A stable New World must be
based on regional poles structured to face current threats
- M. Dominique de Villepin, Minister of
Foreign Affairs, France
It is an honour for me to be here today to
deliver the annual lecture given in memory of Alastair Buchan, the founder of your
institute.
In these moments of crisis, a place of
intellect and reflection such as yours shows its real importance. It is a forum for
exchange and debate vital to thought, an essential laboratory for action.
I am speaking to you at a decisive moment in
our history. At a serious moment, when the United Kingdom is engaged in the military
operations in Iraq. I naturally wish that this conflict finds a swift conclusion with the
minimum possible number of casualties.
And in this time of trial, I come to you in a
spirit of respect, friendship and dialogue. With the clear awareness that your country is
at war and your soldiers at risk, I come here to look to the future, beyond the current
differences between our two countries. I believe that we will only overcome the current
obstacles if we take a clear and frank measure of our divisions. I am certain that, in the
troubled world in which we live, we need unity more than ever before. And I hope to show
you a French vision that aims to build and re-establish dialogue.
France and the United Kingdom have particular
responsibilities as permanent members of the UN Security Council. They should exercise
these responsibilities in pursuit of the same goal: international stability, security and
peace. This implies working together to define the balance required for any international
action: law, force and justice.
***
Where were we ten years ago?
The end of the Cold War changed our world.
Law was placed at the centre of international concerns. Its relationship with force was
profoundly changed.
For nearly fifty years, nuclear deterrence
had guaranteed order. Both the West and the Communist world knew that the use of force
would result in untold devastation on both sides. War would have meant the failure of
deterrence and the unthinkable apocalypse.
Yet, with the end of the Cold War, force came
back as a policy option. It could be envisaged again, because its cost was no longer
disproportionate.
Yet it was rarely used. Because the assertion
of Western values met with little opposition. Because the United States was moderate in
its use of force. Indeed, it has always been true that only moderation makes power
acceptable. As Thucydides remarked in ancient times: We should be praised for being more
just than our available power would normally imply.
However, no international order can be based
solely on what the powers-that-be want it to be based. Collective norms were hence defined
to contain the use of force within the bounds of collective responsibility.
This new order met with considerable success.
It curbed territorial aggression. In 1991,
respect for the rule of law and the use of force drove Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait. Any
similar invasion would surely be met today with an immediate and forceful reaction from
the international community.
This order also brought assistance to the
populations who fell victim to civil war, authoritarian regimes and natural disasters.
Following the Gulf War, operation Provide Comfort stopped the flow of Kurdish refugees
into Turkey and helped them to return to Northern Iraq. It paved the way for the right of
humanitarian intervention and major UN operations: in Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, Bosnia, East
Timor and Sierra Leone.
And not least, the new order helped define a
set of standards that made force available to a law based on humanist values. Respect for
the individual, the defence of freedoms, and the fight against poverty and epidemics were
all given the force of law.
Yet this balance between law and force did
not solve all security problems. Firstly, it did not solve the question of Iraq's
disarmament, other than with a policy of sanctions that hit primarily the Iraqi people.
Secondly, it did not open up prospects for solving the regional crises threatening the
world's stability: first and foremost the Middle East, which remains a prisoner of a
spiral of violence and retaliation; but also the disputes in Cyprus and Western Sahara,
and the crisis in Kashmir. In these regions, the promises of the new world order ran up
against the complexity of religious and ethnic relations, the weight of history and
geographic constraints.
Moreover, the international community's
support for this order gradually waned. The results obtained demanded considerable UN
resources: in Sierra Leone, a country with 4 million inhabitants covering 71,000 square
kilometres, 16,000 UN troops are needed to maintain what remains a fragile order.
The limits of the humanitarian intervention
concept have gradually started to show. It makes it possible to take action against a
government's will when an imminent humanitarian catastrophe demands it. But it has also
prompted concern among the emerging powers and could be criticized for being partial. Why
take action here rather than elsewhere? Who makes the decision to intervene, and based on
what legitimate authority?
