A future roadmap to settle conflict: Short-term strategies

Bishnu Raj Upreti PhD Conflict Management

Considering the geopolitics of Nepal, growing international concerns and desire of Nepalese people, there is no option other than a peaceful resolution of conflict through negotiation. Military intervention cannot solve the problem. If we want to prevent external military and political interventions in Nepal we need to resolve this conflict ourselves.

There are easy ways for international community to intervene conflict-ridden county. They use two logics:

failed state and 2) security risks to them.

There is an international understanding that powerful countries have obligations to assist failed state. This is an easy way to intervene. The second reason is security risk from the conflict-ridden country to their homeland security. The peace talks is failed, ceasefire is broken down and country is entering into war, Nepal some time soon will be declared as a failed state that gives both logics for international intervention. Therefore, immediate start of the third ceasefire and resumption of peace talk with the following strategies is essential:

Formation of broad based interim government

It would be logically or theoretically very good if an all-party consensual government under the leadership of one of the main political parties were formed to deal with this crisis. But the King seems not yet ready to accept this option because of fundamentally glaring differences between saying and doing of the parliamentary political leaders. Parliamentary parties are also not ready to accept the nominees of the king, if their recommendation is not given proper hearing. Thapa government wants to continue its tenure with strategically bringing impractical relevant issues such as holding election and it is, I think, getting full support form India. At this complex situation, there are no other pragmatic avenues than to form a consensual government. That will also help to build trust among all political actors and give a reflection of the commitment to implement the future negotiated settlements. There will be no long-term peaceful solution of conflict by ignoring parliamentary parties. Likewise, the king should play a constructive, assertive and visible role to resolve this bloody conflict in Nepal. Therefore, the success of the negotiation completely depends upon the collaborative efforts of the king, the political parties and the Maoists.

Remove pervasive mistrust- barrier for peace process

Distrust is pervasive in the present Nepalese politics. It is destroying political process and fuelling endemic conflict. Principally, cognitive, emotional, and behavioural trusts shape society and democracy. However, in Nepal all forms of trusts have eroded, especially in the political sector. Nepalese people are not ready to believe what politicians say and commit, as their saying and actions are often contradictory. Political parties do not trust the king's repeatedly reiterated commitment to multi-party democracy and constitutional monarchy, the king does not trust the major political parties. So nobody trusts any one and every body suspect each other.

The current conflict between the king and the five parliamentary parties proved that trust is very fragile. Building trust takes considerable time and efforts. However it can be eroded by a single mistake and in some cases lost trust may never be rebuilt. Trust is a binding force of civil society building and functional democracy. But the poor performance of political leaders and subsequent conflict has taken away the trust that existed in Nepalese societies. Decades of repression, hostility, fear and distrust have been combined with political failure, which has severely impaired the ability of civil society organisations for collective action. When the civil war had pitted Nepalese people against each other, hostility and suspicion were rife. Restoring mutual confidence is therefore a difficult yet extremely essential task. Confidence is needed on all sides to overcome distrust, to promote broad participation, and to move away from old strategies of confrontation to new strategies of engagement and co-operation and to restore lasting peace in Nepal.

Now priority of the King, the civil society actors and the parliamentary parties must be to rebuild trust through collaboration, dialogue and collective action and bring the rebel group into mainstream politics. The Maoists must end violence and resume ceasefire for peaceful negotiation. Confrontation and mistrust cannot solve the current crisis of Nepal. One of the best options in the next round of peace talk is to agree on constitutional assembly election (by redefining the existence of the constitutional monarchy), as the Maoists have already recognised one of the three main forces is monarchy and therefore it is a pragmatic option. Now all three major actors are deeply suffering from perceived risk. The palace supporters have perceived risk of possibility for republican state if the constituent assembly election is agreed. Parliamentary political parties have developed perceived risk of being sidelined by the Maoists and palace. The Maoists have developed perceived risk of possible suppression by the collective efforts of parliamentary parties and palace. Consequently, none of them are willing to inter into constructive dialogues to resolve the conflict.

