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World peace also depends on respecting the balances of the world
New challenges: Is the UN still useful?

What new risks does the UN face at the beginning of the 21st century? Does it have the ability to adapt and take the necessary action to deal with the threats that are undermining peace and to remain at the heart of the system of international cooperation? The analysis of an active participant and privileged observer of the United Nations’ activities.

There should be no illusions about the summit of the sixtieth anniversary of the United Nations (UN) in New York. Heads of State like to meet each other and talk about reform. But doesn’t this series of events hide a slight feeling of culpability, as if the UN were being celebrated all the more because it was being abandoned? Is the UN still necessary?

The ordinariness of this description of the changes in the world, copiously watered down in the reports submitted to the Secretary General of the United Nations, is striking: the globalisation of communications and economies is also a globalisation of attacks on development, health, the environment and security. The real question is knowing whether the UN has managed to adapt to these changes and meet these challenges. Despite set-backs and slowness, the answer is yes. The United Nations has managed to evolve: to take account of the growing diversity of risks and their interdependence; to enlarge its area of intervention; but–and this is the critical point–to preserve the principle at the heart of the Charter, which is that action should result from debate and a "collective" decision, this therefore outlaws unilateral action.

The United Nations is taking account of the twofold transformation of the challenges faced, the nature of which has changed. They affect every aspect of life in society. They no longer pit State against State; they affect every individual, regardless of the barriers put up by governments.

The textbook case envisaged by the Charter was that of open warfare: where one country invades another, North Korea against South Korea, Iraq against Kuwait. But in sixty years the dangers have taken a thousand other forms including:

- the accumulation of weapons of mass destruction. An entire body of resolutions and treaties aims to prevent this proliferation (nuclear, biological or chemical). For more than ten years a heavyweight inspection machine was deployed in Iraq to prevent the country getting access to the most destructive weapons. After the event, this typically UN mechanism proved to have been effective; - terrorism. The UN has taken the decisions that had to be taken. By describing the attack in September 2001 as "armed aggression", the Security Council recognised the United States’ right to defend itself and legitimised the military action it was decided to take against the Taliban regime (Afghanistan), host of the terrorist organisation.

Newer still, on the other hand, are the threats hanging over the world: the economic imbalances between the North and South, epidemics and damage to the environment. Poverty destroys human relationships in the deprived areas of Africa and central Asia, AIDS is leading some countries into chaos, disregard of the environment is ruining some of the former Soviet republics. The United Nations are aware that world peace also depends on respect for the world’s balances.

In the interest of its very credibility, this very broad concept of security must be tempered. Treating everything from this angle risks making us forget that development imperatives are above all questions of justice and equality. Kofi Annan has understood this and talks not about security but about our "duty" to protect the world from need and epidemics.

Less ambiguous is the second major change–the predominance of national problems. Current conflicts are rarely those of a sudden clash between two countries. They arise from a warped excess by one State, drifting towards dictatorship (as was the case in Ethiopia, Liberia, Central America and the Balkans), or the opposite, the collapse of a government.

Faced with these threats, the UN seems to be blocked by its Charter, which, in Article 2, paragraph 7, prohibits it from intervening in a State’s internal affairs. The response was very pragmatic. Arguing that unrest is always a risk for local security that soon becomes international, the UN very quickly involved itself in the internal conflicts of countries. Today, most of the Security Council’s activities are focused in this area. Now developing is the common sense idea that the sovereignty of States creates obligations for them, the first of which is to protect their population, and that if they fail to do so the community of Nations will take action in their place. There is no need at all to modify the Charter. A resolution codifying this responsibility is sufficient and the summit in September will ratify this step forward.

The UN has enlarged the area, methods and procedures of its interventions. The Charter used to deal with cases of traditional conflict, the solution entailing, as a last resort, the use of the coercive measures stipulated in Chapter 7, either sanctions or the use of military force. But the multiplicity of forms of insecurity has led to rethinking the way of doing things.

Let us pass over the evidence - the distinctive feature of an international organisation is to set standards of discipline for States. Hence the constant activity on agreements, reforming the laws of the sea and space, trying to at least slow down the arms race. Lacking a court, the UN has been slower to ensure respect for Human Rights. Will the International Criminal Court prevent new crimes against humanity? It is much too soon to judge.

The United Nations has always practised preventive diplomacy before conflicts break out. The Security Council makes active attempts in this area by moving on to the ground, in Timor in 1999 and in Africa on several occasions.

But it is the role of the Secretary General that should be emphasised. His strength is his independence. Standing alone, he can put forward ideas, as Dag Hammarskjöld did over Suez in 1956 and the Congo in 1960, U Thant for Indochina, Pérez de Cuéllar for Central America and the Gulf War, Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Kofi Annan for Africa, former Yugoslavia and the Middle East.

