Pioneering Partnership for
Europe
Daniel Vernet, Foreign policy editor, Le
Monde, France
They say it’s old and outdated. But that
is one thing that is certainly not true of the Elysée Treaty – with the exception a
few provisions which are no longer relevant now that the Cold War and the division of
Germany are a thing of the past. Some people even wanted to replace it by a "new
basic pact" just in time for its fortieth anniversary. Fortunately, this idea was
dropped in favour of a more modest declaration. There is, after all, absolutely no need to
rewrite the Franco-German treaty of January 22, 1963. Ensuring that it is fully applied is
perfectly sufficient.
Three examples should suffice to illustrate
the point. Forty years ago the then French President Charles de Gaulle and Konrad
Adenauer, the first German Chancellor, agreed to "strive to take concrete measures to
increase the number of German pupils learning French and French pupils learning
German." We know what became of that idea: in both countries the number of pupils
learning the partner country’s language has been steadily declining for many years.
The second example relates to foreign
affairs. On this, the treaty says: "The two governments will consult each other
before every decision on all important matters of foreign policy (...) in order, as far as
possible, to arrive at a parallel viewpoint." Considerable progress is still needed
in this field. The same applies to defence – our third example – in which the
two countries committed themselves "to bring their views into line with each other in
order to arrive at common concepts"; in the field of arms the aim was "to
organize (...) teamwork." In Europe today we are still discussing the possibility of
co-ordinating policy on arms. In short, there is no need to replace or add to the treaty;
it is enough to apply it.
The strange fate of this text – which
was a stopgap measure for de Gaulle and a source of embarrassment for Adenauer – is
that it has nevertheless been a success! When the General applied himself to Franco-German
co-operation, he did so rather reluctantly. It was only after his return to power in 1958
that de Gaulle became a true advocate of reconciliation with the "hereditary
enemy." At the end of the war he had taken up a tough stance, being much closer to
the policy of Versailles than to the views of Jean Monnet or Robert Schuman. However, the
President of the Fifth Republic’s top priority was a strong, political Europe that
was independent of both the United States of America and the Soviet Union. He had not
succeeded in initiating such a development after his partners rejected the Fouchet Plan.
The first steps towards
reconciliation
So he now wanted to build, just with France
and Germany, what could not yet be built with the six European partners. Adenauer was
fully convinced, although he had been lured into it. At the signing of the Elysée Treaty
he was aware that he would get into difficulties with his own party. The
"Atlantic" foreword to the approval law (dated June 15, 1963), which was added
by the Bundestag, put this uneasiness into words and proved to de Gaulle that it was
difficult to build Europe with Europeans who did not (yet) want to be Europeans.
The Elysée Treaty thus became a paramount
symbol of Franco-German reconciliation; it was the event that initiated a collaboration
that developed over the years, despite some resistance, until it climaxed in the revival
of European integration and the upheavals of the late eighties and early nineties.
Launching new initiatives
The best way to celebrate the 40th
anniversary of the Elysée Treaty in January 2003 is not to issue new declarations, but to
launch a serious joint initiative to revive European integration – in the sense of
the Joint Declaration on the Treaty dated January 22, 1963. It stated "that the
strengthening of co-operation between the two countries is an essential step on the road
to a united Europe, which is the goal of both nations." The sentence might be phrased
a little differently these days, but the spirit would have to be the same.
Setting the pace
Are Paris and Berlin capable of doing this?
It must be said that, for the most part, France and Germany stopped re-inventing Europe
several years ago. Reconciliation is no longer a matter for discussion: it has long-since
been a historical and social fact which nobody can or wants to question. Indeed, it has
become so self-evident that it has even lost the motivating function it still used to have
a few years ago. If German reunification had not opened a new chapter in European and
Franco-German history in 1990, all in all neither economic and monetary union nor the euro
as the single currency would have seen the light of day – or at least not so quickly.
In France’s view, by the way, the abolition of the deutschmark and the introduction
of the euro were further confirmation of reunited Germany’s commitment to Europe. The
imminent expansion of the European Union could have been the occasion for a great, common
draft for the future. This has not happened as yet. European defence policy, which has
been laboriously carving a way for itself between the NATO temptations of some and the
neutralist inclinations of others, has been given quite a boost since 1998 by the
agreement between Paris and London. The Germans have since jumped onto the bandwagon.
Yet the president of the French Republic
showed little consideration for his partner on the opposite bank of the Rhine when he
decided – without prior consultation or even notification – to convert the
French army into a professional force and to close the French army bases in Germany. All
this despite the existence – in the spirit of the Elysée Treaty – of a
Franco-German Defence and Security Council, which was not informed.
A new generation
Many reasons can be ventured to explain this
state of affairs. In both Paris and Berlin power has since passed to a generation of
politicians who did not experience the Second World War and do not develop the kind of
sentimentality that François Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl shared when they held each
other’s hands in Verdun. With a few exceptions, this new generation is less focused
on European affairs, because they are satisfied with the status quo and are now seeking to
hold on to the bit of sovereignty that has remained after the transfers to Europe and the
demolition work done by globalization.
The german side is seeking to redefine the country’s place in Europe and the world.
This had been easier for what was known as the Bonn Republic, because the number of
alternatives had been limited by the international constellation. The Berlin Republic has
more foreign-policy possibilities, but they come with greater obligations.
