The Challenge of the WTO:
Rethinking Strategies-4
Second, many of the developing countries are
still in the process of trying to understand the implications of the various WTO
Agreements. Countries like \India, Pakistan, Malaysia, Egypt, Brazil for instance, are
consciously engaged in an effort to build a cadre of personnel familiar with WTO
Agreements and specializing in the same. This is however not the case with most of the
other developing and least developed countries. As a result, the level of appreciation of
WTO related issues is not to enable effective trade negotiations.
Third, only a few of the countries are
engaged in a transparent consultative process with all concerned stakeholders. Unless this
is done and broad based consensus obtained on the negotiating stance, countries would find
themselves stymied once again at the negotiating for a. this requires intense
consultations and a transparent analysis of the of the implications of the Agreements by
inviting comments and suggestions. The services of various stakeholders from journalists
to academics, policy makers, chambers of commerce and industry, consumer associations,
non-governmental organizations (NGO) and others need to be co-opted so that the debate can
contribute substantively to a more informed appreciation of WTO Agreements and its
implications on the economy.
This compares poorly with the sort of
preparations undertaken by richer countries. Delegations from the US and the EU or Japan
to WTO Conferences are considerably larger than those that the poorer countries can bring
along and furthermore, richer countries delegations include specialists and lawyers. This
is not the case with delegations from developing and LDCs. A combination of all the above
factors resulted in severely constraining their effective participation in earlier WTO
Conferences. As a result, the full import and implications of the WTO Agreements were
never realistically assessed or appreciated by the poorer countries. It was, therefore,
only much later that these countries realized that the URA were unbalanced.
Given the above scenario, it is important to
recognize that developing countries are not equipped to undertake full- fledged
negotiations on an equal footing with developed country delegations for a variety of
reasons. These relate, at one level, to either a lack of knowledge of the full import of
the fine print in the WTO Agreements or an incomplete understanding of the legal and other
implications of these Agreements. Capacity building and training is no doubt positive in
this regard. However, at another level, the poor countries lack the wherewithal to
withstand the enormous pressure and other tactics that the developed countries can muster.
And thirdly, negotiating skills alone would not guarantee development for the low-income
countries. Technical assistance and capacity building specifically directed towards
institutions and policies are critical. In areas like development or labor standards, for
instance, or SPS standards, good negotiating skills are not a substitute for the enormous
expenditure that the poor countries would not need to incur to simply upgrade their
standards. None of these countries currently possess the required funds for such an
exercise. Unless these funds are directly addressed at the WTO, the poor countries would
not be in a position to derive the full benefits of trade liberalization and integration
into the global economy.
So Where Do We Go From Here?
The first point we need to be conscious of is
that globalization is not an option. No choices are available to us for 'opting out'.
Globalization is a fact and a reality and it is here to stay. How we adjust to
globalisation, how we manage gloabalisation is the policy option open to us.
Indeed, anti-globalisation can be extremely
counter-productive if it starts becoming a fetish. It may be recalled for instance, that
during the 1950s and the 1960s, developing country attitudes and trade policies were
generally characterized through extreme protection. These economies attempted to
industrialize through 'import substitution'. From around the 1980s, these countries
realized the enormous economic costs of their failure to integrate with the international
economy, and their policies started shifting. For example, both China (in the early 1980s)
and India ( in the early 1990s) moved away from their closed-door developmental strategies
and began liberalizing their economies. As a result, the rates of growth experienced by
both countries post-liberalization were more rapid compared to the pre-liberalization
period. This would therefore suggests that while being critical of globalizations failures
(or 'bad globalization' as some have dubbed it) may be useful in that it may contribute
towards improving the manners in which globalization is managed, excessive criticisms
could have unintended consequence of triggering panic and encouraging developing economies
to once again close their doors to trade liberalization. Such a step would be retrograde
for the global economy. It is essential therefore that developed countries recognize this.
The fears of developing countries need to be directly and urgently addressed if the
process of trade liberalization is not to be retarded.
How the developed countries would encourage
trade liberalization is therefore important. There is a tendency, for instance, to link
trade liberalization to other benefits and concessions. Such measures, by themselves, are
not likely to encourage wholehearted support for trade liberalization and market reforms.
