Issues of Conflict:
Bangladesh-India relations
Humayun Kabir, BANGLADESH
Some of the issues that generate
conflict between Bangladesh and India are:
Border Issue: Allied issues like border
demarcation, border fencing by India, the Tin Bigha Corridor, enclaves, etc. are not new,
but what is interesting to note is the changing position of India on the ratification of
the 1974 Mujib-Indira Border Agreement. India is yet to ratify the Agreement, while
Bangladesh did so immediately after its signing. As the Agreement involved ceding
territory, India started dilly-dallying on the pretext of the case being sub justice, as
one citizen from West Bengal state had filed a writ petition against India’s handing
over of a tiny patch of its territory to Bangladesh. Indian courts took about two decades
to decide on a verdict that Indian Constitution did not have to be amended for such mutual
transfer of territory. Only six and a half kilometers of land boundary remains
undemarcated between Bangladesh and India. India now says that ratification of the 1974
Border Agreement is subject to completion of the boundary demarcation between the two
countries. The tendency of procrastination on the part of India creates bad blood in
Bangladesh, preventing blossoming of relations between the two close neighbors.
Trade Issue: The staggering gap in trade
balance between Bangladesh and India is not new. What is relatively new, even in this age
of economic liberalization and market economy, is New Delhi’s denial of access to
Bangladeshi goods to Indian market by way of imposing an array of tariff and non-tariff
barriers.
Push-in Issue: India claims
that there are a large number of illegal Bangladeshi migrants in India. This number widely
and wildly varies - from 1 million to 19 million, scattered all over the country but
concentrated mostly in the bordering states of India as also in Delhi and Mumbai. The
criteria to identify these people remain obscure and there are many in India itself who
oppose the methods. Bangladesh denies the existence of such illegal Bangladeshi migrants
in India and, hence, no question of taking them back. India is now making vigorous
attempts to push in people whom it calls illegal through the border to Bangladesh. India
is engaged in this exercise in a big way, making the bilateral relationship rather bitter.
Remarkably, Indian attempts usually coincide with the nature of relationship with
Bangladesh, with the centre-state relationship in India, with the approaching of elections
in India particularly in the states bordering Bangladesh, etc.
Training Camps in Bangladesh:
India alleges that Bangladesh offers shelter and training to rebels who are waging
insurgencies in India’s Northeast. It is alleged that there are as many as 195
training camps inside Bangladesh territory. The number of camps on the Indian list keeps
on increasing with every meeting between chiefs of the paramilitary forces and Home
Secretaries of the two countries. It is ridiculous that these suggested camps include some
cantonments and the Institute I come from. Bangladesh denies the existence of such
training camps. It is believed in Bangladesh that the camp issue is a convenient whip in
India’s hand to occasionally beat Bangladesh with. The whipping frequency and
intensity is now gathering pace, it seems.
Export of Bangladeshi Gas to India:
Energy-hungry India is just too eager to get gas from Bangladesh. Bangladesh is hesitant
to export the same to its giant neighbor. The issue is at best controversial in
Bangladesh. The exact quantity of gas in Bangladesh is not known and most of the country
does not have the access to gas, while Bangladesh buys gas at a high price in dollars from
foreign companies exploring gas in Bangladesh. While domestically in Bangladesh the use of
gas is debatable, the export of it to India becomes politically sensitive and even
explosive. India’s persistent insistence on gas export makes it a lot worse.
Transit issue: It is a most
sensitive issue vitiating relations between Bangladesh and India. India wants transit
through Bangladesh territory to connect its mainland in a big way with its isolated
northeastern seven states. As India views it, this will facilitate development of and
communication with the northeast and guarantee access to the Chittagong port. Bangladesh
has misgivings about Indian intentions. Bangladesh is not convinced about the economic
benefits that might accrue from granting transit facilities to India, and Dhaka remains
concerned about the security implications and strategic underpinnings of the transit
project of India.
Common water resources management:
This is the most important and sensitive issue for Bangladesh, as the life and living in
Bangladesh depends on the water resources that flow from upstream India. The issues here
are the sharing of these common resources, flood forecasting, harnessing the resources for
economic development of the two countries, maintaining the eco-system and the navigability
of the watercourses, clean water, etc. Bangladesh and India are only addressing the
problem of sharing of the waters of the common rivers, mainly of six including the Teesta
River. Over the last seven years, there have been many meetings at the political, official
and technical-expert levels over the problem of sharing of waters of these watercourses.
So far little progress has been made. Hopes in Bangladesh were high concerning the Teesta
River. Even here, the JRC level and the expert level meetings held in the last 2-3 months
could not make any breakthrough, as the two sides still tend to differ over the formula to
share waters of the Teesta and over the quantum of water required for the river itself.
Things have taken a grave turn with the news of India’s river- linking project.
Bangladesh, which has experienced the effects of the Farakka Barrage, is deeply concerned
about the implications of it.
There are some strands in the foreign
policies of both Bangladesh and India observed since the 1990s that reflect certain
strategic dissonance in the interests and worldviews and that have implications for their
respective national security perceptions.
(IFA/FES seminar, Kathmandu) |