For good or ill, above all when it comes to the settlement of conflicts, opinion always remembers peacekeeping operations. The Charter makes no provision for them; proof, if any were needed, that the United Nations is changing and innovating.

People scoff at the deployments of the Blue Berets and harp on about their failures. This is to forget that at each crisis the UN has asked for additional resources which the Member States, who have ultimate responsibility, have refused. It is right to want clearer and more precise mandates. But in today’s reality there are who knows how many ceasefires, how many hot spots, that do not explode because a handful of men in blue preserve a truce that may be fragile but lasts and is better than war!

Nonetheless, the majority of current conflicts are old disputes resurfacing. It is not enough to have re-established peace. It still has to be consolidated, not only through disarmament but also by being developed. Secretaries General have sent in "special representatives" to coordinate reconstruction efforts at a very early stage. A Peace Consolidation Commission in New York will bring together the energies of the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council and the countries contributing troops or financial support.

The common feature of these changes is that they occur without it being necessary to conduct exhausting institutional discussions. The merit of the Charter is that it is a simple text, permitting adaptations. Should the principal authority — embodied by the Security Council — be modified? The problem is not that of the "legitimacy" of the Council as it is. The question is rather the quite understandable ambition of several countries to join its ranks. The debate about reform simply illustrates the value placed on the role of the United Nations.

Why this interest? Because by demanding to play a bigger part in the decisions of the Security Council, the States bear witness to the vitality of the cardinal principle of the Charter –the "collective" nature of its deliberations and actions. On this key subject, the summit establishes the victory of wisdom. However powerful and however well-inspired it may be, one State cannot police the world.

The United Nations embodies the constant listener and respect for the opinions of others. The spirit of the Charter, which makes this constant consultation an obligation, lives on. The UN is still useful.

Questions on North Korea's Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy

Kang Jungmin
Research Fellow
Institute for Peace and Cooperation

The controversy over North Korea's right to pursue a peaceful nuclear energy program has become a hot-button issue not only between Pyeongyang and Washington, but Seoul and Washington as well. Pyeongyang's obstinate claim to the right to engage in the peaceful use of nuclear energy was one of the key disputes that drove the fourth round of six-party talks into a more than one-year recess.

The U.S. objection was clearly spelled out in President George W. Bush's comments on August 10, in which he stated that Washington would not condone a North Korean nuclear program, even for peaceful civilian use. The very next day, the Seoul government adopted a contradictory position when Unification Minister Chung Dong-young noted that North Korea has a fundamental right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The minister's remarks were further elaborated upon by Cho Tae-yong, the director of the Foreign Ministry's task force on the North Korean nuclear issue, who said that once North Korea had abandoned its nuclear weapons program, rejoined the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and abided by the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), it would regain the right to operate a nuclear program for peaceful uses.

These conflicting statements revealed obvious differences in the stances adopted by South Korea and the United States toward the North Korean nuclear issue, which calls for prompt policy coordination between the two allies, prior to the opening of the second phase of the fourth round of six-party talks, in order to assure more productive negotiations.

Article 4 of the NPT stipulates that all member countries of the treaty are assured of a "fundamental right" to conduct research, produce, and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination, in return for their commitment to abide by the IAEA safeguards system, as specified in Articles 2 and 3 of the treaty. In line with this, the United States has said it would allow Iran to pursue the peaceful use of nuclear energy as long as it accepts IAEA inspections, despite protracted international controversy over the Middle Eastern country's operation of uranium conversion facilities, as part of its uranium enrichment and reprocessing programs.

NPT Loophole

Under these circumstances, North Korea should be entitled to enjoy the same basic right to peaceful nuclear programs if it complies with IAEA safeguards and inspections. Then, why has the United States adopted a seemingly discriminatory opposition toward Pyeongyang's pursuit of peaceful nuclear programs?

According to Article 10 of the NPT, each member country has the right to withdraw from the treaty if it decides that certain "extraordinary events (related to nuclear nonproliferation) have jeopardized the supreme interests" of the country, and to give notice of its intended withdrawal to the United Nations Security Council. Three months after filing this notice, the country can legally withdraw from the treaty.

Herein lies the loophole of the NPT. Should a country with a hidden intent to develop nuclear weapons join the NPT in order to develop a full range of nuclear facilities as part of its right to conduct the peaceful nuclear programs allowed under the treaty, and then at a certain point suddenly proclaims its withdrawal from the treaty's obligations, the United Nations would find itself with no legal recourse.

In January 2003, North Korea became the first-ever country to withdraw from the NPT. And even if the North returned to the NPT regime, there is no guarantee that Pyeongyang would not at some point in the future again seek to exploit this loophole. It can thus be assumed that the United States, unconvinced by Pyeongyang's pledge to return to the NPT and abide by the IAEA safeguards, is highly skeptical about North Korea's dubious track record, and thereby inclined to deny the latter's right to even a peaceful nuclear program.

