PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATION DIM

By M.R. Josse, Senior Journalist

With a strategic military stalemate on the ground no more operative – if it ever were – prospects for a negotiated settlement of the Maoist insurgency seem remote or dim at the present time, in my view.

Indeed, with the state forces steadily gaining experience and confidence, not to mention more accurate intelligence capability vis-à-vis the Maoist guerrillas, the perception within the armed forces of the State that it can ultimately prevail militarily on the ground has increased significantly.

To be sure, what has greatly helped in creating such an assessment is the infusion of modern weaponry and training to shore up its anti-insurgency capability, particularly from India, the US and the UK.

Combined with the widespread belief that the two cease-fire periods of the past were not only beneficial for the Maoists in terms of rest, replenishment, re-grouping and recruitment but, significantly, also resulted in the release of hundreds of Maoists, including a number of senior figures, from detention, there would at present seem to be no compelling incentive for the State to repeat that scenario, at least in the short run.

The apparent visible stiffening of New Delhi’s stance against the Maoists, now openly described as a threat to her security/integrity, is another key factor in that regard. Clearly, that the Nepali Maoists have teamed up with their Indian counterparts – and, moreover, that they now propagate a vision not only Nepal-specific but one covering the whole of Southern Asia – has probably influenced such a change in policy.

Militating against the Maoists’ interest, too, is China’s consistent, if low-key, backing for the counter-insurgency operations mounted by the State against a movement that, among other things, is viewed by Beijing as insulting to the image and name of Mao Zedong. The ideological implications of the Maoist movement to China’s post-Deng Xiaoping reform policies, I believe, constitute an additional factor in shaping such a stance.

Though the Maoist rebels have, periodically, demonstrated their ability to mount sizeable attacks on State security forces and other targets, they have not been able to able to hold on to their "gains." Often, as in Bhojpur and perhaps more so in Beni, they have had to pay an inordinately heavy price for the same..

That the Maoists increasingly advocate the intervention of the United Nations – politely turned down by a State that does not wish to further complicate an already complex, delicate problem, not to mention the well-known sensitivities of India and China, Nepal’s immediately neighbours – is probably a reflection of their need for another cease-fire period. One wonders if they would have been so pro-international intervention if they believed that they were indeed gaining the upper hand militarily on the ground.

The same can probably be said about their recent release of hostages via the intervention of the ICRC. Such humanitarian acts, welcome as they are, may also be driven by the same consideration. Besides, it is probably a part of the Maoist calculus to secure international legitimacy and credibility including, ultimately, recognition of equality with the State.

That there has been a repeated violation of Maoist leaders’ commitments in the past, including that not to target innocent civilians and so forth, does nothing to instill confidence about their long-term strategic objectives, as distinct from ad hoc or tactical decisions necessitated by specific exigencies on the ground.

Post-9/11 developments – including the generation of an international movement against "terrorism" - was certainly not something that could have been foreseen earlier by anyone, including the Maoists. While militating against their interest, it brought the United States into the picture with the resultant boost in capability of the States’ armed forces, not to mention the bolstering of confidence in the political leadership of the Establishment.

That there cannot be an exclusive "military solution" is more or less accepted. What is also acknowledged, as seen above, is that the military aspect can be part of a solution, in so far as exerting pressure on the Maoists to give up arms and return to mainstream non-violent politics. It is no doubt with such in mind that the Establishment, or the ‘Old Regime" in Maoist parlance, has a two-track policy in operation: carrots (amnesty/rehabilitation) for those who surrender and sticks (military action) for those who do not. I, for one, do not visualise any basic change in this regard, any time soon.

While it is a given that the Maoists have greatly benefited for the Great Palace vs. Parties Divide perhaps the day is not too far off when that will change. Thus far, although there is even speculation of an alliance between the agitating political parties and the Maoists, that may not, in effect, come about. I am quite sure that, in their heart of hearts, their leaders realise that the elimination of the Monarchy would do nothing to boost multi-party parliamentary democracy or to safeguard the achievements of the 1990 Constitution.

The wide gulf of separation between the "constitutional forces" and the Maoists goals, including their categorical rejection of surrender of arms before a final settlement, cannot be bridged merely by wishful thinking, no doubt brought about by an ardent yearning for peace.

Finally, I find it almost impossible to believe that India, China and the US, to mention only three interested external powers, will tolerate a Maoist takeover, whether it comes from the battlefield or from the negotiating table.

In short: the prognosis for a negotiated settlement of the Maoist insurgency is, at this time, not very encouraging despite the deafening calls from some quarters for another cease-fire and follow-up talks. I know others have different ideas.

