Prospects for Peace: The
Way Ahead
by Inam ul Haque, Pakistan
Abstract of remarks made by the author in
Kathmandu last week at a seminar held under the aegis of the FES-editor
Conflict and crisis prevention
The only avenue for conflict and crisis
prevention is the holding of a sustained dialogue between the two countries on all issues
that separate them.
In the absence of direct communications
between the two governments, it falls to third countries to engage in shuttle diplomacy to
bring down tensions.
India and Pakistan are both nuclear weapon
states and must display the maturity that accompanies this status. India as the largest
country bears greater responsibility to eschew the periodic cycles of threats and
counter-threats, which merely expose an immature state of mind.
The leadership of both countries must be
aware that in case of a nuclear exchange both countries will suffer such grievous damage
that neither will survive in its present form and the people of this region will suffer
for generations.
The option of so-called coercive diplomacy
and bringing forces to the borders in confrontational and threatening postures is not
available to either side and must not be resorted to again.
Inciting passions in the two countries by the
leaders and the media is always counterproductive because it limits the choices available
to the leadership.
Nuclear risk reduction
Mechanisms for nuclear risk reduction must be
a part of a larger effort to reduce and eliminate the risk of war through the resolution
of problems peacefully the through negotiations, in accordance with the principles of
international law and the UN charter.
If the conventional disparity between the
military strength of the two countries continues to grow, the nuclear threshold is bound
to become lower.
Clearly, due to the proximity of the two
countries the warning times i.e. the period between launch to impact are, in practical
terms, non-existent.
Confidence building measures proposed by some
particularly those relating to demating and distancing are non-verifiable and therefore
unlikely to work in a climate of mutual suspicion.
While hot lines can be useful in preventing
the outbreak of a conflict, they are unlikely to be of any use in the face of an acutely
launch even if it is the launch of a conventional missile capable of carrying nuclear
warheads.
The declaration of non-first use by India
does not offer much solace to Pakistan, when on occasion Indian leaders themselves
undermine their stance buy stating that they will nor wait around for Pakistan to initiate
the use of nuclear weapons.
Freeze and ceasefire
The dispute over Jammu and Kashmir has to be
resolved in a way that is acceptable to the people of Jammu and Kashmir. It cannot be
resolved either by draconian measures inside Kashmir or through aggression against
Pakistan. India has to sit down with Pakistan and make a genuine, sincere and sustained
effort to resolve this problem. There can be no preconditions to such a dialogue. It
should be considered whether such a dialogue can be held at the official level in the full
glare of publicity, where each side will try to satisfy its most radical lobbies or should
there be some other process away from the public eye where all possibilities can be
discussed in full confidentiality, and if necessary on the basis of deniability, by the
official and authorized representatives of the two sides.
Cease-fires are good but are not an end by
themselves. They will be undermined or eroded. Nor can cross border activity be brought to
a complete halt. Pakistan does not have the capacity to ensure that. The maximum it can do
and is doing is not to encourage, assist or allow any cross border activity.
Negotiations must bot be stalled or broken
off by reason of any breaches of cease-fire or alleged cross border activity. India
weakness its own case when it refuses any impartial arrangement to monitor the LOC and
make its findings public.
If the idea of a freeze is to place Kashmir
on the so-called back burner, this is unlikely to work. Kashmir was on the back burner
from 1972 to 1989. India refused to hold serious discussions on the issue. Pakistan did
not bring it to the front burner. The Indian forces forced the Kashmiris to take up arms
by using massive-force against unarmed protesters.
Improving trade relations, including
prospects for SAARC.
Increased trade and economic cooperation
between the two countries is indeed a desirable objective. I am therefore surprised that
India has consistently rejected the proposal for an overland gas pipeline between
Iran-Pakistan-India and has refused to join in the propo9sed
Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan pipe3line project, to be extended to include India as
well. Pakistan has given assurances about the security of gas supplies through Pakistan to
India. So the question is does India wish genuinely to increase economic interaction with
Pakistan or does it wish to use the MFN issue only to place Pakistan on the back foot.
