Fashion accessories on a
rampage
The hat is dead, long live the hat!
By Nadia Khouri-Dagher, Journalist,
France
Paris, the capital of fashion, used to be the
capital of the hat, once an essential complement to any elegant outfit. After falling into
disuse in the 1960s,this fashion accessory returned to favor in the 1990s, with designers
vying with each other in inventiveness.
Today in chazelles-sur-Lyon, where, until the
1940s, 2,500 skilled hatters were employed in 28 factories, the hat museum and a
population a little more hatted than elsewhere u France are the sole reminders of this
past. The museum presents 300 models annually to 25,000 visitors, nostalgic before an
extraordinary and forgotten craft.
Light wide-brimmed hats decorated with huge
silk flowers, naughty skull caps with spotted black tulle and peppy little caps worn at an
insolent angle have made generations of women dream and their lovers languish; while
magically soft rabbit fur hats or panamas with their summery feel, by giving a little
extra assurance and masculinity, had the opposite function and effect.
"The hat declined with the liberation of
women." A bare head was a symbol of freedom, since women had to wear a hat when they
went out. Then came Brigitte Bardot, and the fashion for long hair."
Nevertheless, signs of recovery were felt
from the 1990s, initiated by Marie Merice, who now exports her designs as far afield as
Japan. With the return of aore fe;inine look and the "liberation" of men in
their turn, who are not daring to break free of the uniformity imposed on them, young
designers are making an appearance those already in the trade export well, like
Jean-Charles Brosseau, whose elegant velvet berets have been a great success in New York.
Today, Jacques Le Corre, Rue Saint Honere, in
Paris, is offering styles that are both flexible and elegant, in the colors of today.
Isabelle Leourier is daring with her outrageous styles – hats shaped like leaves or
birds nests. The young designers who rush to enter the Hat Competition organized by the
Chazelles museum show an extraordinary inventiveness not just in styles but in materials
too: sharkskin, ratan, even nylon or steel, put to daring and unconventional uses. For, in
our modern and liberated society, humor, as much as elegance now has freedom of
expression.
Text courtesy: Label France N-46 April
2002.
How the war began
By Khaled Abu Toameh
A chronology of Palestinian moves leading up
to the outbreak of violence two years ago shows it was planned in advance and ignited over
the Jerusalem issue
A few days after the failure of the Camp
David summit in July 2000, the Palestinian Authority's monthly magazine, Al-Shuhada
("The Martyrs"), published the following letter on July 25: "From the
negotiating delegation [At Camp David,] led by the commander and symbol, Abu Ammar (Yasser
Arafat) to the brave Palestinian people, be prepared. The Battle for Jerusalem has
begun."
The letter appeared in the aftermath of
reports emanating from Camp David suggesting that the summit had failed because of
Arafat's intransigence. According to PA sources, the letter was written by a senior Arafat
adviser and approved by the PA chairman beforehand
The letter was published in a magazine
distributed only among PA security personnel. It did not appear in any of the daily
newspapers published in Jerusalem or Ramallah. Hence the message Arafat was sending to his
armed men was clear: "Be prepared for an all-out confrontation with Israel, because I
refuse to accept Israeli and American dictates."
One month later - long after Arafat had
returned to Gaza - the PA's (former) police commissioner, Gen. Ghazi Jabali, told the
official Palestinian newspaper Al-Hayat al-Jadida on August 14: "The Palestinian
police will lead together with the noble sons of the Palestinian people, when the hour of
confrontation arrives."
Freih Abu Middein, the PA Justice Minister,
said he could see the writing on the wall. In an interview with the same newspaper
published on August 24, 2000, he warned: "Violence is near and the Palestinian people
are willing to sacrifice even 5,000 casualties." The statement came after a series of
meetings that Arafat had held with his cabinet ministers
Upon his return from Camp David, Arafat
received a hero's welcome from his people because he was being portrayed as the Arab and
Muslim leader who refused to compromise on their historic, national and religious rights.