Chronological background to the Maoist movement/insurrection
From Birth To People’s War

By Man Ranjan Josse

Physically, the Maoist insurgency was launched by the underground CPN (M) on February 13, 1996 under the rubric of Jana Yuddha, or People’s War. Conceptually, however, it began or was "born", if you will, when in 1994, the CPN (Unity Centre) group led by Comrade Prachanda aka Pushpa Kamal Dahal and Dr. Baburam Bhattarai decided to separate from the grouping led by Nirmal Lama.The ostensible deciding factor was Prachanda’s/Bhattarai’s desire to initiate an armed uprising against the State.

Chronologically speaking, however, the roots of today’s Maoist insurgency can be traced directly to 1974 when the CPN’s more radical elements held what is known in their parlance as the Fourth Convention. Led by Prachanda and Bhattarai, this party, the CPN (Fourth Convention), advocated armed struggle against "class enemies" – in particular, the overthrow of the Monarchy.

In 1983, Mohan Bikram Singh, a senior and charismatic founder member of the CPN (Fourth Convention), broke off and went on to form the CPN (Masal). In 1984, at the CPN’s Fifth Convention, Prachanda was elected to the Central Committee, then subsequently, to the Politburo of the CPN (Masal).

The CPN (Masal) underwent further division in 1985 over the issue of the Tamil rebellion in Sri Lanka. In this fashion were constituted of two separate political entities: the CPN (Masal) and CPN (Mashal) with Prachanda as General Secretary.

When the People Movement’s was gearing up against the Panchayat polity in early 1990,three Communist groupings came together to form the Samyukta Janamorcha, or the United Left Front. In November of that year, opponents of the main Communist party established the CPN (Unity Centre).

Prachanda played a leading role in uniting three radical Communist factions in that form. Also established then was "a Left political front – the United People’s Front (UPF) – that participated in the first general election in 1991 after the reintroduction of the multi-party system."

Bhattarai was named UPF’s Chairman. It was under his leadership that in the 1991 general election his party won nine seats in the 205-seat House of Representatives making it the third largest party after the Nepali Congress (NC) (110) and the CPN (UML) (69).

"In May 1994, the party split into an Unity Centre led by Prachanda and another led by Nirmal Lama." The latter was "not particularly in favour of an armed uprising immediately."

In 1995, the UPF split following radicalisation of its revolutionary wing. It was then that Prachanda and Bhattarai formally set up the (CPN) (M).

Currently, Prachanda is the party’s chief ideologue, Commander-in-Chief of the People’s Liberation Army of Nepal, and its organisational brain. In February 2001, the party’s Central Committee, in recognition of his seminal leadership role, endorsed the Prachanda Path, or Prachanda’s Way, as constituting the party’s guiding principle or philosophy. Bhattarai is head of the Joint Revolutionary People’s Council.

Prachanda Path has been described as "a combination of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism advocating a dual strategy of simultaneous armed conflict and urban mass uprising." with ‘mass uprising’ being spearheaded by front organisations of students, women, farmers and labour unions, all with the ‘revolutionary’ suffix in their nomenclature.

In an interview to A World to Win on May 28, 2001, Prachanda has himself expounded, in classical Communist parlance, on what Prachanda Path is all about. In his own words, it is "a definite set of ideas" that "represents the centralised expression of collective leadership and Comrade Prachanda’s ‘correct and continued leadership.’ " Additionally, he explained:

"The Party considers Prachanda Path as an enrichment of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism. Giving it concrete

definition the Conference has termed Prachanda Path as a set of ideas that is more than a general Party line but which has not yet developed up to the level of ‘Thought’. The Party has defined Prachanda Path in the Nepali context as a new link of creative Marxism, opposed to both the right revisionists and sectarian dogmatists." He went on to predict: "The Party is confident that the synthesis of Prachanda Path will serve the world revolution by giving direction to the forward march of the Nepali revolution."

Incidentally, in the same interview, Prachanda provided an illuminating insight into Maiost’s thinking on how their People’s War has been progressing. He stated, inter alia: "The Nepali People’s War has been advancing at a fast pace due to the proper balance between strategic firmness and tactical flexibility and between political offensive and military offensive."

However, to return to the history and genesis of the Maoist insurrection in Nepal, Bhattarai, as UPF chairman, on February 4, 1996 presented a 40-point charter of demands related to "nationalism, democracy and livelihood" of the Nepalese people to Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba, then heading a NC-led coalition.

For the sake of the record, it may be recalled here that it was not the first time that such demands have been voiced by the UPF. Indeed, initially in 1992, it came out with an eight-point demand, later expanded to 14. By the time of the UML government headed by Man Mohan Adhikari, it had reached 36.

In his February 4, 1996 roster of demands, Bhattarai declared that unless the government took positive steps toward fulfilling those demands by February 17, 1996, the Maoists would launch an armed struggle against it. However, four days before the expiry of that ultimatum, their guerrillas fired the first salvos of their People’s War by attacking police outposts in Rukum, Rolpa, Gorkha and Sindhuli districts. The Maoist’s People War soon spread to Kavre district, just east of Kathmandu.

