Security in South Asia: A Nepali Perspective
"What Vision for Security Future in South Asia ? " 4

The socio-psycological context on the basis of which the central leaderships of India treat the Northeast is akin to the way that West Pakistan had treated the former East Pakistan – a distant, different and dissociated land, people and culture – who are to be commanded but not cared for. Pakistan faced the tragedy with the emergence of Bangladesh, when the Bengali ethnicity, culture and language asserted difference with the predominant Punjabi culture of West Pakistan. But the Bengali nationalism replicates the Punjabi traits while dealing with the cultural differences of the Chittagong Hill Tamils, the Buddhist Drukpas' awkward posture against the Hindu Nepalese in Bhutan, the Nepali Hindus concern against the non-Hindus and especially Janjatis as different people inside Nepal, and demolition of the Babri Mosque along with treatment rendered to Muslim minorities in Hindu India are travesties in the course of state building in South Asia.

South Asia today, thus stands at a crossroads. It has neither a secure past nor a secure future as the present itself is textured by uncertainty. The governments in South Asia have become simply an outcome of the electoral process designed with an objective of assimilation, popular participation and representation, which are neither assimilative nor representative. In sum, the South Asian electoral process has become a symbol of three-Cs, "cash, criminality and corruption." Elections have been ritualized; they have also become the means for "concentration and personalization of state power." Therefore,, the loss of the faith of the people in a process called democracy, which in practice has become the denial of democracy, has brought about a crunch in the sphere of governance. The roots of insecurity in South Asia therefore emanate from processes of bad governance engineered by bad leadership. Not to delve into details, it would suffice to note here how South Asia reflects in the course of governance both with the elected as well as non-elected leadership along with their avid commitment to nation/state building. According to the Human Development Report 1999:

South Asia has emerged by now as one of the most poorly governed regions in the world, with exclusion of the voiceless majority, unstable political regimes and poor economic management. The systems of governance have become unresponsive and irrelevant to the needs and concerns of people.

Further elaborating on the pathetic situation in South Asia, the Human Development Report says, it is a "region where the richest one-five earns almost 40 percent of the income, and the poorest one-fifth makes do with less than 10 percent. A region where today begins with the struggle of survival for 515 million poverty ridden destitute, and tomorrow threatens the future of 395 million illiterate adults. Where women are often denied basic human rights and minorities continue their struggle against prejudice and discrimination." Despite such nightmares, South Asia has emerged as one of the most militarized regions in the world where each dollar spent on the social sector is matched on the average by 2.5 dollars in the security related expenditures. Similarly, endemic corruption, which is floating upward at the very highest level of the state, has further weakened and compromised the state's capacity to deliver. The conclusion though sordid, is that the stare has fundamentally failed to deliver even the basics for the survival of its citizenry. The "survival complex" in most South Asian countries, as defined by Azar and Moon, relates also to the provision for "food and water" to the people living within a territorial state to enhance their security. Failing to provide such a minimum necessity the façade of democratic governance, in the final analysis, has become a farce.

Although South Asian countries have short histories of statehood, they have long been practicing corrupt governments, stagnant economies and fragmented people. The challenges to "nation state building" have perennially come from the fragmented populace. The learning from over fifty years of experiences of the sub-continental governments' harmonizing and homogenization practice of the state building is that the effects of such politically induced process have been largely negative. The efforts of the majoritarian identity building process of south Asian states are weakening as the parallel efforts towards ethno-religious identity are strongly articulated by the minorities. Violent ethnic conflicts along with the growing resentment of destitute people against the government have made states incapable of facing the challenges and coping with the destruction brought about by the societal chaos bordering on anarchy. The disparate trends that the ethno-politics indicate violate both the conventionally dispensed sovereignty as well as juridical statehood. In the emergent context of societal and political violence the state no longer retains the monopoly over the use of coercive power. In other words, the breakdown of authority to use coercive apparatuses in pursuit of the preservation of the integrity of the state is an indisputable testimony to the erosion of sovereignty and inviolability of the state system.

Empirically, the breakup of Pakistan in 1971 was much the consequence of domestic conflict in its post-colonial state formation as the cause of external intervention. The dominant security concerns of the Pakistani elites led to the insecurity of the Bengali national aspiration and their resistance fragmented the state. Pakistan's failure of national integration is a case representing governmental corruption, militarism, economic stagnation and, above all, the pursuit of internal colonization and domination of the power-less by the powerful. The case of homogenization to maintain exclusivist identity of the state through deliberate attempts to dissipate multiple identities.

