"For
a Cooperative World Order"
Interview with
Federal Chancellor Gerhard Schröder Interviewed by Sabine Rosenbladt
You recently reiterated
your view that what matters "in foreign and security policy is that we draw the
necessary conclusions from the changed reality in the world." German foreign policy
has indeed changed since you came to office in 1998, especially over the past year. How
would you describe the strategic prospects of this new policy?
Germany’s
responsibility and role in international politics have grown continuously over the last
few years. Today our country is making substantial contributions to international
peacekeeping missions and in the fight against international terrorism, in both the
civilian and military field. This has been universally welcomed by the international
community. We make our contribution according to our own means and in close coordination
with our partners and allies.
On the basis of a
comprehensive security concept, our strategic priorities are conflict prevention and
conflict resolution by peaceful means, the non-proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and the strengthening of the multilateral system in general, and the United
Nations in particular. Military means can – and sometimes must – be used as a
last resort to underpin or back up this policy. The Federal Government is prepared to do
this, as credibly proven by the deployment of German armed forces in both international
peacekeeping missions and the fight against terrorism.
It always used
to be considered taboo to talk about German "national interests." Does this
taboo still apply today, or is there not, on the contrary, a need to define German
interests?
Of course Germany
defines its national interests and seeks to achieve them in international forums, in the
same way that our partners and allies do. One priority of our policy is thus our
membership in multilateral institutions such as the UN, the EU, NATO and the OSCE. One
consequence of this is that we live in a permanent process in which many different
national interests have to be reconciled. Perhaps Germany expresses its interests a little
more clearly than in the past. But I cannot see anything negative in that. Our partners
and allies evidently feel this is something entirely natural, since they do exactly the
same.
The things that
have changed most visibly are the role of the Bundeswehr – here one might say that
"the military is no longer taboo" – and the transatlantic relationship. As
regards the latter: has the break been repaired?
As I mentioned before,
Germany bases its security policy on a comprehensive security concept, emphasizing
conflict prevention and the use of civilian means. However, the use of military means
cannot be excluded on principle. This applies, for example, in the fight against
international terrorism. This is also the agreed view in the European Union. As far as the
transatlantic relationship is concerned, I can only say that we are working together
closely with our American friends on all levels in a spirit of mutual trust. Currently,
this cooperation is particularly intense in Afghanistan, as President Bush also recently
emphasized, as well as in the Balkans and elsewhere in the fight against the terrorist
threat. The economic and social links between our two countries are enormously varied and
strong. There is no break in the transatlantic relationship – and I would therefore
recommend that we do not allow ourselves to be led too much by vague speculation, but
focus more on the facts of our excellent day-to-day cooperation.
Javier
Solana’s draft European security strategy calls for a world order that is based on
"effective multilateralism." It also seeks an important role for the
international institutions and envisages strategic partnerships with Russia, Japan, China,
Canada and India. Does this mean that the EU is moving away from the USA in this context
to create a "counterpole" to the superpower?
To start with, in view
of the differences of opinion between European countries on the Iraq issue, it is
remarkable that Javier Solana’s draft for a European security strategy has been
positively received by all EU partners. This shows a willingness to look to the future and
arrive at a Common EU Foreign and Security Policy based on common principles. We agree
without reservation with the basic statements of the Solana paper. Proceeding on the basis
of a comprehensive security concept, the EU must address such central challenges as
international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; military
means are essential, but they must be embedded in a comprehensive strategy of conflict
prevention and international crisis management. Such a strategy must make use of the
European Union’s special strength, which has at its disposal a broad range of
political, economic and diplomatic instruments. We and our partners are working for a
cooperative world order. This requires a wide range of different partnerships. It also
involves above all a close transatlantic partnership, both bilateral and between the EU
and the US, as well as in NATO. This partnership remains fundamentally important for both
our own and international security and stability. There is no question of any
"severing of ties." We Europeans are completely united on this.
This new
strategy also speaks of "preemptive engagement" to ward off danger. Does this
mean that in future the EU will also launch preventive strikes against states it considers
a threat?