From then on, it raged on for over five years until the first cease-fire of July 2001. In November 2001, the Maoists launched surprise assaults on police and RNA forces throughout the country, strengthening the popular perception that the Maoist rebels had used the interregnum to prepare for a blitzkreig on state security personnel.

By the time of the dramatic (second) cease-fire announcement on January 29, 2003 – ironically enough, three days after the assassination of Armed Police Chief Krishna Mohan Shrestha, his wife and bodyguard while on a morning walk in Lalitpur – the Maoists had demonstrated their lethal reach throughout the Kingdom.

(Excerpts: paper presented at a FES/NEFAS seminar recently)

Pro-Dalit policies: Barriers in Implementation

Mr. Tek Tamrakar

Public Interest Lawer

The pro-Dalit policies and provisions are not self-executorial or auto-operating. They are needed to be mobilized and operated by human beings. The human beings who are supposed to implement these policies are not so pro active and having positive attitude towards Dalit rights. There is a dominant participation of Brahmins, which sometimes is called brahminocracy15. Most of these problems exist because the existing policies have not been implemented effectively. The main barriers of implementation of the pro Dalit policies are given below:

Lack of Call Record Back System

The basic barriers in the effective implementation is the lack of any institutional mechanism for call the record back system in legal as well as governance process. The call record back system is applied for scrutinizing the government authorities against misuse, and mal administration as well as the negligence in implementation of policies, provisions and plans. Calling back the situation of implementation, there should be an institution to fire, fine and imprisonment against the disobedience of the duties.

Ambiguous Policies and Laws

Another barrier in implementation is the dependence nature of policies. The programs and policies are not independent from the prejudice and pre mind–set. The policy makers leaves the discretionary power while formulating the welfare policies. This discretionary power is used as a tool to be aloof from their legal liability.

No disincentives Provision against non-implementation

There lacks the special and strong provision under any legal mechanism, which impose the punishment if any policies and provisions are non-implemented. In India, there are several provisions under various laws for looking after the implementing process of the government authorities and make them subject of firing from job and imprisoned if they do not obey their legal duties honestly.

Stereotypical Attitude18 of the State Mechanism

Some popular policies and plans were determined by the Ninth Plan. Since, lack of commitment and dedication of the implementing agencies and the instability in the national politics, most of these plans were not executed.

Lack of Independent and Competent Monitoring Body

The establishment of the Commission for Dalits is the positive attempt for the upliftment of Dalits. Yet it has not become the real watchdog for the protection and promotion of human rights. The commission has not initiated any action to the concerned authorities for effective implementation. Similarly, the commission has not assigned power to look any complaints against the communities and individuals.

Political instability

Political instability is another problems against smooth implementation of the plans and programs. Frequent change of government and regular change of government staff in the higher positions affected the implementation of programme activities. Everyday strikes, band and other political scandals are also responsible for poor implementation of the policies.

For the effective implementation of pro-Dalit policies, the Dlait themselves should be aware and be sensitized to their rights. The following recommendations have been made to for the effective implementation of such policies:

Recommendations

There should be constitutional rights of Dalit for reservation in all state services, distribution of state resources (Acquisition of Land) and private sectors. This system can uphold their participation on governance process and build their self-confidence.

Specific law should be enacted with the mandatory provision for implementation of all state policies as well as provisions.

Amendment of law is also most important for removing the barriers of implementation. Some laws lack Dalits' representation in implementing process. Lack of their representation in governance process has reduced their enthusiasm and belongingness.

Policies should be effective and practical for which feasibility studies could be conducted.

There should be the provision for call record back system of the programs directed by the law and planning. If there comes the cases on negligence against any, they should be fined, fired or imprisoned.

Public awareness about pro polices and laws is to be ensured. Otherwise, mere policies can not play role. Public should be aware about these provisions and about concerned actors also.

Similarly, the government authorities are to be re-oriented about the changing policies, planning and laws. It can not be said that they know everything about existing policies. In this regard, the concerned governmental agencies should be provided re-orientation about the new as well as existing pro policies on Dalits.

Stereotypical mind-set and wrong attitude of the implementing agencies and interpreting bodies are also the invisible barriers felt by all victims, which need to be corrected.

Clear Law should be framed for strengthening the Commission for Dalits. The commission should be financed by the consolidated fund and its activities should be made independent.

Dalit Commission should work as a real human rights watch dog at local as well as central level. It should look after the implementation status of policies and recommend for effective implementation.

In every department of Government, there should be a Officer with the name of Liaison Officer for conveying the message from Government side on the process of reservation and facilitating them for effective implementation.

( Courtesy: FES/CETS)

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