Most South Asian countries are not exception to this process. The tiny island country Maldives, however, is distinctively different and it does not require hegemonic pursuit to induce the process of homogenization. Bangladesh is also ethnically and linguistically a strong state but it is tragically at war with the slightly over 0.5 percent of the total population – the CHT tribals along with the Bihari Muslims which the state treats as the "others". Constitutionally, too, Bangladesh has declared itself as a unicultural and unilingual state there by relegating all the minorities to the margin. Such a state posture constricts the political rights of about 2.5 million Hindus. Their cultural and social insecurity has increased through exclusion. Though the Hindus constitute nearly 12 percent of the total population of Bangladesh and the Bihari Muslims are of sizable number, the state is in irreconcilable conflicts with the numerically small tribal groups whose articulation of identity is more pronounced than their numerically stronger compatriots.

The ethno-religious homogeneity would have assured the territorial integrity of Bangladesh had it been used constructively in the state building and national reconstruction. But the egoistic development of the typical majoritarian state syndrome has destroyed the opportunity of national integration which is at fault in promoting ceaseless domestic conflicts in South Asian states. According to a perceptive scholar, the Bangladesh case reflects: "What began as a problem of socio-cultural and political economic grievances among the minority tribal community turned into a major problem of national integration that constitutes a threat to territorial integrity".

Similarly, when Nepal demonstrated its insensitivity towards the religious minorities by declaring itself a Hindu state, although at the same breath granting the "multiethnic, multilingual" status to the nation, it deliberately resurrected the age-old grievances of the national minorities towards the majoritarian elites provoking ethnic demands. Yet the state in Nepal is to experience the misfortune of ethno-political violence as well as demands for secession, despite the weak voices of discord, which are currently being heard. However, the poisonous weeds of conflict sowed in the constitution are growing and can best be ignored at the country's own perils. Demands authoritatively raised to amend, and even repeal the Constitution for the formation of a Republican state by replacing the constitutional monarchy by the Maoist insurgents along with the emergence of various ethnic organizations to struggle for their cause have considerably changed the social landscape in Nepal. Although the foci of contention in Nepal remain power sharing with proper representation of the destitute and marginalized people in the national political, social and economic mainstream, any delay and denial of these rights can adversely affect the integrity of the state in the future resulting in a civil war.

One need not look at different sources to determine what actually provoked the ethnic backlash in Bhutan other than to the absolute and irrefutable evidence of the Drupka regime's adoption of exclusivist nationalism to define its national identity. The majoritarian syndrome predominantly influencing decision making in that small country can be summed up by the following statement attributed to have been made by Bhutan's Home Minister at the 71st State Assembly Meeting in 1992.

The Home Minister pointed out that while different customs, languages and dresses add colour and enriched the culture of a large country, for a small country with small population like Bhutan, and which did not have the advantage of economic strength and military might, different customs and languages would only erode the national identity and undermine the unity and security of the country (emphasis mine).

Bhutan's determination to promote ethnic cleansing for the cultural purification of the state was also made clear by an earlier official assertion in 1991 that the Royal government cannot "afford to discontinue the policy of national integration and the concept of one nation and one people. These policies are vital for ensuring Bhutan's long term security and well being as a unified and cohesive nation (emphasis mine).

Sri Lanka demonstrated traits towards the construction of exclusivist unitary notion of nationalism in its post-colonial formation by deliberately eliminating the prospects of the Tamil's assimilation in the national mainstream. The country that nurtured pluralism in the beginning had to cave into the pressure built by the Sihalese-Buddhists community who asserted their national predominance. The political imperative brought about by independence and democratic practices of electioneering finally thwarted the efforts towards nation building in the pluralistic mould. Hence, as Shankaran Krishna asserts: "I see the problems of nation building…not as instances of inadequate or flawed modernization, but as the very form modernity has taken into these countries (of South Asia). The rise of Sinhalese majoritarian ideology and of Tamil secessionism in Sri Lanka is not a resurgence of primordial and premodern affinities. Rather the modernists requirements of electoral politics, party competition, access to educational opportunities, employment in state-controlled agencies and the likes have been proximate forces that have engendered identity politics in their present form in that country". He further notes that the "quest" for securing a "nation" can create multiple insecurity that may ultimately unravel a nation when it is being made. Sri Lanka is a living testimony to insecurity generated by the security imperatives of the majoritarian political elites who have eventually become the instrument for destroying the peace and tranquility of the Island State.

The multiple ethno-nationalist crises facing India can also be described as a sequence of interaction between modernity and the formation of identities of different nationalities. On the eve of British departure there were over 580 autonomous princely states along with some larger provinces that had legal rights to declare their independence. Their assimilation contributed to the formation of the Indian Union. The territoriality defined and preserved by the British colonial power after partition thus has become the sacred frontiers of India. A unified India has been able to resolve challenges to statehood not only through repression, and forcible annexation of territory like Goa and manipulation of ethnic sentiments in Sikkim, but also through conceding internal statehood as federal units to others.

