Wednesday, July 27, 2005

Special for Academicians
Renewed Importance of Korea-US. Relations

-Prof. Bae Geung Chan, Institute of Foreign Affairs and national Security, Seoul

There are at least five reasons why Seoul should strive to maintain and cement the Korea-U.S. alliance. First, Korea shares borders with or neigh­bors the regional and extra-regional powers of China, Japan, and Russia. When viewing the Korean peninsula's geopolitical situation from the tra­ditional balance-of-power theory of "making friends with distant countries and being cautious of neighboring countries," it becomes evident that the need for Seoul to preserve its security alliance with Washington is of the utmost importance. Second, the U.S. role of a stabilizer and balancer in the region is already vital but will be all the more crucial in the years ahead. History has shown that the rise of new powers and ensuing shifts in power is often accompanied by wars of a massive scale. China's abrupt emergence as a global economic and political powerhouse and Japan's in­creasingly rightist-leaning policies over the past few years, coupled with a possibility of the ongoing Sino Japan rivalry and tension leading to a con­flict, have served to heighten the anxiety and insecurity of neighboring countries.

Third, China faces definite limitations in supplanting the United States as the principal hegemon in the region. China will require at least 30 years to build up its national power in order to attain a comparable footing as the United States. Furthermore, Korea-China relations are unlikely to progress into an alliance unless China makes a fundamental transition to a stable democracy. Fourth, Korea must serve as a bridge between China and Japan. Without an alliance with the United States, the middle power's ne­gotiating leverage with China and Japan will be reduced significantly. Lastly, the United States will remain a valuable export market and the largest source of foreign direct investment for Korea, despite Korea's rapidly increasing commercial transactions with China, which have sur­passed the Korea-U.S. trade volume in recent years, and China's steadily mounting sway in East Asia, as a result of its explosive economic growth and Japan's comparative economic stagnation.

A key question related to the Korea-U.S. alliance is the direction of Washington's future involvement in Northeast Asia. In this regard, the United States should not be excluded from taking part in the region's co­operative framework altogether. Discourse about Northeast Asian coopera­tion generally hypothesizes Korea-China Japan trilateral cooperation, but participation at the functional level, or in regard to the region's secu­rity and economic spheres, will redouble the likelihood for successful Northeast Asian regional cooperation. As a balancer of power in East Asia, the United States continues to maintain vital security and economic interests in the region. As such, it is likely to vigorously oppose Northeast Asian cooperation from which it is excluded, while in reality, a regional group­ing without U.S. support will inevitably face a dimmer outlook. In this light, it is incumbent upon Seoul to make continued efforts to induce and ensure U.S. participation in Northeast Asian regional cooperation, irrespec­tive of the actual form of such involvement.

Its relationship with China remains a conundrum, which calls for intro­spection, as Korea moves to redefine and revamp its alliance with the United States. Seoul and Washington can envisage various mid- to long-term developmental objectives for their alliance, ranging from a more robust bi­lateral defense initiative to a comprehensive regional security system or a strategic partnership. Whatever the shape or form that the Korea-U.S. all­iance may take, Korea needs to maintain strategic flexibility toward bilat­eral or multilateral arrangements that are in fact designed to check and con­tain China. For Korea, which is compelled to ride the wave of China's vast growth potential on the way to ushering in a Northeast Asian era, it cannot afford to convert the Korea-U.S. relationship into an anti-China alliance solely for the sake of its relations with the United States.

Bridge Linking China and Japan:

The road map for cooperation within and across Northeast and East Asia remains unclear. For starters, it is difficult to say to what extent deep mu­tual trust might underlie Korea-China-Japan tripartite cooperation or the ASEAN+3 arrangement. While ASEAN members have undergone nearly 40 years of interaction to develop a considerable level of mutual confidence, the three Northeast Asian countries have barely embarked on a confi­dence-building process. Confidence building between Northeast and Southeast Asia remains at a nascent stage as well. To further complicate matters, East Asia lacks the strong leadership necessary to spearhead re­gional integration. Japan may have sufficient economic strength, but it is lacking in political leadership; while China has sought to expand its politi­cal and diplomatic clout in East Asia, but its economic capability remains a question mark. Moreover, this leadership vacuum is compounded by these two heavyweights' all-out contest to gain regional hegemony.