History bears witness that India has held
SAARC hostage to its whims. In the most recent case India went back on an agreement to
hold the summit in Pakistan in January this year. It stood in the way of the holding of
the Summit in Nepal for quite sometime.
Today, when even the economically most
powerful countries are organizing themselves into ever-larger trading blocs, it is a pity
that SAARC has remained a group on paper only. The issues of concern to the developing
countries like India, Pakistan and other Members of SAARC are marginalized and ignored in
the trade rounds organized by the WTO because our countries do not formulate group
positions and our economies are not strong enough to compete with West. Only trading blocs
and united positions can give us some countervailing negotiating power.
The Way Ahead
The only way ahead is to start a serious
dialogue at the earliest with a view to resolving the issues and not to score debating or
propaganda points.
Text courtesy: FES
COERCIVE DIPLOMACY AND
INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS
Dr. S. Kalyanaraman, India, Associate
Fellow, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi
In the wake of the December 13, 2001 attack
on the Indian Parliament by terrorists from the Pakistan-based and-backed Lashkar-e-Taiba
(LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), the Government of India (GOT) targeted a series of
diplomatic and military measures against Pakistan. This has been interpreted as an
exercise in coercive diplomacy, the aim of which was to force Pakistan cease official
support for terrorist outfits based in its territory and targeting India.
The fact that the use of force was never
authorised – in spite of that fact that the military was deployed all along the
India-Pakistan border for over ten months – clearly indicates that the GOI’s
intention was to utilise the threat of military action to coerce Pakistan to cease
official support for anti-Indian terrorist outfits in its territory and to dismantle the
terrorist infrastructure that had been built up over the previous two decades. At the same
time, the threat of use of force – given growing international acknowledgement of the
Pakistani Establishment’s proven nexus with fundamentalist terrorist outfits –
was also intended to generate greater international diplomatic pressure on the Musharraf
regime for the same purpose.
Here, we should keep in mind that the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 transformed international perceptions on
terrorism. Terrorists could no longer masquerade as ‘freedom fighters’, nor
their actions be glorified in terms of jihad, a practice adopted by Pakistan to even refer
to the terrorist activities in Jammu & Kashmir carried out by Pakistani citizens and
other "graduates of the Afghan war".
Though India mobilised its armed forces, the
circumstances were not propitious for military action. Firstly, the United States and
other major powers began to call on India to show restraint. Secondly, any military effort
would have been impeded by the presence of US-led coalition forces operating from, around,
and through Pakistani territory. Under the circumstances, the only option available was
the generation of a crisis to exert direct military pressure as well as bring
international pressure to bear on Pakistan to stop support for, and sponsorship of,
anti-India terrorist outfits within its territory. Military mobilisation was an integral
element of this strategy.
Indian military pressure, combined with
international diplomatic pressure, forced President Musharraf to make commitments in
January and May/June 2002 that terrorism will not be allowed to emanate from Pakistani
territory. This included a private assurance to Richard Armitage that infiltration would
"visible and permanently" cease across the LoC and it "would be followed by
other activities that had to do with the dismantling of the camps that led to the capacity
to conduct these kinds of operations."
But these commitments have not been fully
translated into action on the ground. Infiltration has indeed come down, but it has not
stopped completely. Neither has Pakistan complied with all the demands that India placed
upon it, including the hand-over of 20 criminals and terrorists as well as the dismantling
of the terrorist infrastructure.
A combination of factors determined this
outcome. Pakistan’s stake in Kashmir is high, given the perception that its
absorption is necessary to validate the ‘idea’ of Pakistan, which was dealt a
fatal blow in 1971. In addition, the United States did not exert greater pressure on the
Musharraf regime because of Pakistan’s renewed strategic importance in its scheme of
things. India’s contribution to this outcome assumed the form of expanding demands, a
result of not thinking through the course of action at the very outset.
A major gain that accrued to India from this
exercise was the shifting of international attention to, and acknowledgement of,
Pakistan’s support for terrorist activities in India. Directly flowing from this was
the further consolidation of liberal views among the Pakistani elite, who seemed to have
become completely enchanted with the mantra of jihad during the 1990s. Most important of
all, India convinced Pakistan that it has the will to risk a nuclear was when its national
interests and honour are at stake, and that it would not allow itself to be hampered by
Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.
