Security Organization for
South Asia (SOSA)
By Niaz A. Naik, Pakistan
South Asia remains mired in conflicts and tensions, India and
Pakistan have fought three wars without resolving the adversarial relations. The 18 months
stand off between the two nuclear neighbor and the deployment of nearly one million troops
on the LOC brought them precisely close to yet another devastating conflict.
At the same time there exist equally explosive conflicts in
South Asia. The Maoist insurgency in Nepal, the unresolved issue of over 100,000 refugees
of Bhutanese origin in Nepal; Sri Lanka’s; long period of bloodshed due to LTTE
separates insurgencies in North East India pose continuous threats to the overall peace
and stability in South Asia Maldives in confronted with serious environmental challenges
due to global warming.
Terrorism, drug trafficking, illegal transfer of arms,
illegal in integration excluding trafficking in women and children for unmoral purposes
HIV/AIDS etc are threats eroding the social and moral fabric of South Asian societies.
Inhabited by one fifth of mankind South Asia ranks amongst
the poorest, the most illiterate and most malnourished region of the world SAARC has
failed to come up to the expectations of our people.
The SAARC Summit of 1997 at Male recognised the need to
foster mutual trust and confidence and initiated a process of informal political
consultations.
In the wake of a rapidly changing global strategies and
economic environment the concept of peace, security and development has been radically
redefined.
The globalization of security issues has enhanced the
importance of multilateral cooperation, several models of existing security mechanisms can
be cited – OSCE, ARF, CICA, Sranyrai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and ACD etc.
The absence of a security mechanism in South Asia is acutely
felt. South Asia needs cooperative or collective security; Security not against each other
but security along with each other. South Asia can benefit from the existing models and
evolve its own security mechanism to be called Security Organization for South Asia
(SOSA). It can evolve its own principles, infrastructure, aims and objectives and its own
functional instruments. By getting together, moving together and acting together, under
proposed SOSA, South Asia has much to gain. Conversely, South Asia is much more to lose.
Remarks made by the author at a FES seminar held recently
in Kathmandu. Text courtesy: FES, Nepal.
Reporting The Confrontation:
Role Of The Media
ARNAB GOSWAMI, Senior Editor NDTV, New Delhi
For all the claims of objectivity, did the media in both
India and Pakistan steer clear of jingoism while reporting the 2002 Indo-Pak standoff?
This is a subject that requires some sincere analysis, since it would appear that in both
sides, the media coverage of the events was done with a specific audience in mind.
Did the electronic media actually "report" the
event, from the ground, or was the coverage limited to photo-ops allowed by the army? Did
the media question the degree of access they were given in the first place? Is television,
due to sheer logistical reasons, more dependent on military backup and help?
To what extent do television debated influence public
opinion? In 2002, were these debates, in both India and Pakistan, caught in a "doves
versus hawks" trap? What impact does this kind of polarized debate have?
In the Indian context, was the media-government relationship
much more cautious in 2002 than during Kargil? What factors could have influenced this?
Was indecision along the reason why none of the key government figures (on security
issues) used the media to showcase their agenda during 2002?
Has there been a shift, between Kargil and now, in the stance
taken by the media on Indo-Pak issues? Has the media become "less cussed, suspicious
and hostile"? Does this apply equally to print and television? And if there has been
a certain shift, does it influence policymaking?
Remarks made by the author at a FES sponsored seminar
held recently in Kathmandu. Text courtesy: FES, Nepal.
Clouds of War Over South Asia?
Dr. Ayesha Siddiqa, Pakistan
Since conducting their nuclear tests in 1998,
India-Pakistan’s bilateral relations have experienced an increase in tension. There
is twice that the drums of war seemed to be bearing with external intervention avoiding an
outbreak of a conflict. The ten months of military standoff, in particular, was an
extremely worrisome period. However, one has to analyze the situation carefully before
suggesting that there was a real threat of an actual outbreak of war. Considering the
military situation of the two countries and their nuclear doctrines and force structures,
one would like to argue that a war was not imminent. Although a number of Indian analysts
had advocated a limited conflict, the fear of a negative dividend and lack of clarity of
objectives and potential to manage a conflict between two nuclear neighbors played a
critical role in avoiding outbreak of a military conflict.
In fact, the standoff basically laid out the basic structure
of conventional and nuclear deterrence and the use of military as a tool of coercive
diplomacy. From Pakistan’s perspective, India’s primary intention was to use
nuclear deterrence to influence a policy shift in Islamabad, an approach that could be
used also because of the presence of external forces in the region. The international
community’s reaction to the threat of a conflict was also a part of nuclear
deterrence and coercive diplomacy. This approach did get partial results in terms of
partial reversal of Pakistan’s policy, especially the policy on militancy and
low-intensity conflict with the neighbor. Islamabad has had to reverse its policy and
withdraw assistance from militant organizations to a large extent.
