10th. Anniversary of German unification
Berlin wall was pushed open by people of eastern Germany
-Chancellor Gerhard Schroder, Germany
For us Germans the 3rd of October is a
national holiday in the best sense of the term. Ten years ago, on 3 October 1990, the
people of the former GDR acceded to the Federal Republic of Germany in free
self-determination. After more than forty years of division, essentially a consequence of
the criminal policies of the Hitler regime, Germany’s political unity was restored.
Unification had numerous fathers and mothers.
Many who held positions of political responsibility at the time, in Germany or among our
friends and neighbors abroad, doubtless rendered great services. But the crucial factor
for the wall was the moral courage of thousands of Germans in the GDR who refused to be
intimidated any longer by state and secret service repression and went out in the streets
to engage in non-violent protest for their rights, for freedom and democracy.
On the 10th anniversary of reunification it
deserves to be noted that the Wall was not brought down in Bonn, Washington or Moscow. It
was pushed open by the people of eastern Germany.
We owe a special debt of thanks to our
neighbors in Eastern and Central Europe. Without the active support of the peoples of
Poland, Hungary, and what was then still Czechoslovakia, and without their opening of the
Iron Curtain the peaceful revolution in eastern Germany would not have led to success as
quickly as it did.
The decision on eastward enlargement of the
European Union will enable us to complete the process of European unification. At the same
time it constitutes express recognition of the process being made in the political and
economic reform processes taking place in our neighboring countries. But eastward
enlargement is by no means a mere gesture of gratitude. It is in German’s immediate
economic and political interests. People in the eastern border regions, in particular,
will profit noticeably from new markets and opportunities over the medium term. All of
Europe will profit from a gain in security and stability.
It is true that the aim of rapidly narrowing
differences in standards of living between eastern and western Germany proved impossible
to achieve everywhere as quickly as we would have wanted.
In the tenth year of unification unemployment
continues to be depressingly high in some parts of eastern Germany. However, those who
have had an opportunity, as I did in recent weeks, to travel through the now no longer so
"new" states can hardly avoid admiring the progress that has been made in the
reconstruction effort and the magnificent work the people have done. In many places
engineering and services companies who compete successfully on the world market have built
highly modern production facilities. The high levels of training and commitment among the
people here will continue to promote progress.
In the fight against unemployment among young
people we have achieved above-average success in the eastern German states, not least of
all through a special federal government program. But we need to be aware of the fact that
we still have quite some way to go. Financial support for reconstruction efforts in
eastern Germany will continue to be necessary above and beyond the "Solidarity
Pact" that extends to the year 2004. The federal government intends to conclude a
viable follow-up agreement on this with the state governments.
Unification has also changed a great deal in
western Germany. The seat of federal government was re-established in the capital, Berlin,
in 1999.
Pressures on government and on society as a
whole to reform and to modernize have increased considerably. With its "Program for
the Future", a tax reform and a pension reform the federal government has undertaken
initial urgent steps towards satisfying pent-up needs for reform. But society as a whole
is called upon to help in the modernization of our country. With and every individual in
our society is faced with the challenges of a rapidly changing world. Looking back on the
great achievements of unification and reconstruction can only serve as an encouragement
for moving forward.
This also applies with regard to the worst
chapter in the still young history of German unification, the still festering presence of
right-wing extremism, violence, and racial hatred in all of Germany. Neo-Nazi propaganda
and xenophobia constitute attacks on the core values of our society.
We must not and will not allow gangs of
criminals to claim the right to determine who will or will not be allowed to live and work
in our country. Our government and our society as a whole will not permit this to happen.
A determined defense of the rule of law and the government monopoly on the use of force is
needed along with close cooperation between the police, the justice authorities, and the
general public in fighting right-wing extremist activities and crimes directed against
foreigners.
Protection of our fellow human beings,
regardless of their race or religion, is also protection of our free and democratic
society.
I am certain the Germans in both the eastern
and western parts of the country will successfully address this challenge. Together we
want to build a cosmopolitan, tolerant and just Germany in which our children will be able
to live free of fear for their safety.
(Speech made by German Chancellor Gerhard
Schroeder on 3 October, in Dresden on the tenth anniversary of German reunification amidst
a gala function which among others was participated in by the French President, Jacques
Chirac-Chief editor).
About the frontiers of
Europe
-Michel Foucher, Director, CAP, Paris
In its earlier phases, enlargement at
first was not considered in its territorial dimension, this was neither necessary nor
possible; it was a process of continuous evolution. Although now it is being transformed
in to a self-perpetuating process, because of its very success and the appeal this
excites, the uncertainty about the final frontiers is becoming a problem factor since the
architecture of the whole is not being sketched out alongside it. As the minister of
Foreign Affairs, Hubert Vedrine, points out, " The question of the institutional and
geographical limits of the Union is thus posed and should be clearly debated."
Can geography and history come to the rescue
to define the ultimate frontiers of Europe? Traditional geography is hardly a basis.
Reference to natural boundaries does not stand up as soon as the presence, towards the
east, of open spaces and "fringes" is observed. The notion of a continent
connotes a continuous stretch of land but this is not a very firm concept for the
historian or the strategist and, besides, the strength of American and
‘Atlantic’ tropism in central Europe illustrates this only too well.