Promote people's participation in peace process

Civic engagement in peace making and peacekeeping in Nepal is not getting enough attention. It is very hard to realise any genuine efforts to promote public participation in peace process in our country. Pragmatically, peace making and keeping is more than ending the armed rebellion. It goes beyond to address root causes of conflict and political and social transformation process (focus on structural change in governance, security and development, human rights policies and practice).

A widely held misperception in Nepal is that peace will be achieved when the Maoist and the government negotiate and sign peace agreement. But this will not be the case. There will be numerous obstacles to implement the agreement, if (and when) there is an agreement. So the successful negotiation between the government and the rebels will be only a beginning of peace. It is only a minimum condition. Restoring political tolerance and coexistence, indispensable elements of peace, will be a major unsolved challenge in Nepalese peace process. Unless people own the peace process and be ready to develop feeling of tolerance and coexistence it will be meaningless optimism to restore lasting peace.

The important question is how to promote people's participation in Nepalese peace process. One of the potential answers would be to promote peace advocacy/lobbying and massive campaigns at local level in a non-partisan way. Essentially, creating a mechanism of local participation is essential to achieve that objective. The impacts of such local efforts could be far more than the westernised, ritualised techniques of five star hotel conferences and seminar in Kathmandu with domination of few elites. Real resources flow to community for peace campaigns would be more meaningful than fashionable, elite-biased, formality-focused, target oriented conferences in cities attended by same faces in many star hotels.

Establishment of Peace Resource Centre

Another practical strategy is to establish an independent Peace Resource Centre having full authorities, responsibilities and resources. This must be legally constituted with an autonomous status and fully endorsed by the government, the Maoists, and the parliamentary parties. It should have full authorities to work in peace process and negotiation. This organisation can have the mandate to facilitate civic participation, collect public voices and concerns, propose facilitators and mediators to the government and the Maoists, conduct research, design code of conduct and monitor it, and monitor the implementation of negotiated agenda. This Centre should facilitate all activities related to peace process and post conflict transformation. It is very hard to achieve real peace from the current approach and practice. There is a need for a total paradigm shift in peace process.

Many issues of conflict need further analysis from the negotiation perspective. What are the elements of agreement, how they can be addressed in what way and with what institutional structures and process need to be thoroughly examined to give firm basis for negotiators to negotiate. That analysis has to be coordinated by the Centre. This Centre should focus on the following broad areas:

Research, Studies and Analysis:

On poverty and structural inequality: Several research and studies have been conducted and findings are documented in the issue of poverty and structural inequality as fundamental causes of the current conflict. However, very little has been done on how to address these issues at the negotiation table and after the successful negotiation for conflict transformation, what structures and mechanisms will be required to address these fundamental causes in a non-coercive ways, which area and activities should get immediate priority and what can be long term programme, who has to take lead and who should support. A Task Force is essential to come with very clear proposal to initiate a wider debate and help negotiators to make negotiated agreement on various issues like administrative and bureaucratic reform, autonomy and regionalisation , post reconstruction, rehabilitation and reconciliation.

The studies have to give basis for negotiation on disarmament, demobilisation, rehabilitation, reintegration, reconstruction, and reconciliation (D2R4). Answers to promote D2R4 need to seek on what (activities), how (process) to do, who has to be involved, with what time-frame and from which resources.

Monitoring of negotiation and peace process

This Centre should coordinate with all actors (the government, the rebels, civil society, international community, UN agencies, etc.), develop Codes of Conduct in collaboration with other concerned actors such as human rights organisations, monitor it and feed the negotiators with the needed information, findings of study and external expertise. It should work closely with national commissions (Human Rights, Women, Dalit, Ethnic Commission, etc.)