However, the opportunity created due to external intervention
provides a temporary relief to the region. Ultimately, the long-term results would depend
on the consistency with which the external players can focus on the internal South Asian
conflict and keep the situation diffused over a period of time. It is the longevity of
concentration on the issue that would reap long-term benefits for the overall peace
process in the region.
Remarks made by the author at a FES sponsored seminar
recently held in Kathmandu. Text courtesy: FES, Nepal.
India-Pakistan Confrontation 2002 Military,
nuclear dimensions and strategic fallout
Synopsis: Ashok K Mehta, India
Introduction
The most heinous terrorist attack against the Indian State
was the assault on Indian Parliament on 13 December 2001. This was preceded by targeting
the J&K state assembly on 1 October that year. The cumulative effect of these
provocation’s led to the largest and longest ever military deployment on the western
borders starting 15 December 2001. The terrorist attack let to Operation Parkram (valour).
On 14 May 2002, terrorists struck again in Kaluchak, Jammu against an Army barrack of
families of soldiers on the front. This added fuel to fire and pushed the country to the
brink of war.
Preparation for war
The military deployment was a key component on India’s
coercive diplomacy. Mobilization was ordered on 15 December and by 8 January the
deployment and strategic relocation was complete. Nearly 700,000 armed forces had been
deployed at 100 percent readiness for war.
Pakistan’s proxy war
This is the casus belli for the latest confrontation. The
desired Indian objective. India started with the limited political objective of curbing
the proxy war and ending cross border terrorism. The politico-military-diplomatic strategy
was one of coercion and internationalization of Pakistan’s role in sponsoring
terrorism.
How close were we to war?
Pretty close. There were six strategic opportunities when
Indian could have gone to war. The Indian perception will be presented.
Limited war and nuclear dimension
It is the Indian viewpoint that there is adequate space for
limited war even in a nuclear overhang both in J&K and across the IB.
Escalation control
Could limited strikes/operations in PoK have escalated? If
India chose to restrict the war to PoK would Pakistan have expanded the conflict? The 1965
story about escalation is instructive in this regard.
Why did India not go to war
India’s coercive strategy was based on one key
assumption: that the US would act as a force multiplier in helping end CBT.
Balance sheet of confrontation
India’s coercive strategy was fairly sound though
implementation was not effective. India could not get the US to act on its behalf as had
been assumed.
Strategic fallout
Did Pakistan deter India? India was certainly not deterred by
Pakistan.
It may have been deterred by the US. But most of all, it was
India’s decision not to go to war.
Conclusion
Operation Parakram has shown that if pushed beyond a point,
India is prepared in its national interest to fight a limited war to deter Pakistan from
following its policy to jihad even with attendant nuclear risks.
The positive fallout of the confrontation is the revival of
the ongoing political process. After every war, crisis or confrontation, India and
Pakistan have agreed on a set of CBMs but these have remained short-lived. One hopes that
history will not repeat itself.
Remarks made by the author at a FES sponsored seminar
recently held in Kathmandu. Text courtesy: FES, Nepal.
INDO-PAKISTAN STANDOFF:
Military and Nuclear Dimensions and Strategic Fallout
Synopsis of "Indian Nuclear
Doctrine, Declaratory Policy, and Escalation Control"
By: Rahul Roy-Chaudhary, Senior Research Fellow,
International Policy Institute, King’s College, London.
During the Indo-Pakistani confrontation of 2002, nuclear
"signaling" between the two countries took place at a level never seen before.
By their public rhetoric or forced silence, by the issuing of statements and subsequent
clarifications, and by relative action or even inaction on various issues, both countries
attempted to send signals on nuclear matters. These signals were multiple in nature,
carried out at multiple levels, and addressed to multiple "constituencies".
Although India attempted to convey clear messages during both
the crisis and the post-crisis periods, its nuclear signals were confusing, and appeared,
at times, to be at cross-purposes with one another. It is also not clear whether these
signals were even perceived as such by the adversary and other parties. If they were, it
is not clear whether they were fully understood, or even taken cognizance of, especially
by the adversary. In this context, this paper examines the complexities of India’s
nuclear signaling since December 13, 2001.