Abstract of the remarks made by the author at
a seminar held in Kathmandu last week under the aegis of the FES. Text courtesy:
The FES.
Thinking the Unthinkable
Manfred Haack, FES India, The
Indo-Pakistan conflict appears to be ideological and asymmetric.
"Ideological" means that the
competition between the Indian concept of being a secular democracy and the Pakistani
founding motive of being an Islamic country for a long time has escalated to malevolence.
Different to common disputes on economic interests or competition on political influence,
ideological conflicts can not be solved by bargaining but rather need a kind of therapy.
2. Obviously, Pakistan and India differ
categorically in respect to political self-understanding and national identity.
Like human beings, nations thought as social
entities can suffer from role conflicts and alleged or real shortcomings of their role
expectations. Attempts to solve ideological conflicts must consider such psychological
restraints, which might become hurdles for rational looking compromises.
Therapies on ideological conflicts start with
awareness, which goes far beyond confidence building measures. Awareness means temporarily
taking over the role of the adversary for the sake of better understanding. The second
step would be to sort out the crucial concerns of the other side which could be addressed
by less expensive concessions. The third step is the isolation of core issues, which seem
to be by no means negotiable.
Negotiating the non-negotiable can be learnt
from the market economy.
Political entities if they are not controlled
by sects or ill-minded fanatics organise their decision making mainly by rational
criteria. Therefore political positions become negotiable if something of a higher value
can be offered in exchange.
Conflict resolution starts with considering
on what the other side would be able to accept as compensation for foregoing its disputed
position or to change its undesired behaviour.
Negotiating the non-negotiable definitely
requires to join the world of ideas of the other side, to identify its essentials, and to
weigh possible solutions accordingly.
The Kashmir problem is simmering with
different intensity on three levels.
The ground level is the fate of the people of
Kashmir, which in the meantime seem to be more favorably addressed by the new government
of Mufti Mohammed Sayeed.
The rather burning issues are cross-border
terrorism and a climate of violence, for which India and Pakistan are habituated blaming
of each other.
The basically abstract level is the long
lasting controversy on sovereignty, which becomes increasingly theoretical when a limited
autonomy will be given to the people of Kashmir.
The controversy on sovereignty can not be
solved by partition but by unification.
The sovereignty problem shows the asymmetric
side of the conflict. Pakistan dedicates itself to the liberation of "Indian
occupied" Kashmir. India insists on keeping Jammu and Kashmir as undisputed Union
State but could probably be ready for abandoning her claims on "Pakistan occupied
Kashmir" within the wider frame of a peace accord. Because of this asymmetry, a
solution by partition along the Line of Control is not feasible.
The theoretically ideal solution would be a
reunification of India and Pakistan – which undoubtedly will be fiercely opposed by
both sides. Therefore, the second best concept might be to utilise the reunification
paradigm but to limit it on Kashmir.
To meet the essentials of both sides, a joint
sovereignty could be created but has to be linked with a shared one.
As Pakistan demands sovereignty on Kashmir as
a whole and India insists on Keeping Jammu and Kashmir under the umbrella of the Indian
Union, a solution must be in favor of both positions. This can be reached, if sovereignty
will be split in a legal element and an executive element.
Accordingly, India and Pakistan can form a
joint committee carrying the supreme sovereignty on Kashmir in terms of a legal title,
which does not necessarily include executive power. This element serves the Pakistani
demand for getting sovereignty on Kashmir as a whole.
At the same time, both countries will share
sovereignty on Kashmir while maintaining their executive power on the currently existing
parts. This element assures the Indian essential of keeping Jammu and Kashmir in the
Indian Union.
Starting as a legal frame simply compromising
on current disputes, the concept is open for further development in kind of a learning
process.
