their income, race, religion, gender or ethnicity. They have not only been excluded from the benefits of growth but have also failed to gain political empowerment. Some of the worst consequences of their exclusion are seen in the high rates of crime and violence throughout the region.

Income disparities in South Asia are some of the largest in the world. The richest one-fifth of the South Asians earns almost 40 percent of the region's income, while the poorest one-fifth earns less than 10 percent. All the counties in the region have a dramatic concentration of wealth and power among their richest members. Women in South Asia are particularly worst off, contending with exclusionary practice embedded in social structure from he time they are born. Secondly, in many South Asian states, democracy is fast turning into an empty ritual; elections are often the only bridge between the state and society. People continually feel excluded from the larger political process through which decisions that directly affect their livelihoods are made.

The dominance of a narrow band of elite reflects the concentrated nature of political power in South Asia. The concentration and personalization of state power has coincided with the parallel erosion of institutions. Institutional decay is evident in parliaments that cannot protect people's interests, in a civil service that is heavily politicized and unable to provide basic public services, and in a judiciary that fails to deliver social justice.

Thirdly, South Asia suffers from inefficient and unjust systems of economic management. The governments are large in size but low in efficiency. South Asia collects around 10 percent of GDP in taxes, compared to the average tax revenue collections 10-15 percent of GDP in developing countries. Yet a bigger irony is that most of these fall far more on the poor and the middle class through regressive taxes than on the rich, because nearly seventy percent of the region's total tax revenue is obtained through levying indirect taxes.

Pervasive corruption in South Asia has lead to a shift in government priorities away from crucial services and towards areas that affords great rent-seeking opportunities. Evidence of corruption in South Asia is widespread: in reduced availability and increased cost of basic social services, in allocation of resources for mega-projects, and in the breakdown of rule of law. There is a growing perception in many parts of South Asia that corruption has floated upwards- from petty corruption in 1950, to middle level corruption in 1960s and 1970s, to corruption at the very highest levels of the state in the 1980s and 1990s.

But the report is not content with merely counting the governance failures in South Asia. It adds a new dimension to the concept of governance, the need for humane governance. Humane governance is defined as good governance dedicated to securing human development. It required effective participation of people instate, civil society and private sector activities that are conducive to human development. The report argues that, in the context of South Asia, the concept of good governance has to be broadened and refined; it has to go beyond good politics or even good economic management. Humane governance must lead to broad-based economic growth and social development as a means to greater humane development. Governance must be seen by the people as operating in their own interest; that is transparent and accountable to all its constituents; and that is conducive to building a society in which all believe they are treated fairly and decently.

The Report suggests a set of policies that governments in South Asia can pursue to establish humane governance.

First, South Asian states need to focus on core human development concerns. This means liberal investments in basic human needs of the poor, provision of efficiently targeted social safety nets, and major stimulus to economic growth, without which the past social neglect cannot be rectified. This would involve an increase role for the private sector, an economy well integrated with the world, and an equitable fiscal policy that emphasizes progressive taxation and pro-poor expenditure.

Second, there is a need for revitalizing existing state institutions. Political systems throughout the region must be based on fair representation of all sections through strong institutions rather than on facts like dynamic politics, oligarchic interests and administration by a narrowly selected civil service. Parliaments must become the supreme authority if democracy is to be meaningful. Civil service should be made more efficient by increasing pay and reducing size. Similarly, judiciary needs to be independent as well as accessible to the people.

Third, new partnerships between the state and society have to be forged for any major turnaround. Governments must provide a supportive framework to aid meaningful civil society initiative and private sector enterprises.

The report also provides a concrete plan for combating corruption. This would involve the creation of exclusive corruption courts, requirements by public officials to declare assets, and transparent procurement laws. Other steps—like the passage of bills demanding a public right to information and the use of independent private-sector auditor—can form the basis of a concerted strategy to combat corruption.

At the end, the Report underscores the point that the solution to South Asia's governance crisis does not rest simply in the design of imaginative reform proposals; the region's cupboards are full with these. In fact, most governance failures in South Asia are due to the lack of implementation of policies and programs. Many South Asians, particularly those in leadership positions, are already aware of the nature of the governance problems and how to overcome them. Therefore, a more fundamental question is how to implement these reforms and who will do it. A committed leadership, with a clear and long-term vision, is undoubtedly the most important factor in this framework for change. Leaders have to be remained to carefully weigh the costs of timely reforms against the risks of violent uprisings. 

(Text read by the author at the launching ceremony of the HDR 1999 in Kathmandu. Mrs.Haq is the wife of late Mahbub-ul-Haq-chief editor).