Kashmir, however, remains a nemesis to India because of the controversies over Kashmir's accession to India on October 26, 1947, and the United Nations has yet to recognize India's de jure sovereignty over it. Similarly, no governments in India have dared to repeal Article 370 of the Constitution that provides special status to Kashmir to preserve its integrity by preventing other Indians from buying property and settling permanently. But efforts to breach the essence of Article 370 underlying paramountcy of the Indian state in pursuant of preserving Kasmiri autonomy with the pursuit of centralizing power in Delhi by prime ministers Indira and Rajiv Gandhi through excessive interference in the state's politics have wrecked the integrity by inviting an ethnic backlash, increasing insecurity and fuelling separatism. The Kashmiri separatists have questioned the political legitimacy of Indian rule through denial of democracy in Kashmir and have asserted themselves for its independence.

Among the separatists there remains a strong pro-Pakistani persuasion that has complicated the Kashmiri liberation movements, despite the expansion of its international support base. The claim that Pakistan has laid on Kashmir as being a majority Muslim majority, thus an integral part of Islamic homeland contiguous to it, has projected this intra-state conflict into an inter-state crisis over which India and Pakistan have already fought two inconclusive wars. Pakistan's claim has further sensitized India's professed secularism, the banner of its national identity and democracy. The Indian strategy vis-à-vis Kashmir remains a war of attrition, notwithstanding the human and material costs of such a venture.

In summation, the irony that the South Asian situation presents today is that if the nation-state building projects of the majoritarian states are a dismal failure in replicating the West, the ethno-politics and secessionist movements are also trying to replicate the West similar to those experienced in continental Europe. Witness the resurgent ethnic nationalism in South Asia which is more narrowly focused on religion, language, race and culture that exclude the others in their imagined political and territorial dispensation. For instance, in the case of Nepal the ethnics have divided territories into different ethnic categories like the Khambuwan Chettra and the Limbuwan Chettra in Eastern Nepal. The Sikhs declared Punjab Khalistan and Darjeeling has Gorkhaland. Kashmiriyat could be a wonderland for the Kashmiri Muslims who have developed an irreconcilable hatred towards everything Indian. Bodos are struggling for Bodoland and ULFA is still active as the "sons of soil" movement in Assam. The Tamils have declared Eelam. Pashthunistan and Balochistan in Pakistan are a living testimony to potential destruction and disintegration. So what are the ethnics striving for? Are these conflicts the causes and consequences of cultural, religious, linguistic, as well as material and identical differences?/ Or they are actually caused by the craving for control of the machinery of the state? As yet there is no hard evidence to prove which of the case is authentic.

But if one were to look at some historical analogy one can generalize that the ambition to control state power is predominant in the conscience of the ppeople struggling for their rightful place on earth. The case of Moldova stands out to exemplify my contention. Prior to World War II, Moldova was a part of Romania. The Soviet Union annexed it in 1945. The Balkan tragedy freed Moldova from the Rusian yoke inspiting some Moldovans to reunite with Romania. In the end, the idea of reunion spurned in favor of retaining political power with Moldovans themselves. Though Moldova never had any history independent of Romania, the country has survives independently. Besides the Kashmiris, the Tamils in Jaffna could also have been inspired by the Moldovan case. Intensive fighting for liberation and self-determination can particularly be observed in this area other than other territories desirous of dissociating from their respective states.

The cycle of violence that continues in South Asia has a lesson to be learned. Violence has definitely compromised the state's capacity to pursue its goals of national integration. And the project of a unified state has yet to be achieved. The crucial fallout of this failure is that the state as a role model has become an anathema to the people living within. This has led to the weakening of the state from within and without. Assertion of cultural identity of the people living within the space of the state has unleashed a process of fragmentation weakening both state power and sovereignty. And the increasing pressure of globalization experienced by states in managing their economies from without has caught them between the crossfire of internal pulls and external pressures. These twin pressures from within and without are expressions questioning the role model of states conceived by the Westphalian system.

The states have provided their people neither with the strongest political identity in south Asia, nor have the states been able to perform the task of institutionalizing the system of producing public goods benefiting the people and, in turn, enhancing the cohesion of the state. The disruptive ripples created both from the internal and external pressures, therefore, have posited the states into an environment where uncertainty and insecurities writ large. States in south Asia can no longer wield the power of coercion and violence treating the minorities as " pariahs" deserving suppression by ignoring their legitimate demands for participation and sharing as they do. As state building in south Asia remains incomplete, broadening participation and inclusion of desperate mass can only provide cohesion to the process of consolidating the statehood. To think otherwise would mean the contestation of the very foundation of the statehood by the people who retain sovereign rights to make a state sovereign because the democratic space carved by the people for themselves while preserving the territorial space of the state has led to disputes between the rulers' sovereignty and the people's sovereignty. As the world now looks for the preservation of human rights with increased emphasis on the sovereignty of the people rather than the sovereignty of the state, the case of sovereign rights of a regime with upholding legitimacy. To use force by insulating the state either from internal or external interference has long passed.