Strategic planning for the post conflict transformation

As a specialised body, this centre should take lead role in the post conflict activities on disarmament, demobilisation, rehabilitation, reintegration, reconstruction, and reconciliation (D2R4). This role is crucial and needs specialised agency to work with. International co-ordination, coordination with national service organisations (such as road, drinking water, irrigation, agriculture, health, education, cottage industries, electricity, telephone, etc.) and channelling resources through a single gate and monitoring field implementation of the D2R4 must be it's some of the important functions.

External support and involvement

We need to involve expert facilitators from neutral countries like Switzerland, Sweden, Norway or many other African countries to support the negotiation process and develop capacity and skills of national facilitators. We should also involve neutral organisations like UN, EU or ICRC in the mediation process that helps to keep the process on track, prevents negotiating parties from running away and also to ensure their financial commitment for the post-negotiation reform and conflict transformation, as we need extremely huge resources to implement the agreed social change. There are many ethical, experienced professional mediators who can help our facilitators and negotiators. I do not see any logic not to involve outsider experts if we have no such expertise. Though deeply committed, the Nepalese facilitators are not yet experienced enough to professionally facilitate the negotiation process. The external facilitators could work as co-facilitators to help them to gain experiences. Despite the frequently reiterated rhetoric by politicians about our own ability to deal with the conflict, by now it is clear that we are not able to negotiate conflict and therefore we need external mediators. Many military and intelligence experts from foreign countries are coming and involved in training in Nepal. Unnecessary foreign experts (in fact, many of them are inexperienced, unrelated, generalist, and having tourist motive) are working in this country and influencing all development policies and strategies but neither the government nor the political parties did critically look to involve these so-called development experts. But when there is a request on need of involvement of experienced outsider facilitators or mediators to resolve the bloody conflict all in one voice say we do not need them.

Nepal must invite UN to mediate this conflict. Kofi Anan, Secretary General of UN, had repeatedly expressed his concerns over Nepal. UN is yet interpreted in Nepal as similar to other independent nation states and its involvement is treated as the involvement of USA or UK or any other independent country in conflict resolution. But this is not the case. Nepal is the member state of UN and therefore UN should have concerns over the problem of its member state. Any member state could seek support from UN. UN has tremendous experiences of conflict resolution across the world and Nepal could benefit from that experiences. In addition, Nepal can benefit from UN involvement when there is negotiated settlement, as post-conflict transformation needs tremendously huge amount of resources and UN could fund, uses its expertise on post conflict transformation process, and help to bring resources from other member countries.

Resident Representative of the European Union has also expressed willingness of EU to involve in the mediation of Nepalese conflict. Even it is understood that EU has sent written proposal to the Nepalese government but the EU is not yet getting any response. Nepal must not miss these opportunities. Otherwise, Nepal may have to accept the intervention of powerful independent states like USA or UK or India, which is far more costly than the involvement of more independent organisations like EU or ICRC or UN.

Maoist Insurgency: Politico-Historical, Socio-Cultural, and Economic Implications – II

By: D.B.Gurung

In the two elected Panchayat legislatures of the 1980s, the upper caste Brahman and Chhetri got fifty per cent of the seats. This proportion went up 53, 63, and 63 per cent respectively in the 1991, 1994, and 1999 parliaments. Only one dalit MP was elected in these three elections. The asymmetry appears more shockingly in the bureaucracy. Between 1983 and 1985, 69 per cent of the Lok Sewa (Public Service Commission) posts were occupied by Brahman and Chhetri. This figure increased to 81 per cent in 1992/93 and by 2001 it went up to 98 per cent. One can be less hesitant to point out that in Nepal a minority is running a multiethnic nation. The above figures vividly illustrate the tyranny of what some critics define as Bahunbadi (Brahmanic imperialistic) perspective, policies, and practices. But let us not wink at another blazing reality, that of the 29 per cent of Brahman/Chhetri population in Nepal who appear to have almost total command over the state machinery, it can be assumed that probably less than 12 per cent (from the above figure) actually enjoy the pie, the rest are as unfortunate as any other neglected group and doomed to live a miserable life.