Also worthy of note is that Korea and ASEAN came together as a dedi­cated core nation and group to take the initiative for promoting regional cooperation in and across Northeast and East Asia. As a cooperative forum in East Asia, ASEAN has provided a diplomatic stage (hardware): the ASEAN+3 format. Meanwhile, Korea has laid out a procedural foundation (software) for regional cooperation in East Asia, in the form of the Korea led EAVG and EASG initiatives. In addition, Korea-China-Japan tripartite summits have turned out to be a valuable tool for bolstering Seoul's role as a bridge and an intermediary to link Japan and China together in Northeast Asia.

Korea is naturally endowed with a fundamental role for the advance­ment of East and Northeast Asian regional cooperation: Korea's excep­tional geopolitical situation in Northeast Asia places it in an ideal position to function as a bridge between China and Japan, along with its unique status of being the sole middle power in East Asia. Korea may not be com­parable to China or Japan in the political, economic, military, or diplomatic realms; but, neither China nor Japan itself can play a central role in East or Northeast Asian regional cooperation, since both sides would not be satis­fied with a subordinate standing. The lack of strong leadership only cre­ates more maneuvering room for Korea to enhance its role and function in the region.

Under current circumstances, there is little possibility of China and Japan joining hands to exercise joint cooperative leadership, as was the case with France and Germany during the European integration process. China and Japan are separated by virtually antipodal sets of systems, ideol­ogy, law, and institutions. Moreover, the two countries are ill-fated rivals with irreconcilable views in the political, economic, and military, security, and strategic spheres.

Ironically, East or Northeast Asian regional cooperation that is not founded on China-Japan economic integration will lose its genuine signifi­cance, as the essence of cooperation in East and Northeast Asia requires effective integration of the two largest economies in the region. As such, a primary challenge of Korea's goal of helping to launch a new Northeast Asian era will involve its ability to seize the initiative in Northeast Asian economic integration and promote efforts to combine the Chinese and Japanese economies into a single market.

Bolstering Strategic Collaboration with ASEAN

The ongoing full-scale Sino-Japanese competition for regional hegemony clouds the prospects for regional cooperation across East Asia, with the ASEAN+3 being the only active dialogue channel at this time. More impor­tantly, neither China nor Japan has adequately demonstrated the kind of capable leadership required of a country to push forward with regional cooperation. To take advantage of this vacuum, Seoul will have to relent­lessly endeavor, over the middle to long term, to devise strategies in which it can market itself to ASEAN nations as a kind of wild card or buffer state for promoting their mutual interests. It is highly likely that ASEAN itself will seek out strategic collaboration with Korea as a means of avoiding and easing the acute rivalry between China and Japan and creating a new balancing point for the region.

While having traditionally adhered to a nonaligned foreign policy ap­proach, the majority of ASEAN member states are seeking to strike a bal­ance or equilibrium of power among the extra-regional powers that are vying to increase their weight within ASEAN. In response to changing interregional dynamics, ASEAN has recently sought to reassess its strategic relationship with Korea. Mounting tension between Beijing and Tokyo of late has also nudged various ASEAN countries to reinforce their bilateral ties with Korea. Unfortunately, all of Korea's diplomatic resources at this time are committed to resolving the North Korean nuclear issue or strengthening the Korea-U.S. alliance, thereby leaving Seoul with ex­tremely limited means to show proper appreciation for or reciprocate this interest on the part of these Southeast Asian countries.

Accordingly, the Seoul government must formulate a new approach to ASEAN, which will enable Korea to fully capitalize on its unique geopoliti­cal position in Northeast Asia and strategic status as the sole middle power in East Asia with the dynamism and capability to promote regional cooper­ation. Seoul is blessed with opportunities to promote diversified action programs and serve a critical role in maintaining a regional balance of power. Situated between China and Japan, the giants of East Asia, Korea is capable of serving as an intermediary to bring the two together for the betterment of everyone's interests. At the same time, Korea can take ad­vantage of its middle-power status, as well as ASEAN's inherent concerns with what its members perceive as political, military, economic, and psy­chological threats from China and Japan, to fortify its strategic cooperation with ASEAN.

