Robert Schuman and the
European Union
On 9 May 1950, the French Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Robert Schuman, announced in a declaration that has since become famous, the
creation of the European Iron and Steel Community. The project aroused the enthusiasm of
public opinion and received the approval of the German, Italian, Belgian, Dutch and
Luxembourg governments. For the first time in their histories, it was proposed that these
governments delegate part of their sovereignty to a higher supra-national and independent
authority.
The Schuman declaration
The progression of the European idea, the
different post-war changes and the first effects of American aid kept a glimmer of hope
alive, but European construction lacked a large scale pragmatic project with specific
objectives. Many were tempted to build unity on Atlantic foundations, but men such as Jean
Monnet and Robert Schuman considered that the dynamic for creation should be the sole
responsibility of Europeans and should allow Franco-German reconciliation that would be
based on solidarity. Furthermore, in the face of the increasing impatience of Washington
and London, they considered that France had to regain the initiative by proposing an
innovative German and European policy. Drawn up in the greatest secrecy by Jean Monnet and
some of his colleagues, on 3 May 1950, the programme for the creation of a coal and steel
pool was sent in the form of a memorandum to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Robert
Schuman. He acted immediately. Brushing aside custom and proprieties, he decided to make
use of the effect of surprise. On 9 May 1950, in a now famous declaration, he revealed the
content of the plan, about which only Chancellor Adenauer had been informed a few hours
earlier. The birth of the European Coal and Steel Community aroused the public's
enthusiasm and received the approval of the governments of Germany, Italy, Belgium, the
Netherlands and Luxembourg. For the first time in their histories, it was proposed that
these governments should delegate part of their sovereignty to a higher, supranational and
independent authority.
First steps in European construction
The cataclysm of the Great War truly marked
the end of a world. Hegemonic Europe of the previous century became«old
Europe,»annihilated and more divided than ever, where injured nationalism was just
waiting to react to the least crisis. Both inside and outside Europe, many doubted its
moral and intellectual superiority and the capacity of its progress of which it had been
the vehicle for several centuries. In some lucid, optimistic and generous minds, ideas and
projects were germinating. The future construction of Europe would use elements of these
ideas, but the mentalities and blockages created by the very structure of Europe under the
Treaty of Versailles prevented them from being put to use. There were many approaches,
evidence of the fertility of thought which, it should be emphasised, had only a minor
impact on public opinion. At the League of Nations, the Geneva Spirit aimed to promote a
method of co-operation, which was to inspire the founders of the European Community such
as Jean Monnet. The idea of a confederation was first put forward in 1923 in the book
Pan-Europe by the Austro-Hungarian Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, a perfect example of
a visionary from the cosmopolitan background of imperial Europe. The different projects
for economic union were more concrete, as much anticipating the creation of a vast market
as the industrial integration that the business world and major industry envisaged. Except
for some half successes, these projects were not followed up. The spirit of the times,
particularly in France, needed solutions that were more than just purely economic,
preferring the ideal of an organised political grouping. This was the thinking of Aristide
Briand, to whom we attribute the first truly political project. As tentative as it was,
this project for« some sort of federal connection» aroused only vague interest in Europe
before being forgotten in the turmoil of the thirties.
Europe after 1945
In a Europe newly bled dry by a second world
conflict, voices were raised calling for reconciliation and union. On 19 September 1946,
Winston Churchill proposed establishing a United States of Europe. His announcement caused
a furore; a number of movements arose in different places, a few months later coming
together in Paris to create the European Union of Federalists. In fact, due to the
antagonism towards the two superpowers, these aspirations for union were boosted to the
extent that a European «Atlantic»model, as opposed to the eastern European model
dominated by the Soviet Union, emerged. Thus the famous speech made by General Marshall on
5 June 1947 at Harvard University particularly drew the attention of Europeans: economic
aid would be granted to the European nations if they committed themselves to co-operation.
The European Recovery Programme, usually known as the Marshall Plan, was set in motion.