Countries and governments need tangible benefits that they can show their people and which
in turn, would create the domestic support for reforms. This can only be done if
employment is provide, poverty levels decline and improvements take place in the social
sector. In other words, if development is widely seen and perceived by the people as a
direct consequence of trade liberalization.
Second, countries need to undertake economic
and market reforms. Such reforms need therefore to be an integral part of economic policy.
However, reforms entail costs in the immediate short and even medium term and
democratically elected governments find it extremely difficult to sell short term
sacrifices to their people for a longer benefit. To cushion the costs, external funding
needs to be envisaged. Since the WTO would be compatible with its proclaimed Development
Agenda. Economic reforms need also to be seen in the context of foreign direct investments
(FDIs). Unless developing economies are in a position to attract substantial FDIs, their
growth prospects may continue to be slow and sluggish. At the same time, it needs to be
recalled that countries that do attract FDI (like China for instance), wield enormous
clout at the negotiating table because many of their supporters and lobbyists are in the
developed world.
Thirdly, the market is likely to play an
increasingly influential role in determining the distribution of global power. In this
regard, countries that are economically better-off and attracting FDIs are likely to
emerge as major global players.
Developing countries need therefore to
candidly seek out allies. Such an exercise should not only co-opt countries whose views on
the Agreements coincide with our own (such as the like-minded countries group), but also
to candidly recall that very poor countries would understandably come under pressure to
succumb to carrots and sticks from the developed world. The identification of countries
should therefore clearly include those countries which are likely to withstand such
pressure: China in the WTO might reap enormous benefits for the developing world.
At the same time, countries should recognize
that there are no permanent friends, only permanent interests and these are always
domestic and national, never global. There is no substitute for a better understanding of
the WTO instruments and Agreements, and therefore cadres need to be built up. The
consultative process needs to be expanded. Wider publicity needs to be given to the
developmental obstacles that poor countries face.
Preparations for Mexico are long over-due. If
the US has its way, the Fifth Ministerial Conference would be held earlier than
anticipated. And it should come as no surprise if developmental issues continue to remain
in the back-burner.
Concluded
Pushing Pakistan into
Central Asian "Stans"
-Dr. Shireen M. Mazari, Pakistan
In the post 9/11 strategic environment, there
is a campaign impacting Pakistan that has gone all but unnoticed. Yet this has serious
long-term consequences for Pakistan's strategic framework. The campaign is well planned
and widespread-as reflected in February 2002 National Geographic magazine and the March 5
Shahid Javed Burki article in Dawn. The former had a feature on "New Players in the
World" focusing on the "Seven Stans" which included Pakistan, while Burki
wrote on "Bringing together the 'stans'" in which he lumped Pakistan in with
Afghanistan and the Central Asian "Stans".
Apart from the fact that the National
Geographic was factually incorrect in labeling Pakistan a new player in the world-since it
is over 50 years old along with India-it also chose to label Pakistan as "most
volatile of the stans" and a "failed" state. Embedded in the rhetoric of
the past, the magazine made references to the now moribund "Pashtunishtan"'
issue and of course to the dire consequences of Pakistan's nuclearisation! In fact,
National Geographic seems to have launched an all-out campaign to highlight all the
negative aspects of Pakistan since it has simultaneously aired a television feature on its
cable channel on the killing of women in Pakistan. Had it expanded this to South Asia and
examined the bride burning and "sati" tradition amongst the Hindus of India, one
could perhaps have avoided questioning its motives.
Mr. Burki's central theme was that Pakistan
was a natural part of Central Asia and should try to movetowards creating a regional
economic and trading bloc involving the seven "stans" all of whom should try to
project a "new image to the world"' of a group of secular Muslim states! He also
draws on Ahmed Rashid's earlier inclusion of Pakistan as a part of Central Asia in his new
book, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia.
So what is wrong with identifying Pakistan
within Central Asian region, given the common historic and cultural links that do exist
between the Muslims of South and Central Asia? Nothing, in terms of purely cultural or
economic affinities and opportunities, but if Pakistan is identified in politico-strategic
terms solely as a Central Asian player, then there are a number of implications-especially
over the long term. In any case, Pakistan is fortunate enough to have cultural and
historical links to multiple geographic regions because of its strategic location-from the
Gulf to Iran to South Asia. In fact, the cultural richness of these parts filtered through
and enriched the Indian subcontinent. In addition, Pakistan can also claim links to the
Muslims of South Africa, Malaysia, Mauritius, Seychelles, Fiji, Surinam, Guyana and
Trinidad, due to the migration of South Asian Muslims to these parts during the era of
British colonialism. However, even culturally, we can and need to claim our South Asian
heritage also.