The euphoria noticed in the afterglow of the democratic revival did not rhyme with the development performance as promised. Various rural groups that make up the overwhelming bulk of the country's population still have to bear the brunt of the utter neglect, discrimination, and deprivation inherited from centuries of elitist military rule based on Hindu caste hierarchy. Such was the situation that even the new dispensation failed to deliver in terms of better socio-economic conditions. To see the plight of the indigenous peoples in Nepal one just needs to trek a couple of days to their settlements and it becomes apparent that their living conditions have not changed much since the conquest by Prithivi Narayan Shah in the eighteenth century. They became subjects of modern Nepal but were never treated as such, despite their devotion and loyalty to the new masters.

Taking a glimpse into the history of the Gurkha who derive mainly from four ethnic janajati groups, i.e., Magar, Gurung, Rai, and Limbu, it is appalling to note how they have been put to use as mere tools of war since the beginning of the Gorkha expansionary campaign. Some of them were entrusted with top positions in the initial years of the Gorkha empire, however, they found themselves ejected soon later by the ruling coalition of Shah-Chhetri and Brahman gurus. Some historians observe that, of the total 49, there were at least ten Magars and Gurungs who held the status of kaji (the highest rank a commoner could aspire to) between the years 1768 and 1814. Abhiman Singh Rana, a Magar general who was killed in the Kot Massacre, was the last ranking ethnic janajati figure in the royal court of Nepal, thereafter there is no record of an ethnic janajati holding top rank in military, judiciary, and in bureaucracy: they have never been trusted for such standings.

During the First World War, the Rana government moved into massive Gurkha recruitment drive, even by means of conscription, and acquired a better diplomatic relationship with the British, the then most dominant European colonizer. The Rana rulers bartered the young-blooded citizens for their vested interest, and sent them down the river to bleed and die on foreign soils. There is probably no place on earth where the Gurkhas' sturdy feet have not stepped upon; wherever there was threat of war they have always been deployed in the front lines for immediate sacrifice either to please foreign masters or the feudal lords back home. During the First and Second World Wars, hundreds of thousands of Gurkha soldiers were selected and dispatched to assist the British, and a tremendous number of them either perished, disappeared, or were severely wounded. Entire mountain villages were emptied of young males. Their graves are scattered across the world from Gallipolli and Cassino in Italy to Egypt, Africa, Tunisia, France, Afghanistan, Sinai, Jerusalem, Israel, Palestine, Dardenals, Burma, Malaya, Indonesia and Hong Kong. The population growth of the Gurkha natives was drastically checked because of the men being away: they became minorities in their own lands whereas the influx from the south increased. According to an Indian official source reported as of 15 July, 1980, some 10.9 million Indians were residing abroad, of which 34.7 percent were living in Nepal alone. Among those 3.8 million residing in Nepal, 62.8 percent had acquired Nepali citizenship certificates (Gurung 2001: 18).

In fact, it was the British who propagated such myths as of the Gurkha who once they unsheathe their signature weapon, the lethal Khukuri, will re-sheathe it only after drawing the blood, and preferably only after hacking off the head, of an enemy. This reputation as a relentless bloodthirsty warrior, carefully nurtured by the British, has been used in propaganda endeavors to wage a psychological war against the enemy from the First World War to the recent Falklands War. The reality is however quite different. Like any other soldier who went to war, the Gurkhas also bled, suffered, and feared. They joined the army not because they are innately bloodthirsty war-like creatures, but because they also have hopes and dreams to provide a living for themselves and their families, as most of them came from poor hill farmers or herders of Nepal.

(To be continued)

(Courtesy: Name of the book: Conflicts, Human Rights & Peace: Challenges Before Nepal Editor: Bipin Adhikari Publisher NHRC, Kathmandu

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