The charm of this construction lies in its
flexibility to allow the participating parities to cooperate in good times on the joint
supreme level and to pull out down to the shared level occasionally if ever required. In
any case, the two patronage powers have to delegate as much political responsibilities as
possible to he sate respectively province governments and to enable them further to
cooperate.
Instead of responding on territorial claims,
the concept creates far reaching political opportunities though bound on responsibilities.
Particularly, as there will be no further justification for violent "freedom
fighting", India and Pakistan may cooperate on improving internal security.
The main objective of the concept is to cut
the fetters, which a long lasting conflict has put on two countries to the limitation of
their role in regional and international politics.
Remarks made by the FES Chief, Nepal and
India office, at the seminar held last week in Kathmandu organised under the aegis of the
FES. Text courtesy: The FES.
Thus spake conscience
Ponder over what His Holiness has
pronounced
Ramesh Sharma
The Israeli army is reported to have been
ordered to 'completely wipe out' the Palestinian militant group Hamas. While doing so the
military has been also provided with a carte blanch: they are authorized to use 'whatever
means necessary'. It was a direct fallout of Israeli missile attack on the car of Hamas
political leader. Some people were killed, with the Hamas leader spared, when the Israeli
helicopter gunships fired missiles at the Palestinian leader's car.
Coincided with it is Indian Deputy Prime
Minister Advani's urge that the US help India battle the threat of Islamic 'terrorism'
from Pakistan. Both incidents are closely associated with certain belief systems. On the
one hand Middle East is embroiled in longstanding and internecine conflicts between Jews
and Arabs. India and Pakistan on the other hand, are mired in political extremism
intrinsically attributed to Hindu - Muslim divide.
Islam in the core of its heart advocates
humanity. Jews have their own belief system that always stresses the need for cooperation
and cordiality. Hinduism represents a vibrant embodiment of sacred values on which human
civilizations are built. In spite of their passionate emphasis on humanity and solemn
attributes of our civilization they have been grossly misinterpreted. Religions in modern
age have been used for perpetrating one's evil designs. In doing so, politics sans ethics
and morality has proved a safe sanctuary.
No less lugubrious is the declining
relationship between the US and Iran. US disenchantment with Iran can be traced back to
the 1979 Islamic Revolution that overthrew the American backed monarchy in that country.
The Carter administration was excruciatingly snubbed when the revolutionary clerics of
Iran incarcerated dozens of Americans for pretty long time. No doubt, the US tried to heal
its wound by supporting Iraq's Saddam Hussain in his war against Iran in the 1980s.
However, strategic compulsions propelled US to get involved in war against the Iraqi
dictator twice in 13 years. The Bush administration has dubbed Iran one of the members of
'axis of evils' that also constitutes Iraq and North Korea.
Referring to ongoing protests against the
establishment, Iranian leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has accused the US of having incited
some 'rabble rousers' with a view to destabilizing the Islamic Republic. Specially in the
wake of September 11 that rocked the very foundation of US, the only super power on earth,
America's predicament is reasonably understandable. However, it cannot be countenanced as
a subterfuge for mounting offensive against any states. The US as the mightiest democracy
of the 21st century should take care not to offend any regime, no matter whatever religion
and creed it pursues.
Sense of intolerance and hostility has begun
to vitiate global environment. It has been explicitly reflected in the conduct as also
foreign policies of nation states. International peace and security might always prove
elusive as long as such a pernicious course is resorted to. Therefore, it is incumbent
upon them to start anew by spiritualizing their attitude and behavior. Only through
spiritualization can order and tranquillity be ensured. Spiritualism, however, does not
imply grotesque perpetuation of archaic rituals and ceremonials as practiced in most of
the human societies. It is a solemn commitment to certain values and principles that
provide dignified sustenance to human existence.
The Dalai Lama's observation is worth
reflecting on when he says: 'This is my simple religion. There is no need for temples; no
need for complicated philosophy. Our own brain, our own heart is our temple; the
philosophy is kindness.' Once the warring factions across the globe internalize this
truth, their belligerence will automatically wither away. Therefore, it is solemnly
advisable that the regimes, which are engaged in debilitating infighting, will do well to
ponder over what His Holiness has pronounced. |