Public-opinion polls showed a dramatic rise in his popularity, and even his secular and
religious rivals were now heaping praise on him for not compromising. Arafat told
well-wishers who came to see him in Ramallah that he refused to become [Egyptian president
Anwar] "Sadat No. 2," who was denounced by many Arabs for signing a separate
peace treaty with Israel
"Welcome Arafat - the hero of war and
hero of peace," said one banner in the streets of Gaza as Arafat's motorcade made its
way from the local airport to his office. Another read: "Jerusalem is in our eyes,
tomorrow it will be in our hands."
Earlier in the day, hundreds of Palestinians
marched in the city demanding a return to the intifada against Israel. Buoyed by the
failure of Camp David, Hamas and the Islamic Jihad issued statements
urging Arafat to abandon the peace talks with
Israel and return to the armed struggle
The two radical Islamic groups regarded the
breakdown of Camp David as further evidence that Israel was not serious about reaching a
just and comprehensive peace with the Palestinians. Their spokesmen also told Arafat that
if the summit proved anything, it was the fact that the US remains fully biased toward
Israel
After the failure of Camp David, Arafat
visited almost all the Arab states, except for Syria and Iraq, asking their leaders for
their support for his position. He also visited a number of European countries in an
effort to explain his stance
"Jerusalem and its holy sites,
especially al-Aksa mosque, belong to one billion Muslims and I don't have the right to
give them up to anyone," he reportedly told the Arab kings and presidents
The Arab leaders assured Arafat that they
stand behind him, but his tour of other world capitals after Camp David highlighted the
fact that, for the first time in years, international sympathies were now on the side of
Israel. For Arafat, this signaled the beginning of his isolation in the international
arena
As the pressure on him mounted, Arafat became
even more defiant when he declared that he would go ahead with plans to announce the
creation of the State of Palestine on September 13, 2000. In an
interview with a Saudi newspaper on August 1,
Arafat said: "There is no retreat on the fixed timetable of the declaration of the
state. It will be declared on the fixed time which is September 13, God willing,
regardless of those who agree or disagree."
Almost all the Arab states gave Arafat their
blessing for the state idea. The PA chairman also received a commitment of diplomatic
recognition from South African President Thabo Mbeki, whose country then had a big impact
on the decisions of many other Third World states. Arafat was so confident that he would
obtain widespread support that he ordered the PA Ministry of Planning and International
Cooperation to start training Palestinians for diplomatic jobs overseas
But on September 10 Arafat and the central
committee of the PLO were forced to postpone, yet again, the planned declaration of
statehood. The decision only increased the sense of bitterness among top PA officials who
accused the US of blindly backing Israel and misleading the rest of the world on the
reasons for the failure of the Camp David summit
By now the atmosphere in the Palestinian
street was one of "the eve of war." PA ministers and representatives stepped up
their criticism of Israel and the US as part of the PA's efforts to refute accusations
that it was responsible for the collapse of the Camp David talks and that the Palestinians
had missed yet another historic opportunity
PA-appointed imams in West Bank and Gaza
Strip mosques began referring to Israel as "the Zionist enemy" and urged all
Muslims to mobilize for the war against the "infidels." In the words of one
Gazan preacher, "All weapons must be aimed at the Jews, at the enemies of Allah, the
cursed nation in the Koran, whom the Koran describes as monkeys and pigs, worshipers of
the calf and idol worshipers."
Other imams spoke of the need and duty to
liberate Palestine from the Zionist aggressors. This time the talk was not only about
liberating the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Now the demand was for Jerusalem, Jaffa, Haifa
and Ashkelon
Israel was also being accused of distributing
drugs among young Palestinian men and women in order to corrupt them and bring about the
disintegration of Palestinian society. In addition to the drugs, the Israelis were also
believed to be behind sexually-arousing chewing gum found in Palestinian shops. The
alleged goal: to turn Palestinian women into prostitutes
More than a year later, on the first
anniversary of the intifada, West Bank Fatah leader Marwan Barghouti gave an interview on
October 22 to the London-based Arabic newspaper al-Sharq al-Awsat in which he admitted
that he had played a direct role in igniting the intifada
He said: "I knew that the end of
September was the last period [of time] before the explosion, but when Sharon reached
al-Aksa Mosque, this was the most appropriate moment for the outbreak of the intifada...