The case of Kosovo reflects the complexity of
these issues. We were faced with some disturbing realities in this crisis. The concept of
humanitarian intervention was questioned for the first time. Some powers in the South
feared it would allow the Western democracies to unduly encroach on their sovereignty. And
Kosovo prompted contradictory criticisms from these same democracies: some objected to a
premature use of force, or the interference of political leaders in the conduct of
military operations.
At the end of the day, the operation in
Kosovo was a legitimate enterprise and a political success. But it was also a source of
divisions. Some saw it as the first instance of a customary right to intervene on
humanitarian grounds without a UN mandate. We, however, saw it as an exception, justified
by wide support and the threat of an imminent humanitarian disaster.
***
11 September put an end to the emergence of a
new world order.
Firstly, the world entered the age of mass
terrorism. We now know that the terrorist organizations will stop at nothing to spread
their message of hate.
Secondly, it changed the meaning of power: in
a world where the weak can destabilize the strong, where ideologies flout the most
fundamental rights, the use of force is not a sufficient answer. When the blade unites
with new technologies, it side-steps the classic rules of power.
Thirdly, it revealed the vulnerability of the
United States, triggered a feeling of anger and injustice and led this country to change
its view of the world. Attacked in the heart, America refocused its priorities on its own
security, its own soil and its own population.
These times of great changes call for a
renewed close and trusting relationship with the United States. France is ready. We
understand the immense trauma that this country has suffered. We showed unwavering
solidarity with the Americans after 11 September and we share their utmost determination
to tirelessly fight terrorism worldwide. Our military commitment in Afghanistan and
especially our intelligence input illustrate this. Lastly, we will continue to work
together on the major proliferation challenges facing us, especially in North Korea.
Because they share common values, the United
States and France will re-establish close cooperation in complete solidarity. We owe it to
the friendship between our peoples, for the international order that we wish to build
together.
Over the last few months, some have wondered
about France's reasons for its ways of going about settling the Iraq crisis. I would like
to say loud and clear that our choices were not made against one country or another, but
in the name of a certain idea of collective responsibility and of a world vision.
We shouldn't underestimate the stakes here.
We need to know by which rules we would like to live together: only consensus and respect
for law can give force the legitimacy it needs. If we overstep this mark, could the use of
force become a destabilizing element?
We also need to know how to manage the many
crises throughout the world. Iraq is not an isolated case. North Korea and other countries
are raising new threats of proliferation. We must therefore give ourselves the means to
deal with them. We had started defining a disarmament method together and this method was
giving results.
Lastly, we have a fundamental concern: how
could we neglect the risk of increased misunderstanding between peoples? A
misunderstanding that could lead to a clash of cultures. Isn't that the major challenge of
the day? Is it unavoidable? We must find the right answers and fuel the spirit of dialogue
and respect amongst peoples.
In this respect we noted two elements that
lie at the heart of UNSCR 1441: the international community is most effective only hen it
is united; the international community is truly legitimate only when it shoulders all its
responsibilities.
Responsibility meant that the Council had to
strive relentlessly to improve inspections in order to make the most of UNSCR 1441. We
proposed reinforcing the inspectors' resources, adopting a stringent timetable for
inspections, a speedy and focused work programme, and a short deadline for the interim
report to be presented.
Responsibility also meant that Security
Council members should decide together what must be done. And that they should keep
control of the process at every stage. That is why the Council could not endorse an
ultimatum including an automatic use of force. Indeed it would have been outside the
framework unanimously agreed on in UNSCR 1441. And it would not have been in keeping with
the spirit of our work. Those are the simple reasons for the impasse in the Security
Council during the last round of negotiations. In this context, France was continuously
searching for a compromise. Throughout this process, France kept its options open,
including the use of force, should inspections fail.
The situation in the Council did not change
even by one vote because most members felt the peaceful option had not been pursued to the
full. Because the military timetable seemed to overtake the diplomatic agenda from January
onwards. Because the very principle of inspections soon seemed to be called into question.
Because the sense of a gradual shift in objectives from the disarmament of Iraq to regime
change, or even the reshaping of the Middle East, no doubt increased the
misunderstandings.