The Soviet Union saw in this plan, the stamp of American imperialism and ordered its
satellite states to refuse the plan, although some of them were in favour of it. In the
west, the year 1948 was in many respects a decisive year in the history of European
construction. In February and in June, the Prague coup and then the blockade of Berlin was
evidence of a hardening in the cold war; in March, the signature of the Brussels Pact
created the western union, an important stage in the establishment of NATO; in April, the
Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC), the future OECD, was set up in
Paris to manage the distribution of American funds; in May in The Hague, supporters of a
united Europe met, resulting in the creation of a structure for reflection, the European
Movement, and the first European institution, the Council of Europe.
The ECSC
In Jean Monnet's mind, coal and steel were
bound to be the first area in which it would be possible to establish a concrete community
of interests, opening the way to solidarity in other areas. It was not about creating a
purely liberal economic area, but about setting up a supranational authority with real
powers to ensure the balance of both production and the markets, to set the rules of
competition, and to direct investment. Without doubt, the greatest originality of the ECSC
was to be found in the boldness of the ideas that were to guide setting up the
institutions. On 18 April 1951 in Paris, Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands and FRG signed the treaty instituting the ECSC, which was to come into force
on 25 July 1952. The treaty provided for a High Authority, a supranational collegiate
executive made up of 9 members, a Council of Ministers representing the 6 governments
which was to co-ordinate the decisions made by the High Authority with the economic
policies of the Member States, a Court of Justice and a Joint Assembly designated by the
national parliaments. From the beginning, even before confronting the grave difficulties
caused by the coal crisis of 1958, the ECSC achieved significant successes in the rapid
expansion in trade and production, the modernisation of equipment and in social action.
Above all, the habit of working together independently established by the first officials
of the High Authority were a foretaste of the working methods later used by the community
authorities
Towards a European army and political
union?
When the Korean war and the threat of Soviet
aggression posed the problem of security in western Europe, the United States envisaged
rearming Germany in the framework of the Atlantic alliance. To prevent a German national
army being set up once more, Jean Monnet felt that it was essential to take the initiative
by extending the community system to the armed forces. The project drawn up by the
President of the Council, René Pleven, was extremely ambitious as it aimed to create an
integrated military force, financed by a common budget and under European authority.
Negotiations opened in Paris on 15 February
1951. All European states that were signatories of the Atlantic Pact as well as FRG were
invited. The proposal met with a mixed response: the European allies were satisfied with
the feasibility of defence within the framework of the Atlantic Pact. Only Italy, Belgium,
Luxembourg and FRG decided to take part in the negotiations, with the other countries
sending observers.
By repositioning the EDC project in the
framework of the Atlantic Pact, Robert Schuman obtained the support of the United States.
After more than a year of negotiations, the treaty creating the EDC was eventually signed
on 27 May 1952 and ratified by the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany and Luxembourg. In 1953,
a project for genuine political union with a federal base was examined.
A section of French public opinion found
fault with the Paris Treaty for encouraging German rearmament, for distancing France from
its British ally and for threatening the French armed forces with either supranational
control or dissolution. On 30 August 1954, after much laboured wavering, the National
Assembly refused to ratify the Paris Treaty. This refusal prompted the first major crisis
in European«politics»since 1945.
From the EEC to the European Union
Robert Schuman's grand design now included
all west European nations and affected all parts of Europeans' lives. From 1979, they were
called on to elect their representatives to the European Parliament by universal suffrage.
This new expansion and the dispersal of the socialist bloc in eastern Europe called for
adjustments to be made between the various institutions and missions of the Community.
This was gradually realised by the Single European Act, signed in Luxembourg and The Hague
in 1986, the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) and the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997).
Telegram from Europe on the France's proposal
of the first Fouchet plan, 21 October 1961.
The Quai d'Orsay informed those concerned
that on 19 October 1961 the French delegation to the examining commission, chaired by
Christian Fouchet, presented a draft treaty to establish a union between states. The
proposal, which had to remain secret, received a largely favourable response.
Enlargement to include Denmark, Great Britain
and Ireland New York Times, 31 December 1972.
On the eve of the first enlargement since the
foundation of the ECSC, the American daily emphasised, with supporting figures, the
increase in the economic power of a European Economic Community which now comprised nine
members.
The challenges and the men in an enlarged
Europe New York Times , 2 January 1973.