The night prior to Sharon's visit, I participated in a panel on a local television station
and I seized the opportunity to call on the public to go to al-Aksa Mosque in the morning,
for it was
not possible that Sharon would reach al-Haram
al-Sharif [the Temple Mount] just so, and walk away peacefully. I finished and went to
al-Aksa in the morning.... We tried to create clashes without success because of the
differences of opinion that emerged with others in al-Aksa compound at the time.... After
Sharon left, I remained for two hours in the presence of other people, we discussed the
manner of response and how it was possible to react in all the cities and not just in
Jerusalem. We contacted all [the Palestinian] factions."
Imad Faluji, the PA communications minister,
admitted on October 11, 2001, that the violence had been planned in July, far in advance
of Sharon's "provocation." He said: "Whoever thinks that the intifada broke
out because of the despised Sharon's visit to Al-Aksa Mosque, is wrong, even if this visit
was the straw that broke the back of the Palestinian people. This intifada was planned in
advance, ever since President Arafat's return from the Camp David negotiations, where he
turned the table upside down on President Clinton. [Arafat] remained steadfast and
challenged [Clinton]. He rejected the American terms and he did it in the heart of the
US."
"In light of the information, [after]
analyzing the political positions following the Camp David summit, and in accordance with
what brother Abu Ammar said, it became clear to the Fatah movement that the next stage
necessitates preparation for confrontation, because Prime Minister Barak is not a partner
who can respond to our people's aspirations. Based on these assessments, Fatah was more
prepared than the other movements for this confrontation. In order to play the role given
to it, Fatah coordinated its administrative, civilian and sovereign apparatuses, and was
not surprised by the outbreak of the current intifada... The Fatah movement believed that
the phenomenon of comprehensive struggle would appear at the final settlement stage."
In October, almost two months after the
intifada began, Arafat went to the Sharm e-Sheikh summit against the will of most of the
Palestinian factions and some of his cabinet ministers. PA sources said Arafat's decision
to go to the summit came largely in response to pressure from Egypt and Saudi Arabia,
which feared that the Israeli-Palestinian crisis was spinning out of control. As far as
Arafat was concerned, prime minister Ehud Barak and his government were no longer peace
partners
As expected, the "cease-fire
agreement" reached at Sharm e-Sheikh drew fire from many Palestinians, who believed
Arafat was under immense pressure from Washington to comply. PA officials told Palestinian
journalists that Arafat's acceptance of the agreement "was more out of courtesy for
president Clinton and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, who hosted the summit."
Arafat himself later denied that he made any agreement with Barak. He rejected an Israeli
and American request to call directly and personally on the Palestinians in the streets to
show restraint and restore calm. "Arafat was really offended by the accusations that
he was responsible for the failure of the Camp David talks," explained a Palestinian
negotiator. "That's why he wasn't prepared to humiliate himself by calling for an end
to the violence."
The intifada was actually the best thing that
could have happened to Arafat. It came at the right time, because it turned the fury of
the Palestinians away from the corrupt and inept regime that he had established in 1994.
Moreover, the violence united Palestinian factions against the common enemy, Israel, and
rallied the people behind Arafat's leadership. In a sense, the intifada saved Arafat and
his self-rule government because it directed the anger and frustration towards Israel
instead of the PA
Another reason why Arafat didn't move quickly
to end the violence in the first days of the intifada is the fact that he believed that it
would enhance his position in any future peace negotiations. Arafat hoped to use the
intifada, which he expected would last for a number of days or, at the most, a few weeks,
to tell Israel and the world that this is one of the results of the breakdown of the peace
talks
One of Arafat's conclusions following Camp
David is that the best way to extract more concessions from Israel would be to involve
more countries in the peace process. One of his main goals now was to drag the Arab
countries into the conflict with Israel. He repeatedly reminded the Arab and Muslim
countries that Jerusalem and its holy sites were their responsibility too
Arafat and the Palestinians were once again
greatly disappointed by the lack of support from the Arab League Summit, held in Cairo in
October 2000. There was plenty of lip-service but an unwillingness to do anything
practical on the ground
It is now clear that the past two years of
violence were unleashed as part of a strategy to internationalize the conflict and force
Israel into making further concessions. But the violent tactics spiraled out of control
taking on a deadly momentum of their own. What remains to be seen is whether there is a
way out |