***
Through the Iraq crisis, two different
understandings of the world are coming head to head. They reflect different relationships
between law and force, between international legitimacy and the defence of national
security interests.
According to one such understanding,
democracy can be imposed from the outside. Having faith in the power of the law is
therefore something of a delusion. International legal tools become constraints more than
safeguards of international security. Some even say that the US would assume its
responsibilities alone and thereby show its strength while Europe's position reflects its
weakness. It also means that some governments might decide of their own accord to strike
first given the scope of the threats. Self-defence then knows no bounds or constraints.
But the limits of the use of force in Iraq
and unclear political prospects for the country fuel many questions on the relevance of
such an analysis.
We live in a complex world. It can no longer
be explained by series of alliances, as was the case in the nineteenth century or the Cold
War. Today's world is about new threats – terrorism and the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction; about extremely volatile regional crises; about extremist and
fundamentalist ideologies active across the world; about organized crime becoming a new
means of financing and implementing these threats. Using force in this context will not
solve the real issues. It may reveal new fault lines.
We believe in democracy, just as the British
and the Americans do. With the Magna Carta, the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and
the US Constitution, our countries headed the democratic revolution. We are convinced that
democracy needs resolve, conviction and a long learning period.
We do not oppose the use of force. We are
only warning against the risks of pre-emptive strikes as a doctrine. What example are we
setting for other countries? How legitimate would we feel such an action to be? What are
our limits to the use of such might? In endorsing this doctrine, we would risk introducing
the principle of constant instability and uncertainty. We risk not controlling situations
and rushing headlong into action. Let us not open a Pandora's box.
How, then, can we act? Our own view is
underpinned by a number of requirements.
Unity: it is necessary given the complexity
of our world. We can only uproot terrorism if we increase our police, judicial and
intelligence cooperation. We can only respond to proliferation if we develop together an
effective method. We must build on what we started doing in Iraq. We can only resolve
regional crises if we start a constructive dialogue with all parties involved.
Responsibility: all the countries are
collectively responsible for increasing the security and stability of our world. Force is
not a privilege some enjoy and law the alibi of others. We are all bound by the law.
Legitimacy: it is the key to the
effectiveness of international action. If we want to develop the right answers to the
challenges of the modern world and to take appropriate measures – including the use
of force – we must do so with the authority of collective decisions.
***
We must now find once again the path to
European unity and reassert transatlantic solidarity on the basis of those requirements.
We must rebuild the world order shattered by the Iraq crisis.
This is a goal for all Europeans – the
fifteen current members of the EU and the soon-to-be members. However, it is a particular
challenge for France and the United Kingdom, which have developed over time a different
relationship with the US. Yet we are both concerned about the quality and strength of the
transatlantic relationship, which we acknowledge as a stabilizing force in our world.
The alternative is not between force and law.
Force must serve the law. Force must be contained by the law to reverse Pascal's words:
unable to make what is just strong, we have made what is strong just. Asserting the
primacy of the law is not an admission of weakness. It is a moral and political
obligation, the prerequisite not only for justice but also for effectiveness. Indeed, only
justice can guarantee lasting security.
Conversely, if the international system is
still seen as unjust, if force always seems to prevail over the law, if the opinions of
the peoples are disregarded, then destabilizing factors will grow stronger, proliferation
programmes will develop, power play will go on needlessly, and hostility towards Western
democracies will be increasingly manipulated.
We must now define our common goals.
Firstly, we must fully disarm Iraq. A
unanimous international community rallied around this goal. It must now be carried through
by the inspectors. The UN must steer the process. More importantly, the UN must be at the
heart of the reconstruction and administration of Iraq. The legitimacy of our action
depends on it. We must come together to build peace together in a region rife with a sense
of insecurity and deep fault lines.
The fight against terrorism must remain our
priority. We must pursue our cooperation, strengthen our exchange of intelligence and
develop new tools to fight against the financing of terrorist networks.
