Position of Russian
Federation spelt out:
"International Security in the
Era of Globalization"
- Igor Ivanov, Russian Foreign Minister
It is more than a decade since humanity
liberated itself from the pressure of ideological, political and military confrontation of
the Cold War. The community of nations has moved a long distance away from the deadly
abyss of nuclear war on the edge of which it stood forty years ago, in the days of the
Caribbean crisis.
However, one has to admit that the
hopes for a dramatic spurt towards a new and safer world system, which ran so high in the
early 1990s, have not yet been justified. New dangers and challenges have come to replace
the threat of total nuclear destruction of civilization. They are terrorism and
separatism, national, religious and other forms of extremism, drug trafficking and
organized crime, regional conflicts and the threat of the spread of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD), financial and economic crises, ecological disasters and epidemics. All
these problems existed before, but in the era of globalization when the world has become
much more interconnected and interdependent, they have begun to quickly acquire a
universal character posing a real threat to regional and not infrequently to international
security and stability. Simultaneously -- and this needs to be stressed -- they affect the
day-to-day lives of billions of people to a much greater extent. Proof of this is the wave
of terrorist acts, unprecedented in scale and cruelty, that has rolled from New York to
the Island of Bali and Moscow.
Why is the creation of a new system of
international security that is vital not only for states, but also for their citizens,
proceeding so slowly and with such difficulty? What are the main factors that determine
the dynamics and substance of the new dangers and challenges that confront mankind in the
early 21st century? Most importantly, what should the world community do in order to
securely protect itself from this new wave of threats?
THE LIGHT AND SHADOWS OF THE GLOBAL
WORLD
Globalization is becoming an ever more
influential "architect" of the new international security agenda. Its impact on
the evolution of the relations among states in this key area is contradictory.
On the one hand, globalization contributes to
accelerated development of productive forces, scientific and technological progress and
ever more intensive communication among states and peoples. So, objectively it helps
mankind to build up the resource base and the intellectual potential for ensuring
international security at a qualitatively new level. The growing interdependence of
countries and peoples in every sphere helps to generate new political approaches aimed at
creating democratic multilateral mechanisms of managing the international system and hence
reliable solution of the security problems.
At the same time the processes of
globalization, which mainly develop spontaneously, without a collective directing
influence of the world community, aggravate a number of old problems of international
security and engender new risks and challenges.
The role of external factors in the
development of states is dramatically increasing. Because of the differences in financial
and economic power, the interdependence between countries is acquiring an ever more
asymmetric character. While a small group of leading industrialized states plays mainly
the role of the subjects of globalization, the vast majority of the remaining states are
turning into its objects that are "drifting" on the waves of financial economic
developments. As a result, the inequalities of social and economic development of the
world are increasing. The world economy is obviously becoming divided into "zones of
growth" and "zones of stagnation". Thus in 1998 ten leading states --
recipients of foreign investments accounted for 70 percent of their total amount, and
countries with a low development level accounted for less than 7 percent. While in 1960
the incomes of the richest 20 percent of the world's population exceeded those of the
poorest 20 percent by 30 times, by 2002 that gap had trebled. At present half of the
Earth's population have an income of under two dollars a day. About a billion people have
no work, and among those who work almost 89 percent are deprived of social guarantees.
We witness a massive "export" of
the negative phenomena of globalization to the Third World. Just as an epidemic first
strikes at the weaker people, the weakest members of the world community are sustaining
greater damage from the growth of negative consequences of globalization than the
countries that are protected by their financial and economic might. Thus, the slowdown of
globalization results in the gaps in the pace and direction of social and economic
development of entire regions of the world widening, and not narrowing.
The content of the concept of the "might
of the state" is changing. While military force remains a significant component,
economic, financial, intellectual and information resources of influencing partners and
opponents are increasingly coming to the fore.
The factors that make it easier or, on the
contrary, more difficult for states to gain access to the benefits of globalization are
increasingly becoming included in the arsenal of national security strategies.
