Security in South Asia : A Nepali perspective
"What vision for security Future in south asia?" - 3

dhruba kumar

Socialism as a process of nationalization of economy to fundamentally serve the interests of majoritarian elites has now to be denationalized in the interests of globalization benighted by the World Bank. Heavy dependence on foreign aid of almost all of the South Asian countries has constrained their choices. They have no other alternative other than to compromise their autonomy in economic decision making to be credible for being a foreign aid recipient. Thus the process of development chosen to replicate the West on the Western prescription has indeed increased insecurities of South Asian states.

States in South Asia have therefore fallen into the vicious circle of a security/insecurity dilemma. Previously their reliance on the military was a prima facie necessity in the course of state formation. Military as an institution has become an instrument of the ruling elites in organizing and maintaining their hegemony. National security defined as the intrinsic value that the state must preserve at any cost has encouraged militarism as a sustaining means of coercion. In other words, state building for the ruling elites is intricately linked with the objective of "primitive central state power accumulation", as defined by Cohen, Brown and Organski. As the security forces are created with the objective of expansion, control, consolidation of territorial and demographic domain as well as for policing and extraction of resources from the territory and population necessary to carry out routine administration and order, they become integral to the state's survival. This military function of the state, though contested domestically, nevertheless has continued to ascertain its primacy given the history of intra-state and inter-state conflicts spreading in South Asia.

The intra-state conflicts have not only become bloodied and deadly but has also questioned the conventional thinking on sovereignty as being indivisible and therefore inviolable. The contention today is between the concept of inviolability of the territoriality and sovereignty of the state and the concept of autonomy and secession articulated in favor of self-determination. The fundamental contention textured in the discourse remains the definitive argument that the states in South Asia have been an artificial creation and have been heavily fabricated by the use of force. South Asian states are neither a product of social contract nor the consequence of consent. The States in South Asia are in fact the accidents of colonial history. Further elaborating on this theme, Sudip Kaviraj has observed, in the case of India that the "imaginary institution" as India had never existed in the past. According to him, "[T]he nation, in India…is a thing without a past. It is radically modern. It can only look for subterfuge of antiquity. It fears to face and admit its own terrible modernity, because to admit modernity is to make itself vulnerable.

Kaviraj did not stop there. He further says India as a "national state was an inheritor of two distinct, and in some ways, incompatible legacies" (from its colonial past).

-"It inherited the colonial state's systems of internal command and control, its administrative ethos, and its three predominant characteristics to the popular mind:; its marginality, its exteriority, and its persistent repressiveness against the lower strata of the people, who, at least in constitutional formality, were made the repository of sovereignty. At the same time, it was a successor to a triumphant national movement whose principal objective was to contest the culture of the state…[However] the historical circumstances of partition, dissidence, insurgency and war, made it inevitable that the apparatuses left behind by the colonial state would not be dismantled, but actually reinforced. This relatively strong state could see itself and act upon society in different ways, depending on which ideological constellation established its dominance on the political world."-

Keeping India and other multiethnic states in mind, Bhiku Parekh strongly observes that though the process of state building is predominantly a manufactured reality inclined to an assertion of a culturally homogeneous society, this presumptions runs into deep trouble in a "culturally heterogeneous or deeply divided society." In case the state were to conform to the presumption of a culturally homogeneous society, then it would naturally become both suppressive and oppressive where justice would be denied. Consequently the state would promote disorder rather than order thereby failing to achieve the very objective from which it derives its raison d' etre'. When power to violence other than power to pursue by recognizing the legitimate grievances of dissenting groups is exercised by the state, it weakens its power as an instrument to rule by consent. Power used in the quest of retaining rule may destroy it, as violence becomes the ultimate means to seek compliance. In other words, while violence can destroy power, it is utterly incapable of creating and consolidating power. But, as Parekh maintains, the modern state has undertaken activities beyond the wildest dreams of its predecessors by virtue of its monopoly over authority to use force and a capacity for indefinite elaboration and expansion. The emergence, consolidation and expansion of the modern states entailed egregious internal and external violence. The rulers of these modern states have dismantled long established religious, cultural and other communities in the pursuit of a culturally homogeneous and easily governable community. But their success so far remains elusive.