A shifting geopolitical concept: The ultimate
frontiers of Europe are shifting concepts since they are historically dated; their
boundary lines translate long-standing geopolitical projects and strategic policies.
Suffice it to recall here the ‘invention’ of the Urals by the cartographers of
Tsar Peter the Great, 18 century, who wished to include Moscow in scheme to modernize
Europe. As for the southern frontier of the Transcaucasian regions, it was
‘moved’ from the high peaks of the Caucasus to the Ottoman and Persian confines
by Georgian and Armenian geographers at the beginning of the 19 Th century, in order to
legitimize its inclusion in the Russian Christian empire.
Increasing the lengths of frontiers brings us
close, gives us more neighbors, these factors themselves favor self-perpetuating linking
effects: it will be thought, in any ‘frontier’ country that security is best
assured if its neighbor, in its turn, has the prospect of joining the European Union, in
accordance with a previously proven pattern; playing this tune, any enlargement would call
for another, as far as Russia…. or Iran.
Long history, in its turn, offers some useful
markers. It has delineated some lasting divisions-the social and religious boundary of
1054 between central Europe proper, the heartland of Catholicism, and Orthodox Eastern
Europe). To radicalize this cultural limit echoes the notion of a ‘Christian’
club sometimes evoked as a parameter not open to discussion. But it is still true that
this area did, in some periods, marks break in the pace of the spread of some forms of
modernity.
Long history indeed reveals the interplay of
‘translations’ of progress: today the European Union is perceived from outside
as the home of modernization, the place of a Renaissance or of a period of Enlightenment,
whose advances are spreading from West to East. The current modernization has its own
geography, from neighbor to neighbor, which is not summed up in membership of
institutions. It is in part the challenge of adopting community norms, which can’t be
reduced to incorporating directives in national legislation, but accompanies real social
and political transition. These transfer processes delineate, at a given period, a
temporary structure at the center and on the periphery with intermediate areas, depending
on the degree of openness to modernity.
In this transition, the processes become
complicated when differences of maturity in three fields are taken into account: the
construction of a national identity, as, for example, in the case of Byelorussia, where it
is gradual, probably because of burden some strategic some strategic constraints and
inherited factors heavy with portent; relations between nation and territories that have
not yet stabilized, as seen in the Western Balkans; lastly the recent character of the
(re) conquest of sovereignty in Eastern Europe, Ukraine, Moldavia, Slovakia and Macedonia.
Rather than seek boundaries, it is important
to be committed to central processes, the driving forces, which are spreading-community
norms- as well as to the functions of frontiers more than to their layout. We are aware of
the central importance of the Copenhagen criteria. Europe is where an area and a
democratic project meet. A claim that those play a full part in this project can make. The
future external frontiers of the EU will, moreover, serve a dual purpose. First, the
control of migration. Then a security function, with, in some cases, an overlap between
the Schengen area and membership of NATO: this is the case, for example, of the eastern
frontiers of Poland and Hungary. No doubt that, initially, some States will have real
comparative advantages, over and above security, including in attracting investment and
conducting their external policy, for example, towards the former Soviet bloc.
A strategic partnership: At this point of
reasoning, one understands that while there is no answer to the initial question about the
frontiers of Europe in the sense of a continent and its approaches, the question relating
to the borders of the EU is clear since they depend on a decision by the member states.
This is the meaning of the arrangements introduced at the Helsinki European Council, in
December 1999, which invited new states to commit themselves more resolutely to the
transition process. But nowhere is it written that one would cease to be
‘European’ if one were not, within a given time of the transformations being
made, a member of the EU.
It is up to us to establish with a series of
States, who are part of the continent of Europe and share its outlook, genuine
‘strategic partnership’ whose ultimate object is to promote democratic behavior,
the introduction of the rule of law and structural changes likely to encourage the spread
of European prosperity and modernity. This is, for example, the case of the interaction
that we have to create with Russia, where the elite sees the success of the European
experiment as an attractive model and a decisive point of anchorage.
Similarly, it is right to guide, in a
mutually beneficial direction, the interaction between the EU and the countries bordering
the south and east Mediterranean, whose economies are already linked to a vast
geo-economic Euro-Mediterranean bloc. A consolidated peace process will permit the
establishment of a constructive relationship with the countries of the Near East; the
transformations at work in North African countries can only feel encouraged by a more open
approach on the part of the present European Union.
Far from the traditional formula-which
maintained that the policy of States lay in their geography, a useful stance but which
can’t be found- it is more effective to consider that the future geography of States
resides in their political options. As the minister responsible for EU affairs Pierre
Moscovici, points out: "It is the political area of Europe that determines its
frontiers." This prospect is undoubtedly more demanding than that of expected
assistance given in advance by ‘geography’ or even history; it lends itself to
helping a diplomacy of change to flourish.
(The author is the
representative of the minister of Foreign Affairs and concurrently the director of CAP
based in Paris. Text courtesy: Label France, No 40, July 2000.) |