We continue to have a rich and ongoing
partnership with the US and the United Kingdom on proliferation. This partnership must go
hand in hand with the work we will conduct in the UN at the summit [of heads of State and
Government] proposed by France. We also suggest that European countries consult closely
and develop a common analysis of proliferation risks so as to assess together the means to
respond. We have started developing disarmament tools. They are based on a balance between
force and law. Establishing a standing group of UN inspectors would give flesh to our
hopes.
All these challenges demand that we work
together more than ever before to find a political settlement to the Middle East crisis.
Because it is a fundamental crisis, because it is fuelled by a deep sense of injustice, we
can only have lasting peace if it is justice-based. Such justice must meet the
expectations of the Palestinian people and guarantee the security of Israel. Only justice
can strengthen peace and law.
All these goals can only be met if the UN
gives the impetus. But they can be implemented within major regional poles.
To be truly stable, this new world must be
based on a number of regional poles, structured to face current threats. These poles
should not compete against one another, but complement each other. They are the
cornerstones of an international community built on solidarity and unity in the face of
new challenges.
The determination of European countries to
develop a common foreign and security policy must reflect that. This determination shows
our will to bring about a true European identity. An identity that all the peoples of our
continent are yearning for. We wish to go resolutely down this path with the support and
involvement of the United Kingdom. We have already covered much ground together in the
field of defence. After the decision in Macedonia, we must pursue our projects: taking
over from NATO in Bosnia and establishing a European armaments agency. A strong Europe
will be in everyone's interest. It will strengthen the security of our world.
Speech given by M. Dominique de Villepin,
Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the International Institute for Strategic Studies,
(London, 27 March 2003). Text courtesy: Embassy of France, Kathmandu.
Science on Wheels
The Weizmann Institute makes science
accessible for students - wherever they may be.
The storm is at its peak. Heavy raindrops are
beating against the windows as the van climbs up the winding mountain road. The powerful
engine roars, and the fast-moving windshield wipers reveal a gray hilly landscape. Fog is
wrapped around the mountaintop where the driver, Dan Nutman, is headed; but for the car
passengers there's nothing foggy about the purpose of their trip. The staff of Madanoa,
the science education van operated by the Weizmann Institute's Youth Activities Section
headed by Dan Peri, know that over the mountaintop, in the Druze Village of Mrar in upper
Galilee, nearly one hundred youngsters are expecting them.
Another turn, another groan of the engine,
and the large van has already passed the village's first houses, circled the main square,
driven along a street flanked by two torrential streams of water, and reached the
community center. Nazam Siran, head of the center's activities is waiting at the entrance.
"I knew you wouldn't disappoint us," he says, breaking into a broad smile
beneath his large mustache. "After your success here last year, I simply knew you
would make it again, despite the storm."
Rather appropriately, the first lecture the
youths hear this morning has to do with thunder and lightning. The wide windows provide a
perfect view as the storm plays out its fury. Later, they watch and participate in the
process of glass making under Nutman's direction.
The Madanoa van is equipped with science
education exhibits and teaching aids that can be transported and set up in classrooms and
school courtyards as well as in community centers. Some of Madanoa's teaching items are
simplified versions of exhibits found in the Clore Garden of Science, the Weizmann
Institute's award-winning outdoor science museum. The approach is simple: to make it
possible to touch, feel and try out natural and physical phenomena, making learning
effective and fun.
Created in 1994, the goal of Madanoa is to
offer this unique learning experience in relatively remote places, where the teachers and
students can't pay regular visits to large city museums, universities or research centers.
Madanoa's instructors also work in the Weizmann Institute's Youth Activities Section and
in the Clore Garden of Science. Thus, for example, when instructor Hila Dotan explains to
Mrar youngsters about climatic phenomena such as wind and lightning, she uses models that
she's brought along to make the various concepts easier to understand.
After the lecture, students Sahar and Reja
share their impressions. It was really interesting. This is a lecture from life, unlike
our usual classes, which are based on books. It's fun to understand what's happening right
where you are - the mystery behind thunder, lightning, rain and other powerful forces of
nature." |