Globalization and manipulation of its course is more and more often used as instruments of
political pressure. This feature of the present stage of international relations is
pointed out in the UN report "The Impact of Civilization on Social Development".
The document notes, among other things, that "concern over globalization is partly
due to the fact that the national policies of states are increasingly influenced by
policies pursued outside their boundaries". The instruments of such influence are
many. They include "investment and credit diplomacy" that takes advantage of the
acute need of most countries for foreign capital investments and loans. They include
information diplomacy aimed at domination in the global information space. They include
"political engineering", a combined use of economic, information and
military-political levers to "construct" the desired kind of
"partners", i.e. governments ready to accept the terms of the solution of
international and internal problems that are imposed on them from outside.
On the whole, the process of the formation of
a new system of international relations after the end of the Cold War has acquired a long
drawn-out and in many ways unmanageable character. A situation has emerged that is fraught
with a large crisis potential and at the same time is ill-suited for prevention or
settlement of global security problems on a collective basis. The lack of effective
mechanisms for coordinating the actions and accommodating the interests of a wide circle
of states can be used as a pretext or a justification of the thesis that the acquisition
of mass destruction weapons, even in limited quantities, is becoming just about the only
way to guarantee security in this unstable and in many ways unpredictable world. The
danger of this situation lies in the fact that unless urgent measures are taken, the
threats to international peace and security may grow to such an extent that the world
community will be unable not only to cope with them, but to keep the situation under
control.
THREATS OLD AND NEW
What are the most acute problems of
international security at the current stage of globalization? How effective are the
efforts of the world community to solve them?
International terrorism is developing into a
strategic threat to the security of mankind. A sinister symptom of that disease were the
terrorist acts, monstrous in their cruelty and the number of victims, that have swept the
world in recent months.
Terrorists of every stripe are constantly
changing their methods, means and tactics, are finding new targets for their actions. The
population of the major megalopolises on the planet and strategically important marine
transportation of energy resources, computer systems that support the life of a modern
state, the transportation, tourist and banking infrastructures of the world -- this is by
no means a complete list of targets of attacks that have already happened and may happen
in the future. The main thing is that the leaders of extremist groups are trying ever more
actively to sow discord playing up the old stereotypes about "bad" and
"good" terrorists. They destabilize the situation in individual countries by
fomenting religious and national hostility and separatism, they look for -- and sometimes
find -- weak links in the global chain, governments which because of inherent weakness or
short-sighted foreign policies are inclined to flirt with international terrorism.
Regional mechanisms of anti-terrorist
interaction, including within the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization, are gathering strength. They are called upon to put a serious
barrier to the spread of terrorism in Central Asia. The new quality of partnership between
Russia and NATO countries and the European Union is an important potential of countering
terror. The common task of the world community is to preserve and develop the acquired
experience of interaction within the coalition avoiding any unilateral actions that could
undermine it.
It is the UN that is called upon to continue
to guarantee that efforts in combating new threats and challenges should have a solid
basis in international law.
Protection of the rights and freedoms of its
citizens is the duty of every state. Chief of them is the right to life. But it is the
life of the common man that is threatened by terrorists. The world community is obliged to
ensure for its citizens the right to safe protection against terrorism.
The solution of this task is possible if an
effective code of protecting human rights against terrorism is developed under the UN
aegis, a code aimed at:
-- preventing and stopping acts of terrorism;
-- opposing the funding of terrorism;
-- prosecution of the people who have
perpetrated acts of terrorism or are complicit in them in other ways;
-- ensuring that such persons should not
escape from responsibility and punishment;
-- assistance to persons who have suffered
from terrorism, including financial assistance, social and psychological rehabilitation
and reintegration into society; and
effective international cooperation towards
achieving the above goals.
An article by the Russian Foreign
Minister Igor Ivanov Published in the Journal "Russia in Global Affairs" No.
1/2003 (January-March) under the title "International Security in the Era of
Globalization"
Nature of Future Pakistan-India Wars
Dr. Shireen M. Mazari, Director General
9/11 may have displayed the changed nature of ware-fare most
graphically, hut the change itself can be dated back to the advent of nuclear weapons,
which altered the whole conceptualistion of war itself. What one has been since then has
been the development of dialectical approach to war and strategy.
