Strategic Stability, Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament -1
Mr. Hazairin Pohan, Indonesian diplomat
in Kathmandu
Missile Proliferation: The dangers posed by
the spread of missiles and missile technology has become increasingly self-evident.
Research and development leading to more sophisticated missiles in the nuclear dimension
would be ominous to the security of all nations.
The threat to U.S. security from the so-called rogue states is often advanced
to rationalize the ballistic missile defense. It is fig leaf or a thin cover for other
military objectives. Analysts have pointed out, as, for example, a poverty-stricken North
Korea without allies would dare risk an attack on the U.S. without inviting its own
destruction. Such a scenario lacks credibility. Moreover, North Korea is now engaged in
negotiations that may lead to the abandonment of its missile program. The actual cost and
consequences of a missile defense would be far more dangerous than a presumed threat from
a rogue state. (Arms Control Today, 11/99)
Any U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty would precipitate a Russian response
to redesign its strategic forces and promote China's strategic modernization program.
Such developments would negatively impact on their bilateral relations, and in
turn, on regional and global security. It has been pointed out that even some of U.S.
allies recognize the dangerous ramifications of a missile defense system. (Arms Control
Today, 11/99)
The impending collision course over the deployment of a missile defense
system can only be avoided by its abandonment based primarily on efforts and expense
involved apart from its wide-ranging ramifications which I already noted. You cannot
deploy such a system while preserving the integrity of the ABM Treaty.
There are two sub-regions where the ominous prospects for missile
proliferation have become a pre-occupation of the states in the Asian region. These are
South and Northeast Asia.
According to news reports, India flight-tested its newest medium-range
ballistic missile in April 1999. In April 1998, Pakistan flight-tested a medium-range
ballistic missile. In April 1999, it flight-tested another medium-range ballistic missile
and a short-range ballistic missile. Both these nations, according to these sources,
acquired external assistance (India from Russia and Western Europe, while Pakistan from
China and DPRK) in varying degrees.
It would appear that chances are dim for stemming missile proliferation
because those programs are directly linked to their nuclear weapons and the perceived need
to deliver nuclear warheads through the launching of missiles. The withholding of
proliferation-related external assistance as well as restraint by the major military
powers and the countries concerned offer the best means to avert the development of
dangerous and destabilizing missile proliferation leading to the moderation of their
missile and nuclear rivalry.
Meanwhile, the U.S, says that it will face ballistic missile threats
from a wide variety of nations (Russia, China, DPRK, Iran and
possibly Iraq)
In a 1979 memorandum of understanding with the U.S. which was reiterated in
1990, South Korea voluntarily pledged not to develop ballistic missiles with ranges
exceeding 180 kilometers.. Since late 1995, however, Seoul has appeared to be hesitant to
be bound by that limit. The position being those longer-range missiles will be a
more credible deterrent against the DPRK that has a much more developed ballistic missile
program. At the present, it is difficult to predict if South Korea will opt for
longer range missiles (Arms Control Today, November 1999)
Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space: It is generally acknowledged by
arms control experts that a critical component of strategic stability and an indispensable
element to reduce strategic armaments during the past quarter century been the ABM Treaty
(Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems). Its role and utility for restraint in
acquiring strategic offensive arms is also recognized by member states of the United
Nations as is evident from the debates in the General Assembly's First Committee.
The crux of the problem, it seems to me, can be summarized as follows: First,
it is complying with the obligations of START I in good faith. Second, it is
important that START II be ratified and implemented by both sides; this would provide
strategic stability and provide a solid foundation for a further reduction of strategic
offensive weapons. These calls for a commitment to engage in further negotiations to
eliminate these weapons on the basis of the elements agreed upon between the Russian
Federation and the U.S. in Helsinki in March 1997 and reaffirmed in Cologne in June 1999.
This will be the framework for the future START III.
But these prospects are dependent upon compliance with the provisions of the
ABM Treaty which contains the obligation not to deploy a missile defense system on the
territory of the signatories and not even to create a basis for such defense. Hence,
any attempts to revise or modify the ABM Treaty would tantamount to its abrogation. The
inevitable result would be the unraveling of START START II and I. In effect, it would
undermine the whole structure of nuclear arms limitation and elimination agreements that
led to a measure of strategic stability in the post-cold war era. Worse still,
it may threaten the integrity of the NPT because of the lack of progress for the
total abolition of nuclear armaments. These compelling reasons call not only
for the maintenance but also the strengthening of the ABM Treaty (Russia, in the First
Committee,13 October 1999).
South Asia: Irrespective of developments in the regional and
international milieu, one thing is certain in the view of seasoned observers
of security in South Asia: India will not sign the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon
state, nor abide by the UN Security Council Resolution of June 1998, which called
for , among others, for "immediate and unconditional" adherence to that
Treaty as a non-nuclear state, which would mean giving up its nuclear option and
subjecting itself to IAEA's full-scope safeguards. No future government will agree
to put the nuclear genie back into the bottle unless it is on a reciprocal basis.
Perhaps the grave challenge posed to the NPT so far has been the nuclear
tests carried out by India and Pakistan. They have added to the complexity of issues
attendant upon non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament because of the change in
strategic equation. They have shown that as long as nuclear weapons are maintained along
with the power, status and privileges which they confer, there will always be an incentive
for the non-nuclear weapon states to acquire a weapons capability.
- These tests were also a graphic warning about the flaws of a policy
premised on the reliance on nuclear weapons as the corner-stone of security while denying
this option to others. The justifications for the Indian tests were the perceived threats
from China while Pakistan's were the perceived threats from India. Nuclear capabilities
are regarded as critical to their national security.