After the entry of Denmark, Great Britain and
Ireland in to the Community, the New York Times presented portraits of the members of the
Commission
The benches of the European Parliament in
Strasbourg, 1992.
Signature of the Maastricht Treaty by Roland
Dumas and Pierre Bérégovoy, 7 February 1992.
Signature of the Treaty of Maastricht, 7
February 1992.
Map of the European Union in February 2000.
(Courtesy Embassy of France,
Kathmandu, Nepal)
N.K. NUCLEAR ISSUE
Wu-Kim Accord Bodes Well for Nuke
Talks
By Kim So-young, Seoul, Republic of Korea
Next 6-way discussions expected to focus on
U.S. security assurance.
North Korea's agreement to reopen six-way
talks over its nuclear weapons program marked another step forward in peacefully settling
the yearlong nuclear standoff, following the announcement that it would consider a
U.S.-proposed written pledge not to attack the country, analysts said Oct. 31.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-il (second from
right) talks to the Chinese delegation led by parliamentary leader Wu Bangguo at an
unidentified location in Pyongyang Oct. 30.North Korean leader Kim Jong-il and China's No.
2 leader Wu Bangguo "agreed in principle to continue to hold six-party talks"
Wednesday, reviving negotiations that have been stalled since August's inconclusive
meeting in Beijing between the two Koreas, the United States, China, Japan and Russia.
For the past three months, international
efforts to end the nuclear crisis have been frustrated, as Pyongyang dismissed dialogue as
futile and continued to ratchet up tension on the divided peninsula by boasting of its
nuclear capability.
Analysts said North Korea might have seized
on Wu's visit as an opportunity to respond to growing international pressure to resume
dialogue, and to strengthen amicable ties between the two communist allies by rewarding
China's diplomatic efforts to break the prolonged stalemate.
U.S. President George W. Bush recently
proposed giving North Korea a multilateral security guarantee in return for Pyongyang
ending its nuclear program, in a marked shift from his earlier stance that the U.S. would
not offer incentives for the North to disarm. His offer, widely viewed as a significant
concession, put the ball back in North Korea's court.
The communist state, under increasing
pressure from neighboring countries to respond positively to Washington's overture, said
last week that it was willing to consider the proposal, shifting from its longtime demand
for a formal bilateral nonaggression treaty with the United States.
"It appears that the North tried to
avoid missing out on the perceived softening of Washington's hard-line stance, and the
high-ranking Chinese official's visit to Pyongyang constituted a good opportunity to
convey its intention to resume dialogue," said Paik Hak-soon, a North Korea
specialist at the private Sejong Institute.
Seoul officials had expected that Wu, the
highest-ranking Chinese official to visit the country in two years, would make
considerable progress on the stalled diplomatic efforts, because the majority of earlier
breakthroughs coincided with high-level Chinese missions. China brokered the first round
of six-way talks in Beijing by acting as a go-between for Pyongyang and Washington.
China, the North's staunchest communist ally
and biggest donor of food and energy supplies, has been stepping up its efforts to
persuade Pyongyang to return to the negotiating table, partly due to fears of a regional
arms race.
It is also believed to fear the prospect of a
regime collapse in Pyongyang, which would unleash a flood of refugees across the Chinese
border and lead to the establishment of a South Korea-controlled democratic government on
the Korean Peninsula.North Korea's economic plight is another factor motivating its return
to negotiations, as neighboring countries will almost certainly provide North Korea with
large-scale economic assistance in return for Pyongyang abandoning its weapons program.
Since the North admitted developing clandestine arms, the international community has
reduced financial aid for the starving country by 20 percent.
However, despite brighter prospects for
future nuclear talks, a negotiated settlement is still perceived as being a long way off,
as countries involved will likely press ahead with their conflicting demands.
Wu Bangguo made it clear during his meeting
with Kim Jong-il that the concerns of both Washington and Pyongyang should be addressed,
supporting the North's demand that the two countries must both make concessions.
Pyongyang wants "simultaneous
action," under which North Korea will gain economic assistance and a security
guarantee in return for dismantling its nuclear weapons program, but Washington has
rebuffed such calls, insisting North Korea must act first before receiving any reward. |