Twin Failures: The sorry state of the South Asian situation today where contending forces are rivaling towards establishing their self-professed ideals of state or nation building are distinctly a sign of the failure of "nation building" and "nation integration" by increasing disintegrative complexities. On the other hand, even with the dehumanizing consequences of the conflicts, the secessionist movements have also failed to provide a viable alternative to the disruptions brought about by the integrationists' clamor. The national security state of South Asia are so versed in claiming their omnipotence over the people, territory and the resources they possess that they tend to be least prepared to be flexible whenever their possessions are sensibly challenged. Kashmir reminds India of its security imperative, as the territory is adjacent as well as vulnerable to both Pakistan and China. Likewise, Northeast is both political imaginations of most central leaderships except in a negative sense. For them the Northeast is both politically and psychologically marginal. But it is a strategic zone, a buffer against China and Burma, and therefore must be defended. As the region has tenuous territorial link with the rest of India and located vulnerably, there is positive disincentive to invest in the region because of the anticipated risk the vulnerability poses.

India's claim on the Northeast, therefore, is a pursuit of the colonial possession, which it is neither prepared to abandon, nor eager to assimilate. The socio-psycological context on the basis of which the central leaderships of India treat the Northeast is akin to the way that West Pakistan had treated the former East Pakistan – a distant, different and dissociated land, people and culture – who are to be commanded but not cared for. Pakistan faced the tragedy with the emergence of Bangladesh, when the Bengali ethnicity, culture and language asserted difference with the predominant Punjabi culture of West Pakistan. But the Bengali nationalism replicates the Punjabi traits while dealing with the cultural differences of the Chittagong Hill Tamils, the Buddhist Drukpas' awkward posture against the Hindu Nepalese in Bhutan, the Nepali Hindus concern against the non-Hindus and especially Janjatis as different people inside Nepal, and demolition of the Babri Mosque along with treatment rendered to Muslim minorities in Hindu India are travesties in the course of state building in South Asia.

South Asia today, thus stands at a crossroads. It has neither a secure past nor a secure future as the present itself is textured by uncertainty. The governments in South Asia have become simply an outcome of the electoral process designed with an objective of assimilation, popular participation and representation, which are neither assimilative nor representative. In sum, the South Asian electoral process has become a symbol of three-Cs, "cash, criminality and corruption." Elections have been ritualized; they have also become the means for "concentration and personalization of state power." Therefore,, the loss of the faith of the people in a process called democracy, which in practice has become the denial of democracy, has brought about a crunch in the sphere of governance. The roots of insecurity in South Asia therefore emanate from processes of bad governance engineered by bad leadership. Not to delve into details, it would suffice to note here how South Asia reflects in the course of governance both with the elected as well as non-elected leadership along with their avid commitment to nation/state building. According to the Human Development Report 1999:

South Asia has emerged by now as one of the most poorly governed regions in the world, with exclusion of the voiceless majority, unstable political regimes and poor economic management. The systems of governance have become unresponsive and irrelevant to the needs and concerns of people.

Further elaborating on the pathetic situation in South Asia, the Human Development Report says, it is a "region where the richest one-five earns almost 40 percent of the income, and the poorest one-fifth makes do with less than 10 percent. A region where today begins with the struggle of survival for 515 million poverty ridden destitute, and tomorrow threatens the future of 395 million illiterate adults. Where women are often denied basic human rights and minorities continue their struggle against prejudice and discrimination." Despite such nightmares, South Asia has emerged as one of the most militarized regions in the world where each dollar spent on the social sector is matched on the average by 2.5 dollars in the security related expenditures. Similarly, endemic corruption, which is floating upward at the very highest level of the state, has further weakened and compromised the state's capacity to deliver. The conclusion though sordid, is that the stare has fundamentally failed to deliver even the basics for the survival of its citizenry. The "survival complex" in most South Asian countries, as defined by Azar and Moon, relates also to the provision for "food and water" to the people living within a territorial state to enhance their security. Failing to provide such a minimum necessity the façade of democratic governance, in the final analysis, has become a farce.

