On the eve of the
French National day July 14
Development aid: a French priority
By François Pallier, journalist FRANCE
Development aid, particularly for Africa, is
the stated priority of the French presidency of the G8 at Evian. The personal commitment
of President Jacques Chirac, who maintains close ties, often of friendship, with a great
many African heads of state, is not unrelated to this decision. It is also true that the
increase in the world’s inequalities is taking on alarming proportions. According to
the American magazine, Forbes, the assets of the seven richest people on the planet equal
the gross domestic product (GDP) of the 49 least advanced countries, with a population of
650 million.
In 2000, at the United Nations’
millennium Summit, the heads of State of the entire world undertook between now and 2015
to halve the proportion of the population living on less than one dollar a day (1.2
billion people in 2000), also to halve the number of people suffering from hunger (840
million today) and to reduce infant mortality by two thirds. But the excessively slow pace
of the reduction in poverty worldwide is seriously compromising these objectives.
If the G8 countries wish to keep their
promises, they must give absolute priority to development aid. Increasing official
development aid and ensuring better coordination, greater efficiency, reducing the burden
of debt of poor countries, seeking new sources of financial support ... there are a great
many sides to the question, all aspects that the G8 member countries (which represent
almost half the world’s GDP) will be examining for two whole days at Evian.
International consensus was achieved in March
2002, at the Monterrey (Mexico) conference on financing development organised by the UN,
to highlight the necessity for a new partnership for development, based in particular on a
stronger commitment to official development aid (ODA). Official Development Aid totals
just 50 billion dollars. At the Barcelona summit in March 2002, the European Union
countries committed themselves to raising aid from the current 0.33% of GDP to 0.39% in
2006. This commitment will represent an increase of about 7 billion dollars. The American
president has promised to raise United States assistance from 10 billion dollars a year to
15 billion by 2006.
A better partnership is also on the G8
agenda. Multilateral (World Bank and regional development banks) and bilateral (the
States) donors do not sufficiently co-ordinate their efforts, which complicates the task
of the recipient countries and leads to major losses. Three avenues are being explored.
The first is to give beneficiary States more responsibility by strengthening their
capacity, particularly administrative, to make use of aid. A consensus was also reached on
the idea that there must be more selectivity in this area in order to encourage countries
making efforts to achieve good governance: respect for democratic rules, transparency,
fighting corruption. Lastly, the G8 is working on untying aid to the poorest countries, in
other words, lifting the obligation imposed on beneficiary countries to use the businesses
and products of the donor country.
France is also very keen to seek new sources
of finance to help developing countries and considers that all avenues should be explored.
Famine, which threatens tens of millions of people in Southern and Eastern Africa, also
figures on the agenda for the G8 talks. The subject of secure food supplies obviously
raises the thorny question of the subsidies awarded to farmers in the North, accused of
undermining those of the South.
Reducing the burden of debt of poor
countries
Lightening developing countries’ burden
of debt has been a priority of the international community for a number of years. Since
1997 the third world has repaid each year more than it has received in new money. In other
words, capital is not going from the North to the South, but from the South to the North,
no minor paradox. The G8 got to grips with this problem in 1996 at the Lyon (France)
summit, by launching an initiative for heavily indebted poor countries (PPTE), whose
income per head is less than 755 dollars a year and whose indebtedness is not tenable.
This programme, launched jointly by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World
Bank, in which the Club de Paris, over which France presides, plays a central role, aims
to substantially reduce the debt of States which set up parallel programmes of action to
fight poverty. To date, of the thirty-eight countries eligible, only six have reached the
point called completion* which allows them to benefit from a permanent reduction in their
burden of debt.
Following the proposals of the Head of State
at the Sustainable Development Summit in Johannesburg in September 2002, France also
proposed to its partners that thought should be given to the position "of heavily
indebted middle income countries".
* The country must, for example, have worked
out a strategy for reducing poverty in agreement with civil society and its various
backers, in particular the IMF and the World Bank.