The EU is not putting
the case for a policy of preventive attacks on other states. Nor does the Solana paper do
so. "Preemptive engagement" is defined there as timely action by civilian means
such as trade and development policy. The Federal Government has long since supported such
a policy of conflict prevention.
The
Europeans’ military capability is weak. They spend only half as much money on their
armed forces as the Americans. And it is spent ineffectively, because each EU state
maintains its own national army, instead of the Union bundling all its forces for common
defence. Yet not even the EU reaction force of 60,000 troops agreed at the Helsinki summit
in 1999 is in sight. Why is this so difficult to achieve at the EU level?
The European Security
and Defence Policy has made considerable progress since the European Council in Cologne in
June 1999. Europe has also become active in this field in the meantime: three missions are
currently ongoing – a police mission in BosniaHerzegovina and two military
peacekeeping missions in Macedonia and Bunia (Congo). However, we must further improve our
capabilities, particularly in the military field. Here, the European states must cooperate
even more intensively. Germany, France, Belgium and Luxembourg launched initiatives in
this field at the end of April with the aim of achieving closer cooperation through
pooling and sharing of responsibilities. These proposals are now the subject of further
discussions in EU circles. If we jointly improve our military capabilities in Europe, this
will also benefit NATO. There, too, the main issue is that the Europeans must contribute
more. An effective European Security and Defence Policy will not weaken NATO. On the
contrary, it will strengthen NATO. We want a strong European pillar in NATO, precisely
because we continue to need NATO and the transatlantic partnership for our common
security.
The revival of
the Franco-German EU engine on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the Elysée Treaty
and the agreement between Germany and France on the Iraq issue surprised many people. Was
that an ad-hoc alliance, or is there more behind it?
The close relationship
between Germany and France has never been an ad-hoc alliance. Franco-German cooperation is
and remains essential in order to move Europe forward. The success of the enlargement
summit in Copenhagen in December 2002 would not have been possible without the
FrancoGerman compromise that President Chirac and I agreed on the financing of
agricultural policy. The Franco-German initiative of January 2003 on the institutional
reform of the EU had a decisive influence on the successful work of the Convention under
the chairmanship of the former French president Valéry Giscard d’Estaing.
A permanent
seat for Germany on the UN Security Council seems impossible in the foreseeable future, as
does a common seat for the European Union. How can Germany, as the third-biggest financial
contributor to the UN, nevertheless attain more weight on the Security Council? Are there
efforts to commit London and Paris to represent the EU position at the Security Council?
In 2003/2004 Germany is
a member of the UN Security Council for the fourth time since our accession to the United
Nations. This is a clear expression of the trust that Germany enjoys at the United
Nations. Germany carries a lot of weight on this body, not only because it has been the
third-biggest UN contributor for a long time, but also due to its role in Europe and the
world. In New York there have been discussions on reforming and enlarging the Security
Council for many years. Germany supports this reform with the aim of institutionally
strengthening this important body and making it representative of the community of states
in the 21st century.
The power
monopoly of the United Nations, as embodied in the UN Charter, seems unenforceable. Does
international law need to be modernized?
The existence of a
power monopoly on the part of the United Nations does not mean that only the UN is
authorized to take or authorize military action. Article 51 of the UN Charter expressly
provides that every member state’s right to individual and collective self-defence is
not impaired. It is true, however, that the UN’s member states have transferred the
main responsibility for keeping world peace and maintaining international security to the
Security Council. International law is involved in a continuous adjustment process. It is
already more modern today than many people believe. It is not possible to simply decide
new international law; rather, changes essentially ensue from the practice of states, from
legal judgments and difficult multilateral negotiations. The Federal Government, for its
part, is resolutely continuing its policy of strengthening the United Nations and
international law, particularly the Charter of the United Nations.
Should France,
Germany and Britain join forces as a "Club of Three" to really move Europe
forward? Up to now London has tended to obstruct such moves, particularly when it comes to
the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Do you see any chance of recruiting your
friend Tony Blair as a club member for such a core Europe?