On the one hand, the implied non-usability of nuclear weapons
has altered the nature of war with the focus being on how to use the weapons politically.
So, Clausewitz has been stood on his head in that politics has become a continuation of
war by one means. Hence one has seen the evolution of notions of Cold War and Limited War.
Nuclear weapons have also altered the nature and dynamics of strategy, especially in the
context of nuclear deterrence. Here, traditionally, nuclear deterrence has been premised
on the mutual vulnerability of the two antagonists. A reflection of this was the ABM
Treaty signed between the US and the then Soviet Union.
On the other hand, one has seen efforts to restore the
viability of ware-fare through the development of tactical nuclear weapons, depleted
uranium weapons as well as conventional Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs) and other
high-tech systems, which have altered the parameters of war fighting itself. The Gulf War
was a reflection of this and the way if Afghanistan, on the part of the US was another
reflection of this new trend to fight war "from a distance." Air power, with
high-tech systems, now really has come into its own as it is used to prepare for the entry
of minimal number of ground troops for mopping up operations. The war zone now has
expanded into space also as a result of technological innovations, especially the planned
deployment of Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) systems by the US. BMD also aims at trying
to restore the credibility of nuclear was again and in the process it will destroy the
notion of nuclear deterrence, premised on sustaining mutual vulnerability.
So, where are we at present?
In many ways, technology is now defining the nature of war,
at least at the level of the major powers. Developments in information technology and
precision weapons have led people to declare that there has been a revolution in military
affairs (RAM), allowing for quick decisive victories, minimal casualties and collateral
damage. But what has been even more revolutionary ahs been the political shift in the
nature of war, with major powers now highly unlikely to go to war with each other. So ,
asymmetrical conflicts are becoming more common- with efforts to sustain a military effort
under an international guise. Within asymmetrical conflicts, a most dangerous possibility
may well be a future war without any fighting at all, through cyber war destruction of C4I
systems, so that weapon systems are also made non-functional before war can even commence.
Also, on the part of the major powers, there is a growing intolerance of casualties for
oneself and growing acceptance of casualties on the side of the enemy.
Within the Pakistan-India context, how far are these
contradictory approaches relevant? The nuclear dilemma is prevalent but the stage of
developing PGMs and high-tech systems for war-fare "from a distance" is still
not a reality. So, within the above context, to understand the nature of future war, or
wars, one needs to first understand the types of military threat that prevail. The type of
war will reflect the type of threat being operationalised. What types of threats and
warfare can one envisage for Pakistan within the framework of its perceived threat from
India? The question is important because it impacts doctrines and weapon systems’
development.
Types of Threat and Nature of War
I – Conventional
Within a conventional mode, one can envisage three types of
threats:
All-out conventional war between Pakistan and India. However,
the risks of an uncontrollable escalation into a nuclear exchange here would be
tremendous, especially given the need for Pakistan to go for one-rung nuclear escalation
ladder.
Limited War, for instance of the Kargil type; or, border
skirmishes/hot pursuit along the LoC. This is an increasing possibility – as being
witnessed presently – where the attempt by both parties would be to gain local
advantage and keep the war deliberately limited. Air power becomes very important in this
context, through precise military targeting and the threat of possible expansion if
limitations are not observed. Whereas in the past, there was an assumption in Pakistan
that the use of air power would expand a conflict, now the use of air power may keep a
conflict limited by precise military targeting and limiting one’s own ground
casualties – especially if no territorial control is sought.
Limited War of the high-tech variety where ground troops are
not involved in the main fighting. Here also air power can come into its own –
without the need to use ground forces, purely against military targets, especially in
terrain where ground access is difficult.