Excerpts from author's article on Moving Forward with Korea's Northeast Asian cooperation initiative published in KOREA FOCUS, 2005 issue. Embassy of Republic of Korea in Kathmandu. ed

Special for University Students
European Union: SUMMARY OF THE AGREEMENT ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY

The fact that the elaboration of a Constitution was entrusted to a Convention in which representatives of national parliaments, the European Parliament, the national Governments and the Commission openly discussed the future of the Union has been one of the most outstanding developments of recent years. The result of these deliberations went beyond expectations. The Intergovernmental Conference that had to give its final agreement has largely taken on board the Convention's proposals. In the end, even though the Intergovernmental Conference introduced a large number of editorial modifications, the real changes were limited to a somewhat lesser ambition with regard to the scope of qualified majority voting.

What are the key elements of the European Constitution?

The Union will have a single foundation, the Constitution. Europe has been built in stages and is based on different Treaties that have been concluded over time. This is why the European construction is difficult to understand today. From now on, there will be only one European Union replacing the present "European Communities" and the "European Union"; the three "pillars" will be merged, even though special procedures in the fields of foreign policy, security and defense are maintained; the EU and EC Treaties, as well as all the treaties amending and supplementing them will be replaced by the "Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe".

The integration of the Charter for Fundamental Rights into the text, the clear acknowledgement of the Union's values and objectives as well as the principles underlying the relationship between the Union and its Member States, allow us to call this basic text our "Constitution". It also contains a clearer presentation of the distribution of competences and a simplified set of legal instruments and procedures. In future, European laws will be known as laws.

In legal terms, however, the Constitution remains a treaty. Therefore, it will enter into force when only all Member States have ratified it, which implies popular consultations in some Member States. It should be noted that any modification of the Constitution at a later stage will require the unanimous agreement of the Member States and, in principle, ratification by all. For some modifications, however-for example with regard to the extension of the scope of qualified majority voting- a unanimous decision by the European Council will suffice. The Constitution also provides for the establishment of enhanced cooperation or structured cooperation in the field of defence.

A revised institutional framework

The attention paid to the Member States' divergences of opinion, particularly with respect to the definition of qualified majority and the composition of the Commission, has somehow veiled the fact that the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) has to a large extent confirmed the Convention's efforts to reform and clarify the institutional framework.

In fact, the Constitution clarifies the respective roles of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission. In particular, it recognizes the different missions of the Commission, including its near monopoly of legislative initiative, its executive function and its function of representing the Union externally, except in the field of common foreign and security policy. The Constitution devotes the principle of inter-institutional programming to the Commission's initiative. It extends very substantially the scope of the co-decision procedure, which, significantly, will henceforth be called the legislative procedure (95% of European laws will be adopted jointly by the Parliament and the Council).

The main institutional innovation is the creation of the post of Union Minister of Foreign Affairs, who will be responsible for the representation of the Union on the international scene. This function will merge the present tasks of the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy with those of the Commissioner for external relations. The Minister of Foreign Affairs will thus be mandated by the Council for common foreign and security policy, while being a full member of the Commission and as such in charge of the Commission's responsibilities in the field of external relations as well as of the coordination of the other aspects of the Union's external action; in addition, he will chair the External Relations Council. The Union's newly acquired single legal personality will also enable it to play a more visible role in world affairs.

The Constitution establishes the European Council as an institution, distinct from the Council. The European Council will be chaired by a President, with limited powers, appointed for a period of two and a half years. On the other hand, and in contrast to what had been proposed by the Convention, the system of twice-yearly rotation among the Member States of the presidency of the different Council formations (with the exception of the External Relations Council) will be maintained, although within a "team presidency" of three countries. This system will be able to evolve in the future since the European Council acting by qualified majority can alter it.

As to the composition of the institutions, the IGC finally decided to raise the maximum number of seats in the European Parliament to 750. These seats will be allocated to the Member States according to the principle of "degressive proportionality", with a minimum of six and a maximum of ninety-six seats. The precise number of seats attributed to each Member State will be decided before the European elections in 2009.