Our three countries are
united in the view that Europe can only take on an economically leading role if we make
European industry more competitive. This was the basis of my joint industrial policy
initiative with President Chirac and Prime Minister Blair at the beginning of the year,
which the other member states essentially endorsed at the European Council in Brussels in
March. Possible effects on industry must now be considered at an early stage in the run-up
to legislative initiatives by the Commission. The British and the French contributions are
also indispensable as regards both the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the
European Security and Defence Policy (ESPD). Yet this does not mean that our three
countries are uniting to form a "Club of Three." We want progress together with
all our partners in the EU.
The European
draft constitution has brought some progress. However, the old unanimity principle has
been retained in important fields such as the CFSP. Won’t this make a common foreign
policy more difficult?
The Convention on the
Future of Europe did an excellent job. The draft European constitution will significantly
improve democracy, transparency and the enlarged EU’s ability to act. The President
of the Commission will in future be elected by the European Parliament, the European
Council will have an elected full-time Chair. The Charter of Basic Rights will become a
legally binding part of the constitution, and the provisions on the delimitation of
responsibilities are a great improvement. Furthermore, the areas in which the European
Parliament has to be involved in decisionmaking, and the range of issues that can be
decided by a qualified majority in the Council, have been significantly expanded. Of
course I would have wished for some more farreaching results on some points, e.g. in the
Common Foreign and Security Policy. Yet considerable progress has also been made in the
CFSP. Let me remind you of the reestablished office of EU Foreign Minister and the
creation of a European diplomatic service. Moreover, the prospects for further developing
the ESPD have been markedly improved. As a whole, the result of the convention represents
a fair compromise.
The Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung newspaper has given you credit for having initiated a "fundamental
change of style in German foreign policy," saying that, under your leadership, the
reunited Germany was freeing itself "from subalternity." What kind of power is
Germany today, and where will it stand in ten years?
Everyone has their own
style. I don’t think phrases like "freeing yourself from subalternity" are
particularly helpful; they also have little to do with reality. As I mentioned before,
Germany’s responsibility in international politics has grown over the last few years.
Germany will continue to make an important and responsible contribution in the future, but
it will always work according to its own means and in close coordination with its partners
and allies. Nothing will change in this respect.
Text courtesy:
Deutschland Magazine No: 6/2003, Embassy of Germany, Kathmandu, Nepal
N.K.
NUCLEAR ISSUE
Pyongyang Wants EU in Nuclear Talks
North Korea wants the
European Union to participate in multilateral talks on the North's nuclear problem
currently involving the two Koreas, the United States, China, Japan and Russia, a member
of the European Parliament said.
Member of the European
Parliament, Glyn Ford said Kim Yong-nam, the second in command in Pyongyang's hierarchy
and president of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly, conveyed the message when
Ford visited North Korea from Oct. 7-14.
"What is clear is
that North Korea would be happy for EU participation," the British official said.
Ford said North Korea
believes the EU is "the only global power capable of putting a check" on the
United States, which the North has said harbors a hostile policy toward its regime.
He said the EU was
willing to contribute to settling the yearlong nuclear dispute between Pyongyang and
Washington, but that the size of that contribution would depend on the degree of their
involvement in the negotiations.
"I think the days
are fast disappearing where people could come to the European Union at the end of the
process and say, 'Would you like to make a contribution?'" Ford said.
He said the EU, which
has adhered to a policy of "critical engagement" with North Korea, would
continue providing the Stalinist regime with humanitarian aid but would not extend
economic assistance until the North abandoned its nuclear ambitions.
Ford reaffirmed that an
EU delegation would visit Pyongyang next month as part of its efforts to find a peaceful
exit to the nuclear standoff.
North Korea and the EU
have recently showed signs of re-knitting their ties with a series of exchanges.
British and German
parliamentary delegations engaged in recent contacts by making separate visits to North
Korea last month.
Text courtesy:
Korea Now Magazine, Embassy of Korea, Kathmandu, Nepal |