High-tech warfare, sinc3e both countries are developing these
capabilities. The Indians, especially, are not only acquiring state of the art radar and
laser weapons technology, their Technology Experiment Satellite (TES), launched on October
22, 2001, has given India a real military edge. Also, developments in IT technology means
that one can conduct or be subjected to a C4I war- which could do extensive damage to
guidance weapon systems and war-fighting capabilities, with no direct military exchange
taking place. Also, high-tech capability multiplies the C4I capability while undermining
the same of the enemy.
II- Nuclear
Pakistan, with a lack of spatial depth, cannot afford the
luxury of tactical, battlefield nuclear weapons since, in terms of nuclear weapons, it
cannot distinguish between the tactical, battlefield arena and the strategic war area. So,
until a second strike capability is perfected and weapons made more precise with lower
circular error probabilities (CEPs), Pakistan would have to go for counter-value
targeting, with a one-rung escalation ladder in terms of an all-out war. Counter-value
targeting would focus on Indian urban and industrial centres – the critical ones
already being within the present reach of Pakistani delivery capabilities. Counter force
targeting becomes a viable option as the nuclear weapons and delivery systems become more
precise and as second-strike capability is developed.
Basic Components of Pakistan’s Nuclear Force
A separate missile command structure, primarily premised on
land-based missiles on mobile launchers (till such time as second-strike capability and
solid fueled missiles are ensured), would be the immediate mainstay of Pakistan’s
nuclear force, with additional nuclear-tipped air and sea launched missiles as well as
nuclear bombs relying on PAF delivery systems. The PAF has embarked on a force multiplier
programme with upgradations and induction of increasingly offensive 3weapon systems. Also,
the use of bombers allows a lot more flexibility in terms of targeting. With land-based
missile systems targeting counter-value targets, the air force would still, to some
degree, continue to pay a support role for the army in the theatre of war. However,
hostile strike aircraft becom3e a factor. How they will be able to impact on the mobility
of strategic force on the ground has yet to be assessed – but a lot will depend upon
the radar capability of Indian’s Russian-acquired A50s (AWACs). The Indians have also
got access to Israeli Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), and Pakistan needs to consider
their impact as well on the development of its missiles and their deployments.
From an operational point of view, it would be desirable
– till Pakistan can perfect hardened silos and second-strike capability – to
have a wide and flexible dispersal on mobile launchers. But with the range of the A 50s,
Pakistan may need to push deployments into Balochistan, which means increasing the
effective range of its missiles. Dispersal and flexibility also raise questions of costs,
political control and high physical security and communications links. All this will also
impact on Pakistan’s conventional force deployments – both in peace time and in
war. Here, also, the role of the air force becomes critical – in terms of information
gathering and surveillance.
III- Unconventional
Within the framework of unconventional threats, the most
likely military threats and engagements would be:
Low intensity conflicts (LIC)
Terrorism – transnational; subnational; state
Unconventional warfare is the most likely war between
Pakistan and India – in fact, at many levels it may be an ongoing process until the
resolution o the Kashmir issue and establishment of détente. This is because of the
ongoing militant freedom struggle in Indian- occupied Kashmir and India’s inability
to deal with it militari8ly and unwillingness to enter into a dialogue with Pakistan to
resolve the conflict politically. India continues to allege that the struggle is being
directed from Pakistan with infiltration’s across the LoC. So, India periodically
revives military action along the LoC as well as threatening Pakistan with escalation of
military action. After 9/11, India has kept up a sustained policy of trying to bring
Kashmir into the ambit of the international war on terrorism.
There are also transnational linkages across South Asia
between groups involved in violet ethnic and other political struggles in South Asian
states, including Pakistan an India – so there is a constant threat of military aid
and assistance across national boundaries for these groups. The terrorist threat is a
constant factor in this region and Indian efforts to keep Pakistan under pressure means
that Pakistan needs to prepare for efforts at destabilisaion of its domestic polity
through various means.
LIC and psy ops will be the mainstay of any such operation.
If fact, this war form dominates the entire South Asian theatre – and is the only
form that still relates to a "South Asian" frame-work, given the reach of Indian
missiles and the new "Southern Asian" strategic parameters now being identified
by India, stretching from the Middle East to the Far East. |