Although South Asian countries have short histories of statehood, they have long been practicing corrupt governments, stagnant economies and fragmented people. The challenges to "nation state building" have perennially come from the fragmented populace. The learning from over fifty years of experiences of the sub-continental governments' harmonizing and homogenization practice of the state building is that the effects of such politically induced process have been largely negative. The efforts of the majoritarian identity building process of south Asian states are weakening as the parallel efforts towards ethno-religious identity are strongly articulated by the minorities. Violent ethnic conflicts along with the growing resentment of destitute people against the government have made states incapable of facing the challenges and coping with the destruction brought about by the societal chaos bordering on anarchy. The disparate trends that the ethno-politics indicate violate both the conventionally dispensed sovereignty as well as juridical statehood. In the emergent context of societal and political violence the state no longer retains the monopoly over the use of coercive power. In other words, the breakdown of authority to use coercive apparatuses in pursuit of the preservation of the integrity of the state is an indisputable testimony to the erosion of sovereignty and inviolability of the state system.

Empirically, the breakup of Pakistan in 1971 was much the consequence of domestic conflict in its post-colonial state formation as the cause of external intervention. The dominant security concerns of the Pakistani elites led to the insecurity of the Bengali national aspiration and their resistance fragmented the state. Pakistan's failure of national integration is a case representing governmental corruption, militarism, economic stagnation and, above all, the pursuit of internal colonization and domination of the power-less by the powerful. The case of homogenization to maintain exclusivist identity of the state through deliberate attempts to dissipate multiple identities.

Most South Asian countries are not exception to this process. The tiny island country Maldives, however, is distinctively different and it does not require hegemonic pursuit to induce the process of homogenization. Bangladesh is also ethnically and linguistically a strong state but it is tragically at war with the slightly over 0.5 percent of the total population – the CHT tribals along with the Bihari Muslims which the state treats as the "others". Constitutionally, too, Bangladesh has declared itself as a unicultural and unilingual state there by relegating all the minorities to the margin. Such a state posture constricts the political rights of about 2.5 million Hindus. Their cultural and social insecurity has increased through exclusion. Though the Hindus constitute nearly 12 percent of the total population of Bangladesh and the Bihari Muslims are of sizable number, the state is in irreconcilable conflicts with the numerically small tribal groups whose articulation of identity is more pronounced than their numerically stronger compatriots.

The ethno-religious homogeneity would have assured the territorial integrity of Bangladesh had it been used constructively in the state building and national reconstruction. But the egoistic development of the typical majoritarian state syndrome has destroyed the opportunity of national integration which is at fault in promoting ceaseless domestic conflicts in South Asian states. According to a perceptive scholar, the Bangladesh case reflects: "What began as a problem of socio-cultural and political economic grievances among the minority tribal community turned into a major problem of national integration that constitutes a threat to territorial integrity".

Similarly, when Nepal demonstrated its insensitivity towards the religious minorities by declaring itself a Hindu state, although at the same breath granting the "multiethnic, multilingual" status to the nation, it deliberately resurrected the age-old grievances of the national minorities towards the majoritarian elites provoking ethnic demands. Yet the state in Nepal is to experience the misfortune of ethno-political violence as well as demands for secession, despite the weak voices of discord, which are currently being heard. However, the poisonous weeds of conflict sowed in the constitution are growing and can best be ignored at the country's own perils. Demands authoritatively raised to amend, and even repeal the Constitution for the formation of a Republican state by replacing the constitutional monarchy by the Maoist insurgents along with the emergence of various ethnic organizations to struggle for their cause have considerably changed the social landscape in Nepal. Although the foci of contention in Nepal remain power sharing with proper representation of the destitute and marginalized people in the national political, social and economic mainstream, any delay and denial of these rights can adversely affect the integrity of the state in the future resulting in a civil war.

One need not look at different sources to determine what actually provoked the ethnic backlash in Bhutan other than to the absolute and irrefutable evidence of the Drupka regime's adoption of exclusivist nationalism to define its national identity. The majoritarian syndrome predominantly influencing decision making in that small country can be summed up by the following statement attributed to have been made by Bhutan's Home Minister at the 71st State Assembly Meeting in 1992.

The Home Minister pointed out that while different customs, languages and dresses add colour and enriched the culture of a large country, for a small country with small population like Bhutan, and which did not have the advantage of economic strength and military might, different customs and languages would only erode the national identity and undermine the unity and security of the country (emphasis mine).

Bhutan's determination to promote ethnic cleansing for the cultural purification of the state was also made clear by an earlier official assertion in 1991 that the Royal government cannot "afford to discontinue the policy of national integration and the concept of one nation and one people. These policies are vital for ensuring Bhutan's long term security and well being as a unified and cohesive nation (emphasis mine).

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