The french side is having to learn to deal
with a Germany that is losing the complexes it inherited from the past; with a Germany
that no longer needs to seek economic power to compensate for having its political mind
made up for it by others; in a word with a Germany that is developing into an autonomous
partner, relieved of the obligation to pay in order to be accepted. This is the situation
that has existed since reunification; the only thing is that it has taken a dozen years
for the new reality to sink in and have political consequences.
France and Germany can treat each other as equals, without
complexes or ulterior motives. This makes co-operation more difficult, but no less
essential. Indeed, it is more important than ever, because the reasons for Franco-German
rapprochement that existed during the decades of the Cold War no longer apply. The issue
is no longer reconciliation between the two peoples, warding off the threat of war,
reconstructing the economy or containing Soviet expansionist ambitions. This is not to be
regretted, it is to be welcomed. Yet the experience of the past few years shows that
European integration begins to falter without Franco-German amity.
There is no alternative to this kind of co-operation, for
Paris or for Berlin. At times when there are major differences of opinion, evident
conflicts of interest and seemingly incompatible ideas on the future of Europe, it is all
the more important to improve consultations and co-ordination, in order to avoid gestures
that might annoy the other side and to make sure that each government considers what
effects national decisions will have on the other bank of the Rhine – in line with
what the Elysée Treaty requires: "to arrive at joint concepts."
Franco-German understanding remains a
fundamental imperative, above and beyond the process of building a political Europe, of
which it is a necessary precondition. In these times of globalization, the European
states, taken individually, are too small to be able to play a major role, irrespective of
how much economic power they might wield and whatever mission they may have in the world.
Unless they get together to pool their potential, they will ultimately no longer count at
all.
Although the politicians are aware of this, they sometimes feel we should let them have a
breather; and not all of them are ready to finally decide in favour of a political Europe.
De Gaulle and Adenauer signed the Elysée Treaty in order to begin a form of political
collaboration with just two countries which, at that time, was not possible with six. If
it is not possible to create a political Europe of 15 or 25 nations, then the French and
Germans – following the example of 1963 – must point the way, together with
those who are ready to follow them. This would be the best way to celebrate the 40th
anniversary of this treaty on friendship and co-operation.
Text courtesy: Deutschland E n 6/2002
December/January. Embassy of Germany in Kathmandu.
SAARC initiative on regional
cooperation-IV
Children: The summit also agreed to mobilize
necessary resources and intensify broad-based actions to achieve a set of priority goals
related to improving the status of children, such as eradication of polio by 2005;
protection of children from mother-to-child transmission of HIV/AIDS and provision of
quality basic education for children.
Education: Like women and children, education
has remained a priority area for SAARC. A separate Technical Committee devoted to
cooperation in the field of education was first established in 1989. Matters relating to
education are now addressed under the Technical Committee on Human Resources Development.
The priority themes identified for cooperation in the field of education were universal
primary education; literacy, post-literacy and continuing education; women’s
education; education for the undeserved areas and distance learning. Under discussion is
also a proposal for establishing a SAARC Consortium of Open and Distance Learning
(SACODiL) aimed at strengthening cooperation in joint development of educational programs,
credit transfers, and equal opportunities for and access to knowledge.
The Social Charter: The Tenth Summit
(Colombo, 1998) while reviewing the progress made in the social sector by SAARC,
determined that, in order to enhance social development, it would be necessary to develop,
beyond national plans of action, a regional dimension of action, including a specific role
for SAARC. In this context, it directed that a Social Charter be developed for SAARC,
which would focus on drawing up targets with broad range to be achieved across the region
in areas such as poverty eradication, population stabilization, empowerment of women,
youth mobilization, human resources development, promotion of health and nutrition, and
protection of children. For drafting a SAARC Social Charter, a Committee has be
constituted. The first meeting of the Committee drew up its terms of reference and scope
of the proposed charter. It is expected that the Charter would not be of a purely
declaratory nature, but would help promote effective action in the social arena.
IV. Cooperation in Suppression of Terrorism
and in Prevention of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances: SAARC adopted the
Convention on suppression of Terrorism in November 1987 and the Convention on Prevention
of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances in November 1990. These Conventions came
into force on 22 August 1988 and 15 September 1993 respectively. The Conventions provide a
regional focus on some of the well-established principles on international law,
particularly the "extradite or prosecute" concept. They envisage preventive
action by the State Parties, including through exchange of information, intelligence,
expertise and mutual legal assistance.
The SAARC Convention on Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances seeks to address the issue of drug trafficking and drug abuse. A
SAARC Coordination Group of Drug Law Enforcement Officials is functioning in order to
monitor the implementation of this Convention. The conference on Police Matters held in
Colombo ion 1996 and Male’ in 1997 acknowledgement the linkages between drug
trafficking and terrorism. The Third Conference held in Kathmandu in August 2002 decided
to establish a network of police organizations of Member Countries.
A meeting of Legal Advisors of SAARC Member
States was held in Colombo in May 2002. It recommended that SAARC Member States adopt an
Additional Protocol to the SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism. This is
in recognition of the need to update the Convention on account of the obligations
developing on Member States in terms of the Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) and
the International Convention for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism Senior
officials assisted by legal experts are expected to meet soon to draft such a
protocol. |