Notwithstanding all these rich cultural
traditions, to lump Pakistan with the "stans" in politico-strategic terms is not
only erroneous, but also threatening to our critical interests. To begin with, Pakistan's
strategic interests lie in the wider west Asian and South Asian regions, while its threat
perception is solely from South Asia. Therefore, there is a need to formulate our primary
policy options within these two regions-which now cannot be totally distinguishable, one
from the other, in strategic terms because of the range of India's missiles like the Agni
(and, to a lesser extent, Pakistan's missiles).
Secondly, the insidious design to edge
Pakistan out of the South Asian framework is geared towards the grouping of states in
terms of regions for seats on many international for a-including the UN, monitoring
frameworks for international treaties like the Chemical Weapons Convention and CTBT, if it
is ever operationalised, to name just a few. Once Pakistan, the only state that is able to
challenge India in South Asia, is given a Central Asian identity, the way is cleared for
India to move towards attaining its major regional and global player status. Especially,
where elections and votes are based on regional groupings, the regional identity becomes
critical.
Even on the issue of Kashmir, if Pakistan is
compelled into recasting its regional parameters out of South Asia, India will find it a
lot easier to convince the international community that it alone should solve the issue
with the Kashmiris. Given the lack of moral or principled commitment on the part of the
comity of states, as long as Kashmir is "solved", there will be little focus on
the issue of justice. The LoC will become the new boundary of Central Asia.
Also, by forcing a purely Central Asian
framework for Pakistan, its crucial role in West Asia/the Gulf region will be undermined.
Yet, with a growing disillusionment of the US in the Gulf and Saudi Arabia, and the
"'axis of evil"' design of US military strategy, Pakistan can now become a major
player, bringing together the states of this region within an all-encompassing strategic
framework. Pakistan's security threat comes from South Asia but its strategic strength
lies in evolving cooperative frameworks with Iran and the Gulf region-not in the
simplistic and much abused "strategic depth" notion but in terms of a more
substantive Community of Power notion.
The question is whether the intent behind
this labeling is to push Pakistan out of the South Asian ambit in strategic terms? It
would seem that way given the timing of this campaign-from the Ahmed Rashid book to the
National Geographic feature to the Burki article. It is part of an overall campaign to
redefine the geographic parameters of certain strategic players, through one way or
another. For instance, even as Pakistan is being pushed into a Central Asian framework,
Russia is being pushed out of this framework. With the US military now ensconced in
Central Asia, on the border of China, and eyeing its energy resources, it would like to
see Russia gradually move out of this region as a major player. Hence the effort to recast
Russia within a purely European identity-beginning with the lure of linking up with NATO,
which is itself rapidly becoming a regional, European player.
Casting Pakistan in a purely Central Asian
mode is strategically very convenient for countries like the US. Pakistan can play a
surrogate military role for the US-led coalition in these parts. It also makes it so much
easier for the US in its present global strategy where it seeks to have a defense
relationship with India, which it wishes will not impact on Pakistan. Given the strategic
military partnership between US and India, including the terms of Theatre Missile Defence,
the US finds it difficult to accept that such a relationship will impact the Pakistan-US
relationship. But it will as long as Pakistan's threat perception is embedded in South
Asia, specifically India.
This is not to deny Pakistan a role in
Central Asia. Many states, including India, already are in Central Asia-tapping the
economic potential. Pakistan needs to do the same and its location makes it a natural
frontline economic player in the economic development of Central Asia with its natural
partners in West Asia. And all this does not have to be done at the cost of Pakistan's
South Asian strategic milieu. It is within this context that lumping Pakistan with
Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgistan, Tazikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan purely on the
basis of them all being "stans" is as absurd as lumping all the "land"
together-that is, from England to Switzerland (which is still to be part of the EU) to
Poland to Togoland and so on-or all the "ias", like Russia, Somalia, Tanzania,
Bolivia, Australia, etc. together! It is the absurdity of it all that raises the very
relevant question of intent.
Text courtesy: the author herself when
she was recently in Kathmandu in connection with a seminar held in June 2002-chief editor. |