During the first phase of the crisis period (December 13,
2001-May 14, 2002), the Indian Government deliberately ignored any nuclear dimension to
the military crisis. If was concerned that Pakistan’s portrayal of Kashmir as a
"nuclear flash-point" would lead to the involvement of "third party"
mediation in the resolution of the Kashmir dispute, which was not acceptable. In this
context, Prime Minister Vajpayee refused to comment on President Musharraf’s
interview to the German newsmagazine "Cer Spiegel" on April 7, 2002. On January
1, 2002 India and Pakistan exchanged lists of respective nuclear facilities. Later,
India’s Permanent Representative to the UN termed the "nuclear
brinkmanship" of May-June 2002 as an "artificial nuclear scare".
The only exceptions to this policy were the test of the
"Agni 1" ballistic missile (700 kms range) on January 25, 2002, and the then
Indian Army Chief’s (General Padmanabhan’s) inadvertent warning to Pakistan on
nuclear war. Within a few hours, these comments were publicly repudiated by the Defence
Minister George Fernandes in a highly unusual manner, emphasising the point that nuclear
issues should not be handled "in a cavalier manner".
During the second phase of the crisis period May 14,
2002-June 16, 2002), India continued to ignore Pakistan’s nuclear signals, including,
by them, increasingly loud rhetoric by several Pakistani officials. India also refused to
respond, in a similar manner, to Pakistan’s ballistic missile tests (May 25,26 and
28, 2002). However, on June 10, 2002 the then Indian Defence Secretary, Yogendra Narain,
warned of the consequences of nuclear war. This was again publicly repudiated by a
statement from the Ministry of Defence (MoD).
An additional facet of nuclear signaling emerged in this
phase, that of sensitising the international community to the provocative rhetoric
emanating from Islamabad, Following President Musharraf’s second televised address on
May 27, the then External Affairs minister (EAM), Jaswant Singh, decried Pakistan’s
nuclear rhetoric, describing it as nuclear blackmail, and seeking international censure.
This was taken up by Vajpayee, who described it as "nuclear terrorism" at the UN
General Assembly in September 2002.
With the easing of tensions in early June 2003, and the
subsequent withdrawal of armed forces from the international border, India abruptly
changed the focus of its nuclear signals. Instead of attempting to ignore the nuclear
signals emanating from Islamabad, New Delhi pro-actively played up the consequences of
nuclear war in the first phase of the post-crisis period (June 17. 2002-April 18, 2003).
It was perceived necessary to emphasize the credibility of India’s nuclear second
strike capability, and the prowess of its nuclear forces.
This phase began with Vajpayee’s claim of victory
without war in an interview on June 17, 2002. Although the Ministry of External Affairs
(MEA) subsequently clarified his remarks, they brought about a flurry of responses and
counter-responses. George Fernandes subsequent widely-publicized rhetoric on the
destruction of Pakistan in January 2003 needs to be seen in this context, as does EAM
Yashwant Sinha’s statement on "pre-emptive" action against Pakistan in
April 2003. Since Vajpayee’s "hand of friendship" speech to Pakistan on
April 18, 2003, the nuclear rhetoric, and signaling, on both sides has decreased
considerably.
Significantly, on January 4, 2003 the Cabinet Committee on
Security issued its review on the "operationalisation of India’s nuclear
doctrine", representing India’s official nuclear doctrine and command &
control arrangements.
In conclusion, six "lessons" can tentatively be
drawn from India’s nuclear signaling since December 13, 2001:
1.The messages India wanted to convey changed during the
level and nature of the military crisis – from deliberate ignorance of a nuclear
dimension to a possible conflict, to rhetoric on the nuclear destruction of Pakistan.
2. These messages were being sent to different
"constituencies" at the same time – to Pakistan, threatening conventional
war unless its "cross-border terrorism" ended; to the U.S., to reign in
Pakistan, and pressurize it on the issue of "nuclear blackmail", and to the
Indian public, that the Government’s restraint against Pakistan was coming to an end.
In the past-crisis period, New Delhi was primarily sending a message to Islamabad on the
credibility of its nuclear capability.
3. There was some confusion in the messages being sent, due
to the large number of individuals involved in the actual process itself.
4. the messages may well have been at cross-purposes to one
another. Should, for example, the various "constituencies" believe the
statements issued, or the subsequent clarifications which followed? What message was being
sent by the "Agni 1" test in the midst of the crisis period?
5. It is not clear as to how these messages were being
"read" in Islamabad. For example, was India’s refusal to respond to
Pakistan’s missile tests seen as "restraint" or a sign of weakness?
6. It is also not clear how Pakistan’s nuclear
signals were being read in New Delhi. For example, were Pakistan’s three missile
tests made for public consumption alone, as perceived by New Delhi, or actually intended
to send a warning to New Delhi of Pakistani resolve in a possible conflict? Or was it
both? And was this deliberately "misinterpreted" by New Delhi to ease tensions? |