The IGC decided to maintain the current composition of the Commission - one Commissioner per Member State - until 2014. From then on, the Commission will comprise a number of Commissioners corresponding to two thirds of the number of Member States. The members of the Commission will be chosen according to a system based on equal rotation among the Member States, which had been already decided by the Nice Treaty.

The definition of qualified majority for decision-making in the Council was, as is well known, the most difficult question the IGC had to deal with. As proposed by the Convention, the Council will henceforth decide on the basis of the double majority of the Member States and of the people, which constitutes an expression of the Union's double legitimacy. The IGC nonetheless decided to raise the thresholds: instead of the majority of Member States representing 60% of the population, the IGC decided that a qualified majority will require the support of 55% of the Member States representing 65% of the population. This definition is accompanied by two further elements. First, in order to avoid the situation where, in an extreme case, only three (large) Member States would be able block a Council decision due an increase in the population threshold, a blocking minority needs to comprise at least four Member States. Moreover, a number of Council members representing at least three-quarters of a blocking minority, whether at the level of Member States or the level of population, can demand that a vote is postponed and that discussions continue for a reasonable time in order to reach a broader basis of consensus within the Council.

Progress relating to the achievement of the area of freedom, security and justice, and in the field of common foreign and security policy

The Convention did not modernise all the Union's policies. The content of most provisions that govern the Union's policies thus remains unchanged. As opposed to, for example, the Single European Act or the Maastricht Treaty, the Constitution does not extend the Union's competences considerably.

However, the Constitution significantly updates provisions in the field of Justice and Home Affairs, in order to facilitate and improve the establishment of the area of freedom, security and justice. In fact, the Community method will from now on apply to all the areas in question. Moreover, they will fall to a large extent within the scope of qualified majority voting. Nevertheless, the Constitution retains or introduces some special features in these areas, namely in the area of judicial cooperation in criminal matters and in the area of police cooperation.

The provisions regarding external relations have been re-written, but in essence, the distinction between common foreign and security policy and the other aspects of EU external action still determines the respective roles of the institutions and the procedures that apply. Nevertheless, the creation of the post of Union Minister of Foreign Affairs, with the task of developing mutual confidence and the European reflex of the Member States, undoubtedly strengthens the Union's role in world affairs, in all areas. Moreover, the possibility of providing more ways for the Member States to cooperate more closely in the field of defence will underpin the credibility of the Union's foreign policy.

For some other policies, such as economic governance, the Commission would have liked to strengthen the Union's means of action. However, the essential changes are limited to a further extension of the scope of qualified majority and a near generalization of the co decision procedure. It should be noted that, in addition to some specific provisions, unanimity is retained in the field of taxation and, partially, in the field of social policy and common foreign and security policy. Although "passerelles" allow a unanimous decision that henceforth qualified majority will apply in a given area, it remains to be seen whether the existence of such clauses will be sufficient to maintain the Union's capacity to act. Moreover, the future development of the Union means that account must be taken of the fact that laws on own resources and the financial perspectives must be adopted unanimously, as must revisions of the Constitution itself.

A system marked by increased democracy and transparency

The Constitution introduces, or confirms in a fundamental text, an important number of provisions aiming at more democratic, transparent and controllable EU institutions that are closer to the citizen. As an example, the Constitution provides citizens with the right to invite the Commission to submit an appropriate proposal to the legislator, if they manage to collect one million signatures in a significant number of Member States. The proceedings of the Council, when exercising its legislative function, are to be open to the public. The role of the European Parliament has been strengthened. National parliaments are to be informed about all new initiatives from the Commission and, if one third of them consider that a proposal does not comply with the principle of subsidiarity, the Commission must review its proposal. New provisions on participatory democracy and good governance have acquired constitutional status. The Charter will guarantee better protection of fundamental rights.

This document is a non-paper prepared by the Commission in order to provide information. It has no legal status and does not necessarily reflect the views of the European institutions. Text courtesy: European delegation in Kathmandu, Nepal.