More effective resolution of crises
The Argentinian crisis strengthened the
determination of the international financial community to reinforce the mechanisms for
resolving crises, by using the framework for the involvement of the private sector
approved in Prague in 2000. The action plan adopted by the G7 Finance Committee in April
2002 is based on a two-fold approach, the aim of which is to respond to the new forms of
access to the markets of emerging countries:
- the distribution of contractual clauses in
bond indentures designed to facilitate and organise more effectively the action of a
majority of the creditors, hence of restructuring arrangements in cases where the debt is
unsustainable.
- work on the IMF proposal to set up an
international legal framework creating the possibility of restructuring the debts of
insolvent sovereign debtors.
These proposals have recently been
supplemented by an initiative from the Governor of the Banque de France to develop a
"code of good conduct" designed to clarify the principles and good practice
which should guide the behaviour of all the actors concerned (private creditors, debtor
countries, international financial institutions, official creditors, etc.) on a voluntary
basis.
Greater transparency and financial
stability
The increasing number of financial crises all
over the world and the many financial scandals (Enron, Worldcom) that shook the United
States in 2002 have had a galvanising effect on the G8. They have restored as priorities,
on one hand, the reform of the international financial structure and on the other, the
essential coherence, indeed convergence, of efforts to strengthen the regulation of
businesses, to improve the quality and pertinence of financial and accounting information
(including bringing accounting standards more closely in line with each other) and to
ensure greater financial stability.
At the end of 2001, Argentina suspended
repayment of its external debt (140 billion dollars). It was the biggest payment default
in history. Much work has been done since then to strengthen the mechanisms to prevent and
manage financial crises – in particular by ensuring that the behaviour of the various
players is more predictable.
The development of financial markets presents
some advantages but one major disadvantage too. In the event of repayment problems, the
international community has the choice of two hardly satisfactory solutions: to implement
massive rescue plans under IMF leadership, or to leave countries to bleed to death before
the great leap into the unknown of bankruptcy. To alleviate this failing the G8 is working
on the creation of a kind of international bankruptcy forum. This would permit, in the
event of problems, creditors and debtors to meet around a table in order to restructure
the debt.
Harmonisation of accounting standards is one
of the G8 French presidency’s priorities. Two major systems are being worked on: one
American (US FASB, the Financial Accounting Standards Board), the other international
(IASB, the International Accounting Standards Board), which will have legal status in the
European Union in 2005. The principal stumbling block is that these two methods are not
based on the same philosophy. The American model tends to envisage all possible scenarios.
The IASB international standards lay down general principles to be respected, permitting a
degree of flexibility. May an accounting Esperanto see the light of day?
(Courtesy: Label France, magazine N°
50 – April 2003, French Embassy Kathmandu)
India-Pakistan standoff:
Security, Political and Diplomatic implications
By: Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Moinuddin Haider,
Pakistan
ROLE OF POLITICS IN
DOMESTIC/POLITICAL DYNAMICS
Assertion of extremist forces in India and
Pakistan
State’s limitations to deal with the
forces of extremism
Critical role of civil society in promoting
moderate forces
Role of media in creating awareness for peace
Negative role of vernacular press in dealing
with communal, sectarian and ethnic politics in South Asia.
Need for a positive role of press for
ensuring domestic stability and peace
LIMITATIONS OF DIPLOMACY IN ENDING CONFLICT
Upper hand of hard line element in a conflict
situation
Suspension of communication links
Escalation in propaganda warfare
Violation of diplomatic conduct and
maltreatment of each other’s diplomats
Ego-centric approach
Rigid and uncompromising stance by both or
either side
Feelings held by one side that it can impose
its will on the other side by force
Expecting more gain than losses by prolonging
a conflict and denying a diplomatic solution to that conflict
DID COERCIVE DIPLOMACY SUCCEED?
