Strategic Stability, Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament -3
Mr. Hazairin Pohan,
Indonesian diplomat ,New York
-In the absence of a credible and phased program of nuclear disarmament or if
the intentions of the weapon states become clear concerning their rejection of the demand
to give up nuclear armaments, that is bound to lead to an agonizing
reappraisal of the Treaty's value to its majority adherents. This is because either
we have the NPT or nuclear weapons but we cannot have both since that was not the
bargain agreed to in 1970. What is at stake is the sanctity of the Treaty. In May, it is
unlikely that the majority will agree to engage in skillful drafting as in the past that
will paper over fundamental differences between the haves and the have-nots and that will
provide an escape clause to accountability in fulfilling obligations which has been the
hall-mark of the decisions taken in 1995.
The conference will be crucial in these and in other important aspects.
Hence, it is critically important to reverse the growing perception that the Treaty is
of dubious value or even inimical to the fundamental interests of the majority and
has become an instrument to promote in perpetuity the interests of a handful of states and
their allies. The responsibility to reverse this process rests squarely with the weapon
states.
10.Situation in the Middle East: - It is a near unanimous position of the
non-nuclear states parties to the NPT that the 1995 resolution on the Middle East along
with the three decisions constituted an integral part of the package. But attempts were
made during the Prep. Com sessions to erroneously create an impression that the resolution
is separate from the decisions. The only stumbling block to its implementation is Israel's
steadfast refusal to accede to the NPT and to place its nuclear facilities under IAEA's
inspection and safeguards system. In view of the importance of this question and its
implications for peace and stability in this volatile region, it is
reasonable to expect that the May conference will establish a
subsidiary body to one of its Main Committees to consider and recommend proposals to
implement the 1995 resolution.
11.Situation in Northeast Asia
12.Decision-making
-The Rules of Procedure of past review conferences have allowed for
decision-making by two-thirds majority of the representatives present and voting after a
48-hour waiting period. This waiting period has served as a useful device in enabling
representatives to engage in reassessment and introspection of their positions that could
possibly lead not only for a narrowing of differences but also to a consensus.
Sometimes, it worked, but in others it did not.
-For the forthcoming Conference, in my view, we should depart from the
consensus model and switch to decision-making by the majority. Let me offer some
reasonings for a seemingly radical departure. It is true that decisions concerning
disarmament and security that affect nearly every country should be taken by consensus -
meaning not necessarily unanimity but the absence of a sizeable opposition. This has been
the rationale behind the practice of consensus in the Conference on Disarmament and
perhaps other disarmament forums. We learn from experience that such a process has
been used over a period of many years in preventing and obstructing positions taken by the
majority. Meanwhile, the interests of a handful of powerful countries and their allies
became entrenched. The disarmament agenda has become moribund. This has what
happened in Geneva. There has not been any progress in that forum since the CTBT in
1996. Since that time, however, the majority has begun to assert itself on the issue
of a ban on fissile materials and prevented the initiation of negotiations on this issue
unless the question of nuclear disarmament is also on the agenda for negotiations.
I wonder whether it is now timed to seriously consider decision-making by
the majority during the 2000 Conference. This is because it is most unlikely that the vast
majority of non-nuclear states parties to the NPT will acquiesce indefinitely to a
regime whose legal obligations have been flouted with impunity far too long by a minority
while the vast majority have fulfilled theirs. Nor they will agree to a final
document in May that does not fully reflect fundamental differences between the haves and
have-nots. The failure of the three Prep. Com. sessions to agree on substantive
issues does not augur well for consensus unless a miracle happens which is rare in the
field of disarmament! Confidence in the credibility of the current regime has already
begun to erode for reasons with which we are all familiar (especially words like
nuclear hegemony and domination, discrimination and double standards, rights and
privileges, and so on and so forth). The fulfillment of obligations has been
subjected to unilateral interpretations to the detriment of the interests of the vast
majority of non-nuclear states parties to the Treaty. These considerations warrant
decisions to be taken by a majority but consensus should remain the preferred option
wherever possible.
11.Security assurances
-On the issue of security assurances, it should be emphasized that a mere
reiteration of the UN Security Council resolution on security assurances adopted just
prior to the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference with its conditions and stipulations
would no longer suffice to ensure the successful outcome of the review exercise. Mere
declarations, however, solemnly proclaimed will not ensure the security of non-nuclear
nations against the threat or use of nuclear weapons. The 1995 Principles and Objectives
made a modicum of progress on this issue by at least recognizing the need for
"further steps" in this regard and that "such steps" could take the
form of an internationally legally binding instrument." This is an issue, like others
relating to the nuclear dimension, has been languishing, as I recall for at least two
decades in Geneva. And this is also an issue on which the non-nuclear nations have been on
the receiving end of the line.
-In any event, security assurances must be construed as interim measures
pending the abolition of nuclear armaments and cannot be a substitute for other
disarmament measures. It would have no validity if the weapon states cling to their
insistence that these weapons should be in their exclusive and perpetual possession to the
detriment of the security of other countries.
Having given up their nuclear option, the non-nuclear weapon states are
entitled to security against the use of nuclear weapons and this is an area on which
further progress can be made in 2000 in the direction of an international convention
providing for binding and unconditional assurances.
12.Peaceful uses of nuclear energy:- There is scope to build
further upon the edifice of 1995 in May. During the Prep. Com sessions,
delegates generally commended the role of the IAEA as an essential component to prevent
proliferation while promoting the civilian applications of nuclear energy. But attention
was also drawn to the perennial problem of lack of funding in the Agency's programs for
technical cooperation. Similarly, while funds for technical cooperation have
decreased, those for safeguards have increased. Progress on these issues together with
transparency in nuclear-related export controls will provide meaning and substance to
Articles I , II and III of the Treaty.