They have made clear that the objective of non-proliferation cannot be
achieved without significant and irreversible steps towards the elimination of nuclear
armaments. And they sent a chilling message: There cannot be restraint in one direction
(horizontal proliferation) and uncontrolled expansion (vertical proliferation) on the
other. Both horizontal and vertical proliferation are clearly linked in the NPT and the
policy of imposing controls and inspections on potential proliferators rather than the
existing vertical ones has focused once again the imbalance and arbitrariness in
implementing its provisions. Consequently, the unequal emphasis on the goal of horizontal
proliferation while the vertical aspect is under-rated has given rise to a perverted and
unilateral interpretation: All rights and privileges are reserved exclusively
for the nuclear powers, while the non-nuclear weapon states have become the sole
bearers of obligations. This calls for a fundamental revaluation of the very concept
of proliferation in its essential aspects.
The tests conducted in South Asia dealt a serious, if not a fatal blow, to
the objective of the NPTs universality proclaimed in 1995. While progress to achieve this
objectives is reflected by an increasing number of adherents since 1970, the substance or
contents of its universality would have acquired greater significance if it has attracted
the adherence of India, Pakistan and Israel. Thus, the often-proclaimed goal of
universality has fallen victim to double standards and discrimination inherent in the
Treaty.
Although the NPT precludes the recognition of new nuclear weapon states, both
India and Pakistan are de facto (in fact), if not de jure (by right), nuclear powers and
are most unlikely to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states. In India's case, it
is unlikely to give up its nuclear programs because the posturings and policies of the
established nuclear powers do not alleviate its perceived security concerns. The goal in
South Asia is no longer non-proliferation as the threshold has already been crossed.
All the tests did was to demonstrate the capabilities that are already known. As
the probability of rolling back their nuclear programs are slim and even non-existent, the
focus should be the prevention of the capability from developing into a nuclear force
structure (such as arming and deployment of missiles and aircraft with nuclear warheads
and development of associated command. control and communications and intelligence
systems). It is not clear at this stage whether the dangers and responsibilities
that go with the possession of nuclear weapons and the negative economic consequences,
will lead these two nations to sober assessments and realistic postures. These
should include moratorium on testing, readiness in principle to adhere to the CTBT,
participation in the anticipated negotiations on a fissile materials cut-off treaty, a
no-first use policy and refusal to engage in a self-destructive nuclear arms competition.
Let me also add that despite universal condemnation of nuclear tests, their nuclear
programs enjoy broad political support from their peoples and strategic communities.
Any new framework must build on the promotion of security and stability in
South Asia as its core objective. Non-proliferation concerns and more broadly arms control
measures should be incorporated into this framework but concerns of non-proliferation must
not override that of security and stability. However, repugnant it may be, such a
framework must accept the nuclear status of India and Pakistan, take their security
interests in the larger regional context and formulate arms control measures including
non-proliferation to prevent a nuclear arms race in that region. (To be continued).
Managing the forest of the landes by satellite
-Emmanuel
The'venon, France
Scientists at the
French national Agronomic Research Institute (Institut National de Recherche Agronomique,
INRA) have developed a method that is unique in Europe making it possible to follow the
development of the Forest of the Landes by Tele-detection.
In 18th century,
the Forest of the landes, in the SouthWest of France, covered 300,000 hectares, in the
heart of a region surrounded by the endless coastal dunes scattered with a myriad of
insalubrious marches. This area of forest was tripled at the end of reign of Napoleon III,
in 1870, when the wetlands were drained, the hills of a sand attacked by marine erosion
were established, the demand for posts for mines increased and the imports of American
pine resin stopped owing to the civil War.
 |
| Un satellite
d'observation |
In spite of
the big fires of the "red years" (1930-1949), which destroyed nearly 700,000
hectares, the Landes forest, with its million hectares, is the largest in Western Europe.
It is mainly planed with maritime pines and provides a quarter of the production of French
industrial timber (especially for making paper pulp) and a fifth of timber for building
purposes. Looking after this important raw material is essential for good forestry
management.
Just as for other
forests in France, every 10 years, the National Forest Inventory (Inventaire Forestier
National) assesses the volume of wood growing in the forest of the Landes, from thousands
of places. in spite of its reliability, updating the statistics every 10 years seems
rather long in a forest which is managed in a very intensive way.
To follow the
development of the forest more closely, the Bioclimatology Unit at the Bordeaux INRA
Centre is at present testing an original system, the teledetection by satellite of the
felling of all the trees in a parcel of forest. "We work from photos taken every year
by the Landsat satellite which has an infra-red observation sensor", Dominique Guyon
, a research engineer at INRA, explains .'By analyzing the differences in the sun's
radiance reflected on the vegetation, it is possible to make all the areas cleared of
trees, which are larger than four or five hectares, appear". In combination with the
data in the forest inventor, this information makes it possible to annually estimate the
volume of timber cut between two inventories.
Overexploitation?
In the longer
term, the aim is to map the age-zones of all the parcels of land making up the forest of
the Landes as each of them is completely replanted each time all the trees are felled. At
an annual reafforestation rate of 1.5%, it will take about 70 years to find out the
demography of the complete forest/ in conjunction with growth simulations of the
plantations carried out by INRA and the National Forest Inventory, it will also be
possible to fond the production potential of the forest.
The aim is not to
overexploit a forest from which 7 million cubic meters of timber are gathered every year.
This wood comes mainly form the exploitation of trees planted in large numbers after the
forest fires of the Second World War and which have now reached maturity. However, the
number of such plantations is going to dwindle at a time when industrial projects seek to
increase the amount of timber gathered to 8 million cubic meters per year. Data provided
by the National Forest Inventory and the analysis of annual satellite pictures should make
it possible to determine if, in the future, this exploitation will be compensated for by
more recent plantations coming into production and being felled more intensively or being
created from far more productive varieties. |