Therefore, in order to dispel Washington's misgivings and promote mutual trust, North Korea needs to make a binding promise to the United Nations that it not withdraw from the NPT in the future. Should Pyeongyang agree to make a firm commitment of this kind, Washington would then be in a position to accept North Korea's right to pursue nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

Scope of Civilian Use

A related problem area involves the scope of any peaceful nuclear programs. North Korea has yet to specify the extent of the peaceful nuclear programs that it intends to undertake. Because the range of these programs represents a critical matter that could lead to another nuclear controversy, Pyeongyang should take steps to clarify its position on this issue as soon as possible.

In this regard, the South Korean government has adopted a position that North Korea's nuclear programs for peaceful purposes might include the operation of light-water nuclear reactors for power generation, but should exclude uranium enrichment, plutonium reprocessing, and graphite-moderated facilities. This viewpoint of Seoul, which is perceived to be reasonable in light of the prevailing circumstances, is an approach that Pyeongyang would do well to take heed of.

If Pyeongyang continues to insist on retaining its uranium enrichment and reprocessing capabilities under a pretext of securing a self-sufficient supply of nuclear fuel for its light-water reactors, such claims would only underline the possibility that North Korea is actually interested in maintaining nuclear facilities that could be converted to the production of nuclear weapons at an opportune time, which would serve to heighten suspicion among the international community.

North Korea is well advised to acknowledge the fact that, throughout the world, most countries that operate nuclear power plants, with the exception of a few countries such as Japan, conduct nuclear power generation without any facilities for uranium enrichment and reprocessing. Pyeongyang should also realize that South Korea, which itself currently operates 20 atomic power plants, has faced no problems pursuing nuclear power generation without a need to engage in enriching or reprocessing uranium, processes which were halted in order to comply with the 1992 North-South declaration on denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

Text courtesy: The JoongAng Ilbo, August 13, 2005]

Created during the Barcelona Conference held 27-28 November 1995, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, called the Barcelona Process, brings together the 25 Member States of the European Union and ten States of the Southern and Eastern Mediterraneanregion: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Israel, Palestinian Authority, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Turkey.

Libya has observer status at the Conferences of Ministers of Foreign Affairs as well as at Senior Officials Meetings. Mauritania, a candidate for membership in the partnership, has traditionally been invited to the conferences as “special guest of the Presidency”.

Held every two years, the Ministerial Conferences are followed up on through mid-term ministerial meetings. Sector-specific ministerial meetings are also organized: Ministers of Trade, Ministers of Industry, Ministers of Culture and Communication, Ministers of Economy and Finance, Ministers of Transportation.

During the Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Luxembourg (May 2005), consensual conclusions were adopted, proposing the following as priority fields for the future: human rights and democracy, sustainable economic growth and education.

The partnership has three chapters: political, economic and financial, and cultural, social and human.

The partnership is the only forum that has brought together for the past ten years all of the Mediterranean Rim countries, including Israel. The process was created as a joint project, a genuine partnership between the EU and the countries of the Southern Mediterranean region. A climate of trust and dialogue has been established between Arabs, Europeans, Israelis and Turks and has been favourable to the European Union’s external presence.

The acquis of the process

Ten years after its foundation, the assessment of the Barcelona Process is on the whole positive today. Indeed, the Barcelona Declaration has not yet been fully implemented, but the real acquis is quite significant, even if it remains unrecognized:

In terms of the creation of a free-trade area in 2010, nine association agreements have been concluded (a draft agreement was signed in October 2004 with Syria). These agreements are all in force, except those with Lebanon (relations are currently governed by an interim agreement).

The association agreements have allowed for trade between the EU and the Mediterranean countries to increase, playing a key role in the development of the latter : Exports from Mediterranean countries to the EU have grown at an average rate of 7.2% per year since 1990, against 4.2% in the rest of the world. The association agreements have also made it possible to homogenize laws in the areas of competition rules and capital flows and to strengthen economic cooperation in key sectors, such as energy. They have also made it possible, at the macro-economic level, to improve figures reflecting public deficit, foreign debt and inflation rates of Mediterranean countries.

Contacts between companies have been facilitated and have increased, due in particular to the creation of ASCAME, the Association of Mediterranean Chambers of Commerce and Industry. Cooperation programmes between SMEs have made it possible for 6,500 SMEs from Mediterranean countries to get in touch with their EU counterparts.

The signing of the Agadir Agreement (February 2004), which provides for the establishment of a free-trade area between Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan and Egypt by 2006, has resulted in considerable progress in efforts aimed at greater regional integration.