Perhaps, because of this south Asian countries are undergoing a situation where political order so painstakingly built in the post-colonial state formation has collapsed in disorder. The states in south Asia have become more intolerant and repressive in responses to the ethnic assertion. Armed conflicts currently have become as usual and repression and unaccountability of the government a routine. Along with this, increasing interventionist clamor of a government as a party to the multiple disputes interventions from the International Human Rights Agencies to make the contending responsible to the civil society, thus violating the sanctity of states' principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of the country. Sensibly, states are in a fix and the International community in the sphere of their functioning is also constantly scrutinizing them. This way, states in south Asia are eclipsed. Violence they wreak has bred extremism. Unfortunately, there is no end to the cycle of violence.

The contending parties as a double-edged sword as a matter of fact have used violence in south Asia. The use of violence by the state is seen as a process of disempowering people. On the contrary, the violent uprising of the people against the state is seen and defined as the articulation of the process of empowering the people themselves. In this contentious course violence has distinctly become a zero-sum game. But as a noted scholar, Hannah Arendt, said," (t)he practice of violence, like all action changes the world, but the more probable change is the more violent world". Elaborating on the problem of nationalism and increasing tendency of centralizing the state power in the hands of a few, she wrote," again we do not know where these developments will lead us, but we know, or should know that every decrease in power is an open invitation to violence-if only because those who hold power and fill it slipping from their hands, be the government or be they the governed, have always found it resist the temptation to the substitute violence for it".

On the violent Age

It is no wonder therefore that the West has projected south Asia as the "most dangerous place on the earth". The view was also reiterated by President Clinton on the eve of his departure to New Delhi describing south Asia and specially the line of control bordering Kashmir, as the "most dangerous place in the world right now". Naming the region so perhaps is caused by the butterfly flapping effects of the chaos theory influencing the perspective of the west on the (in) security situation is south Asia. Perpetual domestic instabilities coupled with the nuclear weapons tests and the unwarranted Kargil conflict bordering on the nuclear threats have subscribed to a doomsday scenario in the regional strategic landscape. Insurgencies in Kashmir following the Indo-Pak rivalries have indeed set forces in motion that blew a thunderstorm in the international capitals causing anxieties and alarms during the Kargil conflict in mid-1999.

Theoretically, chaos is a term used to define a situation in which a small, local event can provoke systemic disruption. Given the current situation in south Asia one can see all the countries in the region as being disrupted by the undercurrents of different sorts of conflicts and tensions. Characteristically, all the states in south Asia feature high level of political violence. Conspicuous use of forcer by the states in domestic political life has made resolution of conflict intractable. And, as Arendt said, pathways to future are still uncertain. There is no road map to reach the desired destination either for the states or for those who have risen against the states asserting their rights in south Asia.

History has taught negative lessons while attempting to resolve some deadly conflicts. In recent memory, the Khmer genocide in Kampuchea and the Rwanda massacres reflect crimes against humanity. Earlier, Fascism had cast its long shadow over Europe resulting in the holocaust. These are crimes political violence engineered or manipulated by the states or the governments in domestic conflicts was the cause of more deaths in the past century than inter-state or international conflicts. Rumel, in a study of political violence in the 20th century, records over 169 million people killed by their own governments. This figure, as he notes, was over four times higher than the record of 38.5 million people killed in wars.

Despite such a horrendous record, the past century was indeed a period of state making. Decolonization after the World War 11 led to the formation of numerous states, totaling 164 before 1990. The breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia along with the velvet divorce between Czechs and Slovaks led that number to grow by 24 and altogether there are now 184 states. Of them as many as 15 states emerged out of the collapsing Soviet Empire. These emerging states in the 1990s are not the outcome of Decolonization. These states are the products of the assertion of the rights to secede and the upholding of the principle of national self-determination. Encouraged by the secession and formation of new states, south Asia separatists have also reinforced the demand for secession and self-determination. Informed by this urge for independence caused by the failure of nation building some questions are being raised whether the nation as state a form of political organization has outlived its utility. Subscribing to this view, Jayadeva Uyangoda contemplates the possibility of the emergence of mono-ethnic mini states as an alternative to the presently failed state system in south Asia. Though this possibility cannot be negated given the developments in the 1990s, there are evidences in abundance that self determination has not been permitted to carve out independent ethnic states through violence.

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