UN or no UN!

Intense debate continues on whether the United Nations system be allowed to mediate in the government-Maoists talks or the state itself proceed to sort out the matter with confidence. Understandably, this has been an issue boggling the minds of the Nepali intellectuals since the day comrade Prachanda expressed his willingness that he and his party was ready for the resumption of the now stalled talks provided the UN system were brought in.

The Nepali establishment instantly rejected Prachanda’s proposal without furnishing valid reasons. Since then, the country is under debate on analyzing the pros and cons of the UN mediation in the Nepali affairs. Understandably, this debate has both its advocators and opponents who furnish their logic with equal force.

The set that favors the UN mediation concludes that comrade Prachanda must have certain valid reasons when he talks of UN mediation. This set maintains that the Maoists’ appeal for the UN mediation does amply hint that the insurgents were in search of a recognized international guarantor who could impress upon both the sides if any one of the two in the talks later exhibited its reluctance in meeting to the agreed agendas. If the UN is itself a mediator, the sides in talks are more or less bound by moral obligations and can in no way exceed the limits stipulated by the international body prior to or after the finalization of the talks.

The opponents of the UN presence in Nepali affairs do say that what was the guarantee that the UN presence would settle the matter amicably as the UN mediation efforts elsewhere too have not yielded positive results. They further say that if the UN were invited in the Nepali affairs would mean providing a sort of political recognition to the insurgency which would later enhance the bargaining capabilities of the insurgency. Some who oppose the UN mediation also express their concern over the hidden fact that since the UN was heavily dominated by the ideas and the views of the developed Western countries who could later impose their will on the UN sponsored talks only to annoy one party at the talks.

Yet another set of intellectuals clarify Prachanda’s proposition wherein he favors UN mediation could have been due to the fact that the insurgents have no trust in the establishment and hence they fear that in the absence of the UN or any international guarantor if they went in for talks, the establishment at a later stage might not act as agreed upon at time of the negotiation and hence the need for the UN body which is widely appreciated and accepted by the population world over.

Opponents of the UN mediation say that if the Maoists join talks under UN mediation, it would provide them with proper and required legitimacy meaning that a violent outfit would instantly get legitimacy, which might enhance again their political maneuvering capabilities.

Equally important is the apprehension expressed by some in the academic sector who say that will India allow the UN presence in Nepal on this count? Others maintain that why should India object to UN mediation in Nepal?

However, there is yet another factor that is being deliberately ignored. The China factor. If India has concerns in Nepali affairs, equally true is that the Chinese side to can’t afford to close her eyes over what was happening in Nepal.

Summing it up, we can imagine the motive behind the Indian objection to the UN mediation. The Indian perception is that if the UN today is in Nepal might serve as a political precedence, which might facilitate the UN need in their own country as India is also beleaguered with similar sorts of conflicts. If India could object the UN efforts in Nepal, the Chinese too possess the right to do the same. But then the fact is that unless India is taken into confidence, with UN or without UN, the talks with the Maoists is bound to fail. It was not surprising therefore that India reacted well within two hours of the idea that cropped in Nepal regarding the need for bringing in the UN in settling our affairs. If this is any clue then what could at best be said is that the UN might not come unless India provides it with a green signal. This explains perhaps why the Nepali establishment out rightly rejected Prachanda’s preference over the UN. This does also amply explain that whether Nepal can practice an independent foreign policy on its own? Here is a message for comrade Prachanda as well to understand as to why the Nepali establishment is reluctant in agreeing to his demand for the UN mediation. Prachanda and his colleagues should now ponder over Nepali political helplessness. The day the insurgency and the establishment understand the "significance" of the India factor and formulate a sort of common agenda on how to minimize Indian significance in Nepali affairs, the imbroglio would automatically come to an end. The message is loud and clear.

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