In the context of the European policy towards neighbouring countries, which has, since 2003, aimed at a more targeted rapprochement between the EU and the countries located at its borders, action plans have been negotiated with Jordan, Tunisia, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority and Israel. These action plans contain a calendar of short-, medium- and long-term reforms as well as results indicators. They were approved in February 2005 and still need to be adopted by each of the Councils of association of the EU and partners. New action plans are being prepared with Egypt and Lebanon.

The Commission is pursuing its efforts with a view to making the free-trade area between the EU and its Euro-Mediterranean partners a reality. Following the conclusions of the Ministerial Conference in Luxembourg (May 2005), the Commission presented draft negotiation mandates for the liberalization of services and the right of establishment and for the liberalization of agricultural products and processed agricultural and fisheries products.

Cooperation is financed by funds from the MEDA programme (5.35 billion euros for MEDA II until 2006, a total of ?8.785M since 1995). While the ratio between payments made and funds given out was only 29% in 1995, it rose to 81% at the end of 2003. 85% of MEDA II funds were earmarked for bilateral actions with Mediterranean countries and 15% were allocated to regional actions. These funds have made it possible to give aid earmarked for structural and sectoral adjustment policies. As such, Algeria received ?195M, Morocco received ?252M and the Palestinian Authority received ?336.3M.

Loans made to the Mediterranean countries by the European Investment Bank (EIB) (7.4 billion). The EIB is planning to finance investments of up to ?8 to 10M in 2006.

These loans have increased thanks to the Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership (FEMIP), launched in October 2002. FEMIP has three instruments for supporting the private sector: the special budget for high-risk private-sector operations, the trust fund, which at the beginning had ?40M and which finances the priority sectors of water and electricity, the technical assistance support fund for FEMIP, which prepares and implements private investments. The ECOFIN Council of November 2003 decided to strengthen this facility, by postponing until December 2006 the possible decision to create a Euromed subsidiary of the EIB.

These loans have funded projects, such as Steg Gaz in Tunisia (55 million), the Tartous port in Syria (50 million), and the Nubariya power plant in Egypt (150 million).

2. The political chapter, reliant on the difficulties related to the Middle East peace process, has nevertheless allowed for a mutual climate of trust to be created.

The meetings of Ministers of Foreign Affairs have allowed for regular contacts at the highest level between Arabs, Europeans, Israelis and Turks.

A dialogue has been established at the level of experts on certain sensitive issues, such as the situation in the Middle East, terrorism and human rights, in particular. Support to the Palestinian Authority and the peace process (?1.5M from the MEDA fund) has encouraged regional cooperation between Israelis and Arabs in areas such as education and the environment.

Lastly, since 2003, a steady dialogue on security and defence was launched, with the aim of increasing cooperation with Southern partners in the area of crisis prevention and management, and promoting, on the basis of voluntary service, their participation in civil and military operations and exercises.

The Ministerial Conference in Naples (December 2003) launched the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly, which met for the first time in March 2004 in Athens. A consulting body, it comprises 240 members from national parliaments (120 for the EU, 120 for the partners). It is expected to meet on the occasion of the Summit for the tenth anniversary of the partnership planned in Barcelona, this 27-28 November.

In the area of education, healthy budgets helped improve the educational system in Morocco, Jordan, Egypt and Tunisia.

A Euromed trade union forum has also been created to train those involved in employment with regard to labour law.

Since 1995, seven Euro-Mediterranean civil forums have taken place. On 1 April 2005, several hundred representatives of civil society from thirty-five Member States held a Constituent Assembly in Luxembourg. This meeting, supported and funded by the Presidency and the Commission, allowed for the adoption of a Charter of principles and values as well as statutes that resulted in the creation of a non-governmental Euro-Mediterranean platform, the headquarters of which is in France. The aim of this platform is to facilitate an in-depth dialogue between governments and civil society, in order to further the Euromed partnership.

Euromed Heritage plays a role in preserving and developing cultural heritage, Euromed Youth supports the establishment of a platform of youth associations and Euromed Audiovisual promotes cooperation in the audiovisual sector, etc.

The Conference in Naples (December 2003) launched the plan for the Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue Between Cultures, which was opened in April 2005 and the headquarters of which is located in Alexandria (Egypt). With support from national networks, its main task is to develop exchanges between civil societies and to promote dialogue between cultures and civilizations. The French network is led by Mr. Thierry Fabre, head of the Euromed division of the Maison de la Méditerranénne des Sciences de l’Homme at the University of Aix-en-Provence.

The Barcelona Summit of 27 and 28 November 2005

The organization of a summit of Heads of State and Government, on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, is a historic time to reaffirm the political priority that the European Union gives to strengthening its ties with the countries of the southern banks of the Mediterranean. While reaffirming the principles of the Declaration of 1995, this summit must map out new directions for 2010, learning from the lessons of the assessment of the first ten years, particularly with regard to the political visibility of the process.

The acquis of the process

The Barcelona Summit of 27 and 28 November 2005

**The acquis of the process**