Europe of the future: After
the EU Summit in Nice
By Josef Janning
It was the longest summit in the
history of the European Union- and rather a successful one for Federal Chancellor Gerhard
Schroder. "In Nice, the 'old' Europe pushed open the door to the 'new' Europe",
said the Chancellor in the Bundestag at the end of January, and applauded the fact that a
decisive goal had been achieved, namely preparing the EU to accept new members. Another
positive result, from the German perspective, was the fact that a new intergovernmental
conference would define the powers of the EU and the members States from 2004. The
post-Nice process would continue "thinking about Europe ", for example, on the
separation of powers between EU institutions, the status of the Charter of the Fundamental
Rights, the simplification of the Treaties, and the role of parliaments. Nonetheless,
admitted Schroder, the summit in Nice had not fulfilled all his expectations. "We
could have imagined a much more far-reaching outcome on the transition to the majority
voting". In the following article, Josef Janning, deputy director of the Center for
Applied Policy Research at the University of Munich, analyzes the results of the Nice
summit, France, and takes a look at the future of Europe.
The inter-governmental conference of the past
year and the Treaty of Nice represent yet another step forward on the road towards a large
EU that could well incorporate more than 30 European countries in 15 or 20 years' time.
This does not mean to say that the outcome of the summit is unimportant. Although
harmlessly described as "leftovers", the main issues at Nice were not matters
left by earlier reforms, but unresolved questions of power and parity in European policy.
For the first time in many years, the principles governing how countries and their
citizens are represented were up for re-negotiation, and an understanding was only reached
as a result of the pressure arising from the imminent accession of new members. A great
leap forward was not and could not have been achieved- it would seem that policy-makers in
some parts of the EU are too attached to existing privileges and current relationships. It
is a maxim of European policy that politicians are extremely reluctant to take advance
decisions. This was even the case on the eve of the most far-reaching change in EU
structure since the conclusion of the Treaty of Rome.
The results of the Treaty of Nice contained
mixed signals on the future of integration. On the one hand, advances were made towards
the integrated goal of strengthening the EU's ability to act. What is likely to be
particularly significant here in the medium term is the decision that future commission
Presidents will be appointed by a qualified majority vote. However, agreement on the final
size of the European Commission was deferred until the Union has grown to 27 member
states.
Building Consensus:
Nevertheless, Nice significantly improved the
institutional framework for the work of the Commission despite the increased complexity
that enlargement will bring. Furthermore, a limited reduction was achieved in the number
of areas requiring unanimous decisions, and it was also made easier to initiate enhanced
co-operation. A more equitable distribution of seats in the European parliament will also
improve the quality of democratic representation at the European level. When this is
compared with the scope of the changes made in the European Commission and the Council of
Ministers, the European parliament could even be described as the real winner of Nice-a
win that also represents an increase in the quality of democracy in Europe, thereby
completing reforms, including the Character of Fundamental Rights, that stand for greater
proximity to and more participation by citizens.
ON THE OTHER HAND, THESE ADVANCES were won at
the cost of a strengthening of veto positions and non-decisions in sensitive policy areas
as well as on the future number of Commission members-as a result, the EU's effectiveness
will suffer during the various enlargement phases. Above all, however, central areas of
European interior, social and taxation policy were excluded from the extension of the
majority voting. Policy making in Europe, the form of government by majorities that
Germany considers so important, is thus unlikely to become the characteristic paradigm of
integration. The extremely limited extension of qualified majority voting hinders more
effective decision making – and the re-weighting of votes in the Council of Ministers
does not offset this.
Nice was also able to realize a principle
laid down in Amsterdam, that the large member states should be given greater weight in
order to prevent the loss of an unacceptable amount of power and influence in the Council
of Ministers following the accession of similar new member states. However, it will be
more difficult than ever before to achieve decisions that require a three fold majority
based on votes, countries and population. The potential to shape European policy has thus
been reduced , while the power to obstruct has been increased. The re-weighting of votes
in the Council of Ministers and the new distribution of seats in the European Parliament
will also have an impact on the old Franco-German equilibrium in community bodies.
Although both countries retain an equal number of votes in the Council, Germany will carry
greater weight than the other large countries due to the new rule that a majority vote
must also represent at least 62% of the population. Germany is the only country that can
block a majority decision in combination with two other large countries. Representation in
the European Parliament also shifts in Germany's favor, because only Germany will retain
its 99 seats, while France and other large countries will lose 15 of their 87 seats in the
wake of enlargement. The question of an appropriate system of government for the larger EU
still remains unanswered after Nice. The future balance of powers will have to be
negotiated again –but next time this will also include participation from the
enlargement candidates that have acceded.
Dialogue and participation
The member states aim to formulate solutions
to the following four questions by 2004:
* The development of a sensible division of
labor between the EU and the member states; * The incorporation within the treaty of the
Charter of Fundamental Rights proclaimed in Nice; * The simplification of community
treaties and thus the development of a constitutional treaty; * Agreement on the future
role of national parliaments in the European integration process.
It will be crucial for European policy that
the public is made fully aware of the justifications for, developmental direction of, and
issues ensuing from these projects. This is necessary because the integration process has
reached a stage that demands public debate on the next steps. A large European Union with
28 or more member states must not be allowed to distance itself from citizens even
further-it must be capable of effective action and people must be able to understand its
workings without previous study of European history. Understanding Europe is a
precondition for support and participation. Without people's consent, it will be
impossible to realize any of the ambitious plans for Europe.
There is a lot to be said for using new
approaches to answer these fundamental questions and not simply dealing with them in the
now customary manner of negotiating positions in intergovernmental conferences and
treaties. At this decisive phase in the integration process, shaping the future requires
public dialogue and broad participation. Wouldn't it be better if translating the results
of the reform process into treaty amendments, something that will still be required in the
future, were to represent the conclusion of European debate? Intergovernmental conferences
would then no longer be substitutes for reform debates, but to a certain extent become
their notaries. 2001 ought to become a year of public discussion on the distribution of
power and the fundamental political order of Europe. This should be conducted not only by
governments, but also by opinion-makers, parliaments, interest groups and associations.
Integrating future member states: In the
following year, 2002, groups of experts could compile the results and draw up
recommendations. The instrument of a convention could be used to draft a basic treaty,
while the issue of jurisdiction would be suitable for investigation by specialists, and an
inter-parliamentary commission could be established to clarify the role of national
parliaments. The year 2003 would present an opportunity for a review group, consisting of
government and parliamentary representatives, to consolidate the debates and
recommendations and prepare them for deliberation within the framework of a new
intergovernmental conference in 2004.
The future member states should also be
involved in this process. Enlargement negotiations with the countries that have made the
most progress could possibly be concluded as early as 2002. This would mean that some
countries might be able to complete the accession process by beginning of the next
intergovernmental conference and thus claim their seats and voting rights at the
conference. The public debates and expert consultations of the next two years should
accordingly involve all the countries now engaged in accession negotiations.
A program of this kind is not free from
risk-it could reveal limits to consensus that might make the further development of Europe
impossible for governments and parliaments. In any event, forthright debate should not be
avoided, because if it does not take place, diffuse fears, and their exploitation in
certain quarters, could have the very opposite effect to that desired: without
legitimating through discussion and participation, the effectiveness of European policy
decision-making would certainly be weakened.
The author is deputy director of
the Center for Applied Policy Research, CAP, Germany. Text courtesy: Deutschland, E4 No
1/2001, Feb-March; Embassy of Germany in Kathmandu, Nepal. |