13. Document or documents to be produced
-In this task, we should be guided by the experience of the past five review
exercises that have taken place so far. The criterion for success is the adoption of
a final document. The inability to adopt such a document has widely been perceived as
failure.
-The Second Review Conference failed to adopt a final declaration as it
floundered on the question of the relationship between nuclear proliferation through the
dissemination of nuclear know-how versus the developmental needs of the developing
countries.
The Third Review Conference of 1985 did adopt a final declaration due to the
misplaced stress on the fulfillment of obligations by the non-nuclear states.
-The Fourth Review Conference held in 1990 did achieve a modicum of agreement
on recommendations concerning the implementation of the Treaty's provisions on
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, safeguarding of nuclear materials, establishment of
NWFZs and promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It failed, however, to reach a
consensus on the cessation of the nuclear arms race, and hence, was unable to produce a
final declaration.
-We are all familiar with the outcome of the 1995 decisions. Based on
the experience, what kind of final document or declaration will be acceptable to the
majority? We can only speculate at this stage. It should preclude the perpetuation of
evasive and one-sided obligations that should be avoided. It should refrain from the kind
of formulation engaged in 1995 such as "determined pursuit...of systematic and
progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons"...We are of the outcome of those
"determined pursuit". Rather, the final document should address
forthrightly what should be accomplished within the time frame of the years 2000-2005 that
is to "look forward". This, in my view, will constitute a litmus test of the
sincerity of the nuclear powers to live up to the "good faith' negotiations
undertaken way back in 1970. (Concluded).
Airbus
celebrates its 30th Anniversary
-Anne-Sophie
JARRIGE, France
With the A300,
A310, A318, A319, A320, A321, A330, A340 and soon the A3XX, in thirty years of existence,
the European Airbus Industry consortium has made a place for itself as one of the two
biggest aircraft manufacturers in the world. With a staff of nearly 3,000 people, not
counting partners and associated members, more than 1,500 suppliers in 27 countries and a
turnover of some 13.3 billion dollars for 1998, it has enabled the French and European
aeronautics industry to once again figure on the civil aviation scene from which it had
practically disappeared after the Second World War, setting an example of real, successful
European cooperation.
The first
Airbus Industry aircraft, the A300, was launched at the Le Bourget Air Show on 29 May 1969
by Sud-Aviation, today a member of Ae'rospatiale, and Deutsche Airbus GmbH, growing
together the four German aircraft manufacturers who, today, for part of the
Daimler-Chrysler group. The British Hawker Siddeley Aviation company was also a partner
involved in the program in a private capacity. Henri Ziegler, who was, at the time,
Chairman of Sud-Aviation, Roger Be'teille, the technical manager of the Airbus program and
Franz-Joseph Strauss, a minister and president of Bavaria and chairman of Deutsche Airbus
Supervision Board, decided that Airbus would be built up on tasks, even for the final
assembly. It was a first. Airbus Industrie has come into being even if it was not
officially created as an intercompany management syndicate under French law until 18
December 1970.
Airbus got off to
a difficult start owing to competition from American aircraft manufacturers. Orders and
sales were scarce but Airbus held on. A few weeks after negotiations with the American
Western Airlines company failed in 1977, Frank Borman, the former astronaut and president
of Eastern airlines, which, at the time, was one of the biggest American airline
companies, included the Airbus in his company's invitation to tender to renew his fleet
and finally settled for the European aircraft. It was the beginning of a spate of orders,
which was to continue and reach a total of 133 firm orders in 1979. Airbus industrie thus
won 26% of the market just ten years after it was launched. It was also at this time that
the British Aerospace group officially joined the consortium.
With the dawning
of the year 2000, this partnership still holds. Today, with the Frenchman Noel Forgeard at
the head of the consortium, Airbus Industrie groups together the four main European
Aircraft manufacturers: the French Aerospatiale Matra Airbus and the German Dasa each of
which has 37.9%, and the Spanish Casa and the British BAE Systems which have a 4.2% and
20% share. With offices in Sydney, Tokyo, Singapore, New Delhi, Moscow, Brussels and Rio
de Janeiro, and training centers in Toulouse, Miami and Peking, Airbus Industry is present
all over the world and has some 37,000 people working on its programs in partner companies
generating, according to estimates, 100,000 jobs among more than 1,500 suppliers.
So its pioneering
days are well and truly over. The company is no longer at a stage when it had, at all
costs, to challenge the world number one Boeing and desperately fight to win a share of
the market. Thirty years after the A300 program was launched, Airbus Industry can boast of
its 3,350 firm orders placed by more than 160 customers, notably from the Middle East,
North America and Latin America. Moreover, seven new programs or derived versions have
been launched since 1985 to offer airline companies all over the world a complete family
of airliners ranging from the 170 seater single aisle aircraft to the 380 seater very long
haul plane. In the first eleven months of 1999, the European consortium thus registered
417 orders for aircraft whereas the Seattle based giant had fewer than 200 orders.
At a time when
financial stakes vie with engineers' dreams, Airbus is no longer an outsider. Its
commercial success results in a production rate of close on 25 aircraft a month, leading
to continuous improvement in the design of the planes and of their engines. Their
performance in terms of fuel consumption, gases emissions and noise rank among the best in
their category. Engineers in aerodynamics are also working on new materials such as carbon
fibers that are as strong as the materials used today but which can lead to a saving in
weight and in energy likely to have a positive ecological effect. This potential is
naturally present in the future A3XX, the biggest plane ever built and no doubt the
greatest technological, industrial and financial challenge in the history of the
consortium: a cause to celebrate its thirtieth anniversary in style and to serenely look
towards the 21st century. |