Coercive diplomacy has been used those state
actors who have substantial power to humble their weak rival states. In case of India and
Pakistan, since December 13, 2001, New Delhi used various diplomatic channels to malign
Pakistan on the so-called charge that it was supporting cross border terrorism. Diplomatic
tactics like recalling its high commissioners, reducing the size of its diplomatic mission
in Islamabad harassing the staff of Pakistan High Commission in New Delhi were some of the
coercive methods, which were used by India since December 13. But despite such tactics
Pakistan remained firm on its stand that it wants to resolve its conflicts with India
through negotiations. Islamabad also did not reciprocate the manner in which India was
trying to provoke Pakistan on the borders. Therefore, coercive diplomacy has no succeeded
in case of India’s pressure on Pakistan. This fact has been vindicated because the
Indian Prime Minister in his speech in Srinagar offered Pakistan a hand of friendship and
dropped the pre-conditions that it cannot resume the process of negotiations with its
western neighbor unless the latter stop cross border terrorism.
GAINS OF DEPLOYMENT
India could not justify the cost of
deployment and loss of moral of its armed forces, to its people. Pakistan armed forces
reacted and also deployed at a short notice. Professionally it provided a good opportunity
to test the war plans, logistics and efficiency of respective armed force.
Abstract of the remarks made by the
author at a seminar held in Kathmandu last week under the aegis of the FES. Text courtesy:
The FES.
India-Pakistan conflict and
its implications
By Major General Jamshed Ayaz Khan (Retd.), President,
Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad
General
There are obvious events and happenings like
terrorist attacks on the State assembly in Srinagar (Oct. 2001) and then on the Indian
Parliament in New Delhi (13 December 2001), which can be sited as immediate causes or
catalysts that lead India to mobilize its Armed Forces on to their battle locations
vis-à-vis Pakistan.
But underlying political and diplomatic
objectives were:-
Taking full advantage of the international
and Regional Environment with regard to "Anti-terrorism", ‘brow-beat’
Pakistan and impose its ‘hegemony’.
In the process, hoping to ‘flame out’ Kashmir
freedom struggle and compel Pakistan to change its ‘Kashmir Policy’
Deriving maximum political advantage and electoral mileage
domestically and divert attention from Gujarat massacre and from coffin and other serious
financial scandals etc.
To isolate Pakistan diplomatically in the international
coalition against terrorism and if possible force them to declare Pakistan ‘a
terrorist state’ by upping the ante with nuclear back drop.
Put extra economic burden on Pakistan.
Achieving Political Objectives by the Threat/Use of
Military Power
At first, it appeared that India wished to achieve it
political objectives through threat of use of a superior force (especially air and naval
component) short of war.
Now it appears that at least on two occasions when obviously
not seeming to be achieving their political objectives, that Indian felt so frustrated
that they even thought of a ‘limited open conflict’ in Kashmir.
All along Pakistan’s political and diplomatic objectives
have been to exist as an independent and sovereing state in a very hostile environment and
continue to seek the right of self determination for the Kashmiris.
Political and Diplomatic Gains and Losses
Coercive diplomacy failed to achieve its objectives, though
at one time it appeared that movement of freedom fighters across the line of control had
decreased substantially.
Pakistan held its breath and did not accept India’s
unreasonable demands. If any one suffered a loss of face, it was India.
Diplomatically, Pakistan came out more peaceable and
reasonable (Kathmandu and Kazakhstan) and India more hawkish and belligerent despite
nuclear backdrop.
Pakistan’s actions against extremist elements with in
the state were in keeping with United Nation Security Council Resolution 1373.extremists
elements were also involved in sectarian killings and were targeting foreigners in
Pakistan. Law and order situation in Pakistan was not conductive to foreign investment.
Despite serious threat on its eastern borders, Pakistan
Army’s continued anti-terrorist operations on Durand line and rounding up of many
Al-Qaeda suspects (nearly 500) at home won her international praise.
Contrary of the Indian expectations, the Kashmir Dispute too
gained greater attention globally. The Indian exterior maneuver to isolate Pakistan as it
did in 1971 completely failed.
Two nuclear armed developing states with weak economic base
indulging in brink men-ship and coercive diplomacy through military means did no service
to South Asian civilization image any good. |
